
Qass_J 

Book ".._ .„ 



HISTORICAL SKETCH 

of (efy 

LOGIC, 

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY. 



BY 

ROBERT ^LAKEY, 

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS^ QUEEN'S COLLEGE, BELFAST. 

AUTHOR OF 

U THE HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND," 



LONDON: H. BAILLIERE. 

EDINBURGH: JAMES NICHOL. GLASGOAV: GRIFFIN & CO. 
BELFAST : W. M'COMBE. 



y>*$» 



PREFACE. 



The following historical sketch of logical science 
has been written under a conviction, that some 
such work was needed, both by the general 
philosophical reader and the student of logic. 
The theories of reasoning are so numerous, and 
so diversified in their principles and practical 
aim, that some general outline of their external 
history seems, from the antiquity, and acknow- 
ledged importance of logical speculations, both 
called for, and desirable in itself. There is not, 
so far as I know, any work of this kind in the 
English language; and the two or three trea- 
tises I have met with of a foreign origin, pos- 
sessing a historical character, have been so brief 
and limited in their range, that I have not been 
able to derive much assistance or benefit from 
them. 



Vlll PREFACE. 

It has been my constant aim to keep the ge- 
neral principles of the different logical systems 
I have noticed distinctly before the reader's at- 
tention, and to make the historical outline as 
fruitful as possible of solid and useful informa- 
tion ; valuable especially to those who may be 
undergoing a course of logical tuition. How far 
I have succeeded in effecting this object, it does 
not rest with me to determine. 

It has often, in the preparation of this work, 
been a source of regret, that the limited space 
I have had allotted to me, prevented me from 
giving such an extended notice of particular 
and interesting logical questions as I thought 
desirable; but brevity was unavoidable where 
the number of systems and authors so far out- 
stripped the time and means at my disposal. 
Indeed, five or six such volumes as the present 
would have been scarcely adequate to do any 
thing like ample justice to a subject of such great 
magnitude and diversity of materials. My short- 
comings, both in this and in other respects, I 
am conscious, are numerous and weighty; but 
if I have, in the humblest degree, succeeded in 



PKEFACE. IX 



barely planting, here and there, a few useful 
finger-posts to such logical historians as may 
afterwards follow the same route, I shall feel 
proud of the achievement, and fully satisfied 
with the reward it will carry with it. 

It was my original intention to enter more 
fully than I have done into the history of what 
is called formal logic ; but I soon found that this 
would extend the work much beyond what was 
convenient ; and not only so, but that I would 
infallibly be led into a complete labyrinth of 
matters of detail, which are comparatively very 
uninteresting in themselves, whilst the funda- 
mental questions relative to the nature and 
offices of logic itself are as yet undetermined, 
and held in abeyance. It is, therefore, chiefly 
to the philosophical aspect of the science that 
the contents of this volume refer. I hope, how- 
ever, to be able, in a short time, to give some 
account of this technical and formal division of 
logic, so far as it is connected with the general 
science of reasoning itself. 

Belfast, January 1, 1851. 



CONTENTS. 



Page 

INTRODUCTION, xv 



CHAPTER I. 

THE PYTHAGOREANS, ZENO, ETC., 500-400 B. C, . . . . 1 

CHAPTER II. 

PLATO— ARISTOTLE, 380 B. C, . . . . .28 



CHAPTER III. 

PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE FROM THE DAYS OF ARISTOTLE TO THE 

CHRISTIAN ERA, ....... 51 



CHAPTER IV. 

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY ON LOGICAL 

SCIENCE, ........ 66 



CHAPTER V. 

LOGICAL WRITERS FROM THE CHRISTIAN ERA TILL THE TIME OF CHARLE- 
MAGNE, . ' . . . . 94 



XI 1 CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER VI. 

Page 
QN THE ARABIAN AND JEWISH WRITERS ON LOGIC, FROM THE NINTH TO 

THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY, . . . . . .112 



CHAPTER VII. 

ON THE SCHOLASTIC LOGICIANS FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NINTH, 
TILL THE REVIVAL OF LETTERS LN ITALY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH, CENTURY, . . . . . .121 



CHAPTER VIII. 

LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 
TILL THE PUBLICATION OF LORD BACON'S NOVUM ORGANUM, IN 
1620. ........ 160 



CHAPTER IX. 

ON THE NOVUM OR GANUM, OR BACONIAN LOGIC, ' . . .200 

CHAPTER X. 

LOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF-HOBBES, GASSENDI, AND DESCARTES, . 220 

CHAPTER XI. 

LOGICAL SCIENCE FROM DESCARTES TILL THE PUBLICATION OF LOCKE'S 

ESSAY IN 1690, . . . . . . .244 

CHAPTER XII. 

THE LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE, . . - .271 



CONTENTS. Xlll 



CHAPTER XIII. 

Page 
THE PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY, FROM THE PUBLICATION 

OF LOCKE'S ESSAY TILL THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, . 283 



CHAPTER XIV. 

PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN FRANCE, FROM THE PUBLICATION OF 

LOCKE'S ESSAY TILL THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, . 308 



CHAPTER XV. 

LOGICAL SCIENCE IN HOLLAND AND BELGIUM, FROM THE PUBLICATION OF 

LOCKE'S ESSAY TILL THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, . 324 



CHAPTER XVI. 

PROGRESS OF LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY AND SPAIN, FROM THE 
TIME OF LOCKE'S ESSAY TILL THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CEN- 
TURY, ........ 328 



CHAPTER XVII. 

PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, FROM 
THE TIME OF LOCKE'S ESSAY TILL THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY, . . . . . . . .342 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN SWEDEN, NORWAY, DENMARK, POLAND, RUSSIA, 
&C, &C, FROM THE PUBLICATION OF LOCKE'S ESSAY TILL THE END 
OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, . , . . .37; 



CHAPTER XIX. 

A FEW BRIEF REMARKS ON THE EASTERN AND INDIAN LOGIC, . . 380 



XIV CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER XX. 

Page 
ON THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE IN THE 



SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE, FROM THE YEAR 



387 



CHAPTER XXI. 

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF LOGIC TAUGHT IN THE 
UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND DURING THE LAST 
HUNDRED YEARS, ....... 419 



CHAPTER XXII. 

THE LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA, OF A PHILOSOPHIC AND SYSTEMATIC CAST, FROM THE 
YEAR 1800 TILL THE PRESENT DAY, . . . . .448 



INTRODUCTION. 



It may confidently be asserted, that there is no de- 
partment of human speculation and inquiry in which 
so many contradictory opinions are entertained as in 
the science or art of logic. For the last five-and- 
twenty centuries, system has followed system in rapid 
succession ; and one generation of logicians after 
another have been chiefly occupied in refuting or mo- 
difying the principles, and correcting the mistatements 
of their predecessors. No sooner has a particular 
logical system obtained a footing in some locality in 
the republic of letters, and become incorporated with 
the general routine of philosophical education, than 
some aspiring and ambitious speculator has called in 
question its fundamental principles, or subjected its 
practical rules to supervision and amendment. From 
Zeno to modern times, every theoretical logician has 
flattered himself in his day that he had placed logic on 
a firm basis — not to be disturbed as long as the world 
lasted. He has flattered himself with the idea, that it 
was his fortunate lot to chase from the science every 
vestige of doubt, to reconcile every real and apparent 
contradiction, and to make, to all future generations, 



XY1 INTRODUCTION. 



the path of knowledge and science indisputably plain, 
and of ready and agreeable access. 

And the same spirit animates the philosophical 
logician of the present hour in every direction where 
his science is known and cultivated. Every speculator 
has a system of his own with which strangers do not 
intermeddle. He is the sole champion of his own 
theory, and the herald of his own fame. He, too, 
labours under the cheering anticipation that he is put- 
ting the finishing stroke to the science, and silencing 
for ever, throughout the philosophic world, the voice 
of doubt and contention. Though he may have all the 
learning of the East, and all the talent of Christendom 
centred in his own person, yet he knows full well that, 
apart from his own professorial chair or private study, 
he will not find a single cultivator of the same science 
entirely agreeing with him, either on the fundamental 
principles of logical philosophy, or on the best modes 
of applying them. But this does not discourage him, 
nor ruffle the equable current of his self-complacency. 
He has the advantage over those who have gone before 
him, hoping unto death the same thing as himself; in- 
asmuch as he reasons that, if there ever is to be a time 
when the principles of his science are to be known and 
unalterably fixed, he may be the fortunate instrument 
in this grand and noble achievement. While there is 
life there is hope ; and this consideration is sufficient 
to sustain him in his labours, amidst the mass of disap- 
pointment that lies behind him. 

The speculative aspects under which logic has ap- 
peared in different ages and countries, have not been 
more checkered and varied than its external fortunes. 



INTRODUCTION. XV11 

It has at one time revelled in unbounded authority and 
power, and yet at another been doomed to the bitter 
humiliation of abject servitude and dependence. It 
has been the petted child of courts and monarchs, and 
yet been reviled by the beggar in the street. It was 
once the art of arts, the science of sciences, and the 
proudest emblem in the escutcheon of the philosopher. 
The warrior ventured not to battle without it, nor 
could the lawyer on the bench, or the theologian in 
the pulpit, acquit himself with grace unless versed in 
its canons and rules. Notwithstanding, however, all 
this power and grandeur, we have witnessed the science 
scouted from many influential universities ; and, where 
admitted, it was only on the condition of becoming a 
humble menial and a willing slave. 

In spite, however, of all such reverses, fluctuations, 
and uncertainties, logic has within it a vigorous prin- 
ciple of vitality. Like the phoenix, it is continually 
rising from its own ashes. It never allows mankind to 
wander far nor long, without pressing its claims and 
obtruding its counsels and admonitions upon them. It 
must, therefore, have a permanent hold of our sym- 
pathies, some fixed root in our nature, or it would have 
been obliterated long ago from the book of knowledge. 
Astrology and Alchymy never tantalized human reason 
so severely. For what can present a greater anomaly 
to the understanding, than that logic-^calling itself a 
science ; having chairs in universities set apart for its 
especial cultivation ; witnessing its professors taking 
the first rank among the acute and profound of our 
race ; and pointing, with exulting pride, to more than 
a thousand distinct treatises on the subject which have 

b 



XV111 INTRODUCTION. 

emanated from tlieir pens within the last three hundred 
years ; that logic, we say, should, under these circum- 
stances, not be able to furnish two logicians of any 
country, who can agree in any one common principle 
of this science, nor be able to state to what particular 
or general uses it can be applied; must present to the 
candid mind one of the most striking phenomena in 
the entire range of human thought. Can any subject, 
in the whole circle of the sciences, present such a lack 
of unanimity, or a more cheerless and desponding as- 
pect ? The use of the word logic is almost the only 
thing which disputants have in common : if we venture 
a step beyond this, and ask for a definition of what is 
implied in it, we are instantly stunned with a thousand 
discordant voices from all parts of the world. 

Reverting again to the acknowledged vitality of logi- 
cal speculations, there must be some adequate and 
powerful cause for it in the nature and constitution of 
things. There must be something to which such 
speculations invariably point, not always possessed, but 
which has something obvious about it, though difficult 
to lay hold of and secure. The opposing or antagonis- 
tic forces which obstruct our readily seizing the leading 
truths of logical science, and making them obvious to 
the understanding of others, must be the result of some 
settled law of nature, or some extensive range of human 
feelings and sympathies, which the principles and forms 
of civil society foster and sustain. Let us then examine, 
in a sober and serious frame of mind, into the number 
and nature of these opposing forces, with a view of 
throwing, if we can, some little light on the great 
question. Why is it that logic presents such an assem- 



INTRODUCTION. XIX 

blage of discordant and contradictory opinions and 
principles ? 

In the first place, then, logic, whether of a philo- 
sophical or formal caste, is involved in the common diffi- 
culties of all questions connected with, or springing out 
of, mental philosophy. Logic, or the science or art of 
reasoning, is expressive of, and embodies, a purely in- 
tellectual act. This is one of the sources of the hazi- 
ness which encircles its operations and causes. Every 
logician must be, to some extent, a metaphysician also ; 
he deals with mental causes and effects. He must 
learn the difficult art of looking into his own mind, and 
scanning, with more or less comprehension and preci- 
sion, its varied powers and faculties. This is a matter 
of paramount perplexity to many men ; and to men, 
too, of even average learning and ability. Here is an 
obstacle at the first step. The truth soon flashes across 
the mind of every inquirer, that the noblest part of his 
being — his intellectual frame — must ever remain par- 
tially and imperfectly known. This conviction shakes 
the confidence of his own judgment, and imparts a 
doubting spirit to every thing connected with the reflec- 
tion on his own mind. His examinations and inquiries 
are personal, and cannot be visibly portrayed or commu- 
nicated to others. The mode of investigating the world 
within, is not the same as that which we use for investi- 
gating the world without ; and, if we attempt to employ 
the one mode instead of the other, we shall miserably fail 
in our object. The tablet of the mind is not like a chess- 
board, where the unfinished game may be taken up at 
the point where the last player left it ; for the move- 
ments of thought are complicated and subtile, and our 



XX INTRODUCTION. 

trains of ideas seldom remain fixed or visible to con- 
sciousness for any length of time. The lamp of our 
internal knowledge is for ever passing onwards, and we 
can only now and then arrest its course, and benefit a 
little from its light. Every man has to commence a 
new plan of instruction for himself, and is compelled to 
leave it in turn, as a broken thread, to whoever comes 
after him. 

Logic being, then, expressive of an intellectual act 
or operation, it is involved in all that doubt and mis- 
conception which appertain to descriptions of mental 
phenomena generally ; but the science of reasoning, 
viewed in another light, and in connexion with mind, 
naturally gives rise to the chief portion of that differ- 
ence of opinion and judgment so visibly impressed on 
its past history and present condition. Logic is a 
science or art hewn or cut out of the mind ; out, as it 
were, of its very centre, or out of the vital part of its 
organization. This is a prolific source of disputes, and 
of divers opposite systems. The question is, how much 
mentality shall we portion out to the reason, or how 
little? Some thinkers consider reason, or reasoning, 
as the entire mental individual — an embodiment of 
the whole intellectual apparatus ; others, again, limit it 
to a small fraction of the mind. The question becomes 
an open and undecided one. The logician and meta- 
physician are brought into collision. They differ about 
the boundaries of their respective sciences. The one lays 
claim to the whole of the domain; while the other is in- 
capable of fixing on the precise portion of it which he 
wants for his own special purposes. The formal logi- 
cians, for example, say, We only want three items ; a 



INTRODUCTION. XXI 

subject, a copula, and a predicate, and with these we can 
frame a proposition, and present it under various points 
of view; with these, in fact, we can display an act of 
reasoning in all its logical purity and comprehension. 
This is the only solid and philosophical foundation of 
logical science. Their opponents, however, remind 
them that there are more mental phenomena involved 
in the subject, the copula, and the predicate, and in 
their formal arrangement into distinct propositions, 
than what are commonly thought of. If, say the oppo- 
nents of the strictly formal school, you profess to give 
an accurate analysis of an act of reasoning, it should be 
a full and complete analysis ; and if this be given, the 
result will be, that the regular syllogism will be shewn 
to embody the distinct co-operation and exercise of 
a much greater number of mental powers than the for- 
mal theory embraces. In the development of every 
syllogistic process, we recognise the operation of the 
powers of perception, memory, attention, abstraction, 
comparison, judgment, and even others ; and in every 
analysis of such a process of reasoning, it is incumbent 
we should not only take into consideration all these 
separate and independent faculties, but also portion out 
to each its individual share in the general result. Until 
this is done, there is no full or true analysis of the rea- 
soning faculty. A partial or one-sided analysis is of no 
use. If logic be solely confined to the development of 
the laws of thought, considered as thought, it is indis- 
pensably requisite that all those laws should be brought 
out to open day, and admitted as necessary and recog- 
nised phenomena in the syllogistic process. Besides, 
say the anti-formalists, we would like to see a logician's 



XX11 INTRODUCTION. 

warrant for confining the province of logic within the 
strict boundary of merely considering the laws of 
thought as thought? Where is his authority for so 
doing ? Can he back it by historical evidence, ancient 
and modern ? Nay, we go beyond even this in our 
demands ; we require, in conjunction with the autho- 
rity of historical logic, the philosophical reasons — the 
regular and formal canons of science — why such and 
such a thing should be considered as logic rather than 
any thing else. Let these reasonable conditions be 
complied with, and then the great question at issue 
will be in a fair way for a satisfactory solution. For 
any logician to say that this, and nothing else but this, 
is pure logic, amounts to nothing. We must have the 
scientific proofs for the validity of the statement, or it 
must be comparatively valueless. 

On the other hand, again, it is argued, that there 
must be a line drawn between logic and metaphysics, 
to preserve the independence of each. When we once 
admit the consideration of psychological phenomena, 
and the laws and mutual dependence of the separate 
powers of the mind, to constitute a determined portion 
of logic, we, in fact, at once open the door to a vast mass 
of knowledge, which can be of no use whatever as an 
element in logical tuition ; but, on the contrary, must 
tend to obstruct every rational and salutary application 
of its rules to the understandings of men. We are not 
to consider here what is theoretically sound, but what is 
practically possible. Besides, by limiting the definition 
and offices of logical science to the perception of truth, 
arising from the consideration of the laws of thought, 
as thought, we really and virtually do all that is pos- 



INTRODUCTION. XX111 

sible, from the necessities of the case. To go beyond 
this, we must either take all objects of human inquiry, 
and decide on their truth or falsehood, or only some of 
them. To adopt the first plan is obviously impossible, 
and to adopt the latter is to make a selection upon no 
settled or rational principle. The only alternative which 
is left is, to confine logic strictly to thought, as an act 
of thinking, and to pass by the particular objects about 
which the mind thinks. 

This is substantially the true position in which the 
question as to the real objects of logic has been left by 
the two great rival parties who have taken a distin- 
guished interest in logical discussions from the earliest 
times to the present hour. The question always arises, 
How much of the mind shall be appropriated to logic ? 
The entire history of the science of reasoning, when 
viewed from a purely intellectual position, is nothing 
but a practical and running commentary on this ques- 
tion. This has been made the chief point of dispute 
among all the leading philosophical logicians of every 
age and country; and the numerous and diversified 
solutions given of it are conspicuously portrayed in the 
historical annals of the science. 

This, then, is one of the great obstacles in the way 
of mankind arriving at any thing like a general conclu- 
sion as to the limits of logical science. There seems to 
be no avoiding the difficulty, unless by making the 
matter in dispute an object of compromise and arrange- 
ment. There has been hitherto, and there must always 
be, mutual concessions among all logicians, from the 
sheer necessities of their position relative to the subject- 
matter with which they have to deal. 



XXIV INTRODUCTION. 

There are, however, other impediments in the way of 
unanimity as to the principles and modes of teaching 
logic, arising from causes of a different and more exter- 
nal character than those to which we have just briefly 
alluded. These obstructions have their principal seat in 
the influence, direct and indirect, which other depart- 
ments of human knowledge exercise over logical specu- 
lations and systems. Logic has never been studied and 
taught as an independent science. It has no absolute 
domain of its own over which to range. In all ages it has 
professed to deal with truth, whether properly or not we 
need not stop at the present moment to inquire. Suffice 
it to say for our present purpose, that its abstract as 
well as practical aim has been to deal with, touch 
upon, regulate, and establish the canons of truth 
in some general or modified shape or fashion. Now, 
what is truth? A word confessedly of vast import, 
— embracing, in fact, all that is intellectual, and all 
that is materially interesting to man — all that is ab- 
stract, and all that is practical. It has the heart as 
well as the head for its basis or foundation. It em- 
bodies, in reality, the entire mass of human knowledge, 
human happiness, and human prospects. 

Truth, then, though it has to do with every thing, 
has not to do with every thing in the same mode and 
fashion. Truth implies existence, but to mankind it 
implies much more. It is true that there are trees 
and houses around me where I now write ; but this 
truth has no hold of my personality — it is a matter of 
no concern to me — it conveys neither anxiety, pain, 
nor pleasure. The truths, for example, of astronomy 
are highly sublime and interesting, because they can 



INTRODUCTION. XXV 

be applied to practical purposes in guiding the mari- 
ner's frail bark in the trackless ocean, and as being in 
themselves powerful incentives for elevating the mind 
to Him by whom the entire universe is maintained ; 
but take away these immediate and personal effects 
from astronomical truths, and the whole science would, 
in fact, be no science at all. And the same thing may 
be affirmed of every other branch of knowledge. Science 
of every kind has our internal nature for its basis. 
Even the abstract truths of mathematics can only be 
viewed as things having a bare intellectual existence, 
and can be designated and considered as truths only 
by virtue of the reflex influence of other principles of a 
mental and spiritual cast. There is absolutely neither 
wisdom nor folly where the voice of humanity is not 
heard. 

Such, then, being the nature of truth, with the mys- 
teries of an eternity in the background, we have to 
inquire how logic, which pretends to have something 
to do with it, comes to be invested with a peculiar in- 
terest, and to be moulded in its character and applica- 
tion by the prevailing influence of other branches of 
knowledge ? Here a vast field of inquiry presents itself, 
which it is impossible for us at present to travel over ; 
but we shall glance at two or three of the most promi- 
nent objects in the mental landscape, which may pos- 
sibly throw some light on the question we have ventured 
to discuss. 

We have a very striking illustration in the writings 
of the scholastic logicians, and, indeed, from almost 
every class of writers on mental subjects up to a very 
recent period of history, of this peculiar mode of appre- 



XXVI INTRODUCTION. 



hending the nature and offices of all philosophic truth. 
This is exemplified in the discussions on the nature of 
being. Every one who has looked into the books of 
logic and metaphysics of the middle ages, must have re- 
cognised the importance attached to this abstract notion 
of existence. The grand end, however, which it is made 
to serve as a philosophical instrument of reasoning, is 
to impart to the mind a right conception of the design 
of all human knowledge. This being is made to con- 
sist of two elements ; namely, goodness and truth. These 
are its inherent attributes, and they are made the 
medium of connecting all human investigations with 
the vital interests of mankind, — that which is good, 
and that which is true. The entire scope of the dis- 
cussions springing out of the consideration of this gene- 
ral idea of being, and which have a direct bearing on all 
science whatever, is, to enforce the conviction on the 
mind, that all true knowledge must have for its ulti- 
mate object the permanent happiness and improvement 
of mankind; but that these cannot be attained by 
limiting our views to merely temporal or material ex- 
pedients. 

In the first place, logical systems have uniformly 
been discussed through the medium of metaphysical 
theories. Whatever opinions a logician might have on 
the abstract nature of mind, or on the number and 
specific character of its separate powers or faculties, 
these opinions were sure to influence him in his investi- 
gations into the reasoning process. There must be a 
harmony maintained in his general creed at any price. 
This is strikingly exemplified in the entire history of 
logical philosophy, from its first dawn in Greece to the 



INTRODUCTION. XXY11 

present hour. In every age, the mental theories being 
given, we can determine with scrupulous precision the 
general phases of logical speculations. And so point- 
edly is this the case, that all the general terms of classi- 
fication commonly used to designate theories of the 
mind, may be applied with the same force and exact- 
ness to systems of logic. We have the material, the 
rationalistic, the eclectic, the transcendental, the theo- 
logical, the mystical, the sensational, and the common 
sense theories of logical truth or science, in the same 
way as we have corresponding theories of mental philo- 
sophy and speculation comprehended under these seve- 
ral terms. 

And not only is this the case, that logic is greatly 
and directly influenced by the current doctrines of 
mental science, but it is also greatly modified and 
checkered, in its outward arrangements and rules, by 
the prevailing sentiments and opinions of philosophers 
on particular questions of metaphysical knowledge. 
Witness, for example, the unsatisfactory state in which 
theories of mathematical evidence, of induction, of 
^Nominalism and Realism, are at the present moment 
placed. Nothing can be more opposite and conflicting 
than the judgments of the philosophers of Europe, at 
the present moment, on these perplexing, though highly 
interesting points. Yet all these distinct questions are 
so closely blended with systems of logic — theoretical, 
practical, and formal — that no ground can be occupied 
by any speculator promulgating doctrines on the nature 
of general reasoning, free from their actual intrusion and 
influence. These questions lie at the very threshold of 
logical investigations, and must be disposed of in some 



XXVI 11 INTRODUCTION. 

fashion or other before the logician is allowed to take 
a single step in his inquiries. 

Independently of this obstacle from mental philo- 
sophy itself, we have still other more direct and power- 
ful influences to contend against, in reference to the 
unity of logical doctrines and tuition. Antagonistic 
forces of an external character meet us at every turn. 
Logic having, or professing to have, to do with truth, 
the watchfulness and jealousy of men are called into a 
state of activity, whenever the truth of particular de- 
partments of knowledge is conceived to be in jeo- 
pardy, or likely to be affected in any way or degree. 
All the interesting and moving questions which en- 
gross the feelings and sympathies of the mass of man- 
kind in every country, and which are connected with, 
or grow out of, the sciences of theology, morals, and 
politics, have a direct reflex effect upon both the theory 
and practical application of logical science. It forms 
an item of secular interest and calculation to the tem- 
poral powers of the world, which is never lost sight of. 
The theologian, the moralist, and the legislator, keep 
a watchful eye over the use of an instrument which 
professes to deal with every department of scientific 
evidence or proof, with every speculative form of 
thought, and with the application of knowledge to the 
everyday interests and necessities of human life. 

True, the influence of logical systems is not viewed 
with the same degree of suspicion in all departments 
of human inquiry. The mathematical and physical 
sciences, for example, seem removed from any direct 
logical control. The ingenuity of man may exercise 
itself here in comparative independence and liberty ; 



INTRODUCTION. XXIX 



and, with some trifling qualifications, he may adopt 
any theory he pleases. With purely objective know- 
ledge, logic does not come in hostile contact. It is 
only in the mental and spiritual element that its con- 
flict lies. The moment we pass the boundaries which 
separate the outer world of matter from the inner world 
of thought, we tread upon debatable ground, and ex- 
cite the feelings of human nature in such a way and 
degree, as they are never seen to be excited in the 
ordinary philosophical investigations carried on in the 
pure and physical sciences. 

The weighty influence which is thus brought to bear 
on logical studies, by particular branches of knowledge, 
arises from the intimate union subsisting between 
them and the faculty of reasoning generally. Theo- 
logy, for example, has, in many epochs of her history, 
imparted the highest degree of interest to logical doc- 
trines, and inspired a reverence and enthusiasm for 
their cultivation among great masses of people. On 
the other hand, again, theology often stands in awe of 
logic, and views all its modes of tuition with jealousy 
and apprehension. The reason for these opposite states 
of feeling in religious communities is, that the logical 
or reasoning powers have a peculiar and powerful in- 
fluence over the theological element, and may be made 
to agitate vital and momentous questions to a serious 
extent. It is the established policy of Christian nations 
to prevent such occurrences. The action and reac- 
tion of theology and logic is strikingly observable in 
every period of history ; and the mutual sympathy be- 
tween them, even at this hour, is as active and influen- 
tial as ever. 



XXX INTRODUCTION. 

If mankind could be brought to think unanimously 
on all the fundamental principles of theology, morals, 
and politics, there would be then some chance likewise 
for logical unanimity ; but as this is not likely to hap- 
pen, there must always be great differences of opinion 
on the principles which should constitute a science 
of argumentation. Long-established institutions and 
modes of thinking are always chary of speculative inno- 
vations ; for, unless some palpable and immediate ad- 
vantage presents itself as an infallible result of change, 
the public mind keeps in the old channels of inquiry 
and knowledge in which it has been so long accustomed 
to move, regardless of the bold pretensions of startling 
novelties. 

Logic must, then, I conceive, be doomed to present 
for ever a variable aspect — to be a system not united 
or bound together by a series of scientific axioms, sus- 
ceptible of independent and demonstrative proof, and 
backed by a rigid and unvarying consequentially ; but 
rather as constituting a code of rules and judgments, 
gathered from individual observation in every walk of 
science, and from every position in which the human 
mind is placed— partaking, moreover, largely of a pru- 
dential and precautionary character. And this has 
been, in fact, the true form logic has been compelled 
to assume, particularly within the last three centuries, 
purely from the necessity of accommodating itself to 
the progressive and extended range of philosophic 
thought, and to the constant desire manifested, that 
all knowledge should be tested by its susceptibility of 
promoting the moral, religious, and intellectual im- 
provement of individuals and societies. No scientific 



INTRODUCTION. XXXI 

truth becomes important unless it be productive of 
practical and "beneficial results. The necessities of 
human existence require this rule to be rigidly en- 
forced at all times, and under all circumstances, Men 
are led, by a profound and instinctive feeling, to sepa- 
rate the valuable from the unimportant. Between 
what is abstractly true and conceivable, and what is 
possible and useful, there is often a wide and impass- 
able chasm, which no mere subtilty of mind can either 
bridge over or fill up. 

And when we come to look at logical treatises, even 
of the most formal and technical character and preten- 
sions, we recognise in reality the presence of the same 
class of rules, of a provisional and precautionary form, 
which constitute the staple articles of other logical 
works of a looser and more unscientific texture. The 
difference between formal and philosophical or popular 
logic is not so great as at first sight appears. There 
is little or no difference in principle ; and the difference 
in matters of arrangement and detail resolves itself 
simply into a question, how far some logicians will go 
in a given direction, or at what point they are deter- 
mined to stop ? Both parties are proceeding on the 
same track; but the one is bent on taking a more 
lengthened journey than the other. And this will 
appear obvious if we look at the position of both classes 
of reasoners. The general doctrines which form a part 
of every formal system of logic — such as definition, ana- 
lysis, method, and the like — are all grounded on mere 
rules of expediency ; and are, in short, plastic and 
flexible adaptations of the judgment to some leading, 
though ill-defined, conception of the mind or under- 



XXX11 INTRODUCTION. 

standing. They have, in fact, no scientific basis what- 
ever. Xo writer on logic, from the earliest times to 
the present day, has ever succeeded in framing a rule 
on the definition of things and terms, through which, 
to use a common phrase, one might not drive a coach 
and six. And what logician has ever given a rule 
to limit the analytical process, to teach us when to 
separate or divide no further? Every writer on the 
subject makes analysis consist of a greater or less 
number of general rules, dependent for their validity 
on the kind or order of things analysed; the pur- 
poses for which such an analysis is required ; and, 
at the same time, enforcing precautionary maxims for 
its right and successful application. And these re- 
marks are substantially applicable to logical methods, 
and to all that has ever, up to this moment, been writ- 
ten about them. Where shall we look for a single rule 
or maxim on method, which is not purely a conven- 
tional and shifting thing, applicable in one case, and of 
no use in another ? So that, viewing the differences 
between the logical formalists, and the philosophical 
and common sense school of logicians, it is obvious that 
both parties are doing the same thing, varied only by 
the different terms, and the technical phraseology em- 
ployed to express each other's designs and purposes. 



HISTORICAL SKETCH OF LOGIC. 



CHAPTER I 



THE PYTHAGOREANS, ZEtfO, Etc., 500-400 b.c. 

The science of reasoning, considered under two distinct 
aspects — namely, as a science, and as an art — must have 
been coeval with the first ages of literature in every 
country. The social position and wants of men — the 
regular development of the laws of thought — and the 
various ideas and principles on which the moral judg- 
ments and opinions of mankind rest, must have exer- 
cised a direct and powerful influence over all those 
mental operations which form the constituent ele- 
ments of ratiocination. There never was, nor ever 
could be, a time in the history of any people, in which 
reasoning, as a distinct mental section of education and 
philosophical instruction, was not, in some degree or 
measure, known and cultivated. The only difference 
which we can trace between a learned and polite, and 

A 



Z GENERAL REMARKS. 

an ignorant and unpolished, people is, a difference of 
degree only ; a more refined and extended range of the 
mind is manifested in the former case than in that of 
the latter. Both carry on, by certain given rules, pro- 
cesses of argumentation, partly from the natural spon- 
taneity or fecundity of the mind itself, and partly for 
the more effective discharge of the duties and purposes 
of human existence. 

It is, however, both interesting and important to 
trace, along the course of ages, what were the peculiar 
stages of advancement and perfection which mark the > 
movements of thought in the ratiocinative intercourse^ 
of men ; and how far, and in what manner, the general 
stock of knowledge which any nation at a particular 
epoch possessed, tended, directly or indirectly, to the 
cultivation and dissemination of truth. We clearly per- 
ceive, that at certain periods of history, and of periods 
too of long duration, the reasoning powers of men 
— taking these powers in their most comprehensive 
development — were more prominently and directly 
cultivated, and brought to a higher pitch of per- 
fection, than at others. When there happened to be 
any thing in the social, political, or intellectual his- 
tory of a people, which chilled for a time their mental 
ardour, contracted their sphere of knowledge generally, 
or led them to give an undue preference to some of 
the other departments of human learning or specula- 
tion, then the reasoning powers seem to have fallen 
into a state of comparative inaction or collapse. On 
the other hand, we can distinctly perceive, that when 
the mind of a nation was energetically excited, and 
subjects of intense interest engrossed their atten- 



GENERAL REMARKS. -i 

tion, then a new and vigorous impulse was given to 
argumentative talent, and the reasoning man appears 
in all his native vigour and power. To trace out these 
intellectual movements, then, and to mark the leading 
incidents and circumstances with which they were occa- 
sionally or commonly associated, is, I conceive, a legi- 
timate topic of discussion to the mental philosopher 
and logician. 

We shall commence, then, with a few remarks on 
the science of reasoning, or the art of logic, as it was 
developed and cultivated in Greece, where philosophy 
was known, in all its various aspects, at a compara- 
tively early date. 

It may here be premised, that one of the chief causes 
which gave birth to and cherished the dialectic or logi- 
cal science in Greece, was the peculiar condition inse- 
parable from its laws and institutions. These gene- 
rated argumentative talents, both in writing and in 
speaking. As the democratic element appeared in 
vigorous action in the fifth century B.C., there was a 
direct incentive manifested to the cultivation of those 
mental powers more immediately and directly con- 
nected with the reasoning faculties of man. To culti- 
vate the power of persuasion — to defend the interests 
of the commonwealth, or the opinions of a party, or 
the reputation or life of an individual — was an interest- 
ing and important duty, which no true citizen could 
altogether neglect. Patriotism glowed in the breast of 
every active member of the community. The whole 
intellectual energies of man were directed into civil 
and political channels. To protect the state, a friend, 
or himself, was a duty which every person who aimed 



4 GRECIAN DIALECTICS THE PYTHAGOREANS. 

at any thing like an intelligent position in society, 
might in a moment be called upon to discharge. To 
be prepared for this became therefore a necessary 
accomplishment, and often an indispensable piece of 
precautionary policy, in all those who felt an interest, 
and took any part in, the civil and political movements 
of the day. Facility in speech, argumentative dex- 
terity, correct and prompt classifications, and a readi- 
ness in marshalling all the intellectual powers and 
appliances to a given point, became objects of emula- 
tion and ambitious rivalship. Success here led the 
way to influence and renown ; though not unfrequent- 
ly, from the fierceness of party strife, consequences the 
most disastrous ensued, both to the state and to some 
of its most distinguished citizens. 

The philosophic spirit was also a conspicuous ele- 
ment in Grecian dialectics. It was both a cause and 
an effect ; sometimes stimulating to prominent logical 
manifestations, and at other times repressing and hold- 
ing them in check. We see this strikingly exemplified 
in the history of various philosophic sects in Greece. 
The first decided and marked speculative impulse 
which the science of argumentation received in this 
country, was from the Pythagoreans. They came 
forward as cosmogonists. They embraced the totality 
of all things, physical and spiritual. The philosophic 
problems they sought to solve were of the most pro- 
found and gigantic character. What is the animat- 
ing and creative principle of every thing we see? 
What are the ultimate atoms of all things which are 
made ? Why is change effected, and what is it in 
itself? What is composition and decomposition, and 



GRECIAN DIALECTICS ZEXO. 5 

to what do they ultimately lead? These, and many 
similar questions, were the constant burden of their 
logical disquisitions and dialectic warfare. They 
sought, through these abstruse questions, to classify 
and arrange the entire objects of knowledge and of the 
mind's perception, and to develop the forms and rules 
which the logic of uninstructed nature imparts to 
them. They called into their aid other ideal appli- 
ances, such as numbers, mathematical ideas, and musi- 
cal harmonies. It was maintained, that all mental 
operations, and matters constituting what was termed 
truth, were grounded on certain relations or combina- 
tions of numbers and harmony. The entire reasoning 
powers of man constitute, in fact, a harmonica} deve- 
lopment.* 

Zeno of Elea (460-440 b.c.) is commonly con- 
sidered as the first philosopher who really gave birth 
to the regular dialectic science. He had studied phi- 
losophy under Parmenides of Elea, a sage of great 
renown in his day. This Parmenides published a work 
" On Nature," several fragments of which have come 
down to us, wherein he lays down certain abstract 
principles relative to all philosophic truth, and the 
rules and forms of communicating it. These are 
treated of under the heads of opinion and certainty. 
Zeno shewed himself a great logician. All his rea- 
sonings proceeded from certain general principles ; 
and Aristotle considers him as the inventor of the art 
of dialectics. He carried the form of the dialogue to a 
great extent ; so much so, indeed, as to lay himself 

* Stab. Eccles. 1, Diog. Laert., 1. 8. 



6 LOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND METHODS — ZENO. 

under the imputation of employing his reasonings in 
this form, more for the purpose of sophistication and 
bewilderment, than for the discovery and promulgation 
of truth itself. The peculiar nature of the abstract 
principles which lay at the root of his logical system, 
was calculated to foster this idea. These rested on 
his hypothesis of multiplicity, wherein each individual 
was, first, both similar and dissimilar to itself; secondly, 
both one and many ; and thirdly, as at rest, and yet in 
motion. These opinions he endeavoured to illustrate 
and develop by certain perplexed and attenuated 
reasonings on space and quantity.* 

Zeno published a treatise to illustrate all these 
recondite points of his theory, and even held public 
discussions on them before large assemblies of people, 
among whom were some of the most celebrated 
thinkers of the day. That he produced a powerful 
impression on the philosophic mind by his energetic 
and indomitable spirit of controversy, is affirmed both 
by Plato and Aristotle. It is said that he visited 
Athens, and gave logical instructions, for considerable 
sums of money, to some eminent Athenian citizens. 
It is also maintained, that he conversed with both 
Pericles and Socrates ; the latter of whom being, at 
that time, just bursting into manhood. 

On Zeno's merits, as an expounder of logical prin- 
ciples and methods, Mr Grote, in his " History of 
Greece," makes the following judicious and pertinent 
remarks : — " His appearance constitutes a remarkable 
era in Grecian philosophy, because lie first brought out 
the extraordinary aggressive or negative force of the 

* Diog. Laert., 1 8. Lect. Emp. ; 8-7. Arist. Top. 1. 8. 



POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SPECULATION — ZENO. 7 

dialectic method. In this discussion respecting the 
one and the many, positive grounds on either side 
were alike scanty ; each party had to set forth the con- 
tradictions deducible from the opposite hypothesis, and 
Zeno professed to shew, that those of his opponents 
were the more flagrant. We thus see, that along with 
the methodized question and answer, or dialectic 
method, employed from henceforward more and more 
in philosophical inquiries, comes out at the same time 
the negative tendency — the probing, testing, and scru- 
tinizing force of Grecian speculation. The negative 
side of Grecian speculation stands quite as prominently 
marked, and occupies as large a measure of the intel- 
lectual force of their philosophers as the positive side. 
It is not simply to arrive at a conclusion, sustained by 
a certain measure of plausible premises, and then to 
proclaim it as an authoritative dogma, silencing or dis- 
paraging all objectors, that Grecian speculation aspires. 
To unmask not only positive falsehood, but even affir- 
mation without evidence, exaggerated confidence in 
what was only doubtful, and the show of knowledge 
without the reality — to look at a problem on all sides, 
and set forth all the difficulties attending its solution — 
to take account of deductions from the affirmative 
evidence, even in the case of conclusions accepted as 
true upon the balance — all this will be found pervading 
the march of their greatest thinkers. As a condition 
of all progressive philosophy, it is not less essential 
that the grounds of negation should be freely exposed, 
than the grounds of affirmation. We shall find the 
two going hand in hand, and the negative indeed the 
more impressive and characteristic of the two, from 



8 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SPECULATION THE SOPHISTS. 

Zeno down war ds, to our history. In one of the earliest 
memoranda illustrative of Grecian dialectics, the sen- 
tences in which Plato represents Parmenides and Zeno 
as bequeathing their mantle to the youthful Socrates, 
and giving him precepts for successfully prosecuting 
those researches which his marked inquisitive impulses 
premised, this large and comprehensive point of view 
is emphatically inculcated. He is admonished to set 
before him both sides of every hypothesis, and to fol- 
low out both the negative and the affirmative chains of 
argument with equal perseverance and equal freedom 
of scrutiny; neither daunted by the adverse opinions 
around him, nor deterred by sneers against wasting 
time in fruitless talk ; since the multitude are igno- 
rant, that without thus travelling round all the sides of 
a question, no assured comprehension of the truth is 
attainable."* 



THE SOPHISTS. 

There were a number of philosophical logicians in 
Greece, in the early ages of her mental speculations, 
designated by the name of Sophists. The class of 
persons who went by this title occupy a conspicuous 
place in the history of logical science. (Their name 
stands for a particular species or kind of reasoning ; or 
perhaps, to speak more correctly, for a particular or 
special application of the powers of ratiocination gene- 
rally^ Many have been the discussions among philo- 

* Hist, of Greece, vol. viii. p. 471. See also Bayle's Diet., article " Zeno." 
Brandis, Gesch. cler Griecli. Rom. Pliilos. i. p. 409. Shnplicius, in his Commen- 
tary on Aristotle's Physics, p. 255, says that Zeno was the first who composed 
written dialogues. 



THE SOPHISTS — THEIR VOCATION. \) 

sophers, both ancient and modern, respecting their 
motives and character as a sect or party. By the 
great majority of critics and historians, they have been 
denounced as the corrupters of the minds of youth ; 
the subverters of their country's glory and indepen- 
dence ; the overweening pretenders to science and 
wisdom ; the wholesale dealers in logical quibbles, con- 
ceits, and conundrums ; and the unscrupulous revilers 
and scorners of the truth in every department of 
human knowledge. 

These opinions on the Sophists have, on the other 
hand, been in a great measure dissented from by some 
writers of judgment and reputation ; in particular, by Mr 
Grote, in the eighth volume of his " History of Greece." 
He says — " The paid teachers, under the name of the 
Sophists, were Protagoras of Abclera, G-orgias of 
Leontini, Polus of Agrigentum, Hippias of Elis, Pro- 
dicus of Keos, Thrasymachus of Chalceclon, Euthy- 
demus and Dionysodorus of Chios — to whom Xenophon 
adds, Antiphon of Athens. These men — whom modern 
writers set down as the Sophists, and denounce as the 
moral pestilence of the age — were not distinguished in 
any marked or generic way from their predecessors. 
Their vocation was to train up youth for the duties, 
the pursuits, and the successes of active life, both 
private and public. Others had done this before ; but 
these teachers brought to the task a larger range of 
knowledge, with a greater multiplicity of scientific and 
other topics — not only more impressive powers of com- 
position and speech, serving as a personal example to 
the pupil ; but also as a comprehension of the elements 
of good speaking, so as to be able to give him precepts 



1 THE SOPHISTS THEIR VOCATION. 

conducive to that accomplishment — a considerable 
treasure of accumulated thought on moral and political 
subjects, calculated to make their conversation very 
instructive, and discourse ready prepared, on general 
heads or common-places, for their pupils to learn by 
heart. But this, though a very important extension, 
was nothing more than an extension, differing merely 
in degree of that which Damon and others had done 
before them. It arose from the increased demand, 
which had grown up among the Athenian youth, for a 
larger measure of education and other accomplishments 
— from an elevation in the standard of what was 
required from every man who aspired to occupy a place 
in the eyes of his fellow- citizens. Protagoras, Gorgias, 
and the rest, supplied this demand with an ability and 
success unknown before their time ; hence they gained 
a distinction such as none of their predecessors had 
attained, were prized all over Greece, travelled from 
city to city with general admiration, and obtained con- 
siderable pay. While such success, among men per- 
sonally strangers to them, attests unequivocally their 
talent and personal dignity, of course it also laid them 
open to increased jealousy, as well from inferior 
teachers as from the lovers of ignorance generally — 
such jealousy manifesting itself by a greater readiness 
to stamp them with the obnoxious title of Sophists."* 
In order to form something like a correct notion on 
a subject of this kind, where such opposite opinions 
and sentiments have been expressed, one must look at 
it from different angular positions, and give a due 
share of weight to those extraneous influences, which, 

* Hist. Greece, vol. viii. p. 48G. 



POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STATE OF GREECE. 11 

though not necessarily connected with the history of 
Grecian logic as a science or art, were nevertheless so 
intimately associated with it, from incidental circum- 
stances, as to modify its exercise, to a considerable 
extent, in the great field of human thought and action. 
These influences chiefly lay in the political and social 
state of the country. It was divided into a number of 
petty states or republics, in which an oligarchical and 
democratic influence were each perpetually struggling 
for the ascendency. Ehetorical and argumentative 
appeals to the passions and opinions of the people, 
were the stock and trade, as it were, of all who aspired 
to power and distinction in legislative affairs. The 
entire current of domestic and public education was 
therefore directed into this channel. A talent for dis- 
putation, for a power of minute analysis, or even for 
the handling of theoretical and abstract principles of 
speculation, was considered a favourable omen of a 
man's rising genius and future celebrity. In this per- 
petual agitation and contention, where mind was the 
grand and moving power, it may readily be imagined 
that many abuses and misapplications of its faculties 
and energies would arise. They would be irregularly 
developed, and subjected to a one-sided cultivation and 
exercise. The prizes of power and distinction lay too 
openly and too invitingly before the eyes of the citi- 
zens ; and in that eagerness to seize hold of and retain 
them, what was really true, and really stamped with 
sound wisdom, became in a great measure secondary 
questions in the eyes of the struggling competitors. 
To gain a victory by disputatious acclamation, or to 
create doubts, or puzzle and bewilder the understand- 



12 CORRUPT AGENTS AND INFLUENCES. 

ing, where a victory of this kind was to be achieved, 
was the great object of men's ambitious strife and 
rivalry. 

This state of affairs was sure to gather corrupt agents 
and influences around it from all quarters : and accord- 
ingly we find, that one of the most powerful stimulants 
to this undue cultivation and exercise of the logical 
energies of society, was the practice, which universally 
prevailed among the Sophists, of demanding and 
receiving large sums of money for their professional 
services. This led to great abuses, and was one of the 
chief sources of that derision which has been so un- 
sparingly and indiscriminately heaped upon them as a 
philosophical sect or party. They travelled from state 
to state, and from city to city, disposing of their know- 
ledge and talents to the highest bidder — taking- 
especial care, however, to impart to their professional 
services, a marketable value at all times, whether they 
squared in or not with the dictates and interests of 
truth. Among a people naturally prone to mental 
speculations, and possessing no very high tone of moral 
feeling, and nearly destitute withal of every thing like 
religious principle or restraint, it is quite natural to 
suppose that a class of persons, set apart for such ser- 
vices in the logical art, and stimulated by such public 
and private advantages as they enjoyed, should over- 
shoot the limits of truth and dignity, and often degene- 
rate into the political demagogue and the speculative 
quibbler. 

^Lnother agent which conferred tremendous power 
on the dialectics of the Sophists, was the proneness of 
the Athenian race to purely speculative topics. They 



DIALECTIVE SYSTEM OF THE SOPHISTS. 13 

delighted in playing one antagonistic principle of 
human reason against another. It was not so much 
the aid or purpose of reasoning, as the mere form or 
exercise of it, which excited their attention, and received 
their acclamations. To be a reasoner or logician was 
one thing, and to be a lover and promulgator of truth 
was another ; and this distinction became a settled and 
active principle in the public mind — leading, in fact, to 
an unnatural separation of two things which should 
always be in unity, and thereby operating injuriously 
to the cause of general truth, knowledge, civilisation, 
and human happinessy 

When we thus take into consideration the three 
elements which entered so largely into the dialective 
system of the Sophists — namely, the political and social 
condition of the Athenian commonwealth, the merce- 
nary nature of the logical profession, and the tendency 
of the people to foster abstract questions of speculation 
— we cannot fail to see that a widely-spread and firmly 
concatenated plan of instruction, founded on and 
strengthened by such agencies, must have often oper- 
ated injuriously on the cause of truth and justice. A 
body of public teachers spread over the whole country, 
acted upon by such gross and material influences, must 
have often left behind them any thing but a favourable 
impression of their nature and value. When the intel- 
lectual balance becomes unequally poised, the cause of 
truth must suffer. 

Now it may safely and consistently be admitted, that 
there might be many distinguished and able men 
among the Sophists, who really and disinterestedly 
laboured for the solid and useful instruction of man- 



14 TEACHING OF THE SOPHISTS. 

kind ; and yet there might be, in the great body who 
followed this itinerating logical profession, much that 
was highly censurable, and positively corrupt and de- 
basing. Taking all the circumstances into considera- 
tion, there was much that was calculated to make this 
a very colourable presumption. The outward forms 
of declamation and dispute were the chief things which 
engrossed the attention of both speakers and hearers. 
The great thing was to produce effect. This led public 
declaimers to cultivate pertness, self-sufficiency, and a 
shallow and off-hand treatment of a subject ; and, where 
this could not be successfully followed, they took shelter 
among the fastnesses of abstruse and mystical questions, 
susceptible of a double meaning and interpretation, or 
were otherwise of such a character as not to be solved 
by any powers of the human faculties. Then, again, 
came the great temptations, from the love of power and 
party influence, to bias the judgment, and to mislead 
both instructors and people ; and this, too, on questions 
of great moment, but which intrinsically demanded the 
highest degree of dispassionate calmness and consider- 
ation to bring to a satisfactory and truthful conclusion. 
The representations which the ancients have given 
of the Sophists may be safely taken as generally correct. 
These painted the tendency of their public and private 
teachings of the art of reasoning or argumentation, as 
calculated to retard the progress of real truth and 
sound wisdom. Men by this mode of tuition acquired 
a decided taste for fine and flashy ornaments, which 
retarded their advancement in more solid and valuable 
attainments. Besides all that was positively corrupt 
and base, there sprung out of the system of the Sophists 



LOGICAL AND RHETORICAL DISPLAYS. 15 

an arrogant and superficial pretension to knowledge, 
which overshadowed and overbore truth itself in all its 
native grandeur and simplicity. This evil is copiously 
and feelingly dwelt upon by many of the most distin- 
guished philosophers of Greece. 

And the same thing which happened in Greece re- 
lative to logical and rhetorical displays, would, under 
the same circumstances, happen to any enlightened 
country of Europe in the present day. If Great Bri- 
tain, for example, were parcelled out into so many 
distinct and federal republics or states, each struggling 
for superiority and influence, and if this internal strife 
were to be carried on through the means of paid and 
pampered logicians and rhetoricians, we should have a 
race of Sophists the exact counterpart of those who 
figured in Greece more than two thousand years ago. 
A sense of justice would cease to have that degree of 
influence necessary to control party views and party 
interests. Men would meet each other, not for the 
laudable and useful purpose of hearing great truths ex- 
pounded, but to be amused, or to award a prize to the 
cleverest speaker or the most dexterous declaimer. 
The disputatious spirit would necessarily acquire such 
strength and predominancy, as to be the all in all with 
every class of the people. To dispute equally well on 
both sides of a question, would be the great object of 
ambition among all ranks of society. True it is, that 
we have now, in the present state of learning and 
knowledge, sufficiently powerful guards or checks 
against a state of things like this ; but this circumstance 
does not weaken the original argument, but decidedly 
confirms and strengthens it. There is no form or de- 



16 LOGICAL SYSTEM OF THE SOPHISTS — ANTISTHENES. 

gree of influence which moral and religious principle can 
assume, which cannot be seriously weakened by a sys- 
tem of public and private instruction which trifles with 
truth, or weakens the innate power it should exercise 
over the human heart and affections. 

What, then, was the logical system of the Sophists ? 
It was, in few words, a system based on sordid and 
grovelling motives and contrivances. It was a narrow 
and contracted theory of the abstract nature and value 
of truth. Its aim was to show that " the worse was the 
better reason." It was declamation without knowledge 
— subtilty without comprehension — paradoxical with- 
out ingenuity — a display of the forms without the 
essence of reasoning — a fruitless and barren exercise of 
the noblest powers of the intellect — undertaken, not 
for the high and noble purpose of extending, but of 
checking the progress of sound knowledge and truth 
among mankind. 

Antisthenes. — This philosopher entertained certain 
opinions on that branch of logic which embraces the 
nature and use of definitions. He held that a 
definition could not express the essence of a thing ; 
for of all things we can only say, that, as a whole, 
they are what they are. A definition can only deter- 
mine or fix the nature of one quality or attribute of a 
thing. 

THE MAGARIAN, ELIAN, AND EEETRIAN SCHOOLS OF LOGIC. 

Euclid. — The logic of this distinguished philosopher 
is of a negative character. He tells us that the most 



EARLY HISTOEY OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — SOCRATES. 17 

successful mode of refuting any train of argument, is 
not to attack the premises, but the conclusion. 91 ' He, 
and his immediate disciples and followers, pushed this 
doctrine to a great length. 

Socrates. — The name of Socrates is intimately 
associated with the early history of logical science. (He 
was not only a great and profound reasoner himself, 
but he spent a long life in publicly teaching, " without 
money and without price," what were the best rules 
and principles for guiding the judgment in the acquisi- 
tion and promulgation of truth generally^) His name 
is one of these conspicuous landmarks in ratiocinative 
science, which strikes the eye of every inquirer into its 
external history and development. The Socratic form 
of argumentation, though pretty well known to most 
general readers and students, requires to be illustrated 
in some of its leading points. This we shall attempt 
to /lo in as brief terms as possible. 

(Jit would appear that Socrates obtained his elemen- 
tary knowledge of logic from the schools of Permenides 
and Zeno. (It was in this course of elementary instruc- 
tion that he imbibed the notion, which he so firmly 
and unflinchingly maintained in all his subsequent 
teachings, that we should look at every question in a 
double light — both negatively and positively — in order 
to^arrive at just and satisfactory conclusions respecting 
it. j His doctrine, in this point of view, was an illustra- 
tion of the common maxim, of hearing both sides of an 
argument. This is one among the many of those 

* Diog. Laert., ii. 107. 
B 



18 LOGICAL SYSTEM OF SOCRATES. 

general principles on which the entire fabric of his 
peculiar mode of reasoning rested. 

( The logical system of Socrates, in its practical cha- 
racter and results, was analytical and synthetical, alter- 
nating as the occasion suited ; but generally displaying 
the former attribute rather than the lattery Xenophon, 
in his Memorabilia, tells us that " Socrates was con- 
stantly engaged in discussions on subjects immediately 
connected with human nature, investigating — " What 
is piety ? What is impiety ? What is the honourable 
and the base? What is the just and the unjust? 
What is temperate or unsound mind? What is a 
city ? What is the character fit for a citizen ? What 
is authority over men ? WTiat is the character befitting 
the exercise of such authority ? — and other questions 
of a similar import. Men who knew these matters, he 
accounted good and honourable ; men who were igno- 
rant of them, he assimilated to slaves." 

(^Again," says Xenophon, " Socrates considered that 
the logical or dialectic process consisted in coming to- 
gether and taking common counsel, in distinguishing and 
distributing things into genera or families, so as to learn 
what each separate thing really was.) To go through 
this process carefully was indispensable, as the only way 
of enabling a man to regulate his own conduct, aiming at 
good objects and avoiding bad. To be so practised as to 
be able to do it readily, was essential to make a man a 
good leader or adviser of others. Every man who had 
gone through the process, and come to know what each 
thing was, could also of course define it, and explain it 
to others ; but if he did not know, it was no wonder 



ANALYTICAL PROCESS OF SOCRATES. 19 

that he went wrong himself, and put others wrong 
besides."* 

(Aristotle also informs us, "that there are two things 
which must in justice be awarded to Socrates — the 
inductive method of proof, and the general definition 
of ideas — both of which belong to the first principles of 
philosophy."')-') 

The analytical process, which formed such a conspicu- 
ous ingredient in the Socratic logic, was nothing more or 
less than an exhibition of that inward movement which 
every man of sane mind, no matter what portion of 
acquired knowledge he may possess, carries on almost 
every moment of his life. Our minds are perpetually 
dividing the aggregate representations of things pre- 
sented to its contemplation, whether of a physical or 
mental stamp, and resolving them as it were into their 
original or primary elements ; and after this is effected, 
we sum them all up again, contemplate the representa- 
tions as entire and perfect wholes, or compound con- 
ceptions, and fix them as such in the mind. This 
mental process is so subtile and rapid, that we seldom 
can arrest the trains of thought which constitute it, a 
sufficient length of time to bring the faculty of atten- 
tion to bear upon and observe them. But a person 
who has acquired some command over his mind, and 
can readily fall back on his own consciousness, is never 
at a loss to comprehend the whole phenomena of 
analysis and synthesis, and to recognise any chain of 
reasoning founded upon them. 

The analytic and synthetic process of thought, which 
Socrates brought out so prominently before his coun- 

* Xenophon Mem., iv. 11-12. + Met., xiii. 4. 



20 ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL PROCESS OF SOCRATES 

trymen, enter into every train of argumentation, how- 
ever limited or unimportant. Hence the interest which 
his discourses excited. We are almost entirely en- 
grossed with them. But general readers, and youthful 
students in particular, are apt to fall into an error re- 
specting them, chiefly by the language which logicians 
and metaphysicians employ in giving an account of 
their nature and operation. We are apt to imagine 
that the analytic and synthetic methods of reasoning 
are purely matters of art, and were brought to light by 
the inventive powers of some philosopher or another. 
It is no uncommon thing to meet with statements in 
philosophical treatises, in which it is affirmed that 
Socrates invented this analytic method. But this is a great 
mistake. The power of dividing our general concep- 
tions or ideas into their component parts, and the 
faculty of uniting them again into their former or ori- 
ginal state of aggregation, are mental manifestations 
intimately blended with the very earliest movements of 
the mind of man, however rude or unenlightened it 
may be. We recognise the use of these intellectual 
instruments in the savage as well as in the philosopher, 
as far as their respective degrees of knowledge and the 
duties of life require their application. 

(Guarding the reader, therefore, from supposing that 
Socrates invented or discovered this mode of analytical and 
synthetical reasoning, we must yet award him great 
honour for having so fully and clearly developed it ; 
not, however, in its abstract or philosophical character, 
but in its practical details and consequences) And 
unquestionably his dialectical plan of argumentation 
must have produced a great effect on the thinking 



DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS OF SOCRATES. 21 

portion of the citizens of Athens, when we take into 
consideration what was the all-prevailing mode of 
philosophical discussion in his own day on every branch 
of human speculation and inquiry. The origin of 
things — their abstract attributes or qualities, and the 
whole phenomena of both the physical and material 
universe — were thrown into a promiscuous jumble, and 
dignified with the name of philosophy. This huge 
mass of speculation presented nothing tangible or prac- 
tical to the understanding : it had neither beginning, 
middle, nor end. Now Socrates, by a steady and con- 
centrated examination of his own mind, perceived the 
radical error of these philosophizers. He perceived 
that, by barely looking at these phenomena in their 
state of aggregation, no correct information could pos- 
sibly be derived. The complex whole must be broken 
up, and resolved into its component parts. Every thing 
around him presented a wild chaotic mass till this was 
accomplished. He put, therefore, his powers of analy- 
sing, or his powers of observation, into full play, and 
tenaciously grappled with principles and doctrines in 
their totality. He placed, as it were, his dialectic wedges 
into them, and split and divided them into such man- 
ageable and intelligible portions as the ordinary mind 
could retain and profit by. The way and manner in 
which this was done was his own. His individual cha- 
racter displays itself here very strikingly. (He endea- 
voured to carry his analysis as far as he well could, 
without running into frivolous minuteness ; and then 
he either performed the synthetic process himself, or 
left his hearers to make it in the way and fashion that 
best suited them. Every thing was to be done, how- 



22 DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS OF SOCKATES. 

ever, according to a given plan or method ; and this 
plan or method was to be in perfect agreement or 
harmony with the object which the mind had in view, 
by the adoption of any particular line of reasoning or 
argumentation.) 

On this point, I cannot refrain from inserting a few 
lines from a recent and able writer already quoted : — 

" In our present state of knowledge, some mental 
effort is required to see any thing important in the 
words of Xenophon ; so familiar has every student been 
rendered with the ordinary terms and gradations of 
logic and classification — such as genus, definition, indi- 
vidual things as comprehended in a genus, what each 
thing is, and to what genus it belongs, &c. But fami- 
liar as these words have now become, they denote a 
mental process, of which, in 400-430 B.C., few men 
besides Socrates had any conscious perception. Of 
course men conceived and prescribed things in classes, 
as is employed in the very form of language, and in the 
habitual junction of predicates with subjects in common 
speech. They explained their meaning clearly and 
forcibly in particular cases : they laid down maxims, 
argued questions, stated premises, and drew conclusions, 
on trials in the Dicastery, or debates in the Assembly : 
they had an abundant poetical literature, which appealed 
to every variety of emotion : they were beginning to 
compile historical narrative, intermixed with reflection 
and criticism. But though all this was done, and often 
admirably well done, it was wanting in that analytical 
consciousness which would have enabled any one to de- 
scribe, explain, or vindicate what he was doing. The 
ideas of men speakers as well as hearers — the produc- 



DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS OF SOCRATES. 23 

tive minds as well as the recipient multitude — were 
associated together in groups favourable rather to emo- 
tional results, or to poetical rhetorical narrative, and 
descriptive effects, than to methodical generalization, to 
scientific conception, or to proof either inductive or de- 
ductive. (That reflex act of attention which enables 
men to understand, compare, and rectify their own 
mental process, was only just beginning.) It was a 
recent novelty on the part of the rhetorical teachers to 
analyse the component parts of a public harangue, and 
to propound some precepts for making men tolerable 
speakers. Protagoras was just setting forth various 
grammatical distinctions, while Prodicus discriminated 
the signification of words nearly equivalent, and liable 
to be confounded. All these proceedings appeared 
then so new as to incur the ridicule even of Plato ; yet 
they were branches of that same analytical tendency 
which Socrates now carried into scientific inquiry. It 
may be doubted whether any one before him ever used 
the words genus and species (originally meaning family 
and form) in the philosophical sense now exclusively 
appropriated to them. Not one of those many names 
(called by logicians names of the second intention) which 
imply distinct attention to various parts of the logical 
process, and enable us to consider and criticise it in 
detail, then existed. All of them grew out of the 
schools of Plato, Aristotle, and the subsequent philoso- 
phers, so that we can thus trace them in their begin- 
ning to the common root and father, Socrates."* 

There are several general considerations arising out 
of the historical notice of the logic of Socrates which 

* Grote's " History of Greece," vol. riii. 578. 



24 LOGICAL PROCESSES OF SOCRATES. 

are worthy of being placed on record, inasmuch as they 
display the sound and comprehensive view he took of 
reasoning as a science or art. 

(One of the leading principles he steadily kept before 
his numerous auditories, was the lofty and dignified 
character of reasoning in itself. It was the chief orna- 
ment of our race, and the keystone to all our other 
intellectual endowments and graces. It represented 
the entire man, and was in fact the embodiment of all 
that could with propriety be termed rational belonging 
to him. It was not a thing to trifle or play with, but 
a serious occupation, always implying an imperative 
duty. 

Socrates was guided in his logical processes by that 
which has latterly assumed the name of common sense. 
He was certainly the first logician who really considered 
it as an indispensable element in the art of ordinary 
ratiocination^ This is implied in Cicero's declaration, 
that Soprates brought philosophy down from heaven to 
earth. IXenophon likewise tells us, that when he wished 
to form a decision on any subject, his reasonings always 
proceeded from propositions generally assented to or 
understood.* He always took his stand on first prin- 
ciples, and felt dissatisfied with the mere logical forms 
of dialectics. ) 

In all the argumentive displays of Socrates, we re- 
cognise the high principle of moral responsibility which 
he invariably imparted to them. Truth was a thing 
which involved the highest interests to mankind ; and 
under this grave and solemn light he discussed every 
question which came before him. 

* Mem., 4, 6. 



ESTIMATE OF SOCRATES CHARACTER. 25 

There are certain circumstances which have always 
entered into the estimate of Socrates' character as a 
logician, which are altogether unconnected with the 
abstract merits of that particular system of dialectics 
which he cultivated and brought into general use. 
These circumstances have their influence even at the 
present hour, and indeed always must have with all 
future generations. His death was tragical in the ex- 
treme. He was an acknowledged wise and good man. 
He laboured earnestly and disinterestedly to inspire his 
countrymen with lofty and pure conceptions of virtue, 
intelligence, and rectitude of principle. Yet he was 
doomed to feel the weight of the most flagrant and 
unprincipled cruelty. Though far advanced in life 
(being at his death in his seventieth year), he met his 
fate with that heroic and calm fortitude which has ex- 
cited the admiration and sympathy of all writers and 
historians since his dav. 



26 GRECIAN LOGIC — PLATO. 



CHAPTER II. 



PLATO— ARISTOTLE, 380 B.C. 



Grecian logic, considered as a science, received a 
powerful stimulus from the lofty and splendid genius 
of Plato. Having a mind of the highest order, with a 
strong natural predilection to extreme generalization 
and theoretical disquisitions, he felt dissatisfied with 
the mere power of analysis displayed by his master 
Socrates, and the shallow and mechanical formalism ot 
the Sophists. He sought for some solid foundation on 
which our reasonings and constant aspirations after 
truth might be placed. He attempted, therefore, to 
penetrate into the hidden constitution of the mind 
itself; to bring to light its remote and general prin- 
ciples ; and to direct the inward power of conscious- 
ness to those deeper things which lie beyond the mere 
framework of logical or dialectic science. This he 
considered as the only chance that mankind had of 
placing truth upon a firm and abiding structure. 

To a mind like Plato's, all preceding displays of logi- 
cal science, taking them in their general aspects, and 
in conjunction with the discussions on their leading 
principles, must have appeared, in a great measure, 



SCIENCE OF TKUTH — PLATO. 27 

puerile and unsatisfactory. His innate love of truth 
was vehement and sincere ; and he could not view with 
complacency those whose chief occupation in the sphere 
of public and private tuition was to trifle with the judg- 
ments of mankind, and to throw the human under- 
standing into a state of irremediable doubt and uncer- 
tainty on every topic interesting for man to know. 
The sophistical wrangling and declamatory rhetoric of 
the day, was a thing too flimsy and common-place for 
a mind of his order and pretensions. Though he had 
witnessed the effects of the public teachings of Socrates 
to counteract this injurious system by the analytical 
displays of his searching mind ; yet Plato must have 
perceived what, to his eye, would appear a radical de- 
fect in the Socratic method, calculated to limit his 
admiration of its scientific value and efficiency in the 
important work of laying a secure foundation of ratio- 
cinative science. Analysis, however minutely and 
accurately exercised, can of itself lead to nothing. 
By dividing things into a multitude of particulars, and 
thereby placing the mind face to face with them, is 
only one of the functions of the reasoning process, and 
by no means the entire or final consummation of it. 
The synthetic mode was more to Plato's liking; but 
it was a mode seldom used by his distinguished master, 
Socrates. All the various processes of argumentation, 
and the diversified rules which guided the different 
schools of dialectic art, assumed a detached and iso- 
lated appearance previous to Plato's day. He it was 
who, in treating of the science of truth in general, first 
clearly saw the importance of a thorough knowledge of 
the entire faculties and powers of the human intellect ; 



J28_ SCIENCE OF TRUTH PLATO. 

and, above all, of entertaining those lofty and sublime 
conceptions of its origin and destiny, which can alone 
confer a lasting interest on the duties and teachings of 
the logician. 

The first step which Plato took in his dialectic specu- 
lations, was to clear up the question as to the origin of 
our knowledge. This he conceived was of the first 
importance. Some philosophers who had preceded 
him, founded all truth on sensation ; while others again 
as stoutly denied the validity of our sensuous impres- 
sions. He examined the arguments on both sides; 
and after many discussions came to the conclusion, 
that sensation cannot of itself be the foundation of 
truth, but only one of its instruments or accessories. 
A theory of evidence which rests merely upon the 
impressions which external objects make on our various 
senses, did in his opinion involve so many formidable 
difficulties, and even gross absurdities, that no rational 
philosopher could maintain it upon any plausible 
grounds whatever. 

('On the nature of propositions, Plato enters likewise 
into various discussions, chiefly with a view of obtaining 
some clear conception of what is necessarily involved in 
every formal mode in which scientific or abstract truth 
can be presented to the intellect. A universal propo- 
sition is constituted of materials which possess a per- 
manent and eternal existence — are true of all times 
and in all places ; and therefore are distinctly removed 
beyond the sphere of that change which marks the 
results of all mere sensational knowledge. The truth 
which attends the impressions of the senses is transi- 
tory and variable; but the truth on which science is 



NATURE AND CHARACTER OF TRUTH — PLATO. 29 

founded, and which can be transmitted from age to 
age, resides in the soul itself, and possesses a real 
existence from all subjective influences whatever. If 
this were not the case, there could be no such thing as 
knowledge or reasoning; nor could the generation of 
men of to-day benefit in any degree from the expe- 
rience and knowledge of those who had gone before 
them. There would be nothing among men save the 
fleeting and momentary sensations of sensual feeling.\ 

This notion of Plato's on the nature and character 
of all truth, and of the mode of acquiring and promul- 
gating it, rests entirely upon his leading opinions as to 
the essence of our ideas generally. These opinions 
have been a topic of controversy in all ages. But into 
these disputes we cannot enter. Suffice it to say, that 
for the ordinary purposes we have now in view, we 
shall endeavour to give what we consider was the lead- 
ing notion which Plato entertained as to the character 
of ideas, when considered in conjunction with the 
dialectic or reasoning science or art. 

Now let us suppose, for example, a person taken to 
an eminence, and a beautiful and sublime landscape 
suddenly bursts upon his sight. Here is a general 
idea which at once engrosses his mind. He dwells 
upon it, is enchanted with it ; and, as an entire unity 
or whole, it is for ever present to his mind. Should 
he, however, begin to analyse this aggregate concep- 
tion into its elemental parts, still the unity of the 
whole is preserved, however varied the individual sen- 
sations or perceptions may be of which it is composed. 
He pronounces the landscape to be grand and magni- 
ficent; and these attributes are conceived to be in- 



30 REALITY AND IMMUTABILITY OF TRUTH — PLATO. 

vested with permanent or eternal truth, inasmuch as 
the same idea would enter the minds of others at all 
times, if placed in the same circumstances. It is quite 
possible that the individual perceptions or sensations 
of men might vary considerably in the viewing of this 
landscape ; but one sentiment, one opinion, one judg- 
ment, one idea, would be entertained by all — namely, 
the idea of grandeur, beauty, and sublimity. This 
would be general and permanent — would have the 
attribute of truth impressed upon it — would be a thing 
to talk, to think, to dispute about, altogether apart 
from the individual elements of sensation which enter 
into its composition or nature. 

Now it is precisely the same with every other class 
of our general conceptions which forms the elements of 
our reasonings. The ideas which, we have of what is 
good, what is just, what is right, what is intellectual, 
are obtained in the same manner, and clothed with the 
same attributes of permanency and stability, as those 
we have just enumerated as constituting the beautiful 
and sublime. And if ideas did not partake of this 
solid and stable character, there could be no such thing 
as reasoning or logical truth among mankind. The 
reality and immutability of truth, of which we are 
always speaking, and to which we are constantly mak- 
ing appeals, must, if Plato's notions are incorrect, be a 
mere delusion. He demonstrates this in numerous 
parts of his writings. 

This notion of ideas must also be viewed in connexion 
with Plato's theological system. He may be said to 
have been the first man who ever gave to logical studies 
a religious bias. His ideal theory, which represents 



THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM OP PLATO. 31 

the true and the real in science, has a firm and per- 
manent foundation, inasmuch as he places it upon a 
supreme idea, which comprises all the subordinate 
ones, and imparts to all the details and minor divisions 
of truth, the unity and beauty which we all feel when 
they are presented to the understanding. E"ow this 
supreme idea represents the principle of all things — in 
fact, the idea of Glod, the source of all wisdom and 
truth. The Deity is therefore made the measure or 
standard of all that we call knowledge. It is here that 
all truth rests, as upon a grand and common centre. 
This centre is the beginning, middle, and end of all 
things.* 

This idea of Deity comprehends within it every 
other idea, and is that unity which comprises or em- 
bodies the true essence of all things.-)" This is the 
reason why sound philosophy, in all ages, has con- 
nected that delightful sensation which we experience 
in viewing or contemplating what is good, just, hu- 
mane, right, beautiful, orderly, and harmonious, with 
the Sovereign Power which makes and governs every 
thing. It is by this means that men are insensibly led 
to the notion of Supreme Power, to believe in its exist- 
ence, and to recognise its influence over the destinies 
of humanity. Truth can have no value, no influence, 
no charm, unless viewed in relation to this great theo- 
logical principle. God is, therefore, the true and only 
source of all that is beautiful and good, and the true 
aim and pattern, by striving after which man may par- 
ticipate in all that is innately grand, ennobling, beauti- 
ful, and rational.j 

* De Leg., iv. p. 715. f Tim., p. 29. t Phsedr., p. 246. 



32 THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM OF PLATO. 

These theological ideas possess great interest when 
viewed in conjunction with the dialectic system of 
Plato. That beauty or harmony which all truth pos- 
sesses — not the mere beauty or harmony which body, 
or art, or any particular science has — but that beauty or 
harmony of the highest order, is the real and substan- 
tial emanation of the Divine nature, which is the 
essence of all beauty and harmony itself. Plato tells 
us, that precisely in the same manner as the material 
sun is not only the source of sight, and the real cause 
that objects are seen, but that they grow and are pro- 
duced; so the Supreme Good is of such power and 
innate beauty, that it is not merely the source of all 
scientific knowledge to the soul, but is also the source 
of all being and reality to whatever appertains to 
human wisdom. And as the sun is not itself sight, nor 
the object of sight, but presides over both ; so the 
Supreme Good is not science, or the essence of truth, 
but superior and distinct from both. They are of a 
goodly nature, but not the Supreme Good itself.* 

/According to the Platonic notion of reasoning, mind 
or spirit is the grand moving principle. It is impos- 
sible to maintain the progressive and permanent nature 
of knowledge or science, unless on the assumption of 
this truth.; And one of the chief attributes of this 
mind or spirit, is that innate fecundity or spontaneity 
which is indispensable to its existence, and which dis- 
tinguishes it from all material properties and essences. 
The mind is self-moving, and therefore different from 
the body.f 

What Plato advances on the nature of language, 

* De Rep., iv. p. 506. f De Le?., x p. 895. 



NATURE OF LANGUAGE PLATO. _33 

and on that division of dialectics which embraces the 
nature of distinct propositions, does not differ very 
materially from many opinions of the present day on 
the same topics. He maintains that the employment 
of words in sentences or propositions is not arbitrary, 
but follows certain rules and principles. In every sen- 
tence or proposition there must be a noun and a verb, 
otherwise the mind is unable to grasp or lay hold of it. 
Being or existence is involved in every verb, and in 
every phase or form of it ; and action and passion are 
consequently imparted to every object of which any 
thing can be affirmed or expressed. The verb is the 
living and animating principle of all things, and like 
the eye to the body, without which every thing is in- 
volved in impenetrable darkness. (This being or exist- 
ence, as well as its opposite, non-being or non-exist- 
ence, cannot be denned ; only the being is represented 
by an effulgent light which encircles it; whereas the 
non-being is the pure negative, or the want of this 
irradiating influence.) 

In every form of words, therefore, which can be sub- 
mitted to the reason or understanding, there is, in 
order that it may be cognisant of them, an under-cur- 
rent of thought ; and this thought is the subject of 
conviction or rejection in every formal proposition 
which the intellect can possibly frame, or which can 
be brought to bear on the minds of others. Words 
are, in fact, the simple instruments of the thinking 
principle, and in no case act as the substitute of that 
principle. 

We have now touched on the leading and charac- 
teristic points of the logical system of Plato ; and we 

c 



34 LOGICAL WORKS OF ARISTOTLE. 

shall leave the subject for the present without any 
general comments. His views will, in many subse- 
quent parts of our historical sketch, come under our 
notice ; and it would only be leading us into useless 
repetitions to enlarge on the matter at the present 
moment. 

ARISTOTLE. 

We come now to one of the most prominent land- 
marks of logical science and art — to Aristotle — one of 
the most surprising men in point of talent, reputation, 
and influence, whom the world has ever seen. The 
longest life of man would be inadequate to give a 
naked abstract of all that has been said and written on 
his logical works alone ; and as to the direct and indi- 
rect influence which these works have exercised over 
the minds of men for more than two thousand years, 
who can form an estimate of its intensity and range ? 

In bringing the logical works of Aristotle before the 
reader's attention, we shall strictly confine ourselves, in 
the present instance, to a plain statement of their aim 
and character,- leaving all general comments on their 
merits to subsequent sections of this treatise. This 
arrangement will prevent, as in the case of Plato, 
needless repetitions and observation ; besides its being 
more in accordance with the nature and offices of a 
mere historical sketch of this department of human 
knowledge. These two Grecian philosophers have 
been dialectic rivals from their very first appearance 
on the stage of life ; and even at this hour they may 
be said to divide substantiallv between them the suf- 



Aristotle's book of the categories. 35 

frages of all logical thinkers in every section of the 
globe. Their respective systems are, therefore, neces- 
sarily brought before us in various periods of history, 
either in greater or less proportions, and are thus made 
topics of criticism and remark in every direction, and 
on every occasion. 

The works of Aristotle of a logical character are the 
following, namely : — 1st, The Book of the Categories ; 
2nd, One of Interpretation ; 3d, First Analytics ; 4:th, 
Last Analytics ; 5th, Topics; and 6th, Of Sophisms. 
We are told by Diogenes Laertius, that many other 
works of Aristotle's on the same subject are lost. It 
has been a common practice to publish the whole of 
these several treatises under the name of " Aristotle's 
Organon," or his "Logic." 

/The Book of the Categories is preceded by some 
general and explanatory remarks, to which the school- 
men gave the name of ante-prcedicamenta. Words are 
divided into three kinds ; those whose meaning is fixed 
and determined, those that are equivocal, and those 
that are denominative^ What we say about any thing, 
is either simple, as man, horse ; or of a compound cha- 
racter, as a man fights, the horse runs. On predication, 
Aristotle says, There is a distinction between a subject 
of which any thing can be affirmed or denied, and a 
subject of inhesion. A thing is said to be inherent in 
a subject, which, although not part of the subject, can- 
not be conceived without it ; as figure in the thing 
figured. Of all things, some may be predicated of a 
subject which are not in any subject ; as man may be 
predicated of Charles or John, but is not in any sub- 
ject. Some again are in a subject, but can be predi- 



36 BOOK OF THE CATEGORIES — QUANTITY. 

cated of no subject ; as, for example, my knowledge of 
language is in, or belonging to me, as its subject, but 
it can be predicated of no subject, because it is an in- 
dividual or personal thing. Again, there are some 
things which are both in a subject and can be predi- 
cated of it ; as, for instance, science, which belongs to 
the mind as its subject, and may be predicated of geo- 
metry. Lastly, there are things which can neither be 
in any subject, nor be predicated of any subject. All 
individual substances are of this class. They cannot be 
predicated, because they are individuals; and cannot 
be in a subject, because they are substances. 

The Categories, according to Aristotle, comprehend 
all of which we can have the least knowledge.} They are 
ten in number ; namely, Quantity. Quality, Relation, 
Action, Passion, the Where, the When, Position in Space, 
Possession, and Substance.) 

Quantity. — Quantity is divided into discrete and con- 
tinued. Discrete is that whose parts can really be sepa- 
rated. These are again divided into successive and 
permanent. Successive quantity is that which comes 
by succession, as time and motion. The parts of these 
cannot be divided as those of number, but run onwards 
in a continued series. Permanent quantity is that 
which remains always the same, as space ; which never 
changes as time and motion do, but has always a last- 
ing and permanent existence. Its category is long, 
broad, and deep. And here we may observe, that 
quantity, when considered barely extended, without 
breadth or depth, is called a line; when it has both 
length and breadth, a surface; and when it has length, 
breadth, and depth, it is denominated a solid. 



BOOK OF THE CATEGORIES — QUALITY, RELATION. 37 

Quality. — This is divided into four kinds. First, 
Habits; which are such endowments as are either 
created, or very materially strengthened, by repeated 
acts of the mind. When a man is virtuous, we say he 
possesses the habit of virtue. In a similar qualified 
sense we apply the word habit to wisdom, temperance, 
learning, &c. Those endowments which are acquired 
by different acts of the mind, are also considered as 
qualities ; but they are usually called habits, Secondly, 
Natural powers ; which relate more particularly to our 
bodies, such as the power of walking, riding, &c. 
These powers are possessed more or less by all man- 
kind, and can be exercised as occasion requires. 
Thirdly, Sensible qualities ; which are those we acquire 
by our senses from the operation of external objects, 
such as colours, tastes, smells, sounds, &c. Fourthly, 
Figure and Form are also ranked under this category ; 
all external objects must be possessed of these. 

Relation. — This indicates the relative connexion 
between a multitude of things which are of a heteroge- 
neous and discordant nature, as one thing like another; 
one thing unlike another ; one thing near another ; one 
thing far from another ; one thing before, after, along 
with another ; one thing great, equal, less than another ; 
one thing the cause of another ; one thing the effect of 
another ; one person a master, a landlord, a tenant, a 
servant, a child, a parent, a subject, a wife, a slave, a 
client, &c, of another. Many of the relations of which 
these words are descriptive, are from their very nature 
very complicated, and give rise to numerous logical 
distinctions, which are not here, however, of any vital 
importance to enlarge upon. 



88 BOOK OF THE CATEGORIES — ACTION, SUBSTANCE, ETC. 

Action, — Action is either internal or external. In- 
ternal action is when I think of a particular thing con- 
fined within myself, and which effects nothing without 
me. External action regards something without; as 
when I cut a piece of wood, or hew a stone. 

Passion. — After action, passion naturally follows ; it 
is always expressed by a verb. 

The Where. — This answers to the question, Where 
was such a thing done ? If one asks where such a 
battle was fought, I tell him it was in such a country, 
and near such a city. 

The When. — This category gives answers to ques- 
tions relative to time. As, How long is it since he died ? 
One hundred years ago. 

Position in Space. — This relates to standing, sitting, 
before, behind, right, left, &c. 

Possession. — This category involves the whole rights 
of property. 

Substance. — This is divided into two kinds, spiritual 
and temporal. Spiritual is again divided into living 
creatures, as man, beasts, birds; and temporal into 
inanimate things, as metals, minerals, earth, air, stone, 
&c. Both orders may again be subdivided into an 
almost endless number of classes and divisions. 

Aristotle explains, in several chapters, what the 
schoolmen called post-prcedicamenta ; that is, an expla- 
nation of the four kinds of terms expressive of opposi- 
tion — namely, relative, privative, of contrariety, and of 
contradiction. 

\The treatise termed Interpretation relates to language. 
What is a noun ? What is a verb ? What affirmation ? 
What negation ? What speech ? Words are the signs 



ARISTOTLE INTERPRETATION, ANALYTICS, TOPICS. 39 

of mental things, and writing is the sign of words. 
Both the signs of ideas and the signs of words are vari- 
able among mankind, but the operations and powers 
of the mind itself remain the samey 

On the First and Last Analytics, and the book of Topics, 
we shall give some short account, sufficient, it is hoped, 
to make the leading principles of the Aristotelian logic 
intelligible to ordinary readers. To give any thing like 
a complete analysis of the entire system, would be alto- 
gether out of place in a work of this kind. We are 
compelled here to be brief; and this must be our 
apology for the omission of many things which some 
logicians may be inclined to think ought to have been 
treated of, and fully expounded. 

(Although last in order as being treated of in the 
Topics, we shall notice the predicables. These, accord- 
ing to Aristotle, are four, namely, genus, differentia, pro- 
prium, and accidens ; that is, every question must either 
be, first, about the genus of a subject ; or, secondly, 
about its specific difference; or, thirdly, about something 
proper to it ; or, fourth and lastly, about something acci- 
dental. The doctrine of the predicables makes an 
essential part of the Aristotelian logic ; and the reasons 
which its author adduces for them are substantially 
the following : — 

"Whatever is attributed to a subject, it must either 
be that the subject can be reciprocally attributed to it, 
or that it cannot. If the subject and attribute can be 
reciprocated, the attribute either declares what the sub- 
ject is, and then it is a definition, or it does not declare 
what the subject is, and then it is a property. If the 
attribute cannot be reciprocated, it must be something 



40 NATURE OF THE SYLLOGISM — ARISTOTLE. 

contained in the definition, or not. If it be contained 
in the definition of the subject, it must be the genus of 
the subject, or the specific difference ; for the definition 
consists of these two. If it be not contained in the 
definition of the subject, it must be an accident." 

The two treatises called " Analytics,'" develop the 
doctrines and principles of the syllogism. These are 
stated at full length, and in every possible form and 
combination. Though the Categories, the Predicables, 
and some say the Interpretation, are not claimed by 
him as his own, he does nevertheless lay claim to the 
syllogistic system as his own invention and develop- 
ment. The "First Analytics" contain forty-six chap- 
ters, which embrace the four leading topics ; first, the 
conversion of propositions ; secondly, the structure of 
syllogisms in all the different figures and modes ; thirdly, 
the invention of the middle term ; and, fourthly, the re- 
solution of syllogisms. The "Last Analytics" treat 
chiefly of the matter of syllogisms ; and this may be 
either true or false, probable or improbable. 

Of the nature of the syllogism generally, we shall simply 
state that it is an argument or form of reasoning con- 
sisting of three .propositions, the last of which is deno- 
minated the conclusion, and is inferred from the two 
preceding parts, which are termed the premises. The 
conclusion has two terms, the subject and the predi- 
cate ; its predicate is called the major term, and its 
subject the minor term. In order to draw a conclu- 
sion, each of its terms is, in the premises, compared 
with another term, called the middle term. By this 
means one of the premises will have for its two terms 
the major term and the middle term ; and this premiss 



NATURE OF THE SYLLOGISM ARISTOTLE. 41 

is called the major premiss, or the major proposition of 
the syllogism. The other premiss has for its two terms 
the minor term and the middle term, and is called the 
minor proposition. Thus the syllogism consists of three 
propositions, distinguished by the names of the major, 
the minor, and the conclusion; and although each of 
these has two terms, a subject and a predicate, yet there 
are only three different terms in all. The major term 
is always the predicate of the conclusion, and is also 
either the subject or predicate of the minor proposi- 
tion. The minor term is invariably the subject of the 
conclusion, and is also either the subject or predicate 
of the minor proposition. The middle term never 
enters into or forms a part of the conclusion, but stands 
in both 'premises either in the position of subject or 
predicate/) 

Syllogisms are said to be in various figures, accord- 
ing to the various positions of the middle term. All 
the possible positions of the middle term, are in Aris- 
totle's system only three.* Eirst, The middle term 
may be the subject of the major proposition, and the 
predicate of the minor, and this constitutes the syllo- 
gisms in the first figure. Secondly, The middle term 
may be the predicate of both premises, and then the 
syllogism is of the second figure. Lastly, The middle 
term may be the subject of both, which arrangement 
makes the syllogism of the third figure. 

All syllogisms, according to the nature of the subject 
to be proved by them, are divided into universal affir- 
mative, universal negative, particular affirmative, and 
particular negative. 

* The fourth figure was afterwards added by Gralen. 



42 



NATURE OF THE SYLLOGISM — ARISTOTLE. 



The following is an illustration of all the three 
figures. We must observe that A is the minor term, 
C the major, and B the middle term : — 

FIRST FIGUEE. 



Universal Affirmative. 


Universal Negative. 


Particular Affirmative. 


Particular Negative. 


All B is C, 

All A is B ; 

Therefore 

All A is C. 


No B is 0, 

All A is B ; 

Therefore 

No A is C. 


Some B is C, 
Some A is B ; 

Therefore 
Some A is C, 


No B is C, 
Some A is B ; 

Therefore 
Some A is not C. 



SECOND FIGURE. 
This figure expresses nothing but negatives, general and particular. 



No C is B, 

All A is B ; 

Therefore 

No A is C. 



All C is B, 
No A is B ; 

Therefore 
No A is C. 



No C is B, 

Some A is B ; 

Therefore 

Some A is not B. 



All'C is B, 
Some A is not B; 

Therefore 
Some A is not C. 



THIRD FIGURE. 



All B is C, 


No B is C, 


Some B is C, 


Some B is not C, 


No B is C, 


All Bis A; 


AH B is A ; 


All Bis A; 


All B is A ; 


Some B is A ; 


Therefore 


Therefore 


Therefore 


Therefore 


Therefore 


Some A is C. 


Some A is not C. 


Some A is C. 


Some A is not C. 


Some A is not C. 



The theoretical principle on which Aristotle demon- 
strates the four modes of the first figure, is denomi- 
nated the Dictum de omni et nullo, and its nature is 
this : That what is affirmed of a whole genus, may be 
affirmed of all the species and individuals belonging to 
that genus ; and what is denied of the whole genus, 
may be denied of its species and individuals. 
(Although these various syllogistic figures have rules 



Aristotle's book of sophisms. 43 

peculiar to each, there are nevertheless some which are 
common to all syllogisms. Aristotle enumerates the 
following : 1st. Every syllogism must have only three 
terms or propositions. 2nd. The middle term must be 
taken universally in one of the premises. 3d. If one of 
the extremes be particular in one of the premises, it 
must be particular in the conclusion. 4dh. The conclu- 
sion must be particular, if either of the premises be 
particular ; and negative, if either of the premises be 
negative. 5th. ~No term can be taken universally in the 
conclusion, if it be not taken universally in the premises. , 

The Book of Sophisms. — As the sources and forms 
of error are almost infinite, so are likewise the rules 
which may be framed for their detection and classifica- 
tion. Aristotle attempts to bring all the fallacies that 
can enter into the syllogistic form under thirteen heads 
— six of which refer to diction and language, and seven 
that are not in the diction. 

The fallacies in diction are, — 1st. When a word is 
taken at one time in one sense, and at another in a 
different sense. 2nd. When an ambiguous phrase is 
taken in the same way. 3d and ith. Eelate to ambigui- 
ties in syntax. 5th. Embraces ambiguities in prosody, 
accent, or pronunciation. 6th. Ambiguities from figures 
of speech. 

The seven fallacies which lie not in language, but in 
things, are, — 1st. Taking an accidental conjunction of 
things for a natural or necessary connexion. 2nd. 
Taking that absolutely which ought to be taken com- 
paratively, or with certain limitations or qualifications . 
3d. Taking that for a cause which is only an occasion 
or concomitant, ith. Begging the question. 5th. 



44 LOGICAL SYSTEM OF ARISTOTLE. 

Mistaking the question. 6th. When that which is not 
a consequence is taken for a consequence. 7th. Falla- 
cies which lie in complex propositions.*/ 

We have now submitted to the reader's notice the 
leading framework of the logical system of Aristotle ; 
but it must also be observed that, independent of its 
technical and collossal form, we find it supported and 
defended by a large mass of purely speculative thought. 
It is not as a mere system of dialectic formalism we 
must contemplate and value his labours as a logician, 
but as a profound metaphysician and philosophical 
thinker; and one who clearly perceived that every 
scheme for recognising and promulgating of truth, 
must ultimately rest upon the validity of certain ab- 
stract principles of mental philosophy. These prin- 
ciples must be examined and discussed ; they must be 
brought out to open day, and stripped of those doubts 
and ambiguities which hang about them, from the very 
constitution of things, and the peculiar structure of the 
human intellect itself. 

To these purely philosophical elements of his logical 
system, we have not space sufficient to do any thing 
like adequate justice. A few general remarks are all 
that we can devote to them; and must, therefore, 
leave the reader to fill up the hiatus by a perusal of 
the author's metaphysical works themselves, or such 
portions of them as have a direct bearing on his logical 
speculations. 

It may be remarked in the first place, that Aristotle 
connects his logical system with a self-created and 
self-sustaining power in the universe. There must be 

* See Dr Reid's " Analysis of Aristotle's Logic." 



VIEWS OF THE SYSTEMS OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE. 45 

an ultimate basis on which every species and degree of 
truth must rest ; for there could be no such thing as 
science from causes which run into an infinite series.* 
There must, therefore, be a First and Efficient cause, f 
If we cannot assume an eternal and permanent essence, 
independent of all physical or sensible properties, how 
could order exist in the world, or how could there be 
any thing like reason at all, seeing that the nature and 
purposes of reason are, in all cases where it is exer- 
cised, to perform nothing without an end or aim ? The 
mind of man cannot be for ever tossed about in the 
region of infinity ; all the leading divisions or prin- 
ciples of its structure point to something which is 
neither moved, nor can be moved by ought else than 
the inherent power of its own character or being. 

Although many able critics on Aristotle consider 
that his leading views of the mind, and of the abstract 
nature of the reasoning faculties in particular, were of 
a more material complexion than those of Plato's; yet 
there is, I conceive, sufficient grounds for maintaining 
that his notions of the understanding, or the higher 
faculties of the intellect, were decidedly of an elevated 
and spiritual cast. His opinions on the nature of ideas, 
it is true, were not so sublime as those of Plato's ; but 
the difference was not so palpable and wide as to 
justify us in classifying the Stagy rite with materialists 
of any grade whatever. We see clearly from his writ- 
ings, that as a general principle he affirms, that from 
pure matter, and its laws and properties strictly con- 
sidered, nothing can be rationally deduced, calculated 
to satisfy the innate craving of an inquiring spirit. 

* Met., ii. 2. f Phys., v. 1. 



46 VIEWS OF THE SYSTEMS OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE. 

Many of the faculties of the mind he also views as 
merely instruments in the hands of the understanding, 
which is altogether of a superior nature, is entirely 
distinct from it, and out of which true science can 
alone be deduced. Memory is likewise considered as 
a mere motion of the soul, and does not partake of the 
nature of science. And even men of the most extended 
experience are looked upon as mere inanimate or life- 
less instruments, when they are not inspired with the 
higher reason which is concerned in the investigations 
of the causes of those facts which come before them.* 

In Aristotle's opinion it was of the greatest moment 
to all science that we entertain proper ideas of the 
relation in which the mind of man stands to the Divine 
or First Cause. Our notions of the nature and im- 
portance of all truth are directly and vitally effected 
by this relation. The exact position in which the 
human intellect stands in reference to the supreme and 
governing mind of the universe, appeared to him as 
involving, among other things, two very essential prin- 
ciples — namely, a constant desire to approach nearer 
and nearer to that grand source of all true wisdom and 
science ; and yet, secondly, a deep-rooted conviction 
or consciousness that the contemplative reason could 
never arrive at that loftier and higher rule of evidence 
and truth from which its existence took its origin. 
These considerations naturally lead him into many 
perplexing and unfathomable questions; but he seems 
nevertheless, amid all his cogitations on the subject, to 
have maintained with remarkable tenacity and firm- 
ness, and even, betimes, at the expense of his logical 

* Met., i. 1. 



HISTORICAL SKETCH OF ARISTOTLE'S SYSTEM, 47 

consistency, the complete integrity of that principle of 
connexion between the Divine and human minds, 
which he looked upon as the sheet-anchor of all sound 
philosophy and ratiocination. And hence many of his 
most remarkable and pointed expressions on the sub- 
ject — such as his famous declarations, " That the 
thought of God is the thought of thoughts;" and 
" That the reason in man is exactly the same in its 
nature and offices as the reason in God." 

(The grand object, therefore, of all scientific truth, is 
to investigate the grounds on which the phenomena 
around us present themselves to our notice. The prin- 
ciples or rules of investigation are held together by, 
and rest upon, a supreme first cause, God, in whom 
alone every thing can be fully known and compre- 
hended. We can, however, by the faculties we possess, 
attain to such conceptions as fully correspond to the 
objects and things we recognise : and to feel assured 
that these conceptions adequately express, to philoso- 
phical minds, the truth of things, such as science^ and 
the reasoning powers of man reveal them to us. } As 
Plato maintains that the Deity is the principle of 
unity of science and substance, so likewise Aristotle 
declares that God is both intelligence and the intelli- 
gible. (Jhe principles and essence of all things, so far 
as their actuality is concerned, must be in perfect uni- 
son with the rational spirit of man ; for this is a neces- 
sary and indispensable condition of their being appre- 
hended and rendered intelligible by the reason or 
understanding. ) This is the source of that refined and 
delightful feeling which the soul experiences in the 
pursuit of science and truth. 



48 HISTOKICAL SKETCH OF ARISTOTLE'S SYSTEM. 

We ought not to omit, in this historical sketch of 
the famous logical system of the Stagyrite, a few 
remarks which he has left us himself on its compara- 
tive merits in his own eyes. These are important and 
interesting declarations, when viewed in conjunction 
with the subsequent history of his power and influence 
over the art of reasoning among mankind — 

u Of those who may be termed inventors, some have 
made important additions to things long before begun, 
and carried on through a course of ages ; others again 
have given a small beginning to things, which, in suc- 
ceeding times, will be brought to greater perfection. 
The beginning of a thing, though small, is the chief 
part of it, and requires the greatest degree of invention ; 
for it is easy to make additions to inventions once 
begun. Now, with regard to the dialectical art, there 
was not something done, and something remaining to 
be done. There was absolutely nothing done ; for 
those who professed the art of disputation had only a 
set of orations composed, and of arguments, and of 
captious questions, which might suit many occasions. 
These their scholars soon learned, and fitted to the 
occasion. This .was not to teach you the art, but to 
furnish you with the materials produced by the art ; as 
if a man professing to teach you the art of making 
shoes, should bring you a parcel of shoes of various sizes 
and shapes, from which you may provide those you 
want. This may have its use, but it is not to teach the 
art of making shoes. And, indeed, with regard to rhe- 
torical declamation, there are many precepts handed 
down from ancient times ; but, with regard to the con- 
struction of syllogisms, not one. 



ADVENTURES OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 49 

" We have therefore employed much time and labour 
upon this subject ; and if our system appear to you not 
to be in the number of those things which, being before 
carried a certain length, were left to be perfected, we 
hope for your favourable acceptance of what is done, 
and your indulgence in what is left imperfect." 

The philosophical works of Aristotle, including of 
course his logical ones, had some singular adventures. 
Historians tell us that they remained in a great mea- 
sure unknown after his death. Theophrastus, who suc- 
ceeded him in the Peripatetic school, became possessed 
of them. This philosopher transmitted them to JSTeleus, 
his heir, who afterwards sold them to Ptolemy Phila- 
delphus, king of Egypt, who conveyed them to Scepsis, 
a city of Troas, where they were deposited in a vault, 
lest they should fall into the hands of the king of Per- 
gamus, wdio, it is alleged, wished to appropriate them 
to himself for some trifling amount of money. 

In this place of concealment they remained for the 
space of one hundred and thirty years, until the damp 
and vermin had rendered them nearly illegible. They 
were, however, by some means not accurately known, 
preserved from destruction, and were afterwards sold to 
Apelicon, a philosopher of the Peripatetic school, who 
caused them to be transcribed, and to be placed in his 
library. There they remained till Sylla, a general of 
the Roman army, conquered Athens, when he came 
possessed of the entire library of Apelicon, and trans- 
mitted them to Rome. It was here that one Tyrannion, 
a Greek grammarian, and an intimate acquaintance 
of Cicero and Atticus, obtained a copy of Aristotle's 
writings, through the instrumentality of the librarian 



50 ADVENTURES OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 

of Sylla ; and Tyrannion, being an able critic, got them 
transcribed and corrected with great precision; and 
from this copy the Eomans seemed to have received 
the chief portion of their knowledge of the Peripatetic 
philosophy. 

It is supposed that the Arabian philosophers derived 
their first acquaintance of the logical works of Aris- 
totle, from copies of his writings which the king of 
Egypt purchased. The knowledge, however, of his 
works in Italy, appears to have been nearly extin- 
guished by the inundations of German barbarians, 
who overthrew the Roman dynasty in the fifth cen- 
tury. It is confidently affirmed that there were no 
part of his works much read or admired in Europe till 
about the eleventh century; and that the knowledge 
of them then acquired, was chiefly obtained through 
the instrumentality of the Arabian writers. 



PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — ARISTOTLE. 51 



CHAPTER III. 

PROGRESS OP LOGICAL SCIENCE FROM THE DAYS OF 
ARISTOTLE TO THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 

V^hat was the degree of influence which the logic of 
Aristotle exercised immediately after his death, on the 
minds of the Athenians, we have but very scanty means 
of knowing. The history of some succeeding centuries 
presents his dialectics only now and then to public 
notice; and, most commonly, in conjunction with other 
branches of his philosophy. From a story which has 
been often told, it would appear that he was somewhat 
anxious that a system which had cost him so much 
labour, and on which he seems to have anticipated 
that his fame in after times would ultimately rest, 
might receive the fostering care of the most influential 
and talented of his friends. The story runs thus: — 
That a little before his death, and when very infirm, he 
was requested by some of his disciples to name a suc- 
cessor worthy of teaching his philosophy and logic. 
Two of his scholars appeared to him eminently fitted 
to discharge this duty — Theophrastus of Eresos, in 
Lesbos, and Eudemus of Rhodes. After some little 
delay, Aristotle asked for some Lesbian and Rhodian 



52 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — THEOPHRASTUS, ETC. 

wines, and after tasting of each, he pronounced them 
both good, but that he had a decided relish for the 
Lesbian. His disciples interpreted this decision as 
intimating that Theophrastus should be the successor 
to his school. 

Theophrastus became, therefore, the head of the 
Peripatetic school, and he is stated to have filled the 
situation forty-five years — to have lived to the great 
age of ninety-nine — and to have had under his tuition 
as many as two thousand students at one time. Both 
he and Eudemus maintained their master's logical 
system nearly entire as they found it, with the excep- 
tion of some trifling matters of detail. It is, however, 
affirmed by some writers, that their united teachings 
imparted, on the whole, a more material and mechani- 
cal spirit to the general system of reasoning which the 
Stagyrite had left behind him. 

Whether this be the case or not, certain it is, that 
the latter Peripatetic philosophers gradually lowered 
the standard of truth, and of those faculties of the 
mind more immediately subservient to its discovery 
and promulgation. Aristoxenus instituted the analogy 
between the soul and the principle on which the har- 
mony of musical sounds is founded. As this is the 
result of certain fixed and unalterable relations which 
subsist between the various tones ; so the soul, in like 
manner, is the result of certain relative arrangements 
of the different parts or functions of the body — the 
intellectual principle being only a given tension of the 
physical frame. Dicsearchus follows in nearly the 
same strain. He distinctly declares, that the soul and 
reason are not entities, but merely a certain state of 



PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — STRATO, ETC. 53 

body ; a species of lively animation, which results from 
the peculiar configuration of the various parts of our 
bodily structure. 

The logical speculations of Strato, of Lampsacus, 
and of Lycon, Ariston, of Ceos, Critolaus, his imme- 
diate followers and disciples in the Peripatetic school, 
seem to have been nearly of the same stamp with those 
we have just alluded to. All these philosophers appear 
to have paid but a very slight and superficial attention 
to those comprehensive mental principles connected 
with the evidence we have of scientific truth and gene- 
ral propositions. The material, the technical, and the 
sensible, characterised their ordinary philosophical 
teaching. 

Following the Peripatetics, another class of logicians 
made their appearance, denominated Sceptics. The 
prominent feature of their reasonings was a spirit of 
doubt ; and hence the name has descended to our own 
times, as descriptive of a captious rejection of ordinary 
truth or evidence on subjects usually submitted to the 
understanding. The Sceptics, in fact, constituted only 
a species of that logical genus called Sophists, of whom 
we have already spoken. 

The sceptical logicians, who gained some degree of 
renown about this period of history, owe their origin, 
partly to the peculiar political circumstances in which 
their country was then placed, and partly to the old 
leaven of sophistical wrangling and rhetorical decla- 
mation, which so prominently marked the days of 
Socrates, and those philosophers who immediately pre- 
ceded him. There was here a union of the Cynical 
and Magarian notions of the nature of truth ; while a 



54 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — PYRRHO, ETC. 

party sprung up called the Dialectici, whose profession 
was to challenge disputations on the most subtile ques- 
tions and interminable disputes. This mass of floating 
doubt and captiousness became moulded into some- 
thing like a formal system, for the development and 
promulgation of which Pyrrho of Elis laboured with 
great zeal, and some ability. 

This philosophical logician is described by historians 
as having been of low parentage, and by profession a 
painter. He likewise served with the army of Alexan- 
der the Great in India. On his return to Greece he 
devoted himself to the study of philosophy, and parti- 
cularly to the system of the Dialecticians, and the 
speculations of Democritus, the latter of whose writ- 
ings, it is said, first inspired him with a love of study 
and intellectual improvement. He also cultivated an 
acquaintance with the speculative notions of the Gym- 
nosophists of India, whose ascetism he admired, and 
whose mystical doctrines constituted a formidable 
jungle, through which his subtilty and dialectic skill 
sought in vain to penetrate. 

Pyrrho left behind him no written records of his 
philosophy and logic. His successor was Timon of 
Phlius, originally a choric dancer, and who studied 
logic under Stilpo of Magara and Pyrrho of Elis. 
After having acquired an ample fortune by his itiner- 
ating disputations, he retired to Athens, where 
he spent the remainder of his life, which was very 
long, in comfortable ease and independence. He is 
highly spoken of for the purity and simplicity of his 
manners. 

The Grecian scepticism, or Pyrrhonism, was em- 



PROGKESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — THE SCEPTICS. 55 

bodied in what were termed the Ten Tropes, which 
are often alluded to in the writings of the philosophers 
of this and the succeeding ages. Thus tropes may be 
considered as a species of logical rules for the govern- 
ment of the mind, in the pursuit and acquisition of 
truth. They are more of a negative than positive 
character. The principles of doubt involved in them 
go simply to recommend a suspension of assent, rather 
than a positive denial of matters submitted to the un- 
derstanding.* 

The stronghold of the Sceptics was the variable na- 
ture of our ideas of pure sensation. These always 
afforded them weapons against the attacks of their 
adversaries. The Sceptics carried their analogical rea- 
sonings from this source into every department of 
human knowledge, but particularly into our notions of 
what constituted good and evil. Here, too, they 
received fresh succour, from the apparently discordant 
opinions and judgments of mankind upon the rules 
and obligations of morality. People in different coun- 
tries have different notions of what is proper and 
beneficial ; and this diversity is strictly analogous to 
the variable sensations of external things, produced by 
the operation of the senses. It would be idle to deny, 

" Que Pyrrbon ait ete aniene, par son doute universel, a ne pouvoir agir, a ne 
croire a rien dans la pratique, a ne pas se detourner pour eviter un precipice, comme 
le raconte Diogene Laerce, ces assertions sont sans fondement et tout-a-fait invrai- 
semblables. Ce pbilosopbe reconnaissait, au contraire, l'autorite du bon sens, des 
lois, des usages; il admettait des regies de morale, et pretendait que ces regies 
araient leur fondement dans le cceur. II voulait qu'on suivit les apparences, sans 
se mettre en peine de la realite ; qu'on agit comme le commun des bommes, qu'on 
evitat soigneusement les discussions epineuses qui ne pouvaient enfanter que le 
doute, et qu'on demeurat dans ce repos d'esprit qui seul peut faire le bonbeur de 
1' homme."— Bouvier, Hist. Abregee de la Philosophic, vol. i, p. 184. Paris, 
1844. 



56 PKOGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — THE SCEPTICS. 

that such analogical reasonings would have a powerful 
effect upon popular opinion ; but still the nature of all 
similar logical declamations exercises a pernicious in- 
fluence over the progress of sound and rational know- 
ledge. 

The more abstract scepticism among the Greek and 
Roman philosophy has a great uniformity of character, 
because it was grounded upon views and arguments 
which lay very open to common remark and observa- 
tion. The following may be stated as the principal 
springs out of which the various currents of sceptical 
opinions flowed, in almost every period of the ancient 
philosophy : — 

1st, The great diversity in animal nature as to its 
origin, organization, &c., the differences in which exter- 
nal objects are viewed by the inferior creation ; all of 
which go to show what a vast variation there must 
necessarily be in the conceptions formed of the qualities 
and properties of external bodies, through organs of 
sense so much varied. The question then is, as animals 
are deprived of reason, what grounds have we to prefer 
our perceptions to theirs, when we are in the search of 
truth ? 

2nd, The diversity of character is very great in human 
nature, and the differences among men, both in mental 
and bodily qualifications, are varied beyond all concep- 
tion. This contrariety, joined to the interminable dis- 
putes among philosophers themselves, and the differ- 
ences in tastes and affections, particularly noticed by 
physicians, render all attempts to arrive at the truth of 
things hopeless. 

3d, There is a great difference in the organs of 



PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — THE SCEPTICS. 57 

sense, and every organ has its appropriate objects. Do 
the qualities of these objects belong to the particular 
confirmation of our senses, or only to the objects them- 
selves ? Have they only as many and such qualities 
and properties as we perceive, and have they none 
which we do not perceive ? What are the constituent 
elements of objects — have they just such and such qua- 
lities, and no other ? 

4:th, The various ways in which our physical organs 
are affected, by disease, sleep, old age, sadness, fear, 
cold, heat, and a thousand other circumstances, must 
necessarily create a great diversity of judgment relative 
to things around us. 

5th, The differences from variation in the quantities 
of things, produce often opposite judgments and con- 
clusions. A little more heat, a more rapid motion, or 
a little more wine or spirit, creates divers changes in 
our opinions. The general aggregation or division of 
homogeneous bodies greatly modifies sensation. 

6th, The various kinds of education among men, and 
the different laws and conventional rules of society, 
beget opposite opinions and conclusions on the most 
important subjects. 

7th, From the interminable mixtures and combina- 
tions of things, it is next to impossible to form a correct 
opinion of the mass of objects around us. Colours, 
density, and forms, are for ever changing, and the eye 
can only judge of that which is at the moment an object 
of vision. 

8th, The relations of things one with another are 
continually changing. We seldom see an object pre- 
cisely in the same point of view twice in succession. 



58 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — THE EPICUREANS. 

9th, All relations and objects, opinions, notions, and 
principles, are connected together, and have mutual 
dependencies one upon another ; so that the mind of 
man can never be certain that the conclusions it forms 
are the really true ones. All things are not perceived ; 
therefore our judgments are one-sided. 

Of the logical views of the Epicureans, with Epicurus 
himself at their head, little can be said possessing any- 
great novelty or interest. Epicurus and his disciples 
considered all truth and evidence through the medium 
of the senses and bodily appetites ; and formal rules 
relative to definitions, axioms, and propositions, were 
considered by them of little or no utility. Whatever 
was useful, pleasant, and delightful, was true; and 
these were the chief, if not the sole attributes which 
constituted the evidence of real science. The absolute 
criterion of truth rests therefore upon the senses. 
These are the only tests we have, and they never 
deceive us. Whenever there is any discrepancies from 
this source, the real cause of them arises from hasty or 
premature judgments on objects presented to the ex- 
ternal organs. 

The reason or principle of intelligence is not alto- 
gether a dependent or slavish instrument. The Epi- 
cureans invest it with supreme power and authority 
over the whole of the senses. Its office is therefore 
to mould the sensuous impressions into what we call 
thinking, conceiving, reasoning, and deliberating. The 
mode in which this transmutation is effected, appears a 
little singular and whimsical. There are certain airy 
and spiritual essences generated, which present them- 
selves to the reason. These essences are disengaged 



PKOGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE THE STOICS. 59 

from external bodies, or are formed in the air, and seize 
hold of the mind, and fix themselves in it. These 
essences have also a sort of voluntary power, making 
choice of those intelligences whose attention is excited, 
and such as direct themselves to particular forms of 
thought ; to others they remain perfect strangers. 
Attention is, then, reason's chief instrument ; by it logi- 
cal judgments and conclusions are formed. 
Cjjie logical system of the early Stoics is worthy of 
consideration on two or three points. 

The Stoics do not appear to have entered very 
deeply into the logic of either Plato or Aristotle. The 
elaborate system of the latter was in a great measure 
overlooked by them. They chiefly occupied themselves 
with speculations on the foundation of truth or science, 
and laboured hard to reconcile those conflicting views 
which arose out of the connexion subsisting between 
external objects and the sentient or thinking principle 
which perceives them. They set but a light value on 
the opinions and labours of their predecessors, and 
were extremely anxious to appear to the world in the 
character of original thinkers and expounders of the 
laws of human thought. 

All general truths or maxims employed in formal 
propositions, or in trains of reasoning, were considered 
by the Stoics as proceeding from a certain refined pro- 
cess of sensation. Such truths as did not appear to 
follow immediately from the impressions of outward 
things, were formed in the mind by a species of ana- 
logy or transposition. There were certain scientific 
or logical rules under which our thoughts invariably 
arranged themselves; and these rules were the great 



60 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — THE STOICS. 

guides of the uninstructed and unlettered part of man- 
kind, in all those matters necessary for their existence 
and wellbeing. 

These universal or general ideas seem to have 
puzzled the Stoics not a little. Their notions of trans- 
formation from, sensible perceptions were always falling 
short of that measure of conviction which could satisfy 
a rational mind. Their discussions on this point were 
far from being consistent, or even intelligible. They 
laid down certain principles, but expressed themselves 
violently hostile to the inferences fairly deducible from 
them. At one time general ideas were identical with 
the mentally conceivable; and at another they were 
merely a peculiar form of language. It was in this 
manner that they bandied the subject from one hypo- 
thesis to another, without coming to any fixed or 
settled opinion on the matter. 

These speculations on general and particular ideas, 
naturally led them to the consideration of the cate- 
gories, especially those of Aristotle. They did not adopt 
them, but sought to frame categories of their own, of a 
more accurate and comprehensive character. These 
they reduced to four ; namely, the substrate, or that 
which forms the groundwork of things ; secondly, that 
which has qualities or attributes; thirdly, that which 
has a general relation; and fourthly, that which has 
a particular relation to some other thing. These cate- 
gories the Stoics considered an improvement upon those 
of Aristotle, inasmuch as they were both more compre- 
hensive as well as accurate. They conceived that no 
mere investigations into the forms of logical science 
could prove of an utility, without they were based upon 



PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — THE STOICS. 61 

some generally correct notions as to the fundamental 
principles of all scientific truth. 

The substrate embraces the imperishable elements of 
things ; quality is that which resides in, or constitutes 
a thing to be what it is. This second category is neces- 
sarily subordinate to the first, but stands nevertheless 
next in degree of importance to it. The third category 
indicates a changeable or perishable property or rela- 
tion, and not that which possesses a positive fixity of 
existence. The fourth category is the lowest class of 
our thoughts, merely designating these particular 
objects which have a circumscribed, a transitory, or 
local existence. With the Stoics the essence and the 
subject were the highest objects of intellectual percep- 
tion, and to which every thing must be referred ; be- 
cause here rested that absolute entity which embraces 
all forms of existence or being,? 

There was a great deal of the sensible and material 
in the logical philosophy of the Stoics. They viewed 
mankind in their practical and everyday movements 
of life. They took men as they found them. And 
hence it is that theories of every kind hung loosely about 
them. What floated on the general surface of society 
constituted the staple of their public teaching. Theories 
they had undoubtedly, and an abundance of profound 
speculation ; but there was a wider chasm between 
their speculative and practical systems, than between 
any other class of ancient philosophers. And the 
natural consequence of this is, that we find greater in- 
consistencies and discrepancies in their system, when 
viewed as a whole, and in reference to logical science, 
than in any other which antiquity presents to us. 



62 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — THE LATTER STOICS. 

The logical views of the Latter Stoics, or New Aca- 
demy, do not very materially differ in theory from those 
of the old, but they diverge from them in practice to a 
considerable extent. Arcesilaus, one of the principal 
conductors of this school of philosophy, revived the 
Socratic mode of argument, and endeavoured to take 
great pains to inculcate in the minds of his students 
the propriety of entering fully into the merits of every 
question, and also of allowing an opponent, in every 
argument, to state his case with all reasonable degree 
of amplitude. Arcesilaus gave a decided preference to 
the logical principles of Plato over those of Aristotle. 

GCarneades followed) in the Latter Academy, and 
greatly distinguished himself as an expounder of logic. 
His dialectics are eulogized as being at once precise and 
comprehensive. He was a man of splendid oratorial 
powers, so much so indeed, that his appointment as 
one of the ambassadors of Athens to Rome, was the 
result of this reputation. It was in Rome where he 
delivered a series of famous lectures on the nature of 
justice ; entering fully into all the complicated views of 
the question, and balancing his philosophical arguments 
so nicely, that- his able and enthusiastic pupil, Clito- 
machus, declared, that he never could detect what his 
master's own opinion on the subject really was. 

This mode of argumentation naturally led him into 
what were considered sceptical habits. He called in 
question the criterion of truth. He thought philoso- 
phers up to his day had failed in establishing any thing 
of the kind. This criterion must be sought for either 
in our sensuous impressions, or in the reason itself. 
But he maintained, that whatever is a judgment of the 



PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — CLITOMACHUS, ETC. 63 

understanding cannot be such solely from its own 
nature, but must have some relation to sensation or 
conception ; and, on the other hand, sensation itself is 
not a chain of argumentation, from which a judgment 
proceeds, but solely a fleeting, uncertain, and transitory 
thing. Therefore, on whatever side the logician looks, 
as to the absolute standard by which all evidence should 
be tested, he meets with insuperable barriers in the way 
of a rational solution of the difficulty. 

^Notwithstanding, however, his arguments against a 
standard of truth, we find him insisting strenuously for 
man's power to seize hold of the truth of things by a 
system of probability. Though nothing was absolutely, 
yet many things were probably true ; a very paradoxi- 
cal proposition. His theory of probable evidence rested 
on the distinction he made between the elements of 
thought, which related to the object, and the element 
considered in relation to the thinking principle itself, 
in its general character. Every idea has two relations, 
one to the object presented to the senses, and one the 
presenting subject. The first is stamped with truth 
when it agrees with the object, and is false when it does 
not agree with it ; in the second relation it is either 
true or false : — if the former it is called probable ; if the 
latter, improbable^ 

We know little of the logical system of Clitomachus, 
a disciple of Carneades, with the exception that he is 
said to have written four books on the general reasons 
which ought to induce us to suspend our assent to the 
truth of things. 

\Philo wrote largely on the nature of truth and the 
rules of evidence. He distinguishes three kinds of 



64 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE — POTAMON, ETC. 

truth ; first, That which is deduced from a self-evident 
proposition ; secondly, That which is deduced from a 
false proposition, though conditionally true ; and thirdly, 
From a proposition from which the conclusion presents 
not only a hypothetical but a real truth, in spite of any 
absurdity contained in the truth itsejjp 

The Alexandrian school of logic exercised indirectly 
no small degree of influence on the science of argumen- 
tation. Diogenes Laertius tells us, that the philosopher 
Potamon was its founder. He goes on to observe : — 
" But a short time since a new sect called Eclectic 
had been introduced by Potamon of Alexandria, who 
selected from each school of philosophy that which he 
considered the most worthy and important. He thought 
there were two criteria of truth. One resided in the 
same faculty which judges ; that is, reason, which pre- 
sides over the whole system of intellectual laws or 
movements. The second consisted in those perceptions 
which serve as the measure or instruments by which 
knowledge is communicated ; or, in other words, in the 
certainty and evidence of the received impressions from 
external objects." 

On the Roman school of logic we have not much to 
say. Sylla brought to Rome the works of Aristotle, 
which became generally accessible through the means 
of a translation effected by Tyrannion and Andronicus 
of Rhodes. 

On the difficulties connected with the investigation 
of truth in general cases, Cicero makes the following 
remarks : — " All knowledge is encircled with difficulties. 
Such is the natural obscurity of things, and the con- 
stitutional weakness of the principle of intelligence, 



PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE— CICERO, ETC. 65 

that the most sagacious minds of antiquity have doubted 
whether we ever can arrive at truth at all. The most 
part of mankind embrace opinions without having the 
power of choosing them : they judge of what they do 
not know, and attach themselves to some favourite sys- 
tem, as mariners do to a rock in a tempestuous sea; 
but a philosopher will only give his assent after he has 
patiently heard both sides, and after a careful review 
of all the opinions which have previously been advanced 
on the subject."* 

After Cicero we have Alcinous, Maximus of Tyre, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Galen ; the latter of 
whom paid great attention to logical science, and was 
the author of the fourth form of the syllogism, which is 
commonly given in our school-books of logic. 

* De Finibus, ii. 12. 



66 INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 



CHAPTER IV. 



GENERAL REMARKS ON THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 
ON LOGICAL SCIENCE. 



We come now to an important epoch in the history of 
the science of reasoning — to the establishment of a 
system of theology, which has influenced the logical 
powers of men to an astonishing degree, from the 
period of its introduction to the present hour. Though 
laying down no formal rules, no classification of propo- 
sitions, no technical framework, by which men might 
be guided to reason soundly and safely on all topics 
cognisant to the understanding ; yet in place of these, 
there are embodied in the Christian code certain com- 
prehensive principles and axioms, of immense value 
and power to the rational faculties of man. 

The observations we are now about to make in this 
chapter, are altogether of a general character ; yet we 
hope they will not prove the less useful to the ordinary 
reader, or be considered less appropriate in the esti- 
mation of the scientific, to the design and scope of this 
work. Although at first sight it may appear to many 
that theology is placed at a great distance from the 
science of ratiocination, yet we trust to show that there 



ON LOGICAL SCIENCE. 67 

always has been, and ever must be, a vital and living 
sympathy between them — a sympathy, in fact, of such 
a character, as to constitute the permanent distinction 
between man and the animal creation — between what 
is rational and wise, and what irrational and brutish. 

These introductory remarks will be arranged under 
two leading divisions ; those of a theoretical, and those 
of a practical nature. 

It will not, I conceive, be doubted by any person 
competent to give an opinion on the subject, that every 
logical system, whether of a purely formal or of a scien- 
tific cast, owes all the interest it can possibly excite in 
the estimation of men to certain principles, which lie 
as it were in the background from it, and which are 
seldom or ever formally presented to the understanding 
in the ordinary course of tuition. To suppose for a 
moment that any logical scheme — a thing professedly 
teaching you how you are to detect truth from error — 
could have any possible hold of men's esteem — could 
be an object of any conceivable value, apart from these 
rudimental notions or conceptions inseparable from the 
nature of truth itself, and inseparable from the mental 
nature of that being to whom that truth is of unspeak- 
able importance ; is a proposition so ridiculously absurd, 
that I shall not assume that any man, how desperately 
soever he may be wedded to any particular system, will 
in his cool moments give his assent to it. To suppose 
any such thing, would be to suppose that all the lessons 
of history had been thrown away upon him, and that 
he had set at defiance all the dictates of common 
sense. 

That the rejection of this supposition is not a merely 



68 INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

gratuitous or unwarrantable assumption, will, I trust, 
appear from the following considerations. 

The science or art of Logic differs from every other 
department of human knowledge in one important 
particular. It is conversant about truth, which is the 
only thing, quality, or attribute, which renders any 
science interesting to man. Logic has, therefore, to do 
with all subjects of inquiry. It does not stand apart 
from all, but it exercises a supervisional power or 
authority over all. Other sciences are mere instru- 
ments in its hands ; and it forms the medium of com- 
munication between them, and the soul or intellect of 
man. It must examine into, arrange and classify, 
weigh and balance, direct and guide, and pronounce 
an opinion and judgment upon those particular ele- 
ments which constitute knowledge, and which make it 
that really important and interesting thing which man- 
kind feel it to be. For it must be borne in mind, that 
whatever may be the qualities or properties which we 
may conceive inherent in truth, one thing it must pos- 
sess, that of taking a firm hold of the inward nature of 
man — of his mind and affections — or it cannot be said 
to be truth at" all. But on this latter point we shall 
speak more at large afterwards. 

'Now, all the ancient logicians of whom we have 
already spoken, saw clearly that the purely formal part 
of logic, or indeed any scientific view of it whatever, 
could only derive its validity and importance from a 
consideration of the truth and full comprehension of 
certain other principles on which it naturally rested, 
and which really conferred upon it every property 
which could render it either acceptable or beneficial to 



ON LOGICAL SCIENCE. 69 

the human race. This they clearly perceived. And, 
as a confirmation of this fact, we can appeal to all their 
writings and speculations on the nature and importance 
of scientific disquisitions, considered in relation to their 
nature or character. 

To enter fully into all these discussions, or to travel 
over the entire field of ancient investigation on this 
matter, would far exceed the limits of the present work. 
But we shall just dot down a few of the leading topics, 
which seem to have exercised a great influence over 
the minds of the ancient philosophers who especially 
treated of logical systems and theories, partly because 
these topics enveloped their minds in doubt and uncer- 
tainty, and partly because they were the offspring of a 
deep-rooted conviction, that it was absolutely requisite 
that some fundamental truths relative to the under- 
standing should be fully considered and agreed upon, 
before any mere framework of logical rules could be 
erected for the use of their scholars or students. 

Some of the principles or matters which the ancients 
considered as lying at the root of all logical systems, 
were the following : — 1st, Whether there was a creative 
power in the universe ? 2nd, Whether this power was 
invested with the attributes of goodness, wisdom, and 
truth ? 3d, Whether the mind of man formed a part 
of, or was made analogous to, this Divine mind or prin- 
ciple ? \th, Whether this intellectual part of man was 
of an absolutely spiritual nature, and was endowed with 
immortality ? 5th, Whether there is any thing abso- 
lutely true or absolutely good in the nature of things ? 
6th, Whether the true and the good relatively to man, 
be the same in essence as the true and good rela- 



70 INFLUENCE OF CHEISTIAN1TY 

tive to the Divine nature? *Jth, Whether man can 
form any adequate or correct conceptions of matters 
beyond the pale of the material universe ? 8th, Whe- 
ther man was an object of any particular care or inte- 
rest in the Divine economy of the world, and had any 
means of ascertaining this fact ? And, 9th, Whether 
we have any general and definite ideas in the mind, 
when we make use of such words as truth, justice, 
power, existence, creation, intelligence, benevolence, 
virtue, vice, &c. &c. ? 

We have only to cast a cursory glance over the 
writings of the ancients, to see how large a share of 
attention was paid to these, among other topics of 
a speculative character. These subjects, it must be 
remembered, were not investigated as subjects belong- 
ing exclusively to the science of mind ; but were con- 
sidered and classified in their systems as logical 
elements, and brought prominently forward, as occa- 
sions required, to fortify and recommend particular 
schemes of ratiocinative art and dialectical argumenta- 
tion. The Pythagoreans, the Sophists, the Socratists, 
Plato, Aristotle, the Sceptics, the Academics, and in 
fact every section of Grecian thinkers, took a more 
or less distinguished part in discussions of this kind, 
making them the foundation, or starting-point, of their 
respective theories of general reasoning. Whether this 
mode of philosophising was a legitimate or sound one, 
we need not at this moment stop to determine. In 
the present stage of the argument it is with the fact 
alone we have to deal, and this is indisputable. It is 
one of those things which cannot be gainsaid, in as 
much as it is supported by the entire train of specula- 



ON LOGICAL SCIENCE. 71 

tive thought for centuries, and confirmed by opposite 
and rival schools of profound learning and logical skill. 
Such, then, being the state of things when Chris- 
tianity made its appearance (always meaning by this, 
the Old and J^ew Testament conjointly), it cannot be 
a matter of surprise that it should powerfully influence 
the general current of logical thought among those who 
adopted it. And it just did so happen, that ancient 
learning and speculative curiosity were at a very low 
ebb, both at the commencement and for some time 
after the introduction of the Christian system; and 
it consequently became almost the only source from 
which any positive knowledge and learning could be 
derived. A union was now formed between the reli- 
gious and literary 'elements, which has subsisted ever 
since. Christianity was placed as a beacon on a hill, 
to be a light and a guide to all succeeding generations 
of thinkers. It threw a new element into the rational 
powers of man — it made his logical path shorter and 
smoother. There was a glare of sunshine thrown upon 
all those speculative dogmas which had previously en- 
grossed the attention, and bewildered the ingenuity of 
the most refined and intellectually gifted of the sons of 
men. This great and renovating change was effected, 
not by the introduction of philosophical dissertations 
on each or any of these dogmas ; but there was simply, 
though under external circumstances the most sublime 
and impressive, a declaration from heaven made, respect- 
ing, among other things, many of those matters which 
had previously been stumbling-blocks to all the ancient 
sages of the world. This declaration influenced the 
reasonings and judgments of man in divers modes and 



72 INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

degrees ; some implicitly believing in, and adopting it 
as a rule of thinking and acting, while others again felt 
nothing but doubt and hesitation. Still, within the 
sphere where it was proclaimed, there became insepar- 
ably amalgamated with the elements of human thought, 
certain principles of knowledge and criterions of truth, 
which were henceforward to effect great and permanent 
changes in all the grades of society, on their future 
intellectual pursuits and speculations. 

ISTow, let us just cast a retrospective glance at the 
present state of the question, up to this stage of our 
progress. Here we have presented to us an accurate 
and lengthened historical chart of logical speculation 
for several centuries, among a highly civilized people, 
who were utter strangers to all and sundry of the pecu- 
liar doctrines of the Christian system; but who had 
made, nevertheless, great advances in demonstrating 
the importance and necessity of some principles which 
the human understanding required, in order to impart 
confidence to its decisions, and to point out that path 
it might beneficially and profitably take in all its move- 
ments and aspirations. The philosophers among this 
people were possessed of intellectual endowments of the 
highest order — endowments which have never been 
surpassed by any subsequent class of human beings, 
and which are even at the present moment objects of 
deep-felt wonder and admiration. They are one and 
all engaged in schemes for the improvement of the 
mind, and, above all, in giving a right direction, and 
imparting a strength to the reasoning faculty, which 
they considered as the sole instrument for the discovery 
and promulgation of truth, which they affirmed was the 



OK LOGICAL SCIENCE. 73 

only object interesting to man as a citizen of the uni- 
verse. For this purpose they examined the structure 
of then: own minds with the utmost assiduity and care. 
They recognised certain elementary principles shadowed 
forth with more or less distinctness, on which their 
respective ratiocinative systems vitally depended. These 
principles were grappled with, discussed, analysed, 
viewed in every possible aspect, and assayed to be de- 
veloped with marvellous acuteness and philosophical 
skill. Yet no firm decision could be come to on any 
of them. Universal doubt enveloped the understand- 
ings of the sages. They placed doubt against doubt, 
and hope against hope. For want of the requisite ele- 
mentary knowledge of which they were in search, 
partisans ridiculed the systems of each other with keen 
and unsparing bitterness. And after ages of philo- 
sophical strife, without a parallel in the history of 
mankind, they all virtually, on quitting the stage of 
life, announced their deep and solemn conviction, that 
until these questions were placed upon a firmer basis, 
the human understanding was doomed to perpetual 
doubt, and that human life in all its aspects, and with 
all its boasted knowledge and science, was nothing 
better than an illusion and a dream. 

Such precisely was the state of the philosophic mind 
of the world at the Christian era. It was in the most 
disconsolate and forlorn condition. Every thing around 
it looked dark, impenetrable, and cheerless. There 
seemed an impassable gulf between its capabilities 
and its wants. Well ; there suddenly appeared a theo- 
logical system, which excited a surprising influence 
over the minds of those who espoused it. Though its 



74 INFLUENCE OP CHRISTIANITY 

professed object was not to teach logical philosophy, 
yet it spoke of certain things, laid down certain 
principles, gave authoritative judgments on particular 
questions, and treated of the general mass of human 
knowledge and scientific evidence in a tone and manner 
altogether new to mankind. This religious creed was 
embraced by vast bodies of people, among whom the 
learned and the philosophic formed no inconsiderable 
portion. It extended from province to province, and 
from kingdom to kingdom. It changed the entire face 
of human society. It entered into an alliance with true 
knowledge and science of all kinds, which revolving 
ages have not only not weakened, but have rendered 
more indissoluble and lasting. It has in fact influenced, 
more or less, all the reasonings, the discussions, the 
argumentations, and controversies of mankind, from the 
first hour of its introduction to the present moment. 

!STow, why, and in what manner, has this been done ? 
These are important questions to be answered. Let us 
just refer back to some of those primary doctrines which 
the Grecian sages considered as necessarily and essen- 
tially connected with every regular and formal system 
of ratiocinative philosophy. Among the number of 
these we recognise the important and interesting prin- 
ciple of a Divine Creator of the universe. This, Chris- 
tianity affirmed in the most pointed and emphatic 
manner, was a true principle. Even the wisest and 
most profound of the ancients saw this grand truth, 
but " darkly, as through a glass." Then, again, we 
have the declaration, that this external universe, with 
all its manifold beauties and wonders, was actually 
made, such as we find it, by this supreme and intelli- 



ON LOGICAL SCIENCE. 75 

gent Being ; that this Being was really the centre of 
all wisdom, goodness, and truth ; that He made man a 
living and spiritual soul ; that good and evil were posi- 
tive and absolute things or existences ; that what was 
good and true, vicious and false, relative to man, were 
likewise good and true, vicious and false, relative to 
his Maker ; that man was the object of God's benevo- 
lence and providential care ; that the soul of man was 
immortal; and that it was possible for the human 
creature to form to himself certain mental conceptions 
of the things appertaining to spiritual life, and to an- 
other state of existence. 

These were a few only of the elementary and gene- 
ral truths which revelation made known to the world 
after its own mode and fashion. And it is quite plain 
to demonstration, that these truths must have altered 
the entire framework of reasoning on every thing con- 
nected — no matter how remotely — with human nature, 
from the period they were received as canons of scien- 
tific thought among the civilized nations of the earth, 
till the present day. There can be no dispute on this 
point, I conceive, if we consider for a moment the inti- 
mate connexion which, from the nature of things, sub- 
sists between these primary truths and the science or 
art of argumentation, as this is developed in all the 
varied departments of human science and speculation. 

The logical conclusions which the ancient philoso- 
phers arrived at relative to this entire question, strik- 
ingly shew us the general bearings and correctness of 
these remarks. They all saw, for example, that the 
doctrine of a Deity was of essential importance, even 
in reference to the mere dialectical forms of thought, 



76 LOGICAL CONCLUSIONS OF 

when these forms were tested by, and made to bear 
upon, the fundamental question of truth itself; for 
why should there be any thing lofty or engaging about 
truth — why an object of incessant inquiry and eager 
pursuit — or why should it be even truth at all — if 
there were no living and intelligent principle whatever 
in the universe — nothing save a mere series of mate- 
rial events fleeting before the outward senses of man ? 
This was the question which all the ancient thinkers 
put to themselves ; and it was just a question of that 
description on which, to men in their precise position, 
there would be divers and discordant opinions and 
judgments. But still the question never lost any of 
its inherent interest, notwithstanding the different 
solutions given to it. Every philosopher of any mark 
in the heathen world, saw clearly that he could make 
no progress whatever in any kind of rational know- 
ledge — could move in no possible direction — could 
carry no argumentative train of thought, relative to 
human nature, to any thing like a satisfactory conclu- 
sion — unless this problem were solved in some fashion 
or other. A principle of intelligent vitality must be 
established at -any cost, whatever might be the num- 
ber and varied hues of these material or fantastical 
adjuncts with which the subtil ty or the whims of man 
might clog or encumber it. 

And the same observations apply to the great pro- 
blems in morals. Why was a thing good or evil ? or 
why, if these terms were merely expressive of the 
naked differences of things, or carried no ultimate re- 
sults with them beyond the transitory feelings or per- 
ceptions of the present moment, did mankind attach 



THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 77 

to them any importance at all? Why talked about, 
discussed, analysed, and moulded into the forms of a 
logical system ? The answer is, that the ideal of the 
good stood upon precisely the same basis, in the eyes 
of the philosophers of Greece, as did the ideal of the 
true ; — both must have a direct reference to some vital 
and intelligent principle ; otherwise, to talk of this or 
that action being good or bad, moral or immoral, 
praiseworthy or blamable, was at bottom sheer folly 
and delusion. They viewed the mind of man in all its 
totality, and more especially directed their attention to 
that attribute of its nature which was immediately en- 
gaged in the pursuit and communication of truth ; and, 
scanning this attribute from every angular position 
in which it could present itself to the understandings 
of men, they saw that it revolved, as on a fixed centre, 
upon the great and interesting truth, that there was in 
some unknown sphere of creation some living and 
active power, which inspired men with ideas on these 
topics, and forced upon them that indissoluble con- 
nexion which subsisted between what was true, and 
good, and beautiful, and the preservation of their own 
existence and happiness as human creatures. Nine- 
tenths of all ancient speculation are constituted of 
little else, save the constant efforts to penetrate into 
the secret connexion between what is called the science 
or knowledge of human nature, and the existence, at- 
tributes, and modes of government, of Him who was 
considered as the great author and sustainer of it. 

Now, I am free to admit that there have been phi- 
losophers of great powers and reputation who have 
maintained, that this attempt of the ancient sages to 



78 LOGICAL CONCLUSIONS OF 

grasp and seize hold of the ultimate principles of all 
knowledge, was an unauthorized mode of proceeding, 
and was not sanctioned by any sound or rational view 
of the legitimate purposes or ends of all philosophical 
inquiries. This mode of argumentative interpretation, 
it has been affirmed, was their great besetting sin — the 
" slough of despond " into which they plunged them- 
selves and their followers, and out of which they never 
could be extricated. Plato, Aristotle, and others, took 
too high an aim in their logical philosophy, and conse- 
quently fell short of their object. Had they confined 
themselves to the strict or naked forms of reasoning, 
they would have done good service ; but, seeking to 
go beyond them, and to drag into open day certain 
mental conceptions but faintly shadowed forth in the 
intellect, they were continually kicking against the 
pricks, and enveloping the plain rules of practical rea- 
son in doubt and obscurity. Their views were un- 
questionably noble and imposing, but they were im- 
practicable and visionary. Had they known, it is 
said, the modern rules and principles of philosophizing, 
they would not have fallen into this great error. They 
would have seen the folly and inutility of all such 
questions as they raised respecting a First Cause, the 
nature of the thinking principle, good and evil, and 
the like, and would have contented themselves with a 
simple collection of facts, and of pointing out the best 
modes of classifying and arranging them for general 
use and comprehension. 

I beg to observe, that whether the philosophical method 
of the ancients was right or wrong, does not immediately 
concern the chief argument now under consideration. 



THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 79 

Investigations into the legitimacy of this method will 
occasionally present themselves in subsequent parts of 
this volume ; but, in the mean time, I assume that this 
method which I have already mentioned, was followed — 
that it exercised a great influence on the Greek logi- 
cians who developed it — and that it was considered by 
them as being vitally connected with every mere formal 
system of dialectical and ratiocinative knowledge. It 
is therefore not necessary, for the establishment of the 
points I have in view, to prove the logical philosophy 
of the Greeks to be the very best that could be adopted. 
All I require is the fact, that they did pursue a certain 
line of argument and discussion on the abstract nature 
and influence of those principles on which they con- 
ceived their respective systems of logic rested. This is 
all that my position needs at the present moment. 

By way of vindicating, however, the Grecian thinkers 
for the mode they adopted in throwing so many ab- 
stract questions into their logical theories and specula- 
tions, we may be allowed to make, in passing, a single 
remark on the subject. What they did was quite 
natural. Human nature, constituted as it is, could 
have suggested no other course. It was not a matter 
of choice with them, nor has it ever been a matter of 
choice with philosophers of any subsequent age, whether 
they had the power to check all inquiries into the first 
principles of knowledge. We must bear in mind, par- 
ticularly on this occasion, that the science of logic is 
not a thing which possesses an independent existence, 
but is merely the exponent of all other subjects or de- 
partments of human inquiry which force themselves on 
the attention of mankind. This science takes especial 



80 INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

notice only of that which is true of every other science ; 
and it has not a body of truth of its own apart from 
other subjects over which it exercises an authoritative 
control. Consequently, it necessarily becomes a ques- 
tion of eager solution, how shall we discuss this or that 
kind of truth which presents itself to the understand- 
ing ? How shall we test it, deal with it, communicate 
it, defend it, refute it, admit it, or make it an object of 
belief or principle of action ? We can only do this by 
tracing it back in all cases to the sources from whence 
it springs. The mere forms of argumentation will 
teach us nothing; they will not suffice to bring the 
whole truth before the mind, as it were, face to face. 
We are compelled, therefore, to fall back upon those 
fundamental principles or conceptions of the intellect 
from which such and such truths are supposed to be 
derived, or of whose existence and influence they are 
at once an explanatory and illustrative proof. Were 
the light of revelation again entirely withdrawn from 
mankind, and no remembrance of what it taught on 
particular philosophical points left among our race, the 
speculative part of man would have to travel precisely 
the same route as the heathen sages of old did. They 
would strive, but strive in vain, to obtain some rational 
and consistent theory on which to arrange such logical 
systems as necessity required, or curiosity prompted. 

Reverting now to our original proposition, namely, 
the influence which the Christian system has exercised 
over the logical understanding of the world since its 
introduction, we shall briefly state that this influence 
has been both powerful and salutary. The modes in 
which it has manifested itself have been numerous. 



ON LOGICAL SCIENCE. 81 

and of a varied character, not susceptible indeed of 
very nicely defined limits, but sufficiently mapped out 
in their ordinary operation, as to enable us to classify 
them, in some measure, under general heads. A few 
of these we shall briefly advert to. 

In the first place, the Christian dispensation deeply 
impressed the minds of men with the value and im- 
portance of truth. The sacred writings depict it in the 
most lovely and glowing colours, and represent it as 
one of the most conspicuous attributes of Deity itself. 
It is compared to the light, to the eye, to the soul of 
the world. It is affirmed to be intimately, nay neces- 
sarily, connected with happiness here, and immortality 
hereafter. Its pursuit is commanded to be the ever 
active impulse, and its acquisition the crowning glory 
of life. Both the precept and the spirit of the gospel 
tell us, that the love of truth is a powerful stimulus to 
all grand and noble enterprises. It is the genuine 
impulse to all impartial inquiry — of all effective com- 
munications from one mind to another — to all the 
charities, duties, and improvements of life. It com- 
ports more with a passionate thirst after real and use- 
ful knowledge, than with a petty and shallow curiosity. 
The glorious powers of speech are but tinkling cymbals 
without it, and the most gorgeous rhetoric a noisy and 
profitless waste of words. Wherever the love of truth 
reigns in the breast, it fires the whole man, and lightens 
up his mind for grand and useful deeds. It is the 
basis of the patriot's heroism and the martyr's renown. 
Without it the power of argument, the pungency of 
wit, the bitter severity of sarcasm, the exercise of dia- 
lectic skill, the pompous display of declamation, are but 



82 MORAL OBLIGATION OF PURSUING TRUTH. 

the fleeting and evanescent shadows of unsubstantial 
realities. 

Such are the sentiments on truth which revelation 
has inculcated into the minds of all its followers, since 
it was known to the world ; and it is no unwarrantable 
assumption to affirm, that their power over the ordi- 
nary, as well as the philosophic mind of Christian 
societies, must have been great beyond all calculation 
in every age of the Church. 

Christian doctrine has not only invariably represented 
truth, and an earnest and sincere pursuit of it, as ob- 
jects possessing of themselves great innate beauty and 
interest, but it has hedged them around with a moral 
sacredness of inestimable value. We are not allowed 
to trifle with truth on any serious or important sub- 
ject ; nor do the principles of Christian ethics permit 
our playing the sophist, or of following any line of 
argumentation which has no other object in view than 
to produce a quibbling and captious spirit, or to foster 
feelings of indifference as to the value and extension of 
truth generally. All careless, apathetic, and latitudi- 
narian opinions and practices on this point, are consi- 
dered reprehensible, and are in direct hostility to the 
letter and spirit of the Christian scheme. What is 
foolish, as well as false, is prohibited and censured. 

And of so much importance has the moral obligation 
of pursuing truth appeared to some modern writers, 
that the position has been formally laid down in philo- 
sophical treatises, and illustrated at great length, that 
man is responsible to his Maker for his belief as well as 
for his outward conduct. It is as criminal to think 
erroneously as to act improperly. Indeed it is one of 



THE DOCTEINE OF AUTHOEITY. 83 

the plain and explicit declarations of the Scriptures, 
that man is responsible for his creed — responsible for 
his conduct in the pursuit of truth — responsible for his 
manner of promulgating that truth — and responsible, 
too, for the way and degree in which he allows that 
truth to influence his passions, feelings, thoughts, 
emotions, and judgments. And this varied responsibi- 
lity is based upon the reason, that these Scriptures 
treat of things of unutterable magnitude and incon- 
ceivable importance to every human being. Examina- 
tion, inquiry, a desire for information or knowledge, 
are demanded of every one ; not a mere passing glance 
at, or superficial dipping into evidence and proof, but 
that full, active, unbiased, and candid train of investi- 
gation, which distinguishes the unfettered and unpre- 
judiced mind. This alone can discharge the full weight 
of obligation to seek and to know that which is true. 
The very nature of revelation presupposes this obliga- 
tion, and is inconceivable without it. 

We come now to glance directly, though briefly, at 
the great principle of authority itself, which has exer- 
cised, since the introduction of the Christian code, such 
a vast influence on our modes and maxims of reasoning, 
both scientific and formal, and with which principle the 
preceding remarks have an obvious connexion. The 
doctrine of authority was not unknown to the ancient 
philosophers, but with them it had no firm basis on 
which to rest. To give credence to the statements and 
declarations of others, and to constitute this depen- 
dence on their veracity and judgment, an active prin- 
ciple in the government of our own understandings 
and conduct is an original or primary law of human 



84 LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND ARGUMENT. 

nature, the end or purpose of which must be obvious 
to the most ordinary capacity. Without it, there never 
could have been any decided progress in knowledge 
whatever, beyond the mere progress of the individual 
himself. The information of one age could never have 
been transmitted to another. But this original power 
of the mind is susceptible of important and beneficial 
directions, and can be strengthened, weakened, regu- 
lated, expanded, and moulded to a prodigious extent, 
by other and extraneous influences. And this is the 
reason why it plays such an important part in the his- 
tory of the logical and philosophical understandings of 
mankind. 

Every Christian community places itself in a logical 
position, and takes its stand upon certain abstract and 
philosophical principles and truths ; and it decidedly 
and unhesitatingly takes the initiative in all questions 
which come before it for rational discussion and adju- 
dication. The liberty of thought and argument which 
it proclaims and allows, is not of an absolute, but con- 
ditional character. It does not empower its members 
to speak, to discuss, to argue, and reason as they 
please : this has" never been allowed since Christian 
societies were instituted ; nor does it seem a likely 
occurrence, that such a measure of liberty of discussion 
will ever be meted out in any country where the Bible 
is upheld and revered. The fact is, that intellectual 
liberty is apt to run into " licentiousness," as well as 
social and civil liberty ; and hence the necessity of 
some stringent checks upon the movements of the for- 
mer as well as on the latter. To exercise the reasoning 
faculties in any way, or on any subject we think fit, is 



THE PRINCIPLE OF ECCLESIASTICAL AUTHORITY. 85 

a liberty which we can only enjoy under special and 
conventional sanctions. More than this no country 
can possibly allow; and it may well be questioned 
whether a right to absolute and indiscriminate discus- 
sion can be exercised in any state of human society, 
however rude or barbarous. 

The question of ecclesiastical authority, viewed in 
relation to logical philosophy, opens out a wide range 
of topics for our special contemplation. This authority 
may be considered under two aspects — internal and 
external. The internal influence manifests itself much 
in the same way as we have just noticed, in its indirect 
control of the judgment, and in the modifications of 
our sentiments, opinions, and decisions on matters of 
moment and interest. We are swayed in this manner 
in every direction, and to a great extent. And the 
more numerous the religious sects of any country are, 
the more is this internal or secret power over the logical 
forms and conclusions of the understanding brought 
into operation. The various shades of opinion on fun- 
damental doctrines of faith and practice, the different 
systems of church government, and the diversities of 
rituals and observances, naturally give rise to nice dis- 
criminations of the judgment, and introduce into social 
and religious communities an entire code of logical and 
argumentative canons, with a view of smoothing down 
the angular prominences of sectarian bitterness and 
strife, and of giving a free currency to the courtesies 
and amenities of human life. 

The external manifestations of the principle of 
ecclesiastical authority are of a more bold and decided 
character than the internal, and may be viewed in a 



86 FORCE OF PUBLIC OPINION. 

twofold light ; — as expressions of public opinion, and 
as rules or principles of legal and judicial prohibition. 

The force and influence of public sentiment or opinion 
have been powerfully augmented since the Christian 
era. They have also been more concentrated and uni- 
form in their operation, in proportion as compulsory 
prohibitions have become less numerous and severe. 
The very liberty of thought which has been allowed to 
the philosophic mind of society at large, has added 
both to its power and to the refinement and spirituality 
of public censure and reproof. The authority of public 
opinion has become a natural element of the social in- 
tellect, — pervading all its minutest movements and 
inclinations, and guiding and moulding its logical 
conclusions in conformity to certain pre-established 
doctrines and principles. This species of authority is 
sufficiently yielding and plastic as to allow great lati- 
tude of thought and discussion ; but there are limits to 
this indulgence, though not susceptible of practical 
definition, beyond which it is not permitted that any 
member of society should pass. 

All the great and interesting branches of science and 
inquiry, and mare especially those in which logical 
forms and rules are most indispensable, are conducted 
in every Christian state under the absolute control and 
supervision of this public opinion and authority. The 
sciences of politics, morals, mental philosophy, and 
theology, taken in their widest acceptation, where logi- 
cal principles and forms constitute such essential ele- 
ments in their development and elucidation, afford 
striking illustrations of the extreme and sensitive vigi- 
lance which is exerted by the community over the 



FOKCE OF PUBLIC OPINION. 87 

modes of investigation pursued by the cultivators of 
these several branches of inquiry; and how intensely 
anxious the public mind becomes, that there should be 
found no conclusions of the philosophic judgment, save 
those which are in strict and lofty harmony with the 
leading principles, doctrines, and usages of theological 
truth. 

In questions relative to political science, for example, 
it not unfrequently happens, that some particular prin- 
ciple of that science is prominently brought before the 
public eye, and gives rise to long and animated discus- 
sions. If the principle in question should be carried to 
its full or ultra-logical consequences — and if these con- 
sequences appear to militate in any degree against some 
other general principle or canon of theological or phi- 
losophic truth, which the community at large have 
previously incorporated with their established creed — 
public opinion then makes her voice heard ; calls back 
with potent authority the disputers to first principles ; 
puts an end, perchance, to the discussion ; and pro- 
nounces either for a total rejection of the obnoxious 
principle in question, or such a modification of it as 
shall comport with certain other elementary and vital 
truths which constitute the established faith of the 
country. 

Thousands of instances illustrative of such proceed- 
ings might be gathered from the legislative assemblies 
of every country in Europe. Indeed, it seldom happens 
that a single session of the British Parliament passes 
over, which does not offer some pointed confirmation of 
this mode of dealing with public questions. And the 
same thing may be affirmed relative to philosophic 



88 PHILOSOPHY OF SCRIPTURE. 

books and treatises on all the sciences we have just 
enumerated. Public opinion displays here, too, its 
power in the most effective and absolute manner. 
Every work of this kind, as soon as it makes its appear- 
ance, is immediately tested by certain abstract principles 
of philosophy and theology ; and if found to run counter 
to any of these, in an essential degree, it is forthwith 
censured, and ultimately repudiated by the entire com- 
munity. In fact, the logical understanding, in every 
movement and manifestation it assumes, is laid under 
a solemn and imperative interdict ; and it is only by a 
tacit acquiescence in the truth of certain elementary 
principles of human knowledge that its exercise is 
tolerated, and the result of its labours become in some 
measure appreciated, and introduced to public favour. 
Even physical science itself, apparently so far removed 
from some of those principles of abstract thought which 
mingle themselves with the sciences of human nature, is 
not altogether removed from the influence of the philo- 
sophy of Scripture. The logical arrangements and sys- 
tems of material inquiry have invariably been scrupulously 
watched, lest any thing might creep into them inimical 
to one or more of those fundamental maxims on which 
the Divine record rests. That Christian communities 
have been, and are even at this moment, jealous to a 
high degree on this point, is a truth which cannot be 
disputed. The logical arrangement of facts, the classi- 
fication of principles, the construction of theories, and 
indeed the whole framework of what is termed the 
philosophy of induction, bear evident marks in their 
history of the influence of ecclesiastical authority. And 
it is little better than a naked truism to declare, that, 



LICENTIOUS AND INJURIOUS DISCUSSIONS. 89 

however splendid a philosopher's reputation and fame, 
and unbounded his knowledge, he has it not in his 
power to rear any regularly concatenated system of 
material philosophy — to give his opinions any logical 
weight in the world of letters — totally irrespective of 
those general mental principles on which the Scriptures 
are grounded. He cannot take a first step in any 
direction towards such an object without their aid, 
countenance, and support. 

When, however, public opinion becomes outraged, 
and is no longer able to check what the community 
consider as licentious and injurious discussions and 
reasonings, either of a verbal or written character, we 
immediately see the manifestation of penal authority. 
This species of coercion has existed in every country 
since Christianity was incorporated with state affairs. 
Though this power of bodily punishment has been 
gradually diminishing in most nations for a long time 
past, yet none have entirely renounced it. We seldom 
now take away liberty or life for opinion's sake ; but 
there is still a measure of punishment meted out to 
every obstinate and perverse reviler of the established 
creed of a whole people. And it seems to me a diffi- 
cult thing to conceive, how penal exercises of authority 
could be entirely dispensed with, as long as Christianity 
forms "a part and parcel" of the law of every civilized 
country. 

Now, viewing the principle of authority in all its 
phases, we cannot fail to recognise its prodigious in- 
fluence over the logical and philosophical mind of man- 
kind. It compels them to pay a respect and deference 
to certain primary and vital principles of human specu- 



90 MENTAL MOVEMENTS OF MANKIND. 

lation. It places a complete barrier on absolute liberty 
of thought and argumentation; and by reason of its 
connexion, directly and indirectly, with all the civil, 
political, and social institutions of a country, it exer- 
cises in the outset of life that portion of influence over 
every rising generation, which is generally effective in 
checking any violent infringement of its rules and com- 
mands. All the avenues of instruction and education 
in every state, are placed under the absolute control of 
this Christian authority. Universities, colleges, public 
and private schools, and seminaries, are all regulated 
by its injunctions ; and the entire mass of human know- 
ledge, both practical and speculative, is pervaded in 
even the most minute sections of it, and to its very 
heart's core, with that restraining and directing power 
which the declarations of the Christian code possess. 

The sacred writings have also exercised a powerful 
influence over the logical and philosophical mind of 
Christendom, by the inimitable conciseness and the 
simplicity of their statements. Being far removed 
from every form of dialectical abstruseness and mysti- 
cal subtilty, and presenting principles and maxims of 
such a logical cast as to meet the wants and satisfy the 
curiosity of every state or grade of intellectual advance- 
ment, a steadiness is imparted to the mental move- 
ments of mankind which nothing but these writings 
could supply. It is chiefly from this cause, that when 
we cast a cursory glance over the controversies and 
argumentative conflicts in which men have been en- 
gaged for centuries, we so readily recognise that prin- 
ciple of order and uniformity which every way pervades 
them. Whenever controversial intemperances and 



AUTHOEITY AND INFLUENCE OF SCRirTUKE. 91 

excesses have broken out, they have immediately been 
corrected by an appeal to the letter and spirit of the 
Christian canons of argumentation. The wars of the 
mind, like the wars of the body, have been stripped of 
their most revolting features, by the conciliatory and 
candid spirit conspicuously displayed in the Christian 
profession. 

The inspired volume is the great book of human 
nature, where all its intellectual principles, and moral 
springs of action, are displayed with surprising accu- 
racy and distinctness. The entire man — body and 
spirit — is here portrayed in every conceivable position, 
and under the influence of every conceivable motive. 
As the science or art of logic has the great field of the 
inward man for its exclusive display, and as its maxims 
and rules call into requisition nearly the whole train of 
intellectual faculties, and exercises moreover a reflex 
effect upon his moral affections and sensibilities — we 
can perceive at once, that such an inspired record, from 
its very fulness, completeness, and universality, must 
be an important instrument for guiding the reason of 
mankind, and pointing out those paths they ought to 
take, amid the perplexing labyrinths that surround 
them. 

It may be alleged that this authority and influence 
of the Scriptures over logical science, are altogether 
indefensible ; that they tend to circumscribe and fetter 
the human mind; and that they proceed upon an 
erroneous principle, relative to the nature and purposes 
of human knowledge. To these statements I need 
offer no direct arguments at the present moment. It 
is only with the facts of the case I have here to do 



92 CONNEXION BETWEEN THE THEORY 

— to attend to these in a historical sketch is all that is 
incumbent upon me. Whatever opinions some philo- 
sophers may entertain as to the authenticity or value 
of the Bible, the facts of its influence over the reason- 
ing faculties of mankind cannot be doubted. They 
stand out in prominent relief in every page of history 
since the Christian era. To those who question the 
legitimacy of theological influence over the logical 
understanding, we must refer them to subsequent por- 
tions of this treatise, which will develop reasons and 
statements bearing directly on the abstract merits of 
the entire question. 

In bringing those general observations to a close, we 
beg to remind the reader, that the chief source of all 
this direct and indirect theological influence over 
logical systems, both theoretical and practical, arises 
from the fact, that the Bible pronounces authori- 
tatively and uncompromisingly on the truth and rea- 
sonableness of certain mental principles — which prin- 
ciples lie at the root of every system of rational logic 
or argumentation. The intimate and necessary con- 
nexion subsisting between the theoretical and prac- 
tical part of logical science, was clearly seen by the 
heathen world; but its philosophers and logicians 
had no means or power to develop that connexion 
in such a way — to encircle it with such safeguards, and 
to enforce it with such penalties — as to constitute it an 
active and ever-living element in the understandings of 
mankind. These logical philosophers were powerless 
for such a task, although they clearly saw that it was re- 
quisite to be undertaken and executed before the great 
object they aimed at could possibly be attained. This 



AND PRACTICE OF LOGICAL SCIENCE. 93 

important truth is confirmed by arguments, both ab- 
stract and historical, the most convincing that can be 
presented to the mind of man. Christianity came to 
the rescue, and has placed upon record certain facts 
and opinions relative to the nature, operations, and 
purposes of human reason, which are found, by large 
classes of the most intelligent and refined of our race, 
to remove much of that haziness and obscurity which 
bedimmed the intellectual vision of the sages of anti- 
quity. And the more fully these facts and opinions 
are understood, and the more universally they are 
applied to the scientific elucidation of every species of 
knowledge, in the same proportion are the boundaries 
of that knowledge extended, and the greater and more 
widely disseminated are those advantages, to all classes 
of societv, which it is calculated to confer. 



94 THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH. 



CHAPTEE V. 

LOGICAL WRITERS FROM THE CHRISTIAN ERA TILL THE 
TIME OF CHARLEMAGNE. 

The logical writers of this period of history may be 
classed under three divisions — The Fathers of the 
Church ; The Alexandrian School, or Latter Platonists ; 
and, Miscellaneous Authors. 

THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH. 

The logical speculations of the Christian Fathers, 
furnish innumerable illustrations of those principles of 
mental philosophy which abound in the Scriptures, and 
which we have in" the previous chapter endeavoured to 
point out. These writers took the volume of inspira- 
tion in their hand, and discussed all subjects of human 
inquiry through its medium and spirit. They were 
the first who openly declared for the moral obligation 
of pursuing truth, and for bringing it before the minds 
of all men, irrespective of their fortune or condition. 
The science of reasoning in their minds involved a 
serious and imperative duty ; and the interests of the 
human race, both here and hereafter, was necessarily, 



THE FATHEKS OF THE CHURCH. 95 

in their opinion, connected with the way and manner 
in which that duty was discharged. As they were 
expounders of a new system of theology, which had to 
contend with numerous and formidable difficulties, they 
had to deal directly with the understandings of men ; 
and, consequently, all legitimate and effective logical 
appliances were indispensable instruments to their 
calling. They may be considered as the greatest of all 
logical reformers and theorists — inasmuch as they 
zealously and successfully laid the foundation of all 
those broad principles of thought, connected with the 
nature, offices, and ends of truth, without a knowledge 
of which the civilisation and improvement of mankind 
could neither have been exemplified nor secured. 

It may be stated as a fact, which the general testi- 
mony of ecclesiastical history sufficiently attests, that 
the logical principles of Plato were, up to the fifth or 
sixth centuries, decidedly preferred by the fathers of 
the Church to the writings of Aristotleo The reason 
for this preference was, that Plato's philosophy, as con- 
nected with the abstract nature of truth, and the rules 
of evidence, was more in accordance with that which 
the Scriptures developed. The Platonic theory em- 
braced more elevated views of moral truth, of a Divine 
government, and of a spiritual principle in man, than 
were displayed in the writings of any other of the hea- 
then sages ; and these doctrines the Fathers considered 
as eminently corroborative of the importance which 
revelation attached to truth generally, and to those 
means in particular by which it could be attained. 
" I find," says Justin Martyr (99 a. d.), " powerful 
and inexpressible charms in the spiritual notions of 



96 WRITINGS OF JUSTIN MARTYR AND TERTULLIAN. 

Plato ; and the contemplation of his system of ideas 
carries my mind toward grand and lofty topics." St 
Athenagoras says (172 a. r>.), " Plato contemplated, 
with a lofty stretch of thought, that eternal intelli- 
gence and divinity which reason alone can combine." — 
" The idea is the first erection of the celestial Euler ; it 
is the type of all creation." 

And it may be incidentally remarked, that, in view- 
ing the Grecian logical systems as a whole, the Fathers 
of the Church were deeply impressed with the idea, 
that these systems were evidently designed to prove 
confirmatory of the abstract truths of the Scriptures ; 
inasmuch as these Grecian speculations shewed how 
far, and in what manner, the unassisted mind of man 
could advance in the path of scientific truth. We see, 
said the Fathers, the great speculative difficulties which 
lay at the root of all their logical principles and forms 
of evidence, and how totally unable the heathen sages 
were, notwithstanding their splendid powers and con- 
summate refinement, to grapple with any one of them, 
so as to disentangle themselves from the jungle of per- 
plexities in which they were doomed to spend their 
entire existence." Had we not had this notable ex- 
ample of man's innate speculative impotence so point- 
edly brought before us, one of the most powerful proofs 
of the truth and lofty origin of our creed would have 
been wanting.* 

In the apologetieal writings of Justin Martyr, Tertul- 
lian, and others, as well as in those treatises compiled 
for the purpose of demonstrating the general credibi- 
lity of the gospel history, we have the first-fruits of 

* See the Histories of Du Pin, Lardner, Mosheim, and Cave. 



WRITINGS OF JUSTIN MARTYR. 97 

the application of the logical philosophy of the Bible 
to the everyday purposes and reasonings of human 
life. We see the art of argumentation displayed in a 
manner not to be witnessed in any previous ages of 
mankind. We see here continual and stirring appeals 
to the innate feelings of men — to then' general notions 
or conceptions of right, justice, virtue, vice, &c. — to 
those principles of common sense diffused among all 
ranks of men — and to all those constitutional and 
necessary checks and safeguards which keep contro- 
versies and discussions within certain prescribed and 
commendable limits. The logical displays which the 
purely theological writings of the Fathers exhibit, or 
those beneficial effects which indirectly flowed from 
them to human inquiry generally, we make no mention 
of here, because these writings stand upon different 
grounds. But to those which are specially directed to 
the world at large, and treat of matters and things 
on which men of all ranks and stations can form an 
opinion, we owe very great obligation. They were the 
pioneers or forerunners of that enlightened system of 
philosophical and candid discussion and inquiry, which, 
both in its spirit and letter, has descended down to us 
unimpaired to the present hour. 

Justin Martyr (a. d. 90), one of the first of the 
Fathers we shall notice, is a striking example of the 
logical influence of the sacred writings. One of his 
first efforts, after he became acquainted with the Chris- 
tian system, was to obtain clear and concise notions of 
the elements of human reason. He saw the necessity 
of searching examinations and inquiries, and he steadily 



98 JUSTIN MARTYR — TATIEN. 

directed his attention to those rudimental conceptions 
which lie at the root of all rational argumentation. He 
was well acquainted with the philosophical thought of 
Greece, and he was not slow to recognise what were 
the chief stumbling-blocks which lay in the way of the 
most eminent philosophers of that country, in forming 
just opinions on the nature of truth generally, and of 
those particular laws of the human mind by which it 
can be obtained and conveyed to the minds of others. 
This led him to grapple with the philosophy of logic — 
with those primordial principles — imbedded as it were 
in the intellect of mankind. He scanned the various 
logical systems of the Pythagoreans, the Sophists, the 
Peripatetics, and Stoics, and found them all more or 
less imperfect in the correct conception of the true, as 
well as in that of the purposes or ends of all rational 
investigation. St Justin was deeply impressed with 
the solemn duty of examining into all truth; and he 
was equally impressed with the conviction, that without 
men set out, in their inquiries after it, from sound and 
rational starting-points, they could never hope to 
obtain it. These starting-points are developed in the 
Scriptures, and are to be found nowhere else.* 

Tatien (a. d. 170), who was a disciple of Justin's, 
followed in the footsteps of the master relative to his 
opinions on the nature of truth, and of the powers of 
the understanding in pursuing it. Tatien held that 
the reason of man was the supreme and loftiest faculty 
of the soul ; that it was Divine in its origin and charac- 
ter, and could be considered as a logical instrument in 

* Apologia, §§ 5, 15. Dialog, cum Triph., §§ 218, 219. 



ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL ST ATHENAGORAS. 99 

no other light, except in subjection to, and in harmony 
with the creative power of the universe.* 



LOGICIANS OF THE ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL. 

The students and philosophers of this famous semi- 
nary of learning, were of all nations and professional 
pursuits of life. And hence it is that we are obliged 
to treat of both lay and clerical writers under one and 
the same division. 

The general doctrines, it may be remarked, which 
were here taught, were of all imaginable complexions. 
We have the mysticism of the East, the Grecian specu- 
lations, and the Christian system, blended into one 
mass ; and the consequence is, that we find the logical 
systems emanating out of this Eastern sect of specula- 
tion of every description, both as to abstract principles 
and formal classification. We shall notice these writers 
or teachers of logic whom we know received their 
academical instruction here, totally irrespective of their 
professional character or mode of life. 

St Athenagoras (a. d. 170) was one of the Christian 
Fathers who received his education at Alexandria. He 
maintained, that though the faculty of reasoning is 
essentially the same in all mankind, yet it is indis- 
pensable that it should be under the guidance of some 
superior influence to reap the happiest results from its 
exercise. Unless it be based on theological principles, 
it must fall a prey to the most wild conceits and irra- 
tional crudities.")" 

* Contra Grsecos, §§ 12, 26, 31, 32. 

f Legatio pro Christianis., §§ 5, 6, 8, 15, 19. 



100 ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL — PLOTINUS, ST CLEMENT. 

Plotinus (a. d. 206) was an able and scientific logi- 
cian, but enveloped his principles and rules of reason- 
ing in abstruse and mystical speculations. " The 
human mind/' says he, " has two modes of acting and 
knowing — the one by a participation in the principle 
of intelligence, and the other by dialectic or logical 
forms. It enjoys the former when filled and illumi- 
nated with this high and refined intelligent influence ; 
and the second is enjoyed through the means of certain 
outward characters or signs, and laws of the mind im- 
parted to our natures. All the rational forms of things 
are imprinted on the mind by our Creator." 

St Clement (a. d. 218) was another distinguished 
Father of the Alexandrian school, and one who entered 
profoundly into all the philosophical questions of the 
day. He defended the rational use of dialectic or 
logical forms, on the general ground that they served 
as species of bulwarks against the attacks of sophistry 
and unbelief. " The cause of all error," says he, " and 
false judgment is, that we cannot detect the reasons on 
which the accordance or differences of things amongst 
themselves are founded; and we thus erroneously 
classify matters together which ought to be separated. 
It becomes necessary, then, to apply the art of dialec- 
tics as a useful instrument to conduct us to truth, to 
enable us to demonstrate it to others, and to protect 
and defend it from captious argumentations. But we 
must guard against the abuse of this dialectic art." 

The necessity for this precaution is forcibly pointed 
out in that portion of the writings of St Clement, in 
which he treats of the logical connexion subsisting be- 
tween faith and science, and in all those rules which 



ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL PORPHYRY, LACTANT1US, ETC. 101 

guide the understanding in every rational investigation 
or inquiry.* 

Porphyry (a. d. 22-3) was one of the most subtile 
logicians of his age. He was the author of a work on 
the Predicables of Aristotle. His chief aim is to give 
an analysis of the notions we attach to particular 
generic terms of reasoning ; such as genus, species, ac- 
cidents, contrariety, identity, and the like. " Genus/' 
says he, (i is the principle which contains the species 
and individuals placed under it, and involves the idea 
of multitude or number. If genus and species possessed 
each a separate and independent existence, or were two 
distinct and separate notions of the intellect, then on 
the first supposition they would have a corporeal 
existence ; and on the second, they would be of an 
incorporeal nature, for they would be separated from 
sensible or external things." 

There were several Fathers of the Church, as Her- 
nias, Tertullian, Arnobius, Irenaeus, and Lactantius, 
who entertained opinions that logical pursuits, especially 
when viewed through a scientific medium, were gene- 
rally inimical to the interests of revealed religion. 
Hernias wrote against the Pagan systems of philosophy ; 
and Irenaeus against the Gnostic speculations. Tertul- 
lian disliked the system of Plato, and considered the 
Academic mode of reasoning as destructive of all true 
science and wisdom. Logic, in even its most simple 
or formal shape, fell under the displeasure of Arnobius, 
who maintained, that with all its display of methodical 
arrangement and demonstrative conclusions, it was a 
very imperfect instrument for guiding us to truth. 

* Stroinat., lib. i. Ed. Paris, 1641. 



102 ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL ST AUGUSTINE, PROCLUS. 

Lactantius followed in the same strain. a That por- 
tion/' says he, " of philosophy which we call logic, is 
that which contains dialectics and the rules of reasoning. 
The Divine reason has no need of any such assistance : 
it resides not in the form of words, but in the heart, 
and it is of little moment what language we employ ; 
for it is things we seek, and not words." 

St Augustine (a. d. 354) entered into many specu- 
lations on the nature of truth, and the laws of the mind 
employed in its acquirement and promulgation; but 
his views are so much blended with other topics relat- 
ing to mental and theological philosophy, that we can- 
not readily separate the purely logical from the general 
mass of his writings. In his work, " Against the Acade- 
micians" he descants on the value of logical philosophy, 
and on the importance of cultivating a love of truth ; 
and examines at considerable length, and with much 
care, all those general principles of the mind on which 
scientific evidence appeared to him to rest. In his 
opinion, every form of scepticism is self- destructive ; 
for the bare suggestion of a doubt is a proof that there 
is such a thing as truth in existence. 
Proclus (a. d. 409) endeavoured to change the entire 
framework of human reason ; but his logical views are 
so intimately blended with his theology, that we can 
scarcely separate them for especial notice. He culti- 
vated the Greek logic, but founded upon it the East- 
ern ideas of illumination or intuition ; and this led to 
almost impenetrable darkness and mysticism. The 
human mind, according to Proclus, may be viewed 
under two great categories — identity and diversity. 
These purely primordial forms give rise to three other 



MISCELLANEOUS .ENESIDEMUS, AGRIPPA. 103 

principles — harmony, unity, and similitude. These 
three produce by their individual, as well as con- 
centrated influence, all the forms and entities which 
are displayed in the dialectic or logical processes of the 
human understanding. 

The Platonic logic was the great idol of Proclus. 
With him reasoning was the loftiest and noblest faculty 
of the mind. In his Elements of Theology, the reader 
will see in what manner he has attempted to develop 
the entire system of Platonic speculation. 

Synesius (a. d. 410) and Claudianus Mamertus (a. d. 
450) were both able expounders of the logical system 
of Aristotle. Ammonius, the son of Hermeas (a. d. 
470), was the author of a book on the Categories,* in 
which many observations will be found connected with 
the nature of classification and definition generally. 



MISCELLANEOUS writers ox logic. 

The logical scepticism of Pyrrho was again revived 
by ^Enesidemus and his followers. In the second 
chapter of his work on the doctrines of the Academi- 
cians, he treats of truth in general, and of those ques- 
tions necessarily connected with its investigation ; such 
as causation, action, chance, motion, production, de- 
struction, and the like. All his observations and 
reasonings on these points tend towards impressing the 
mind with a feeling of doubt and mistrust, even as to 
matters the most familiar and certain. 

Agrippa was the successor of -ZEnesidemus, and laid 
down five maxims relative to truth, which he considered 

* Edit. Venice, 1506. 



104 MISCELLANEOUS — FAVORIN, SEXTUS EMPIEICUS. 

were in some respects original. The first maxims ap- 
pertains to those differences which are to be found in 
all the schools of philosophy on fundamental proposi- 
tions ; the second embraces the notion of infinity in- 
volved in every chain of argumentation; the third 
relates to the uncertainty we experience relative to the 
nature of all external objects ; the fourth maxim points 
out the errors arising from our hasty or purely gratui- 
tous mode of reasoning ; and the fifth maxim indicates 
the common method of arguing in a circle. 

Favorin was a native of Aries, and considered one of 
the most profound as well as popular logicians of his 
age. He was enthusiastically attached to the entire 
doctrines of Pyrrho. Galen was his antagonist, who 
remarks, "that some recent writers, and among the 
number is Favorin, carry their doubts to such a pitch 
as to call in question the existence of the sun." 

Sextus Empiricus is, however, the most able and 
voluminous writer belonging to this sceptical school of 
logic. This author remarks, that nearly all the philo- 
sophers who had preceded him had laid down three 
principles or standards of truth, or rather three instru- 
ments for the discovery of truth and falsehood. The 
first is the natural judgment of man ; the second the 
means he takes of exercising that judgment through 
his senses and understanding; and the third is that 
action or power by which he applies these objects or 
instruments. The first standard he discards on account 
of the compound nature of man, possessing a body and 
a soul, which organization must needs give rise to many 
inward operations of thought and action which can 
never be accurately known. The second criterion is 



MISCELLANEOUS SEXTUS EMPIBICUS. 105 

refused because the impressions on our outward senses 
are variable and conflicting. The third principle is in 
like manner rejected, on account of doubts springing 
out of our organs of vision. 

The impossibility of man recognising truth under 
any circumstances, results, according to Sextus, from 
three leading considerations, — 1st, The mind itself; 
2nd, The objects with which the mind is occupied; 
and, 3d, The relations which subsist between the mind 
and these objects, or between the subject and the ob- 
ject. The author's arguments may be arranged under 
three heads or divisions. 

1st, Eelative to the mind, the subject of knowledge, 
we have sensations and conceptions. This division of 
our mental nature embraces fundamental principles of 
doubt ; for sensations and conceptions are logically 
antagonistic to each other. The treatment of the mind 
under this point of view, has given rise to the respective 
theories of the ideal and the sensual. Again, if we 
ever take sensations and conceptions separately, the 
result ends in doubt. Sensations are opposed to each 
other, and likewise conceptions ; so that we are hem- 
med in on every side, and cannot know what to believe 
or not to believe. 

2nd, With respect to all external objects it is impos- 
sible to understand their nature, fully and adequately, 
unless we can comprehend, and take within the mind's 
grasp, the entire mass of relations subsisting among 
them, and all their individual properties of every kind. 
In the world around us, we have to grope our way 
among its phenomena by the help of signs, and we are, 
in numberless cases, not able to distinguish even one 



106 MISCELLANEOUS — SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. 

sign from another. The simplicity and the diversified 
character of objects, give rise to constant doubt and 
misgivings. 

3d, "When the objective and subjective relations of 
things are duly considered, another wide field is opened 
for sceptical conclusions. Sometimes the mind acts by 
intuition, and totally irrespective of formal or artificial 
combinations of ideas ; and at other times again it is 
discursive, and conspicuously unfolds those laws of 
mind which logicians more particularly attend to. 

When human knowledge is considered logically, as 
combining certain perceptions and conceptions accord- 
ing to artistic rules, man proceeds to treat of certain 
things called definitions, categories, and arguments. 
These create confusion in minds. Definitions of all 
kinds are entirely useless. He who makes a definition 
must be in a position to know every thing that can be 
known of the thing defined. If definition is to be 
applied to one thing, it must be necessary in all ; and 
thus the mind is perpetually whisked round in a com- 
plete circle, without coming to any fixed point. If, on 
the other hand, we can dispense with definitions in 
any one case, why not be able to dispense with them 
in all? 

All categories, such as genus and species, are useless, 
one-sided, imperfect, and often completely false. If 
we consider them as purely mental conceptions or con- 
troversies of the mind, how can we determine their 
relation to external things ? For any thing we know 
to the contrary, the mental instrument may have no 
real or true relation whatever to the thing on which it 
operates. 



MISCELLANEOUS — CAPELLA, BOETHIUS, ETC. 107 

Argumentation, Sextus states in substance, combines 
general propositions with particular ones ; but, on the 
one hand, it is requisite to set out from individual 
objects in order to arrive at an universal truth; and, 
on the other hand, we must rest on universal proposi- 
tions when we are desirous of proving the reality of 
individual objects. All reasoning and logical trains of 
thought, rest upon a basis of particular things admitted 
to be false — to run in a vitious circle ; and the mind 
cannot arrive at truth, because it requires an examina- 
tion of the individual objects, without any limitation or 
exception, included in the universal proposition ; and, 
consequently, a process of sound and infallible reason- 
ing, on any thing whatever, is manifestly impossible 
for man to accomplish. 

These are the leading points in the logical scepticism 
of Sextus. It need scarcely be remarked that univer- 
sal scepticism is a thing inconceivable. It also mili- 
tates against every feeling and principle of our nature. 
The mind revolts from it as it does from the notion 
of annihilation itself. 

In the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries, there 
were several writers and expounders of logical science 
of note and reputation. Martin Capella wrote on 
dialectics. The celebrated and unfortunate Boethius 
translated the Categories of Aristotle into Latin.* 
Cassiodorus wrote several dissertations on the logical 
system of the Stagyrite, which were used as text-books 
in some of the schools in the East for a considerable 
time after the death of the commentator. His views 

" Explicatio qiiorundam Vocabulorum ad Cognitiorum Dialectica conducen- 
tionem, et Introductionem ad Logicam Aristotelis."— Toliti. 4, 161(3. 



108 MISCELLANEOUS- 

are contained in the treatise "Mhetorica Compendium" 
wherein he lays down the leading principles of logic, 
and also combines them with matters strictly apper- 
taining to rhetorical subjects. Later down the stream 
of time, we have John the Grammarian discussing logical 
systems, as well as St John Damascenus, who makes 
the following remarks on method : — " There are four 
dialectic or logical methods. The first is the division 
which separates genus and species ; the second is that 
which defines the subject by the genus; the third is 
analysis, which decomposes every part ; and the fourth 
is demonstration, which establishes the truth by means 
of the last term." This author also distinguishes ana- 
lysis by three different characters or signs — natural, 
logical, and mathematical. The first resolves compound 
ideas into their simple elements ; the second resolves 
the syllogism into its component parts ; and the third 
consists in the admitting the correctness of a given 
principle, in order to arrive at a knowledge of an im- 
portant and unknown truth. 

Isidorus of Seville, in his " De Arte Mhetorica" enters 
at some length into logical disquisitions. The abstract 
nature of propositions in general, and the doctrine of 
the syllogism, are both dwelt upon. He divides his 
subject into two leading portions ; that which is strictly 
rhetorical, appertaining to the use and choice of words ; 
and that which is dialectical or logical, and relates to 
ideas and their formal combination.* 

Following this writer, we have some logicians of dis- 
tinction in the latter period of the Byzantine empire. 
George Pachymera wrote a Compendium of Logic ; 

* Paris Edit. 1549., pp. 67, 332, 341. 



MISCELLANEOUS PACHYMEEA, PELAGIUS. 109 

Theodoras Metacliita stood as the head of a school for 
logic and eloquence at Constantinople ; and Magen- 
tinus, George Cyprius, and Michael Psellus, are com- 
monly known as assiduous cultivators of logical studies. 
David, the disciple of Leon the philosopher, wrote on 
the Categories and Predicables of Aristotle, and Blemade 
composed his Epitomes of Logical and Physical 
Science. 

Pelagius, a Syrian by birth, but connected with 
Spanish affairs, wrote on general logic and the art of 
reasoning. He flourished in the eighth century ; and 
in the after period of his life lived as a solitary hermit 
in one of the wildest and unfrequented parts of the 
kingdom of Spain. He appears to have been well 
acquainted with the works of Aristotle. 

Logic, he maintains, is conversant about three 
things ; the nature of the human understanding, the 
nature of truth, and the method of investigating and 
communicating that truth to others. 

There are three acts of the mind more immediately 
involved in every logical operation — perception, judg- 
ment, and reasoning. There are also three other 
faculties necessary to argumentation ; namely, compar- 
ing, naming, and ranging our ideas. 

There are two sources of error which vitiate our 
logical conclusions on many subjects of interest and 
importance — authority and precipitancy. The first 
induces us to reject an opinion without thoroughly 
examining it ; and precipitancy induces us to follow a 
like course, by making us content with a very super- 
ficial examination of the evidences on which certain 
opinions rest. Added to these two, there is also a 



110 MISCELLANEOUS — ALCUINUS. 

spirit of contradiction which is inimical to our progress 
in sound and rational knowledge. * 

Alcuinus (Albinus Flaccus) was an English prelate, 
who was the principal agent in the establishment of 
the public schools founded by Charlemagne towards 
the termination of the eighth century. We have 
Alcuinus' system of logic, which he divides into two 
parts — dialectics and rhetoric. His mode of arranging 
the materials of dialectics, is precisely the same as most 
of the treatises we have on this subject at this period 
of history.')- 

The eight centuries we have just past over, present 
on the whole but a dark and checkered aspect when 
viewed in connexion with the progress of rational 
knowledge and science. The good work of improve- 
ment, however, was here commenced. This was the 
epoch of the regular consolidation of European society. 
The seeds were sown which in after times were to 
yield a fruitful harvest. The true foundations and 
limits of human inquiry were distinctly, though some- 
what roughly, sketched out. A mortal struggle be- 
tween heathen speculation and revealed truth had 
been brought to a successful termination ; and the 
human mind, for the first time in its history, had for 
its guidance a solid, though still limited code of logical 
canons for all matters of deep and general interest. 
Speculations on the nature of truth became more 
rational and concentrated. Christian institutions were 
now being consolidated, and beginning to impart a 
steadiness to men's minds of incalculable importance 

* See Los Padres del Disierto. Madrid, 1564. Vol. ii. Art. St Pelagius. 
t See Dialectica et Grammatica. Folio, p. 487. 



MISCELLANEOUS CON CLUSION. Ill 

to the future intellectual movements of mankind. The 
philosophy of Scripture made itself heard in every 
corner of Christendom, and was day after day chasing 
away the clouds of mystic fanaticism and ignorance. 
Theological doctrines were silently yet steadily forming 
the basis of public opinion ; and their intimate rela- 
tions with numerous philosophical questions, which 
they touched at all points, were constantly becoming 
more clearly ascertained and defined. The remarkable 
harmony which the Christian scheme exhibited between 
the world within and the world without — the subjec- 
tive and objective existences of logicians — was of such a 
character as to satisfy, in a great measure, the minds 
of speculative men, and to induce them to make the 
leading principles of that system their common text- 
book in the investigation and promulgation of truth. 



112 ARABIAN AND JEWISH WRITERS ON LOGIC. 



CHAPTEE VI. 

ON THE ARABIAN AND JEWISH WRITERS ON LOGIC, FROM 
THE NINTH TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY. 

We cannot, in a historical sketch of logic, omit a short 
notice of the Arabian and Jewish writers on the 
science. The former, in particular, paid great atten- 
tion to it, and have left indelible proofs of their inge- 
nuity and fervour of zeal in this direction, even to the 
present hour. . 

The Arabian logical philosophy, taken as a whole, 
is a compound of three leading ingredients — the Scrip- 
ture doctrine as to the nature of truth, the Grecian 
dialectics, and the theories of the New Platonists. A 
knowledge of the general philosophy attributed to the 
Arabians, is said to have been chiefly derived from the 
teachings of some distinguished Christian thinkers, 
such as John Philoponus, Mesne of Damascus, Hor- 
nian, and others. It was through this channel that 
the writings of Aristotle and the commentaries of the 
~New Platonists were conveyed to them about the com- 
mencement of the ninth century, and which imparted 
such a powerful stimulant to their speculative subtilty 
and dialectic skill. 



ALKENDI, ALFARABI. 113 

Alkendi, a native of Bassora, a city on the Persian 
Gulf, flourished as a philosopher at the commencement 
of the ninth century. He wrote various treatises on 
the Categories, the Predicables, the Sophisms, and other 
divisions of logical science. He likewise paid great 
attention to the nature of mathematical evidence, and 
regarded it as a very necessary preliminary study to 
philosophy in general. 

Alfarabi was a logician of unrivalled skill and talent. 
He studied at the city of Bagdad, under John Mesne ; 
and the character he bore from one of his contempo- 
raries, testifies " that he penetrated the very depths of 
logic, revealed its secrets, and facilitated the under- 
standing of it. The writings which he composed are 
filled with clear observations and acute conceptions." 

Alfarabi aimed at great achievements. He was am- 
bitious of entering into the very arcana of nature, and 
extorting from her all her most hidden secrets. With 
the assistance of the formal dialectics of the Greeks, he 
essayed to develop the entire system of Oriental intui- 
tion, and to resolve all the problems connected with 
the moral and physical world. His tract Upon the 
Sciences forms a sort of dictionary, or methodical 
classification of various branches of human knowledge, 
embracing the leading principles of these several sub- 
jects of inquiry, and pointing out their logical con- 
nexion one with another. He places Divine wisdom 
at the head of all. " This science," says he, " demon- 
strates, that the objects embodied in this heavenly 
branch of knowledge raise the mind of man to the 
height of perfection. The ascending scale of his intel- 
ligence terminates at the first principle anterior to all 

H 



114 ARABIAN AND JEWISH WRITERS ON LOGIC. 

things ; this is the primordial unity, which confers 
existence and design upon every thing we see. Truth 
flows from it as its only and proper source,* 

The author's work Upon the Understanding relates 
more particularly to the connexion subsisting between 
logical forms and the ideas they represent, or to those 
processes of the intellect which are requisite for the 
full development of universal truths and propositions. 
These are not the results of any mechanical or elabo- 
rated process of the understanding, but arise out of it 
by virtue of its own innate vigour and spontaneity. 
Men can scarcely be said to be really cognisant of their 
existence, seeing that they display themselves so 
promptly and rapidly in every exercise of their rational 
powers.f 

Avicenna was another distinguished Arabian logi- 
cian. In his Treatise on Logic we find that he adopts 
the principles of Aristotle, but does not follow him 
slavishly, According to Avicenna's notions, " all 
knowledge consists in two things — representation and 
conviction. We may represent things to ourselves in 
various fashions, without, however, persuading our- 
selves of their truth. Representation is acquired by de- 
finition, or some such similar contrivance of the mind ; 
but conviction is derived from reasoning alone." The 
author also conceived that there were certain general 
and distinct conceptions of the mind which lay at the 
root of all argumentation ; and he cites the notion or 
idea of being as one of these. This conception of his 
own existence, and the existence of things around him, 

* Alfarabi, De Scientiis. Paris, 1638, pp. 35, 36. 
f Opera. Paris, p. 43. 



AVICENXA, ALGAZELI. 115 

is ever present to the mind of man. He cannot, for 
even a moment, divest himself of it.* 

Algazeli flourished as a logician in the eleventh 
century, both at Bagdad and Alexandria. In some 
essential points he differed from Avicenna, particularly 
as to the mind's power to frame universal conceptions. 
All men have not the like power of recognising and 
using these universal ideas — inasmuch as Algazeli con- 
ceives that high notions of moral worth and intellectual 
refinement are indispensable to the attainment of a 
large measure of truth. The soul of man is as a 
mirror : it reflects the truth ; but, in order to do this 
fully and faithfully, it is requisite that it should be 
pure and unsullied by vice and error. " The logical 
understanding," says he, "can perceive itself; it can 
perceive its own perception ; it can perceive what it 
produces ; it can pass from the strong to the weak, 
from the obscure to the luminous, without any essential 
change of its nature; it is strengthened instead of 
weakened by years. The derangement of the. organs 
of sensation may act upon the reasoning faculty in two 
ways — by causing a distraction of the mind, and by 
depriving it of that assistance required for judging of 
external bodies. But still our intellectual power can, 
by virtue of its own innate energy, emancipate itself 
from this double dependence." f 

The logical method of Algazeli has been charged 
with embodying a species of scientific scepticism ini- 
mical to all sound reason. His enthusiastic admiration 
of the Koran induced him to maintain that all truth 

* See Logique d'Avicene, by Vattier. Paris, 
t Logica et Philos. Cologne, 1506. 



116 ARABIAN AND JEWISH WRITERS ON LOGIC. 

should be viewed through its pages, and be submitted 
to its authority. And, in order to establish this dog- 
matic position, he argued for the uncertainty and doubt 
which naturally hang around our powers of mental 
perception. The only true antidote against absolute 
scepticism was, in his judgment, to take shelter in the 
Koran, 

In the middle of the twelfth century we have the 
doctrine of absolute logical intuition brought forward 
by Avenpace. He was a profound but mystical genius. 
He entertained a thorough contempt for dialectics of 
every form, which he considered a barren and stupify- 
ing branch of public education. Tophail, who flourished 
about the same time at Cordova in Spain, followed in 
the same mystical path. His work, The Man of Na- 
ture, is a description of a man who in infancy had been 
left in a desert, and nursed by a she-w r olf ; having no 
intercourse with mankind, but cultivating an acquaint- 
ance with nature by means of his unaided physical 
and mental powers. He is represented, as he increases 
in age, as going forward from one stage of mental con- 
templation to another, until he arrives at the perfectly 
intuitive, which rests upon Deity itself. 

These fanatic opinions created a reaction ; and many 
of the Arabian philosophers of lesser note and influence 
fell into a species of logical materialism, and considered 
all truth to be represented by, or embodied in mere 
formal technicalities and rules. The absolute scepti- 
cism to which these opinions naturally led, gave rise 
to a number of persons, professing the religious doc- 
trines of the Koran, called Talkers, who devoted them- 
selves, like the Greek Sophists, to mere dialectical 



THE TALKERS, AVERROES. 117 

exhibitions. The entire secret of their exploits in this 
way, was by throwing all questions into obscurity, and 
by dwelling on both sides of an argument with equal 
earnestness and zeal. Truth with them was a name 
only, and nothing more. 

This was the precise state of things when Averroes 
made his appearance. He was a native of Cordova in 
Spain, and flourished in the twelfth century. His 
grand aim was to give a right and powerful logical 
direction to the science of his age. He attempted to 
establish a species of eclecticism relative to the entire 
science of reasoning. Dialectical principles and systems 
were all at variance, and he strived to reconcile and 
harmonize them with each other. Being intimately 
conversant with the writings of Plato and Aristotle, 
and also with the dialectics of the Alexandrian school, 
he conceived there was a possibility of rearing a natural 
and consistent theory of truth out of the several dis- 
cordant materials before him. With this view, Averroes 
maintained it was requisite to examine the primary 
foundation of all evidence. It was clear to him that 
nature herself distinctly pointed to two kinds of evi- 
dence or truth ; to that which was within the man, 
and that which lay without him. There was an intellect, 
and there was a soul. The former takes cognisance of 
all truth as it is exhibited in universal or particular 
propositions ; while the office of the latter is to recog- 
nise those relations which subsist among the several 
phenomena of the material world. The intellect is 
active, the soul passive. The former belongs to all 
men, although possessing the attribute of distinct 
individuality, and the latter constitutes that which is 



118 ARABIAN AND JEWISH WRITERS ON LOGIC. 

individual in each man. The intellect is eternal and 
incorruptible, the soul corruptible and mortal. The 
union of the two principles is necessary to produce 
thought, as it is developed in man. What the univer- 
sal intelligence is, the result of this combination, has 
been the subject of much controversy among the critics 
on Averroes' speculations. Some view it as a decided 
pantheistical principle, while others considered it as a 
species of logical dualism. The latter opinion is the 
more common of the two ; and is supported by testi- 
mony from several works of the author, wherein he had 
to defend his philosophy against certain objections 
which the Mohammedan doctors brought against it. 
He seems to have been driven into a corner ; and, to 
extricate himself, he maintained there were two kinds 
of truth — theological and philosophical. Theology is 
simply the expression of popular belief, and is only 
relatively true ; it indicates only the outside of things. 
Philosophy possesses truth in itself; its principles and 
conclusions partake of the absolute.* 

Mr Hallam observes, that the general doctrine held 
by Averroes was, " that there is one common intelli- 
gence, — active, "immortal, indivisible, — unconnected 
with matter, the soul of the human kind ; which is not 
in any one man, because it has no material form, but 
which yet assists in the rational operations of each man's 
personal soul, and from those operations, which are 
all conversant with particulars, derives its own know- 
ledge of universals. Thus, if I understand what is 
meant, which is rather subtile, it might be said, that as 
in the common theory particular sensations furnish 

* AverroeSj Opera. Venice, 1660. 



AYERKOES. 11.9 

means to the soul of forming general ideas ; so in that 
of Averroes the ideas and judgments of separate human 
souls furnish collectively the means of that knowledge 
of universals which the one great soul of mankind alone 
can embrace. This was a theory built, as some have 
said, on the bad Arabic version of Aristotle which 
Averroes used. But whatever might have first sug- 
gested it to the philosopher of Cordova, it seems little 
else than an expansion of the Eealist hypothesis, urged 
to a degree of apparent paradox. For if the human 
soul, as an universal, possesses an objective reality, it 
must surely be intelligent ; and, being such, it may 
seem no extravagant hypothesis : though incapable of 
that demonstration, we now require in philosophy to 
suppose that it acts upon the subordinate intelligences 
of the same species, and receives impressions from them. 
By this also they would reconcile the knowledge we 
were supposed to possess of the reality of universals, 
with the acknowledged impossibility, at least in many 
cases, of representing them to the mind."* 

The Jewish writers on logical science, particularly 
for the first ten or twelve centuries of the Christian 
era, exercised no small influence on the current of 
philosophic thought in the East, and in the southern 
parts of the European continent. It would appear 
from the edict of Augustus, in the year 15 b. c, to all 
the governors of the Soman provinces, that, though 
we have no account of the Jewish philosophers indi- 
vidually, they must have been held in no small note, 
both in Spain and the south of France. They occu- 
pied chairs of philosophy and logic in all the principal 

* Lit. Middle Ages, vol. i. p. 198. 



120 ARABIAN AND JEWISH WRITERS ON LOGIC. 

schools of learning in several of these provinces, and 
particularly in the cities of Cordova and Toledo.* 

Abraham Ben Isaac was a logician of Toledo, of 
great renown. He was born in 1119, and, on account 
of his wisdom and profundity, was called the Sage. 
He wrote a work on logic, in which he adopts the 
leading principles and forms of Aristotle. 

Jehudah Ben Thibon Marimon was born in 1134, 
and distinguished for his logical attainments. He 
translated into Arabic, and wrote commentaries upon, 
the entire works of Aristotle. E. Joseph Aquichi, 
born in 1190, followed Thibon Marimon, and adopted 
the same opinions as to the nature and offices of logic 
as those contained in the commentaries alluded to. 

Among all the Jewish writers on logic, Moses Mai- 
monides is the most distinguished. He was a native 
of Cordova. He is the author of a work on logic 
called Miloth Higayon. This treatise was originally 
written in the Arabic language ; but, after the death of 
the author, it w r as translated into Hebrew by Moses 
Eben Tibon. Maimonicles follows Aristotle's method, 
though he endeavours to make it applicable to his own 
peculiar theological views. 

* Semaeli David. 






LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 121 



CHAPTEE VII. 

ON THE SCHOLASTIC LOGICIAN'S FROM THE COMMENCEMENT 
OF THE NINTH, TILL THE EEVIVAL OF LETTEES IN ITALY 
IN THE MIDDLE OF THE FOURTEENTH, CENTURY. 

The logical philosophy of the scholastic ages is closely 
identified with mental science itself; so much so, in- 
deed, that it becomes a difficult task to keep always in 
view the radical distinction between that science, and 
the purely dialectic forms or systems which are ever 
obtruded on our notice in the abstract speculations of 
the middle ages. This difficulty must be our apology 
for such passages, in this chapter, as may appear to 
confound or blend together the two branches of know- 
ledge. 

The writings of the schoolmen present, at first sight, 
a huge and disorderly mass of thought. Extending as 
they do over nearly six centuries, we are only able to 
catch here and there the more bold and rugged parts 
of it. But by dint of keeping the mental eye fixed for 
a period on the vast materials around us, we gradually 
begin to see light gleaming through the rents and 
chinks of the apparently solid and impenetrable struc- 
ture, and to recognise many of the primary and indivi- 



122 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

dual elements which compose it. Though treating of 
all things and subjects which can come under the ob- 
servation of thinking creatures, yet there is one conspi- 
cuous feature in the scholastic literature, — namely, its 
logical or dialectic character. Viewed as a whole, it 
was essentially one grand and magnificent organon for 
the discovery and dissemination of truth. This was its 
prominent and ostensible object in all its phases and 
vicissitudes. It aimed to give a reason for every thing ; 
from Deity itself to the most insignificant material 
object. It was constantly in search of some splendid 
and infallible logical method, which should conduct the 
understandings of men to a full and perfect knowledge 
of all truth. 

We are very apt to imagine that the logical philoso- 
phy of the middle ages was altogether of a purely 
formal character, and solely confined to sheer techni- 
calities and syllogistic rules. But this was not the 
case. The grand source of all the controversies and 
disputations of which we read, was not the logical vali- 
dity of the formal, but the logical validity and value of 
the mental principles of reasoning ; which principles, 
as the philosophers of these times conceived, lay at the 
root of all formal rules of argument, and were, in fact, 
the only things which imparted life and interest to 
them. Hence it is that we find every scholastic logician 
of any mark had some definite system of mental prin- 
ciples and maxims to guide him in all his philosophical 
inquiries ; and though he might use the mere formal 
portions of logical instruction as a help to his labours, 
or as an instrument to express his meaning, yet he 
never rested the importance of his cause, nor the 



LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 123 

strength of his conclusions, upon such a narrpw and 
insecure basis. It was always to the great and general 
principles of reasoning to which he looked forward for 
the overthrow of a rival, or the establishment of his 
own fame as a solid and original thinker. ~No scho- 
lastic logician was ever great, even in his own day, or 
in his own university chair, from his mere skilful and 
adroit management of the armoury of formal logic. It 
was as necessary to the attainment of reputation then 
as it is now, that a reasoner should rise above the low 
jugglery of logical dilemmas and syllogistic conundrums. 
All the really great men of the middle ages had to lay 
these aside, and take their stand upon those compre- 
hensive principles of mind which are called into requi- 
sition in all argumentative trains of thought, employed 
in the development or illustration of fundamental and 
vital truths. 

To the student and ordinary reader, there are certain 
characteristics which belong to the scholastic logic, 
viewed as an entire system, which it is requisite to 
know, in order to fully comprehend its bearings and 
import. On some of these we shall make a few brief 
observations. 

One of the prominent features of the scholastic 
philosophy is, that its cultivators sought for their re- 
spective logical methods among the principles of human 
nature, or within those sciences which more immediately 
spring out of, or are based upon, man's mental and 
moral constitution. They looked at him in a social, 
political, moral, thinking, and religious aspect. It was 
in these provinces of the inward man that they carried 
on their logical warfare. The abstract evidence derived 



124 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

from a purely deductive science, like that of mathema- 
tics, was seldom or ever noticed ; and as to any peculiar 
philosophical interest being involved in mere physical 
phenomena, this never once entered into their minds. 
The outward world had but few logical charms for 
them. It was to humanity alone, in its strictest signi- 
fication and form, that they paid attention. The reason 
of this is apparent ; it lies on the very surface of things. 
Opinions on the sciences of human nature were more 
important, and also more discordant in their elements ; 
and here we recognise at once, both cause and effect 
for all that argumentative turmoil, and subtile disputa- 
tion, so conspicuously portrayed in the middle ages. 
These disputes touched the sympathetic cords of huma- 
nity in all directions. Every logical method for the 
discovery or promulgation of truth was considered as 
having a direct reference to some vital, social, political, 
or religious principle, intimately involved in the very 
constitution of society itself; and therefore the discus- 
sion of every such logical method was to be carefully 
watched, and kept within proper and orthodox limits. 
Though morals, politics, social and mental philoso- 
phy, were severally embraced in the scholastic disputa- 
tions, yet the theological element greatly predominated 
over all these topics. The logic of the schools had a 
strong and direct religious bearing or purpose. It was 
illustrated and enforced by constant appeals to theolo- 
gical doctrines. It was an instrument to strengthen 
the powerful hand of the Papacy, which was every way 
present ; working with incredible industry, by its mis- 
sionaries, its rules, its decrees, and its institutions, to 
gain the ascendency over the heathen element around 



LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 125 

it, and to place its authority upon a solid basis. The 
grand idea of the schoolmen was, in one word, to rear 
an entire and perfect temple of human knowledge, and 
to make the logic of theology its basis. 

The idea on which the logic of the schoolmen rested, 
was unquestionably an idea of theological unity. To 
them the entire world of thought seemed to rest upon 
it. The grand object of the Bible was to teach truth. 
Without it the declarations it contained were worthless, 
and man the most forlorn and desolate of creatures. 
St Thomas Aquinas is decisive on this point ; and he 
speaks the sentiments of all his order who either pre- 
ceded or followed him. "Those arts," says he, " which 
govern other arts, are called architectonic or ruling 
arts ; and those who exercise them are called architects, 
and claim the name of wise. These artificers, however, 
as aiming only at particular ends, reach not the uni- 
versal end of all things. They are, therefore, only 
called wise on this or that particular subject. In this 
sense it is said, i As a wise master-builder, I have laid 
the foundation.'* But the name of absolutely wise is 
reserved for him alone whose speculations turn on the 
end of the universe, which is also the principle of all 
things. Wherefore, as the philosopher says,")- the wise 
man must consider the highest causes. But the ulti- 
mate end of every thing is that which is intended by 
its first author and mover. But the first author and 
mover of the universe is Intellect. Therefore the 
ultimate end of the universe must be the good of In- 
tellect, which is Truth. Truth must then be the ulti- 
mate end of the universe ; and with the consideration 

* 1 Cor. iii. 10. + Arist. Metaph., 1, 2. 



126 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

of this end must wisdom be principally occupied. 
Therefore the Divine Wisdom clad in flesh declares, 
that He came into the world to manifest the truth, 
saying, ' To this end was I born, and for this cause 
came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto 
the truth.'"* 

It is from its theological bearings that the unity of 
the scholastic logic is chiefly derived. This unity of 
spirit and design is striking and complete when viewed 
from a certain point ; but on looking a little deeper 
into the subject, and contemplating it apart from its 
mere external manifestations, we see from time to time 
considerable variety in the general principles it pro- 
pounded and discussed. We find among the schoolmen 
abstract speculations of every shade and conceivable 
cast. We have materialism and spiritualism, empiri- 
cism and intuition, pantheism and orthodoxy, with all 
the varied hues of opinion to which the mingling of 
these leading notions with each other may be subser- 
vient, pressed upon our attention in every age of scho- 
lastic learning. And it would be difficult to point out 
a single speculative theory of the present day, on the 
nature and origin of human knowledge, which will not 
find its counterpart in the middle ages. But there was 
this great difference between these times and our own, 
that then books were scarce, and the means of mental 
communication between man and man, and kingdom 
and kingdom, few and tardy ; and also, that whenever 
an opinion or speculative theory reared its head, which 
had the most distant chance of militating against spiri- 
tual orthodoxy, it was immediately struck down by the 

* John xviii. 37. — See Chretien on Logical Method, p. 41. 



LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 127 

hand of clerical authority, and forthwith consigned to 
oblivion. The union of the scholastic system is there- 
fore only a comparative unity ; for there were in the 
shape of abstract principles of thought every variety 
and license in its speculative inquiries. Outwardly, 
that system presented an unity of purpose which no- 
thing seemed capable of disturbing ; but inwardly there 
was a great diversity of philosophical sentiment and 
unstable speculation. 

These remarks apply substantially to the logical unity 
of the scholastic system. Though there were here 
likewise all kinds of logical methods suggested and de- 
veloped, yet there was still a certain unity of purpose 
relative to the chief ends of all argumentative processes 
of thought. Logic in the eyes of all the schoolmen, 
no matter how opposite their abstract principles might 
be, was a grand and noble thing. It was to embrace 
the entire universe of truth. It contained within itself 
all the instruments for the purpose. When the scho- 
lastic logician sallied out to battle, he went armed with 
the ten Categories, with a certain stock of universal 
ideas or conceptions, to which were added the Predi- 
cables ; and the whole embracing, as he conceived, the 
various divisions of all existing things, both physical 
and mental, he was thus enabled to handle all kinds of 
propositions, and to mould them, by the use of lan- 
guage, into all sorts of nominal shapes and forms. His 
machinery was so perfect, that nothing was too com- 
prehensive or too minute for its grasp. It constituted 
his skill to bend and humour these mechanical appli- 
ances to all circumstances and contingencies. And he 
no more doubted of their potency than he doubted of 



128 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

his own existence. Hence logic was to him the 
" science of sciences/' " the rational science/' the " art 
of arts." All investigations were to take their depar- 
ture from logic, because it was the only mode of teach- 
ing how we should proceed in other sciences. This 
was the current or everyday belief of all the scholastic 
thinkers in every age of their disputations ; and this 
belief forms that logical unity which is imprinted on 
the mind of every one conversant with their specula- 
tions. 

Another striking feature of the schoolmen is, their 
incessant and pertinacious disputes on the nature 
of particular and universal ideas. This is one of the 
most conspicuous incidents in their history, and has 
served alike to hand down their fame to posterity, and 
to make them, in the eyes of many, objects of com- 
miseration and contempt. For the sake of those who 
may not know the general merits of the question, we 
shall make a few explanatory observations upon it. 

The point of dispute is simply this : — The Nomi- 
nalists affirm that there are two classes of truth ; one 
class relating to individual or single objects, and their 
particular qualities or properties ; the other class to 
general collections or assortments of things, which we 
designate by a general term or terms. A man is a par- 
ticular idea ; a multitude of men, a general idea. The 
Nominalists affirm that the difference between those 
two kinds of ideas is only a verbal one ; that is, that 
when men talk or reason about these general ideas or 
attributes of things, the general term is the only thing 
with which the mind is conversant. 

Now, the Eealists denied this doctrine in toto. Thev 



LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 129 

maintained, that though these general terms are used 
in our descriptions of the similar properties or qualities 
of things, yet there is a general idea always present in 
the mind when it thus characterises the common attri- 
butes which belong to a particular genus or class. This 
general term is not a mere verbal instrument or sym- 
bol, but stands for a real permanent intellectual con- 
ception, which is always present to the mind, and to 
which the name of general idea is uniformly given. 

Some reasoners attempted to steer a middle course 
— they were called Conceptualists. They agreed with 
the Nominalists in denouncing general ideas or concep- 
tions, such as the Realists considered them to be ; but 
they still thought the mind had the power of creating 
those general ideas, which they preferred to call concep- 
tions. They said there were no essences or universal 
ideas to agree with general terms, and that the mind 
could reason about classes of individuals without the 
mediation of language. 

It may be observed in passing, that the schoolmen 
must not be considered as the originators of this con- 
troversy about particular and universal ideas. We can 
trace it in the oldest records we have of logical philo- 
sophy. Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and many other 
philosophers and sects, entered deeply into the entire 
question. They were all, however, unable to solve it, 
and it descended down to the schoolmen of the middle 
ages, with all its puzzling freshness and inherent 
mystery. 

The progress of scholasticism was characterised by 
extraordinary public excitement wherever it was studied. 
Emperors and kings, as well as the clergy and the laity, 

1 



130 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

partook of the reigning enthusiasm. The universities 
of France, Germany, and England, became one grand 
arena for the discussion of the abstract doctrines of the 
overheated parties ; and sovereigns, led doubtless by 
some political reasons of the day, took part in the con- 
tests, and even scrupled not on some occasions to em- 
ploy the civil power to gain a victory or punish an 
enemy. The accounts which creditable historians and 
eyewitnesses have given of these contests, exceed all 
ordinary belief. We are told by one author, that at the 
public discussions of the scholastic ages it was no uncom- 
mon thing to see disputants shout till they were quite 
hoarse, use the most gross and insulting language, 
make grimaces at each other, threaten personal chas- 
tisement, and struggle with and endeavour to prostrate 
each other to the ground. When words and threats 
failed, recourse was had to the fists. As in the wrest- 
ling schools, they buff, and spit, and kick, and bite ; 
and even go beyond this, and use clubs and other dan- 
gerous weapons, so that many got wounded, and not a 
few killed outright.* 

We shall not extend these general observations to a 
greater length, but shall now give a brief account of the 
individual logical opinions and writings of some of the 
most distinguished of the scholastic philosophers. 

John Scotus Erigena, a. d. 900. — Mere formal logic 
had but a feeble hold on the mind of this famous scholastic 
writer. In every case he made it subservient to men- 
tal science. His grand design was to construct a system 
of human knowledge by an a priori process. The primi- 
tive unity was the result of his logical synthesis. The 

* See Ludovicns Vives. 



■ JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA. 131 

entire material universe, and the whole range of human 
thought, were the logical domains for the employment 
of analysis ; and when this analysis was fully made, and 
carried to its ultimate limits, the results were again 
absorbed into the union of synthesis — -just as all creat- 
ed things must return to the divine unity from which 
they sprung. 

The chief work of Scotus is his " De Divisione 
Naturce." The dialectics incorporated in it are deeply 
tinged with Platonic and Oriental notions, This has 
led to the general charge against Scotus, that his views 
were pantheistical. The "Division of Nature" was in 
subsequent ages condemned ; and Pope Honorius III. 
issued a bull, in which it was declared that it " abound- 
ed with worms of heretical depravity." All persons 
were threatened with excommunication who should 
retain a copy of the work in their possession. The 
treatise is divided into five books; and the author 
endeavours to work out his logical problem by means 
of four instruments — division, definition, demonstration, 
and analysis. 

The human understanding, according to Erigena, 
has two powers, reason and sense. By the latter he 
does not mean external, but internal sense. The ex- 
ternal organs of sensation only connect the understand- 
ing with the body. Eelatively to their principle of 
action, they are but one. These senses are like a 
porter or messenger ; they introduce external represen- 
tations to the internal senses, which preside over the 
operations of the mind in its pursuit after truth. The 
grand object of the reasoning faculty in man, is to 
direct us to a Deity as an universal cause. All human 



132 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

knowledge or investigation may be resolved into four 
categories ; namely, " that which creates, and is not 
created ; that which is created, and creates ; that which 
is created, and doth not create ; and that which 
neither creates, nor is created." 

The logical method of Erigena sets out, like those 
of the philosophers of old, with the primitive unity of 
all knowledge ; and this unity, in his mind, was every 
thing which is comprehended by the word nature. 
2sTow, what would a logician do, aiming at the solution 
of all truth, under such circumstances? The answer 
is, he must endeavour to shew how variety has been 
produced from this radical unity. But, according to 
Scotus, every thing rests on Deity ; all phenomena, 
diversities, and states of being. The intelligence of 
the Deity embraces all other intelligences. All exist- 
ent cognitions are simply an expression of the universal 
unit. Every thought and feeling is but the represen- 
tation of that which does not appear ; the comprehen- 
sion of that which is incomprehensible ; the form and 
body of that which possesses neither form nor body. 
As human intelligence is enshrouded from the outward 
eye, and only makes itself known through the means 
of sounds and letters ; so, in like manner, does the in- 
effable Divine goodness descend from the heights of 
creation, and expand itself to the utmost limits of ex- 
istence ; doing all things, subsisting in all things, with- 
out the slightest alteration or absorption of its nature 
or essence. As every thing springs out of this unity, 
so must every thing one day return to it. This is the 
spiritual progress of things, the ultimate destination of 
all science. In this return to the bosom of unity, " the 



LANFRANC. 133 

body will be resolved into vital motion, vital motion 
into sentiment, sentiment into reason, reason into tlie 
soul, the soul into the science of all things which are 
below God ; science into wisdom, which is the ultimate 
and immediate contemplation of truth, so far as it can 
be attained by the creature. At this point of return- 
ing progress, every spirit becomes an intellectual star, 
and thus is accomplished the final consummation ; the 
evening of creation, the lying down to rest of all intel- 
ligences in the luminous shadows where lie enshrouded 
the causes of all things, and thus day and night will be 
one and the same." 

Lanfranc, a. d. 1036. — Lanfranc was by far the most 
able and distinguished dialectician of his age. He was 
born at Pavia, but he settled at Avranches in Normandy, 
where he established a seminary for the teaching of logic, 
among other things. This establishment gained great 
popularity and fame. Being deeply versed in all meta- 
physical lore, he cultivated a spirit of subtile disputation, 
and was in this line one of the master spirits of his age. 
We are informed that his pupils were " clerks, the sons 
of gentlemen, masters of transcendant renown, power- 
ful chiefs, and individuals of high nobility."* 

Historians relate a circumstance relative to Lanfranc, 
which shews that the " ruling passion " for discussion 
and disputation was strong even in death. His dis- 
ciples were weeping around him, and offering up their 
fervent prayers in his behalf — the last rites of the 
Church had been administered — he was upon the very 
confines of the unseen world — when he opened his eyes > 
and in a feeble but distinct voice said, " I should have 

* Tiraboschi, Brucker, Fleury. 



134 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

been glad before my death to have committed to writ- 
ing my ideas upon the origin of evil, for I had got 
some explanations which will now be lost." So say- 
ing, he gave a wave with his hand, and immediately 
expired. 

Koscellinus, a. d, 1089. — This scholastic was canon 
of Compeigne. He is commonly considered as the first 
writer who distinctly broached the Nominalist theory. 
He maintained that all general terms or names used in 
formal propositions, are but simple mental abstractions, 
which the mind forms by comparing a certain number 
of individuals with each other. In fact, he went the 
full length of maintaining that universals were nothing 
but names. This position appeared novel and startling 
to his age ; and hence it was that he drew upon him- 
self ecclesiastical censure and rebuke. Eoscellinus was 
obliged to retract his opinions at the Council of Sois- 
sons, held in the year 1092. He was afterwards 
banished both from England and France. The theo- 
logical bearings of the logical question were the real 
cause of his defeat and punishment. He taught "tres 
personas esse tres realitates different es " — a proposition, 
says his antagonist St Anselm, that ought to warn 
every one how cautiously they should handle questions 
of holy writ. Those dialecticians of our day, who are 
heretics even in logic, consider universals to be nothing 
but mere speech. Such reasoners should be altogether 
excluded from discussing spiritual doctrines.* 

Aventinus, a writer of the sixteenth century, makes 
the following observations on the system of this scho- 
lastic : — " Eoscellinus," says he, "the founder of the 

* St Anselm, Be Incaniatione Verhi, ch. 2. 



ROSCELLINUS, ST ANSELM. " 135 

~New Lyceum, first cultivated the science of words and 
phrases, and discovered a new mode of cultivating 
philosophy. To him we owe a particular illustration 
of that system of philosophical inquiry which the Peri- 
patetics, or followers of Aristotle, divided into two 
classes ; the one, older, abounding in invention, and 
claiming for itself the science of things, and therefore 
called the real school ; the other, later, embracing the 
disturbers of this science, men calling themselves 
Nominalists, because, being niggardly of things, and 
prodigal of names and notions, they appear to be the 
partisans of words." * 

St Anselm, a. d. 1109. — St Anselm was one of the 
first-rate logical thinkers of his time. His opinions may 
be gathered from his Dissertation on Truth, written in 
the form of dialogue, and to be found at the com- 
mencement of the third book of his " Monologium" 
In this essay we find him endeavouring to establish the 
three following propositions : — 1st, That all intimations 
from our external senses or organs are founded in truth. 
Whenever there is any error in this quarter, it arises 
from the internal sense of perception. 2nd, There is a 
truth in the essence of things ; and this truth depends 
upon the supreme truth, which is God himself. 3d, 
That truth has neither beginning nor end. 

St Anselm was a bold speculator. He conceived 
he had found a logical mode of silencing all future 
cavillers and disputants. The following is a general 
summary of his views : — 

While he admitted the certainty of knowledge de- 
rived from faith, he maintained, at the same time, that 

* Annals. Basil, 1580. 



136 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

it was incumbent on all men to cultivate the reasoning 
power, and to unfold the truth in the shape of science. 
The Scriptures are the true foundation of all mental 
knowledge, just as the phenomena of nature, revealed 
to the external senses, form the basis or ground- 
work of all physical inquiry. Now,, the revealed and 
the scientific sources of truth may be brought into com- 
plete harmony. 

The sphere of science must be considered as an 
unity, and within this unity we shall find a general 
principle for the elucidation of all things. This prin- 
ciple has two inherent attributes ; its logical universa- 
lity, — that is, its susceptibility to comprehend all other 
ideas ; and, secondly, its character of real or objective 
universality, — that is, its harmony with a reality con- 
ceived as the source of all other realities. Unless we 
have this second attribute, we must be doomed to run 
round a series of logical speculations, which, though 
they may assume a certain dialectical form or cohesion, 
would have no necessary connexion with the reality of 
things. What is required therefore is, to establish a 
foundation or firm basis for the logical order and the 
real order of things ; and the only way of doing this is, 
to find out some universal idea which could not subsist 
as a perception of the mind, without at the same time 
involving the absolute reality of its object. Now, ac- 
cording to St Anselm, there is one, and only one, idea 
in the human understanding adequate for this purpose 
— the idea of infinite perfection, or the supreme good ; 
in fact, of Deity itself. The logician maintains, that if 
the idea had not a corresponding reality, it could not 
be the idea of absolute and supreme perfection. But 



ST ANSELM. 137 

this idea, the more it is examined, will be found to 
unite into one both the logical and the real universality ; 
logical universality, since all other ideas, implying more 
or less of being or perfection, are contained within it ; 
and objective or real universality, since the infinite 
reality is the generating principle of all other realities 
or states of being. It is manifest that no other idea of 
which the human mind is cognisant possesses these two 
characteristics ; therefore the idea of G-od is the general 
principle of science. The Deity appears under two 
aspects ; in the logical sphere, as the head or source of 
all ideas ; in the objective sphere of reality, as the head 
or source of all existences.* 

It is almost needless to say, that though the views 
of St Anselm are lofty and noble, he has not succeeded 
in placing them beyond the reach of doubt and cavil. 
This will appear more fully afterwards. 

The authors of the Literary History of France speak 
highly of the logical talents and learning of St Anselm. 
Logic, say they, agreeably to its general and primary 
meaning, was the art of reasoning soundly and justly, 
and by which truth might be discovered. But to exer- 
cise this art to advantage, certain general ideas, arising 
from the knowledge of things, were indispensable ; and 
the logicians of this age seemed to have little relish for 
such necessary information. Their dialectics consisted 
chiefly of words, and dry and barren rules, the proper 
and judicious application of which was by no means 
commonly understood. To remedy this evil, St Anselm 
wrote his work, the Grammarian, which is, in fact, a 

* The edition of St Aiiselm's works here referred to, is that of Cologne, 1612, 
folio. 



138 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

treatise on the art of reasoning. In this work he 
undertakes to define the two general attributes of all 
our ideas, substance and quality. This definition aided 
greatly in simplifying the researches and teachings of 
future logicians. From him the inquirers after truth 
learned to elevate their minds above the barbarous 
sophisms of the schools ; to make use of that natural 
reason that was within them ; and to contemplate the 
eternal essence in all its magnificent effulgence.* 

Gtuinalon, a. b. 1119. — This was a monk who wrote 
a treatise under the title of " Liber pro insipiente adver- 
sus Anselmi in Prosologio Ratiocinationem" in order to 
refute the leading opinions of St Ansehxu Guinalon 
endeavours to prove that his antagonist has not made 
out a good case ; that his theory of human knowledge 
is gratuitous ; and that, in matters of detail, it is full 
of logical imperfections and fallacies. 

William of Ciiampeaux, a. d. 1120. — This may be 
styled the Augustan age of scholastic logic. Our 
modern notions of the value of dialectics, come far 
short of realizing the interest and mental activity which 
were called into requisition under the championship of 
William of Champeaux, He opened, in 1109, his 
school of logic in the University of Paris, which had 
been founded about a century before. His fame 
speedily spread to the remotest corners of Europe. 
Wherever he came immense numbers of students 
flocked around him, to hear him expound his logical 
system. The Benedictines of St Maur represent Paris, 
in their glowing language, to be a Modern Athens ; 
and they affirm that the number of logical and philo- 

* Hist. Lit. dc la France, torn. xiv. 



WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX. 139 

sophical students was so great, that they actually out- 
numbered the ordinary citizens themselves. The in- 
flux of scholars was so prodigious, that Philip Augustus 
had to enlarge the boundaries of the city for their 
accommodation. Paris was called the city of the 
world.* 

It is recorded, that there were certain days of the 
week which were more than usually thronged with 
students ; and these were set apart by William for the 
exclusive discussion of universals. And the eagerness 

o 

to obtain an entrance to the lecture-hall was so great 
on these occasions, that students often took their places 
the day before, and that more than once death was 
produced from the extreme pressure of the crowd. 
These lectures were the engrossing topic of general 
discussion ; and epitomes or abstracts of them were 
every day handed about, both among the nobles at 
court, as well as the merchants and traders of the 
city.f 

That the eloquence and method of instruction of 
this celebrated scholastic teacher were unrivalled, is an 
opinion in which all historians seem to agree. We 
have the testimony of Abelard on this point, who 
says : — u I preferred the armour of dialectic warfare to 
all other modes of philosophy; for it I quitted the 
military life, choosing rather the conflicts of disputa- 
tion than the trophies of real battles. With this view, 
emulating the Peripatetic fame, and disputing as I 
went, I passed through various provinces, wherever I 
understood that the study was zealously pursued. At 
length I reached Paris, which was then the great 

* Hist. Lit. de la France, torn ix. 73. f Chron. de Paris, folio, 1596. 



140 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

theatre of the art, where William of Champeaux 
taught, whom I chose for my preceptor."* 

William of Champeaux had been a pupil of Kos- 
cellin's, but differed entirely from his master on the 
nature of universals. These he considered as ideas 
which had a positive and independent existence, apart 
from all forms or combinations of words. There was 
something permanent and real in such terms as good- 
ness, justice, creation, intelligence, mind, and the like. 
His entire Eealistic theory is based upon the assump- 
tion, that universals are individualized in particular 
objects or beings, in such a manner that these par- 
ticular objects or beings, though strictly identical in 
their respective essences, differ only in the variety of 
their accidents or transient forms. 

It is said that William renounced this logical creed 
in a later period of his life. Abelard says : — " Again 
I attended his school to hear his lectures on the art of 
rhetoric ; but where, in our several contests, I so pressed 
him on his favourite doctrine of universals, that he 
gave up the point, renounced his former opinion, and 
hence lost all the fame which he had acquired." 

Abelard, a. d. 1142. — The name of Abelard is inti- 
mately connected with the early history of scholastic 
logic. He was a zealous JSTominalist, and zealously con- 
tended for the validity of his theory through every 
phase of his eventful life. John of Salisbury says : — 
" That Abelard and his disciples looked upon the pro- 
position, that we can affirm one thing from another 
thing, as a great absurdity, though this absurdity was 
backed by the authority of Aristotle." 

' : A.belard's Epist., 1. 



ABELARD. 141 

It is a difficult matter, even at the present hour, to 
ascertain correctly how far Abelard is really compro- 
mised in the Nominalist theory. He certainly denounces 
the Realists in no measured terms ; but his own pre- 
cise opinions on the chief point of dispute are by no 
means accurately known. De G-erando conceives that 
Abelard considered universals to have no strict or 
proper independence or objective reality, but to be 
simply conceptions, formed and retained in the mind 
solely by virtue of the signs of language. Again, John 
of Salisbury says : — " The one (meaning Roscellin) 
takes his stand on words; the other (Abelard) on 
propositions.'" These statements would go to prove, 
that Abelard looked upon these conceptions as deriving 
their validity and authority, not simply from the power 
of words, but from their logical position in every formal 
proposition submitted to the understanding. If this 
opinion be correct, Abelard must not then be classed 
with the supporters of absolute Nominalism, but must 
occupy a kind of middle station between the Nominalist 
theorists, and those who go under the denomination of 
Conceptualists. 

Up to the time of Abelard, logic had been most 
assiduously cultivated in many countries in Europe. 
Schools and academies for its cultivation were esta- 
blished at Padua, Modena, Naples, Capua, Toulouse, 
Salamanca, Lyons, and Cologne. The Platonic dialec- 
tics were preferred in some localities, while Aristotle 
was all dominant in others. In the West, looical 
philosophy found munificent patrons in the Emperor 
Frederick IL, and Alphonso X., king of Leon ; the 
former of whom caused the logical works of Aristotle 



142 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

to be translated into Latin, with the laudable view of 
giving them a more extended circulation, and making 
them more general topics of commentary and public 
discussion. 

The mere dialectical character of logical studies 
began at this time, however, to wear itself out for a 
season. Men became tired with the everlasting play 
upon the pure syllogistic forms, and longed for some 
variety, and a wider range for their powers and facul- 
ties. The human mind became arid and mechanical, 
there being nothing to touch or fire the inward soul, 
nor satisfy its natural cravings for interesting novelties 
or lofty speculations. The reasoning power itself 
assumed a disproportionate activity and strength, and 
was out of keeping with the other parts of the mental 
structure. A reaction, therefore, against the entire 
dialectic system was the natural consequence. The 
heart and the head must be brought into a closer con- 
tact and sympathy. Science and knowledge were to 
be known and cultivated through the medium of con- 
templative and elevated feelings, and not by boisterous 
and logical chicanery. A new path to wisdom must 
be discovered, and the old one of pure abstractions 
abandoned. We must look to the moral and theologi- 
cal principles of our being for this new direction, 
where we shall find that contemplative intuition which 
can alone give confidence to our footsteps, and conso- 
lation to the spirit. We must impart comprehension 
and spirituality to our reasonings, and no longer 
mould them in those inanimate and shrivelled forms in 
which the dialecticians present them to us. The new 
school said, in fact, " What have we to do with the 



HUGO ST VICTOR, RICHARD ST VICTOR. 143 

disputes about genera or species, or particulars or 
universals ? He for whom the eternal Word is enough, 
is freed from an infinite perplexity of doubts and 
opinions." 

Hugo St Victor, a. d. 1140; and Eichard St 
Victor, a. d. 1173. — These two scholastics were of 
the contemplative school of logic. Hugo belonged to 
Belgium, and Eichard to Scotland, and both were 
monks of the Abbey of St Victor, at Paris. 

Hugo's logical method may be summed up in the 
following words : — " Our organs of sensation apprise 
us of the nature of external objects, and the imagina- 
tion refers to things beyond the confines of matter. 
The latter power expands itself every where, and moves, 
and acts, and creates, and wills, just as it pleases. It 
ranges over boundless space, and embraces all the 
works of the Almighty, meditates and contemplates 
upon them, and all heavenly phenomena. Eeason 
perceives the substances, forms, differences, proper- 
ties, and qualities of objects. It detaches the qualities 
from the object, not however in reality, but by the 
power of abstraction, and places them before the eye 
of the mind. The understanding is the faculty which 
perceives invisible and spiritual substances or things. 
Intelligence is that which immediately recognises the 
existence and attributes of the Deity, and which 
ascends to the source of all things, and to all that is 
immutably true. . This intelligence is exclusively di- 
rected to the abstract principles of things ; that is to 
say, those relating to the Deity, to substance, and 
ideas generally. Genius seeks after that which is un- 
known, and reason judges of these discoveries of genius. 



144 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

Memory gathers and preserves these judgments, and 
collects other fresh materials from new decisions. There 
is thus established a progressive system of ascension 
from things inferior to things superior ; the one de- 
pending upon the other. The understanding is a kind 
of image of intelligence, reason a sort of image of the 
understanding ; and so on throughout the whole extent 
of mental operations. The senses form the imagina- 
tion, and this again gives birth to reason and sagacity. 
The Divine presence enlightens reason, and thus pro- 
duces intelligence ; and this again gives rise to that 
which we term wisdom. There are two distinct move- 
ments, or it may be said, there are two distinct sexes, 
in the human spirit. One movement bears reason to 
heavenly things — this is true wisdom ; the other move- 
ment draws it downwards to earthly objects — and this 
constitutes worldly prudence and judgment.* 

Richard's logical views may be stated as follows : — 
" There are three parts to instruction — experience, 
rational deductions, and faith. The first conducts to 
profane and worldly knowledge ; the other two to ever- 
lasting knowledge. Wisdom conducts to virtue, and 
virtue to wisdom : nevertheless, men are generally car- 
ried with more ardour towards wisdom than towards 
virtue. The latter requires sacrifices — a triumph over 
our passions, which cannot, in ordinary cases, be ob- 
tained without a considerable effort. 

" Philosophy is the living thought, the identical 
reason, the primitive intelligence of all things. 

" The exercise of the bodily senses precedes the 
senses of the heart in a knowledge of things ; for if the 

* Eruditio Didascalia, hook ii. c. 6. 



JOHN OF SALISBURY, ETC. 145 

mind were not made previously acquainted with them 
through the influence of the organs of sensation, there 
could be no opportunity for it to exercise thought upon 
these objects. What are visible things, if they are not 
a kind of picture of invisible objects ? But intelligence 
is the power by the aid of which we can perceive in- 
visible objects." 

Gilbert de la Poree, a. d. 1150. — Gilbert was a 
determined Eealist. He published a work entitled 
The Six Principles, which some have considered as an 
attempt to condense the Categories of Aristotle into 
that number ; while other critics again affirm, that The 
Six Principles were only a species of expansion of the 
six latter Predicaments, which the Greek philosopher 
had passed too cursorily over. Gilbert gives us a logi- 
cal definition of form. " Form," says he, " is contin- 
gent on matter, consisting of simple and invariable 
essence." 

Peter Lombard, a. d. 1170. — Peter Lombard, far 
from indulging in any contemplative mysticism about 
the nature of scientific truth, was nevertheless deeply 
impressed with the conviction, that the general dialec- 
tics of the day were by no means serviceable to the 
progress of sound knowledge and religious truth. It 
was in order to give a check to the current of logical 
disputation, that he composed his Book of Sentences, 
which was an attempt to harmonize general philosophy 
with religion. He was a decided Eealist. 

John of Salisbury, a. d. 1180. — This distinguished 
scholastic was a native of England. He directed his 
critical powers with great vigour against the prevalent 
abuse of the formal logic so commonly taught in his 

K 



146 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

clay. He tells us that all his companions in France 
were so entangled in sophistic pursuits, that they had 
not for many years made a single step in the path of 
useful knowledge, nor did he think it probable they 
ever would. He says, " The benefits of the art, as it 
perfected other mental acquisitions, I am ready to ad- 
mit ; but by itself it is sterile and void of life." 

This author tells us that there were six distinct sects 
of Realists in his own time. These some modern critics 
have, however, reduced to four ; namely, 1st, Those 
who adopted the doctrines of Plato on ideas, and main- 
tained that the names of genera and species belonged, 
strictly speaking, only to those objectively existing 
universals. 2nd, Those who thought that the indivi- 
dual contained within itself the entire essence of the 
class, and consequently, when such particular was 
viewed in a certain light, it was itself an universal. 
3d, Those who declared that the entire aggregate of 
individuals was identical with the universal. And 
4th, Those who looked upon the universal as a sub- 
stance in some mode or other existing in the singular 
being or object. 

The following is his exposition of the Conception- 
alists — a class of logicians whose notions are but very 
vaguely understood even at the present hour : — " The 
senses," says he, "judge of material things; but intel- 
ligence is requisite to perceive spiritual or incorporeal 
things, and reason to form a judgment of them. The 
understanding considers real objects under various 
points of view ; sometimes in an absolute manner, 
sometimes as a whole ; sometimes as connected with 
other things with which they are not necessarily con- 



AMAURY DE CHARTRES, DAVID DE DINANT. 147 

nected ; and sometimes separated from that with which 
they may be combined. Though by analysis the ap- 
pearance of things may be otherwise than their real 
qualities, this operation is not nevertheless a vain con- 
ception of the mind ; for it opens the way to the most 
sagacious and useful investigations. Analysis is an 
instrument of philosophy ; it sharpens reason, and dis- 
tinguishes objects according to their true nature. If 
we separate the understanding from the faculty of ab- 
straction, we shall remove from the arts the arsenal 
which contains their instruments. What the senses 
perceive — that is, subject to forms — is primary and sin- 
gular substance. We give the name of secondary substance 
to that which is necessary to the existence of objects, 
and to their susceptibility of being known to us. That 
which is one is always one. A universal is that which 
is common to many by reason of the constitution of 
their nature. The notion of a universal is produced 
in the understanding when it conceives the conformity 
which nature has established amongst divers objects, as 
their forms, qualities, &c. Though qualities and relations 
cannot exist separately in the order of realities, they 
can be separately laid hold of by the mind, and this is 
the essential end or purpose of all true philosophy." 

A short time after John of Salisbury, we have a 
pantheistical reaction against the logical methods of 
both the Nominalists and Eealists. This reaction 
manifested itself in the writings of Amaury de Char- 
tres, a, d. 1195, and David de Dinant, a. d. 1220. 

Garson gives us the ideas of Amaury de Chartres 
in the following words : — " Every thing is God, and 
God is every thing. The Creator and the creature are 



148 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

one and the same being. Ideas are at once creative and 
created, God is the end of all things, in the same 
sense that all things must return to him, in order to 
constitute with him an immutable individuality. Just 
as Abraham and Isaac are nothing but individualiza- 
tions of human nature ; so all beings are only indi- 
vidual forms of one sole essence." This is the ideal 
pantheism he taught. Our ideas are the only things 
in which there is any reality ; every thing besides these 
is only a manifestation. 

David de Dinant broached a pantheism of a material 
cast. Deity is the universal matter of existence ; and 
all forms — that is, every thing not material — are but 
imaginary accidents or qualities. 

Vincent de Beauvais, a. d. 1260. — Vincent studied 
logic with great zeal. He supports the Realist theory 
with great ardour. The three great problems pro- 
posed by Porphyry, in his introduction to the Cate- 
gories of Aristotle, relative to the certainty of general 
ideas, engrossed the whole of Vincent's attention. 
Before attempting to resolve them, he ascribes three 
different meanings to the word being — the one meta- 
physical, the second mathematical, and the third phy- 
sical. On the first problem, after comparing the opin- 
ions of Plato and Aristotle on the point, he comes to 
the conclusion, that universals exist not only in the 
intellect, but in nature. The second problem he solves 
in accordance with universals relative to spiritual mat- 
ters. The third and last problem he resolves in the 
following fashion : — " There are two causes which bring 
the universal within the sphere of being ; the one 
material, which resides in the individual ; the other 



ST THOMAS AQUINAS, ETC. 149 

efficient, which resides in the understanding. Under 
the first relation the universal is one in many ; in the 
second it is one simply in unity. Thus we are able to 
reconcile the conflicting opinions of Plato and Aris- 
totle."* 

William of Paris, a. d. 1270. — William was well 
skilled in all the logical systems and speculations of 
the Arabians. He points out six meanings to the word 
truth : — 1st, The fidelity of the sign should express the 
thing signified ; 2nd, Eeality opposed to apparent de- 
ception ; 3d, The purity of a substance, as when we 
call good silver that which is exempt from all adultera- 
tion ; 4th, The essence of things, such as is expressed 
by the definition ; oth, The existence of a Creator ; 
6th, Simple logical truth, which relates to the harmony 
between the terms and the proposition. 

St Thomas Aquinas, a. d. 1274. — Thomas Aquinas 
is the greatest name in the annnals of scholastic logic 
and speculation. He was styled in his day the Ange- 
lic Doctor. He was born in the kingdom of ^Naples ; 
and after publicly teaching, with great eclat, at Bo- 
logna and Paris, he died in 1274, in an Italian monas- 
tery, at the early age of forty-seven. 

The logical method of Aquinas, and his speculations 
on the nature of truth and evidence generally, are de- 
veloped chiefly in his Summa Theologica, and in his 
Commentaries on some parts of the philosophy of Aris- 
totle. The former work has retained a high character 
among theologians and philosophers ever since its ap- 
pearance ; and, in fact, it is almost the only treatise 

* Speculum Doctrinale, lib. iii. chap. 7. 



150 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

out of the numerous folios which the scholastic ages 
produced, which we meet now in ordinary libraries, or 
which is referred to as an authority by modern writers. 

Aquinas maintained that the end or object of all 
human science is the perfection of man. As there are 
several paths to science, there must needs be some guid- 
ing and regulating principle to collate and apply the 
evidence from each to this grand and common result. 
The different sciences are like individual and indepen- 
dent states, but governed and directed by a federal head. 
This federal authority or head, is mind. This mind or 
intellect is to be considered under three phases : — 1st, 
as being conversant about the causes of things. 2ndly, 
as being entirely distinct from the external senses, be- 
cause these relate to particular things or objects, where- 
as the mind is conversant about universals. And 
3dly, the mind is the only real standard of the in- 
telligibility of things ; for, in proportion as it is freed 
from material influences, its sphere is enlarged, its de- 
cisions are more momentous and important, and the 
happiness of man is more directly and extensively pro- 
moted. All rational intelligence, therefore, depends 
upon and springs out of the following categories, — 
Being, Possibility, Existence, Cause and Effect, Action, 
and Passion. Mind embraces the whole of these ; all 
other parts or divisions of human knowledge have 
only a partial and subordinate reference to them. 

From such a huge mass of abtruse speculation as 
the works of Aquinas present, it is entirely beyond 
the reach of a work of this limited character to offer 
even a naked summary or outline of his arguments. 



ST THOMAS AQUINAS. 151 

The reader must therefore be content with our touch- 
ing upon a salient point here and there in his logical 
philosophy. 

Considering the unity of science in a logical point of 
view, Aquinas asks the question, Do scientific prin- 
ciples result from a pre-existing empirical knowledge ? 
In grappling with this question, he maintains that there 
are two elements in the principles of science ; the terms, 
which he calls the matter of these principles, and the 
relations of these terms. To illustrate this, let us take 
the principle or proposition, the whole is greater than a 
part. The ideas, whole and -part, are the terms or mat- 
ter of the principle ; the idea of greater extension is 
the relation of the terms. Again, in the principle or 
proposition, the affirmative and the negative cannot be 
both true of the same thing; the ideas of affirmation and 
negation are the terms by means of which the mind 
recognises the relation. Keeping in view this distinc- 
tion, we immediately see a knowledge of the terms of 
any principle whatever depends upon our idea derived 
from experience ; but the knowledge of the relation of 
these terms is not derived from experience, but is a part 
of the mind itself. To illustrate this more fully, let us 
take an example from the science of morals. The habit 
of virtue rests upon the innate notion or conception of 
what virtue is, or what it implies. Before the habit is 
formed, virtue lies in an incipient state ; when it is exer- 
cised, it enters into the experimental state, and then 
arrives at its consummation. But the disposition and 
power to act virtuously, is an altogether different ele- 
ment or thing from the empirical habit of it. Now, it 
is precisely the same with science. The germs of all 



152 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

sciences lie in the rational conceptions of the mind. 
From this doctrine, Aquinas laid it down as a logical 
truth beyond all doubt, that every demonstration of a 
formal proposition is the result of the union of these 
two elements ; the experimental and the rational. The 
one is the matter of the demonstration, and the other 
its productive form. In this sense logic has a necessary 
relation to ontology. 

In the great controversy on universals, Aquinas 
adopted the doctrine of the Realists, at least of that 
division of the sect or party who maintained that the 
one universal existed in the many individuals. This 
notion followed from his exposition concerning form 
and matter. Universals may be considered relative 
either to their matter or their form. The matter of the 
universal of tree, for example, is the union of all the 
attributes or qualities which belong to trees. In this 
sense universals are a parte rei ; their matter exists 
solely in each individual thing or object. The form of 
universals is the character or attribute of universality 
applied to this matter; this character or attribute is 
derived solely by abstracting what is peculiar to each 
individual thing or object, in order to fix the attention 
on what is common to many of them. Universals are, 
consequently, a parte intellectus. 

St Bonaventure, a. d. 1277. — This author was call- 
ed the Seraphic Doctor, and his views of the nature of 
scientific truth and logical evidence were of a spiritual, 
or rather mystical character. The rational faculty of 
man is illuminated in four different modes. The first 
is external, and refers to the mechanical arts of life ; the 
second internal, shewing the natural forms and sen- 



DUNS SCOTUS, RAYMOND LULLY. 153 

sible truths of things ; the third is also internal, mani- 
festing intellectual and philosophical truths ; and the 
fourth teaches divine things. There is a truth in lan- 
guage, a truth in things, and a truth in manners. 

Duns Scotus, a. d. 1308. — It has been a matter of 
doubt whether this scholastic was a native of England, 
Scotland, or Ireland — each country has contended for 
the honour of his birth. He studied at Paris, under 
St Bonaventure and Aquinas. He founded a logical 
school, in opposition to his last-named master. He 
differed with St Thomas relative to the Eealist question. 
Aquinas maintained that universals existed really in 
the individuals, whereas Duns Scotus affirmed that they 
existed only formally in individual things or objects. 
His broad doctrine was, that intelligence, as a principle, 
had nothing to do with the formation of general terms ; 
these were indeterminate entities really subsisting out 
of the mind. He considered universal ideas to be the 
production of another entity. This opinion was really 
not his own, but had been broached by some specula- 
tors before his time ; but he developed it more fully, 
and with great subtilty and acuteness. 

Duns Scotus died suddenly at Cologne, when he had 
only reached his thirty- fourth year. His reputation 
for logical ability was unbounded ; and historians have 
left it upon record, that thirty thousand students press- 
ed forward to attend his lectures. 

Raymond Lully, a. d. 1309. — This was a zealous, 
but eccentric logician. His life, in connexion with 
logical and philosophical studies, is full of romantic 
interest. His Ars Magna is the exposition of a plan 
to enable the mind to work out all kinds of propositions 



154 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

through the means of a mechanical table of ideas, dis- 
posed in such a manner that their different correlations 
would furnish satisfactory answers to every imaginable 
sort of questions. A great deal of ingenuity is display- 
ed in this logical scheme ; and some degree of interest 
was at first excited in different schools of learning as to 
its practical and successful application. But its barren- 
ness and formality soon became apparent ; and many 
of the scholastic doctors pronounced it as useless, and 
as little better than a severe satire upon the entire 
system of dialectic mechanism. 

During the life of Lully, and for nearly two centuries 
after his death, his opinions on logical science were 
pretty generally adopted in seminaries of learning, both 
in Majorca and in a part of Spain. Even in the col- 
leges of Parma, Montpelier, Paris, and Borne, he was 
cordially esteemed as a logician whose general views were 
both enlightened and highly favourable to sound religion 
and morality. His theory of reasoning was nearly in all 
cases, however, adopted with some reservations; and 
he was admired more for his ingenuity than for sound- 
ness and comprehensiveness of judgment. The doctors 
of the Sorbonne protested against the system of Lully, 
although it was taught with great eclat at Toulouse by 
Raymond de Seboncle. Politian praises his method ; 
and Leibnitz himself thought his logical works a monu- 
ment of genius and industry. He has been alike the 
object of ardent admiration and severe censure. Whilst 
it has been declared that the simple touch of his hand- 
kerchief frequently cured hundreds of the sick, yet the 
Church at one time pronounced himself and all his 
disciples as heretics, and Gregory IX. placed his writ- 



WILLIAM OCCAM. 155 

ings, by a formal bull, in the Index Expurgatorkis. 
There seems to have been as much vitality in his sys- 
tem, as to maintain its remembrance for a considerable 
time after the death of its founder. 

The chief object of Lully was to reconcile the philo- 
sophy of reason with revelation. This was the prime 
notion at the bottom of his formal system. But the 
leading conception is so attenuated and expanded by 
numerous divisions, that it becomes almost impossible 
to keep his original drift in view in prosecuting any 
connected commentary on his speculations and forms. 

His writings are voluminous to a surprising extent. 
It has been stated that he wrote more than seven hun- 
dred distinct treatises on philosophy and logic. The 
most complete edition of his works is that published by 
Bucholius, at Mayence, in ten volumes folio, 1721. 

The following are among the best Spanish commen- 
tators on the logic of Raymond Lully. Alphonsus 
de Cepeda, Arboe de la Ciencia de Raimundo Lullo ; 
Petrus Cirnelo, De Arte Raimundi ; Jaimus Januarius, 
Ars Artium Raimundi ; and J. A. de Herrera, Apologia 
pro Raimundo. 

William Occam, a. d. 1320. — Occam was a native 
of the county of Kent, studied at Merton College, 
Oxford, under the celebrated Duns Scotus, and was 
called the Invincible Doctor. The Realistic doctrines 
met with a bold and formidable opponent in Occam. 
He adopted a certain form of the Nominalists' theory. 
He maintained that general ideas could not have an 
existence independent of external things, and of the 
Deity. In external things there can be no general or 
universal ideas ; for in this case they would either be 



156 LOGICAL PHILOSOrHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

the whole, or only a part of these things. In reference 
to the Deity, these things do not constitute the inde- 
pendent essence of the Divinity, but are simply objects 
of knowledge. In the mind of man there is nothing 
more than this. "Every substance," says he, "is 
numerically one and singular; it is itself, and no other. 
It is not the same with a universal. If the universal 
were a thing existing in a number of individual or par- 
ticular things, it would then possess a distinct and in- 
dependent existence ; for every thing which is superior 
to another thing, must, according to the established 
laws of Grod, be independent of that thing — a conse- 
quence which leads to a gross absurdity in reference to 
universal notions." * 

Again, " Every universal is really in itself a singular, 
and is therefore solely a universal in consequence of its 
signification, which is a sign or symbol of several things. 
This doctrine was maintained by Avicenna, who de- 
clares that a single form in the understanding is related 
to a multitude of things, and is therefore a universal, 
inasmuch as it is an intention in the mind, whose oper- 
ation is invariable to whatsoever you apply it. In 
consequence, this" form, though in relation to the indi- 
viduals it is a universal, yet in relation to the intellect 
on which it is impressed is itself only an individual, 
for it is one of the forms which are in the understand- 
ing." "No universal is any thing external to 

the mind." "No universal is a singular sub- 
stance ; for, should this be maintained, it would follow 
that Socrates is a universal ; for there is no more reason 
why one singular substance should be a general idea 

* Logica Oceami, chap. xiv. 



JOHN CHARLIER DE GERSON. 157 

more than another." " If any substance be 

more things than one, it must be either several singu- 
lars or several universals. If the former, it follows that 
a certain substance will be, — e. g. y several men ; and 
then, although the universal will be distinct from any 
one particular man, it will necessarily be, however, the 
same with all the particulars together. But, looking at 
the other side of the question, that one substance is 
really several universals, we must then ask ourselves, 
Is this universal a plurality of things, or only one ? If 
we answer it is only one, it follows that it is only a 
singular ; if we say it is several things, I again demand 
whether it is several universals or several singulars, and 
so on, ad infinitum"* 

The commentators and critics of Occam have been 
by no means agreed as to the precise nature of his own 
opinions. He is charged with arguing in the most 
decided manner against the Eealists — stating the case 
of the Nominalists, and then leaving the question with- 
out offering his own opinions upon it. What these 
really were seems to be, that he could not go the whole 
length with the Nominalists' theory, and that he was 
substantially what is denominated a Conceptualist. 

Occam's logical doctrines were prohibited in the 
university of Paris by Pope John XXII. All persons 
claiming the degree of Master of Arts were bound by 
oath not to teach his system. 

John Charlier de Gterson, a. d. 1363. — This able 
man filled for some years the important office of Chan- 
cellor of the University of Paris. He seems to have 
entertained a very low estimate of the scholastic logic ; 

* Logics chap. xiv. 



158 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 

and, to escape from its chilling effect, he took shelter 
in the intuitive or mystical philosophy. He maintained 
that "logic was not of itself a science, but only the 
path which conducted to science." He conceived that 
the pivot on which the whole contention of the schools 
moved, arose from the notion which was invariably 
attached to the general term being as the point of con- 
tact between the thinking principle and an external 
universe — a notion which had been buried under a load 
of obscurity by imaginary abstractions and refined 
verbal distinctions. He defines two distinct modes of 
being : — " The one is absolute being or existence, arising 
from the nature of the thing itself; the other consists 
in its representative character as an object of the un- 
derstanding. Being, under the latter point of view, is 
quite a different thing from what it is under the former. 
This distinction will be found to be the key for the 
pacification of the Realists and Nominalists, if it can 
be clearly and steadily seized and kept in view by the 
mind. Real being or existence cannot constitute a 
science, when considered in its objective character, in 
relation to positive or absolute reality ; it does not 
change its real existence to agree with modifications 
arising out of this objective character. Such is the 
error of the Realists, who wish to establish metaphysics 
upon realities, without taking into account the opera- 
tions of the understanding. On the other hand, the 
Nominalists envelope themselves too frequently with 
numerous verbal distinctions, which have little or no 
meaning."* 

The scholastic system which we have attempted to 

* De Concordia Metaph. et Logic, 20. 



LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 159 

sketch, taken in its widest logical sense and applica- 
tion, failed in the grand object as a scientific organon, 
chiefly from aiming at ideal perfection. Its deductive 
apparatus wanted coherence in its first premises. Error 
once admitted was irreparable ; and nothing could 
check its downward movement. Its first principles fell 
short of necessary truths, and its facts were by no 
means infallibly tested. The chain of perfect demon- 
stration became thus broken ; and no fresh materials 
could repair the breach. The scholastic system dealt 
with all subjects, but it dealt with them in so reflective 
and formal a fashion, that it deadened the perceptions 
of truth, and paralysed the active powers of mind. 
Every thing fell into a mechanical routine, and a 
drowsy apathy stole over the intellect, and deprived it 
of all vigorous and healthy impulses and movements. 
A change was imperatively called for; and when it 
came, though it was slow, it was sure. Another order 
of things was fast ripening to maturity, which gradually 
widened the basis of human knowledge and freedom of 
thought ; and, though old logical difficulties still re- 
mained, they were rendered less disheartening by a 
vast accession of new and interesting truths. The 
schoolmen served their day and generation ; and were 
soon to be supplanted by men of more enterprising 
genius, and more varied tastes and acquirements. 



160 FROM THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 



CHAPTER VIII. 

LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE FOUR- 
TEENTH CENTURY TILL THE PUBLICATION OF LORD BACON'S 
NOVUM ORGAN UM, IN 1620. 

Logical science was now on the eve of undergoing a 
great change, both in its scientific and formal character. 
New and powerful influences were about to display 
themselves in rousing the activity of the European 
mind, and in directing it into those paths of investiga- 
tion which would extend the boundaries of knowledge 
far beyond their present limits. In reference to Logic, 
men were in a sort of transition state ; held, on the 
one hand, by the power of custom and authority to 
exercise their reasoning powers in a certain formal and 
prescribed manner ; and, on the other, strongly urged, 
from the circumstances of the times, to give unbounded 
freedom to their faculties, and to set out afresh on new 
discoveries in search of more comprehensive and satis- 
factory methods and systems of eliciting and promul- 
gating all truth, both secular and theological. 

There were several causes external to the study of 
logic itself, which had a considerable share in the pro- 
ducing of this state of things. The dismemberment of 



TILL THE NOVUM ORGANUM m 1620. 161 

the Eastern empire induced a number of learned men 
to take refuge in Italy, who were of contemplative and 
speculative habits, and deeply imbued with philosophic 
lore. They were received with enthusiasm in the 
country of their adoption. They imparted a fresh 
ardour to abstract studies, and particularly to logic and 
mental philosophy, and other kindred subjects of in- 
quiry. The entire system of Greek speculation was 
overhauled, and submitted to a critical and most 
searching examination ; and, as might be naturally 
expected, men divided themselves into sects and 
parties, in accordance with their general leaning to- 
wards particular systems, connected with the great 
and venerated names of antiquity. Plato and Aristotle 
were the two grand centres of attraction and rivalship, 
and divided between them, in certain variable propor- 
tions, the general suffrages of the new school of philo- 
sophical inquirers. 

There was another event at this time highly influen- 
tial in extending the boundaries of science generally, 
and logic in particular ; namely, the discovery of the 
art of printing. From the rise to the fall maturity of 
scholastic philosophy, discussions on logical methods 
had been chiefly, and indeed necessarily, confined to 
oral lectures ; but after printing became somewhat 
general, these discussions were embodied into formal 
treatises, disseminated in every direction, and were 
also submitted to a more critical ordeal than they ever 
could have been subjected to within the walls of a 
university or college. Hence logical inquirers became 
better known, as well as more widely circulated ; and 
they travelled with more rapidity and accuracy from 



162 PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

one country to another, than they had formerly done 
from one professional chair to another. 

It may be remarked here, that the general mass of 
logical discussion which distinguishes this period of 
history we have now entered upon, was marked by its 
decided leaning towards viewing all reasoning methods 
for the discovery and promulgation of truth, through 
the medium of certain metaphysical principles and 
faculties. The passionate admiration for Plato and 
Aristotle encouraged this mode of thinking. The 
Italian philosophers entered fully into all those ab- 
stract notions which lie at the root of the dialectic 
systems of both Plato and the Stagyrite ; and they 
laboured hard to shew that these notions were in per- 
fect good keeping with the purely formal systems of 
reasoning adopted by both these distinguished men. 
This is one of the leading features of the logical philo- 
sophy of this period. 

The logical writings of this section of history may be 
classified, for all essential purposes of utility, under 
three heads ; those of the philosophical, the theologi- 
cal, and the mystical logicians. 

PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

The logical writers under this head were chiefly 
those who viewed the art or science of reasoning 
through the medium of the Grecian philosophy. As 
it was pregnant with antagonistic principles, there was 
consequently a corresponding difference of opinion 
among its expounders and commentators ; and on 
some occasions we witness an almost complete depar- 



PLETHO. 1 63 

ture from the logical canons of Plato, Aristotle, and 
other Greek speculators. Indeed we see here very 
distinctly, for the first time during many centuries, 
that men were bent on testing all logical methods and 
systems by their own private judgment, and to be no 
longer led by the sheer power of authority for ancient 
and venerated names. This independent spirit, it is 
true, was shared by a few only of the more bold and 
courageous among the crowd of logicians of the times ; 
but still the speculative principles of these despisers of 
intellectual authority, have exercised a powerful influ- 
ence on the general current of logical studies, from 
their own day to the present hour. 

George Gemistus Pletho (a. d. 1391) entered 
warmly into the dialectic system of Plato. In his 
work, On the Difference between the Platonic and 
Aristotelian Philosophy, he endeavours to shew, that 
Plato's views of the great principles which lay at 
the foundation of the ratiocinative art, were the only 
sound and elevating ones with which the human 
mind could be satisfied in its pursuit after truth. In 
every respect they were much superior to those em- 
bodied in the Aristotelian system, which are manifestly 
tinged to a great extent with empirical and material 
elements. It must be acknowledged, however, that 
Pletho carries his admiration of the Platonic system to 
an extravagant and unwarrantable length, incorporating 
in his disquisitions many of the attenuated and mys- 
tical notions common to Eastern speculation, and to 
the theories promulgated by the Alexandrian school.* 
This was the reason why his work was, after his death, 

* De Differentia, &c, pp. 44, 60. Frankfort Edition, 1584. 



164 , PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

committed publicly to the flames. Bessarion, Bishop 
of Mce (a. d. 1400), wrote also in favour of the Pla- 
tonic dialectics, but in a more rational and subdued 
tone than Pletho. The bishop conceived that there 
were in reality but few points of difference between 
Plato and Aristotle on the main principles of their re- 
spective logical systems. What difference there was, 
was more apparent than real ; arising not from the 
purely abstract nature of the two systems, but from 
the transcendental interpretation which was commonly 
given to that which Plato espoused. His theory of 
truth rested on the eternal character of his ideas, and 
on his considering the law of thought and the rule of 
it to be alike involved in, and necessary to all logical 
processes whatever. Aristotle, as Bessarion points out, 
viewed reasoning in the same light ; only the Stagyrite 
did not adopt to its fullest extent Plato's system of ideas, 
having their archetypes in the Divine mind. It was 
chiefly from these considerations, that the bishop was 
anxious to reconcile all those differences of opinion 
which arose in his own day, relative to the respective 
natures and importance of the Platonic and Aristotelian 
dialectical philosophy. 

Cosmo de Medici, being an enthusiastic admirer of 
the dialectic theory of Plato, as well as of his other 
speculations, patronised Marsilius Facinus (a. d. 1430), 
and induced him to undertake a translation of all the 
Platonic treatises, as well as to act upon the defensive 
against the assailants of the great doctrines they con- 
tained. Mr Eoscoe makes the following just observa- 
tions on Facinus, in reference to the influence of his 
labours on that spirit of free inquiry which a short time 



FACINUS, GE0EGE OF TEEBIZOTO, ETC. 165 

after his clay formed so conspicuous a feature in the 
scientific mind, both of Italy and of other countries in 
Europe. "The education of Facinus," says he, "was, 
as he himself informs us, entirely directed to the new 
philosophy. The doctrines and precepts of the Grecian 
sage were assiduously instilled into his infant mind; 
and, as he increased in years, he applied himself to the 
study, not of the works of Plato only, but also those of 
Plotinus — a distinguished promoter of the doctrines of 
that philosopher in the third century. Nor were the 
expectations which Cosmo had formed of Facinus dis- 
appointed. The Florentine Academy was some years 
afterwards established with great credit, and was the 
first institution of Europe for the pursuit of science, 
detached from the scholastic method then universally 
adopted. It is true the sublime and fanciful doctrines 
of Plato were almost as remote from the purposes of 
common life and general utility as the dogmatic opinions 
of Aristotle ; but the introduction of the former was 
nevertheless of essential service to the cause of free 
inquiry and substantial knowledge. By dividing the 
attention of the learned, they deprived the doctrines of 
Aristotle of that servile respect and veneration which 
had so long been paid to them ; and, by introducing the 
discussion of new subjects, they prepared the way for 
the pursuit of truths more properly within the sphere 
of the human intellect."* 

The admirers of the Aristotelian logic were far from 
viewing this homage paid to Plato with complacency, 
Theodore Gaza (a. d. 1440), Georgius Scholarius (a. d. 
1464), and George of Trebizond (a. d. 1484), were 

* Life of Lorenzo de Medici, p. 15. 



166 PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

three Greek philosophers who came into Italy under 
the patronage of the Medici family, and who were en- 
thusiastic admirers of the logical philosophy of the 
Stagyrite. They unitedly maintained the superiority 
of his system above every other. 

Manettus (a. d. 1435), a Florentine by birth, trans- 
lated Aristotle's Categories, with Porphyry's Introduc- 
tion, and wrote treatises on Wisdom, Truth, Possibility, 
&c. His notion of the nature of all truth was, that it 
was an absolute principle of unity, and that it was 
essentially in essence the same in the Divine nature as 
in man.* Larentius Yalla (a. d. 1445), a native of 
Rome, warmly combated the Aristotelian logic, and 
maintained that the study of it could in nowise advance 
the cause of useful knowledge. Erasmus praises Valla 
for his literary industry, learning, and eloquence. ]Sfor 
ought we to omit mentioning the name of Erasmus 
himself (a. d. 1464) as an enemy to the logic of the 
schools, who in his treatise, The Praise of Folly, makes 
use of the most severe and biting sarcasms against the 
logical excesses and frivolities of the middle ages. 
" They are making preparations (he writes) for a war 
against the Turks. With what view soever this be 
undertaken, we ought to pray God that it may be 
profitable not to a few, but to all of us in common. 
Should we conquer them, it is to be supposed (for we 
shall hardly put them all to the sword) that attempts 
will be made to bring them over to Christianity. Shall 
we then put into their hands an Occam, a Durandus, a 
Scotus, a Gabriel, or an Alvarus? What will they 
think of us (for after all they are rational creatures), 

* Opera, folio, p. 64. Frankf., 1564. 



LUDOVICUS VIVES. 167 

when they hear of our intricate and perplexed subtilties 
concerning instants, formalities, quantities, and rela- 
tions ? What, when they observe our quibbling pro- 
fessors so little of a mind, that they dispute together 
till they turn pale with fury, call names, spit in one 
another's faces, and even come to blows ? What, when 
they behold the Jacobins fighting for their Thomas, the 
Minorites for their most refined and seraphic doctors, 
and the Nominalists and Realists each defending their 
own jargon, and attacking that of their adversaries ?" 

The names of these three men are honourably known 
in connexion with the improved translations of Aris- 
totle's works. Gaza was, however, so ill rewarded for 
his labour, that he fell into a state of hopeless despon- 
dency, and destroyed himself. Trebizond wrote A 
Comparison of Aristotle and Plato> full of party rancour 
and bitterness. Scholarius was the author of an Intro- 
duction to Porphyry on TJniversals, and a Commentary 
on the Categories of Aristotle. 

Ludovicus Vives (a. d. 1440), a man of great talent 
and penetration of judgment, raised up his voice against 
the general system of scholastic logic. He says : — 
" Some persons maintain, that studies of this descrip- 
tion are useful to prepare the way for other kinds of 
learning, by sharpening and invigorating the faculties 
of the student; and that those who understand such 
subtile questions will the more readily acquire know- 
ledge of a less difficult nature. Neither of these 
assertions is true. One of the chief reasons why ques- 
tions of this kind are thought profound and ingenious 
is, that they are not fully comprehended; for it is no 
uncommon thing for men to applaud what they do not 



168 PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

understand. In the opinion of many, however, these 
enigmatical subtilties are only to be ranked as childish 
amusements ; being in truth, not the produce of vigo- 
rous understandings exercised by sound erudition, but 
springing up in an unoccupied mind, from a sheer 
ignorance of better things, like noxious weeds in un- 
cultivated grounds."* 

James Faber or Le Fevre (a. d. 1483) was another 
mortal enemy to the logical philosophy of the school- 
men. He conceived that all logical studies ought to 
proceed from a broad and enlightened system of men- 
tal philosophy ; and that the mere technicalities of the 
schools tended to cramp and impair the human under- 
standing. He wished to restore Aristotle's logic to its 
original purity ; and his Commentaries on the Dialectics 
of the Stagy rite, have this for their chief object. One 
of his contemporaries states, that " Faber has rendered 
the Peripatetic doctrine so obvious and intelligible, that 
we have no longer any occasion for Ammonius, Sim- 
plicius, or Philoponus." These logical innovations, how- 
ever, brought upon the head of the author the perse- 
cutions of the Sorbonne ; but he was protected by 
Margaret, Queen of Navarre, at whose court he re- 
mained for the remainder of his life, which terminated 
at the advanced age of one hundred years. Nearly 
contemporary with Faber, was Koclolphus Agricola 
(a. d. 1484), who sought to effect a reformation of 
logic He is praised by Leibnitz ; and Peter Ramus 
affirms, that Agricola awakened a lively feeling in Ger- 
many towards the correction of the abuses which had 
for centuries disfigured the logical tuition of that 

* Lib. iii., p. 120. 



PETER RAMUS. 169 

country ; and that he taught the youth of his day, not 
only how to express themselves with correctness and 
readiness in debate, but also to think and reason with 
power and justness. 

Peter Eamus (a. d. 1515) stands conspicuously in 
the history of logic at this period. He was a very 
popular lecturer of the science at the college of Na- 
varre ; and, in order to obtain the degree of Master of 
Arts, he published a thesis, in which he was bold 
enough to controvert some of the chief tenets of the 
philosophy of Aristotle, and also to speak in dis- 
paraging terms of the logical system of the Stagyrite. 
This act produced an immense ferment throughout the 
whole of France. Alarm was pictured in every counte- 
nance, and the university of Paris took the affair 
immediately under their cognisance. The members 
of this institution censured the conduct of Eamus 
severely; they considered him a rash and headstrong 
person, and charged him with bringing ridicule and 
dishonour on their entire body. Nor did then censure 
spend itself in mere words. They prosecuted Eamus 
before the parliament of Paris, and petitioned that 
some marked and adequate punishment should be 
inflicted upon him for the heinous offence of which he 
had been guilty; an offence, they affirmed, which di- 
rectly aimed at the entire subversion of all sound 
morality and religion. The members of the university 
being, however, somewhat suspicious that the parlia- 
ment might not enter so warmly into their views as 
they desired, got the indictment against Eamus removed 
to the king and council, where it was confidently an- 
ticipated a suitable verdict would be obtained. 



170 PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

Francis the First was not slow to respond to the call 
which the university made upon him. He entered 
warmly into all their grievances and prejudices. Judges 
were appointed to investigate the matter. They heard 
evidence, and gave judgment in favour of the university. 
The king heartily approved of the decision, and pub- 
lished it as a royal mandate, with his own observations 
upon it. The sentence was, that Ramus had been 
guilty of rashness, impudence, arrogance, and igno- 
rance ; that his thesis was an unfounded and malicious 
attack on the Aristotelian logic, which all the world 
admired, and which he did not himself comprehend ; 
that the publication of this thesis should be entirely 
suppressed for the peace of society, and the interest of 
truth ; and that no person whatsoever should transcribe, 
print, disperse, or read it, under pain of the most severe 
punishment. 

Teissier mentions, in his Eloge des Hommes Savans, 
that the books of Ramus (his Institutionem Dialectics, 
and Animadversiones Aristotelicce) were prohibited by 
the Court, and publicly denounced before the Eoyal 
College. Eamus was condemned to " abstain from 
pursuing his logical instructions." His sentence was 
published in Latin and French, and placarded through- 
out all the streets of Paris. He was even publicly 
ridiculed on the stage, amidst the uproarious plaudits 
of thousands of the disciples of Aristotle. He recovered, 
however, from these multiplied and unmerited insults. 
The plague raged in Paris, and cut off several of 
its most influential and popular of the professors of 
the university ; and this event seems to have again 
opened the way to his logic chair. In 1527, the sen- 



PETER RAMUS. 1 71 

tence of Trancis was reversed by Henry II., and 
Eamus was appointed Eegius Professor of Eloquence 
and Philosophy. But this was only a deceptive glimpse 
of hope in his fortunes. Worse things soon awaited 
him. The cry was raised against him of secretly enter- 
taining and propagating Protestant opinions ; and, in 
consequence of this imputation, he was assassinated at 
the great massacre of St Bartholomew, and, shocking 
to relate, his mutilated body was thrown out of the 
windows of the college, and his infuriated students 
actually tore out his very intestines, and dragged them 
about the street ! * 

Eamus gives us his reasons for making this attack 
on the logic of Aristotle. He says, that after he had 
spent three years in the study of this system of dialec- 
tics, he put some questions to himself, " What use has 
it been to me? Has it rendered me more fluent in 
speech — given me a finer and quicker perception of 
poetic beauties — made me better acquainted with all 
those really important subjects which, when a man 
thoroughly understands, he is said to be a wise man ? " 
The answer, he tells us, to these questions, was not by 
any means satisfactory. Wherein, then, lay the imper- 
fection ? Did it rest with him, or with the system of 
logic which he studied ? He pondered over these mat- 
ters for some time : at length the dialogues of Plato 
fell into his hands, and he thought he discovered a 
more plain and effective instrument for general reason- 
ing than that he had been using from Aristotle. Full 
of this idea, he concocted that system of logic which 
now bears his name ; and it was with this instrument 

* Varillas, Hist, de Charles IX. 



1 72 PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

that he produced such a terrific effect amongst the 
learned doctors of the university of Paris. 

The leading notion which seemed to have occupied 
the mind of Ramus relative to logic was, that all its 
formal rules should be pure transcripts of the laws of 
thought, as these are displayed in the act of reasoning. 
ISTothing should be admitted into any system that will 
not bear this test. He defines logic to be the art of 
discoursing correctly or justly ; and the examples which 
he gives are chiefly taken from the ancient orators and 
poets. Though professing to introduce new matter 
into the science of reasoning, yet all his innovations 
are merely of a nominal character ; for the essentials 
of his work are altogether of an Aristotelian cast. 
Ramus seems to have had a very incorrect and incom- 
plete idea of definition. He places it in the first rank 
in all logical operations. And there can be no doubt 
but this led him to pay more attention to verbal than 
mental definitions. 

It is difficult to determine of what the great logical 
improvements of Ramus consists. His system, viewed 
as a whole, seems as complicated and as formal as any 
work of the kind, even in the most rampant days of 
the schoolmen. It has been surmised, and I think 
truly, that Ramus owes more of his popularity to his 
disclaimer of Aristotle's authority, than to any thing 
he himself suggested or did in reference to logical 
science. In this he kept no bounds. He vilified the 
private character of Aristotle, and attempted also to 
shew, that the logical works attributed to him were 
really not written by him, but were the result of studies 
long prior to his day — to Prometheus among the 



PETER RAMUS. 173 

Greeks, and to Noah among the Israelites. Mr Hallam 
observes, that " as the logic of Eamus appears to be of 
no more direct utility than that of Aristotle in assisting 
us to determine the absolute truth of propositions, and 
consequently could not satisfy Lord Bacon, so perhaps 
it does not interfere with the proper use of syllogisms, 
which indeed, on a less extended scale than in Aristotle, 
form part of the Eamean dialectics. Like all those 
who assailed the authority of Aristotle, he kept no 
bounds in depreciating his works, — aware, no doubt, 
that the public, and especially younger students, will 
pass more readily from admiration to contempt, than to 
a qualified estimation of any famous man."* 

After his death, the logic of Eamus became very 
popular in many of the European seats of learning. 
Melancthon introduced it into Germany ; in some parts 
of Italy it was received with favour ; and even in 
France itself, in many districts at least, it contested 
the honour with the Stagyrite himself. Andrew Mel- 
ville introduced the logical doctrines of Eamus at 
Glasgow university; and they were prelected on at 
Cambridge in 1590. His work passed through various 
editions in England before the year 1600. His views 
were also well known at this time in Switzerland, Den- 
mark, and Holland. 

An able and popular historian and biographer of the 
Eeformation, has expressed himself deeply impressed 
with the great advantages which resulted, to Scotland 
in particular, from the cultivation of the logical system 
of Eamus. It is on this account that I venture to lay 

* Lit. Middle Ages, vol. i. p. 390. 



174 PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

the following quotations before the reader, containing, 
as they do, many observations worthy of notice : — 

" In investigating the progress which science made 
in Scotland during this period, the first thing which 
strikes us is the introduction of the Eamean philoso- 
phy, and its general substitution in the room of the 
Aristotelian. The influence which Eamus had in the 
advancement of philosophy, has not, in my opinion, had 
that importance attached to it by modern writers which 
it deserves. In forming an estimate of the degree in 
which any individual has contributed to the illumination 
of the age in which he lived, it is necessary to take into 
account something more than the character of his opin- 
ions viewed in themselves : we must show that they 
were brought fairly and fully into contact with public 
opinion, and attend to the circumstances which com- 
bined to aid or to neutralize their effect. By a close 
examination of the writings of such men as Bruno and 
Cardan, we may discover here and there a sentiment 
akin to a truer philosophy ; but then these sentiments 
appear to have struck their minds during certain lucid 
intervals, and are buried in a farrago of fantastic, extra- 
vagant, and unintelligible notions, which must have 
discredited them with every sober thinker. They are to 
be viewed rather as curious phenomena in the history of 
individuals, than as indications of the progress made by 
the human mind. There are three grand events in 
the modern history of philosophy. The first is the 
revival of literature, which, by promoting the study of 
the original writings of the ancients, rescued the Aris- 
totelian philosophy from the barbarism and corruption 



PETER RAMUS. 1 75 

which it had contracted during the middle ages. The 
second is the emancipation of the human mind from 
that slavish subjection to authority under which it had 
been long held by a superstitious veneration for the 
name of Aristotle. The third is the introduction of 
what is commonly called the inductive philosophy. In 
the progress of the human mind it behoved the two 
former to precede the latter. In bringing about the 
first, a multitude of persons in all parts of Europe had 
co-operated with nearly equal zeal. The merit of 
effecting the second is in a great measure due to one 
individual. The Platonic school, which was founded in 
the fifteenth century, did not produce any extensive or 
permanent effects on the mode of study and philoso- 
phizing. It originated in literary enthusiasm ; its dis- 
ciples were chiefly confined to Italy; and they con- 
tented themselves with pronouncing extravagant and 
rapturous panegyrics on the divine Plato. Valla, 
Agricola, Yives, and Nizolius, had pointed out various 
defects in the reigning philosophy, and recommended 
a mode of investigating truth more rational than that 
which was pursued in the schools. But they had not 
succeeded even in fixing the attention of the public on 
the subject. The attack which Eamus made on the 
Peripatetic philosophy was direct, avowed, powerful, 
persevering, and irresistible. He possessed an acute 
mind, acquaintance with ancient learning, an ardent 
love of truth, and invincible courage in maintaining it. 
He had applied with avidity to the study of the logic 
of Aristotle ; and the result was a conviction, that it 
was an instrument utterly unfit for discovering truth in 



1 76 PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

any of the sciences, and answering no other purpose 
than that of scholastic wrangling and di-gladiation. His 
conviction he communicated to the public ; and, in 
spite of all the resistance made by ignorance and pre- 
judice, he succeeded in bringing over a great part of 
the learned world to his views. What Luther was in 
the church, Ramus was in the schools. He overthrew 
the infallibility of the Stagyrite, and proclaimed the 
right of mankind to think for themselves in matters of 
philosophy — a right which he maintained with the most 
undaunted fortitude, and which he sealed with his 
blood. If Ramus had not shaken the authority of the 
long venerated Org anon of Aristotle, the world might 
not have seen the Novum Organum of Bacon. The 
faults of the Ramean system of dialectics have long 
been acknowledged. It proceeded upon the radical 
principles of the logic of Aristotle ; its distinctions often 
turned more upon words than things ; and the artificial 
method and uniform partitions which it prescribed in 
treating every subject were unnatural, and calculated 
to fetter, instead of forwarding, the mind in the dis- 
covery of truth. But it discarded many of the useless 
speculations, and much of the unmeaning jargon re- 
specting predicables, predicaments, and topics, which 
made so great a figure in the ancient logic. " It in- 
culcated upon its disciples the necessity of accuracy 
and order in arranging their own ideas, and in analys- 
ing those of others. And as it advanced no claim to 
infallibility, submitted all its rules to the test of practi- 
cal usefulness, and set the only legitimate end of the 
whole logical apparatus constantly before the eye of the 



PETER RAMUS. 177 

student, its faults were soon discovered, and yielded 
readily to a more improved method of reasoning and 
investigation." * 

" The bold and persevering spirit/' says Dugald 
Stewart, "with which Eamus disputed, in the univer- 
sity of Paris, the authority of Aristotle, and the perse- 
cution he incurred by this philosophical heresy, entitle 
him to an honourable distinction from the rest of his 
brethren. He was certainly a man of uncommon acute- 
ness, as well as eloquence, and placed in a very strong 
light some of the most vulnerable parts of the Aristo- 
telian logic ; without, however, exhibiting any marks of 
that deep sagacity which afterwards enabled Bacon, 
Descartes, and Locke, to strike at the very roots of 
the system. His copious and not inelegant style as a 
writer, recommended his innovations to those who 
were disgusted with the barbarism of the schools ; 
while his avowed partiality for the reformed faith (to 
which he fell a martyr in the massacre of Paris), pro- 
cured many proselytes to his opinions in all the Pro- 
testant countries of Europe. In England his logic had 
the honour, in an age of comparative light and refine- 
ment, to find an expounder and methodizer in the 
author of Paradise Lost ; and in some of our northern 
universities, where it was very early introduced, it 
maintained its ground till it was supplanted by the 
logic of Locke." It has been said of Eamus, that 
" although he had genius sufficient to shake the Aris- 
totelian fabric, he was unable to substitute any thing 
more solid in its place;" but it ought not to be for- 
gotten, that even this praise, scanty as it may now 

* M 'die's Life of Melville, vol. ii. p. 302. 
M 



178 PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

appear, involves a large tribute to his merits as a phi- 
losophical reformer. Before human reason could ad- 
vance, it was necessary that it should first be released 
from its fetters.* 

James Concio (a. d. 1530) was a native of Trent, 
and is the author of a little work, De Methodo, of con- 
siderable merit. He sets out with some observations 
showing the necessity of a given or prescribed method, 
when pursuing our philosophical inquiries into any sub- 
ject whatever. This method is the primordial idea on 
which the mind rests ; and to bring out all our con- 
clusions in strict logical harmony with it, is, or ought 
to be, the grand object of all reasoners. A method is 
a classified arrangement, a general term, a starting- 
point, a conception, a comprehensive idea, a purpose 
or end, a theory or a hypothesis. It is like the 
central point of a circle to which all the radii converge. 
Hence no formal system of logic can be intelligible, 
unless there be a method lying underneath it which 
aims at accomplishing some definite thing, or effecting 
some definite conclusion of the understanding. A 
method is the living principle of all formal reasoning ; 
without it the mere technicalities of an argumentative 
process are devoid of all significancy or value. 

All terms, such as general idea, principle, concep- 
tion, genus, species, analysis, synthesis, &c, have then- 
foundation in the notions of method which the human 
mind, from its first rudimental movements, is led to 
entertain. These terms, or their equivalents, enter 
into every thing susceptible of arrangement and classi- 
fication. Children display this power of methodizing 

* Dissert., p. 30. 



JAMES CONCIO. 179 

very early in life; and among all characters of men 
we find it in active operation, and as constituting one 
of the chief features in their intellectual physiognomy. 
But there is, so to speak, a method even in the em- 
ployment of method. We find abuses from the use 
of it, just as we find abuses from the employments 
of many of our powers and faculties. Absurd sys- 
tems and theories arise out of the use of method, as 
well as rational and sound ones. To determine its fit 
and beneficial application, there would seem to be 
a set of faculties which sit in judgment, as it were, 
upon it, determining the legitimacy of its use here, 
and denouncing its misapplication there. All kinds of 
scientific excellencies and defects take then rise from 
this common source ; from the huge collector of scat- 
tered and undigested facts, to the concise and methodi- 
cal systematizer of them for popular use and instruction. 
Method is the first step in the rational movements of 
men ; the significant symbol of growing intelligence 
and usefulness. It operates as a finger-post to point 
out the road to some hitherto unknown or undiscovered 
region. There is in the mind of every philosophical 
inquirer an undefined notion of the direction he should 
take, the general appearance he should give to his 
materials, and the end or purpose they should serve; 
still, as this is but vaguely set before the intellect by 
the notion of method adopted from the commencement 
of his labours, the intrinsic value and importance of 
the guide can only be estimated when the journey is 
finished, and the labours summed up. 

Method, he tells us again, is the proper manner of 
proceeding, whether in the examination of known 



180 PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

truths, the obtaining of those which are not known, or 
in transmitting knowledge to others. But a philoso- 
phical method requires preliminary arrangements. It 
is requisite we should determine beforehand in what 
the knowledge of things consists, how we obtain that 
knowledge, what matters it embraces, and what por- 
tion of these we are able to trace to their proper causes. 
These are considerations of great moment. We may 
be said to have a perfect knowledge of a thing if we 
know what it is ; comprehend it, not only as a whole, 
but in all its most minute parts and dependencies. 
We should know the genus as well as the species ; not 
only immediate or proximate causes and effects, but 
those that are more remote and hidden. 

All knowledge deduced from a process of reasoning 
presupposes some primitive truths, immediate, founded 
on nature, and independent of the reasoning process. 
The office of method is to bring these primitive truths 
to light.* 

Logic may be summed up as the " right method of 
thinking and teaching:" recta contemplandi docendique 
ratio. This "right method" demands great attention 
and labour ; so much so, indeed, that Concio affirms, 
that if a subject required thirty years' study or applica- 
tion, he would not think it disproportioned to allot 
two-thirds of that period to the acquiring a dexte- 
rous use of the methodical arrangements requisite for 
the execution of the work. He lays great stress upon 
the rules which he gives for constructing definitions, by 
paying strict attention to the genus and differentia. 
The soundness of many of these rules may, however, 

* De Metlmdo, §§ 1, 3, 13, 20, 61. Antwerp, 1602. 



ZABARELLA, NIZOLINI, CAMPENELLA. 181 

be fairly called in question. In the distributing of a 
subject the analytic method is the best, both for the 
investigation and communicating of truth. 

James Zabarella (a. d. 1532) was a logician of some 
note, and published Commentaries on Aristotle. Marius 
^izolini (a. d. 1553), wrote a work On the Proper 
Principles and Mode of Reasoning, in which he dis- 
cusses some of the leading points of the Aristotelian 
logic, and likewise enters into an inquiry relative to 
the nature and offices of general terms. He was a 
decided [Nominalist, and conceived that the Eealistic 
theory had not a single argument of any weight on 
which it could rest. Leibnitz, who published an edi- 
tion of his work with an able preface, censures Nizo- 
lini for his unmeasured condemnation of the Eealists. 
In Italy his work met with little countenance or sup- 
port — chiefly from his violent censures on the logic of 
Aristotle; and in more modern times it has been 
variously estimated by Bruker, Buhle, Dugald Stewart, 
and others. " Nizolini argues," says Mr Hallam, 
" against all dialectics, and therefore differs from Eamus 
— concluding with two propositions as the result of his 
whole book : — That as many logicians and metaphysi- 
cians as are any way found, so many capital enemies 
of truth will then and there exist ; and that, so long as 
Aristotle shall be supreme in the logic and metaphysics 
of the schools, so long will error and barbarism reign 
over the mind. There is nothing very deep or pointed 
in this summary of his reasoning." * 

Thomas Campanella (a. d. 1568) was one of the 
most active spirits of his age. He seems to have early 

* Lit. Middle Ages, vol. ii. p. 18. 



182 PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

in life imbibed a strong feeling against the logical 
system of the schools. He enters into the question 
as to its value in his work, Philosophia Mealis. He 
here states fully the arguments for and against it ; and 
comes to the conclusion, that the interests of truth and 
the salvation of men require that a final and complete 
renunciation should be made of the Aristotelian logic. 
He maintains that all truth centres in a Deity ; and 
there are only two great sources from which it can be 
obtained, — first, by examining nature carefully by way 
of induction, and then directing the attention to what 
intuition teaches, and to what the prophets reveal to 
us. These he considers as the chief heads under which 
all human knowledge should be classified. 

The innovations which Campanella introduced into 
dialectics, could scarcely be said to be any decided im- 
provement on the system of the schools. He seems to 
have laboured under the notion, that whatever he could 
advance contrary to the formal system of the Stagyrite, 
must necessarily prove a valuable addition to logical 
science. 

He expresses himself with great contempt for the 
logical squabbles' so frequent and inveterate in the ages 
which had preceded him. In his work, De Investiga- 
tions, he says that he ventures upon pointing out to 
young men a better and readier mode of obtaining 
knowledge than either Plato or Aristotle ever taught. 
He would teach them to reason, not like Raymond 
Lully, through the instrumentality of mere words, but 
from the sensible objects and operations of nature 
around them. 

Sanchez (a. d. 1576), a Portuguese physician, was a 



SANCHEZ. 183 

theoretical logician of a decidedly sceptical cast. His 
arguments, if such they may be called, are chiefly those 
which the ancient Pvrrhonians used, arising from the 
differences of opinion and sentiment among mankind 
on most subjects of acknowledged importance. There 
is nothing new or striking in Sanchez's scepticism. He 
maintains there are two modes of arriving at truth, but 
neither of them give us positive information of the 
real nature of things. These modes are experiment 
and reason. Neither of these alone can communicate 
absolute scientific truth. Mr Hallam observes, that 
" this treatise of Sanchez's bears witness to a deep 
sense of the imperfections of the received systems in 
science and reasoning, and to a restless longing for 
truth, which strikes us in other writers of this latter 
period of the sixteenth century. Lord Bacon, I believe, 
has never alluded to Sanchez, and such paradoxical 
scepticism was likely to disgust his strong mind ; yet we 
may sometimes discern signs of a Baconian spirit in 
the attacks of our Spanish philosopher on the syllogis- 
tic logic, as being built on abstract and not significant 
terms, and in his clear perception of the difference be- 
tween a knowledge of words and one of things."* 

Logical pursuits had been cultivated the latter part 
of the fifteenth, and the whole of the sixteenth century, 
with great ardour and industry. Independent of those 
names we have singled out in the sections of this chap- 
ter, there were many other logicians of no small repu- 
tation, both as teachers and writers. There seemed to 
be a restless desire for indefinite logical innovations, 
both as to fundamental principles and formal systems. 

* Lit. Middle Ages, vol. ii. p. 16. 



184 PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICIANS. 

New methods of investigation, and new classifications 
and arrangements of rules, were seen springing up in 
every direction. Many were eagerly engaged in pulling 
down old systems, while others were tenaciously de- 
fending them. Every where men's minds appeared in 
search of new truths, and more practical and popular 
modes of disseminating them when found. Kecker- 
man, who published his Prcecognitio in 1606, tells us 
that there were upwards of sixty distinguished logical 
writers in his day. 

In Spain and Italy there were many logical authors 
of note in the sixteenth century. We can do nothing 
more than merely mention a few of them. All the 
logicians of the former country took their leading prin- 
ciples from the system of speculation developed by 
Thomas Aquinas. In Italy there was not the same 
uniformity among its theoretical writers on the art of 
reasoning. Francis Toledo (a. d. 1550) wrote Institu- 
tiones ad Logicam ; Father Zunica (a. d. 1560) was a 
popular teacher of dialectics; Antonius Eubeo (a. d. 
1582) was the author of Commentaria in Universam 
Aristotelis Logicam; Franciscus Murcia de la Liana 
(a. d. 1584), Selecta circa Universam Aristotelis Dialec- 
ticam ; Francis Gonzalez (a. d. 1600), Logica Tri- 
partita ; to whom may be added the names of Francis- 
cus de Bivar, Antonio Coronelli, Antonius Johannes 
Andreas ; Gregorius Valentinus Arcisius ; Barth. J. 
Paschius, Dominic Soto, Joh. Bapt. Monlorius, John 
Clementis, and Petrus H. de Mendoza. 

In Belgium and Holland we have many distin- 
guished names connected with logic in the sixteenth 
century. Among the number we may mention Petrus 



THEOLOGICAL LOGICIANS, 185 

de Bruxella, Petrus Bertius, Joh. Murmellius, J. 
Polyander, Th. Eebus, P. Grallardius, Justus Yelsius, 
J. Sturmius, P. Carpenterius, John Bononia, J. Csesa- 
rius, Th. Buridanus, Father Dionysius, Franciscus 
Byrs^eus, F. Titelmannus, Bodolphus Snellius, Augus- 
tus Huens, Bar. Latonius, Martinus Dorpius, Gerd, 
Listrius, and Joh. Aldeburgus. 

Olaus Mcolai Nericius introduced the logical doc- 
trines of Peter Bamus into Sweden in 1570. He 
illustrated them with great eloquence, and was one of 
the most popular lecturers on logic in the north of 
Europe. John Skytte was at the same time the zeal- 
ous organ of the Aristotelian system. Bishop Gothus 
published his Comments in 1578, on the general scope 
of Eamus's innovations in logic ; and a short time after 
this, J. Rudbeckius gave to the world his System of 
Logic, in which were incorporated many important 
metaphysical speculations. 

THEOLOGICAL LOGICIANS. 

The great movement of the Eeformation effected 
logical science considerably — not only in its formal, but 
in its scientific character. All the great reformers, 
though differing on matters of detail as to logical 
instruction, maintained that the Scriptures, as a whole, 
had their own philosophical method relative to the 
manner in which truth should be investigated and dis- 
seminated among mankind. They dealt with the 
science of man in all his relations as a political, social, 
moral, and religious being. On all the branches of 
knowledge springing out of these several relations. 



186 THEOLOGICAL LOGICIANS. 

they spoke with authority and without compromise. 
There was no appeal from their decisions. What was 
not taught in the Bible concerning human nature, was 
neither true nor fit to be taught. This was the first 
time in the history of mankind that Eevelation had 
been fairly and directly placed, face to face, with the 
natural understanding of man. Whatever conflicts 
had taken place between the philosophy of pure reason 
and theological truth, had only assumed the character 
of occasional skirmishes ; but now the great battle was 
to be fought, which should once and for ever deter- 
mine where sovereign authority should permanently 
reside. 

It was impossible that such ardent minds as those of 
the Reformers, could view with complacency any mere 
dry and formal study, which seemed to cramp the 
energies of the mind, and which dealt, or professed to 
deal, with the great principles of human reasoning. 
And this impossibility will appear still greater when 
we reflect that a system of this kind was one of the 
chief instruments which sustained the power and influ- 
ence of their enemies. Accordingly we find, that the 
scholastic logic was one of the first things to which 
Luther and his reforming associates directed their 
attention. It presented a stupendous stumbling-block 
at the threshold of their theological movements. To 
remove it altogether seemed beyond their strength; 
and to modify it appeared a work of no ordinary diffi- 
culty. But something was to be done. It must be 
grappled with in some shape, or Protestant doctrines 
and teachings would be of no avail. Luther, being the 
most ardent and impetuous of all the Reformers, and 



LUTHER. 187 

the least able to brook authority of any kind, was very 
much inclined to strangle the " logical monster " forth- 
with, as the only means of making his future footsteps 
smooth and secure. Of course he keeps no terms with 
the schoolmen. He decidedly declares, that it would 
be impossible to establish any beneficial mode of public 
tuition in theology, if students were to be clogged with 
the scholastic dialectics. He spoke from experience, 
having filled an Aristotelian chair of philosophy him- 
self. The Bible was every thing to him. He even 
goes so far as to paraphrase its grand and leading doc- 
trines with the chief divisions of the philosophy of the 
schools in a somewhat whimsical manner. He says, 
" In divine things, the Father is the Grammar ; for 
he imparts words, and is the source whence flow good, 
pure, and harmonious sayings. The Son is Logic, and 
suggests arrangement, order, and sequence of ideas. The 
Holy Ghost is Rhetoric, states, presses home, enlarges, 
and gives life and strength, so as to impress and hold the 
hearers' hearts. The schoolmen have neglected these 
important signs for silly trifles." " The decalogue is 
the doctrine of doctrines ; the creed the history of his- 
tories ; the Lord's prayer the prayer of prayers ; the 
sacraments the ceremonies of ceremonies." Again he 
says, " What doth it contribute towards the knowledge 
of things, to be perpetually trifling and cavilling, in 
language conceived and prescribed by Aristotle, con- 
cerning matter, form, motion, and time?" "I am 
persuaded that neither Thomas, nor all the Thomists 
together, ever understood a single chapter of Aristotle." 

"The schoolmen! let them go to ." "The 

pagan Aristotle was held in such honour, that whoever 



188 THEOLOGICAL LOGICIANS. 

had disputed his authority would have been condemned 
at Cologne as a rank heretic ; but that he was so little 
understood, that a monk, preaching on the passion, 
favoured his hearers with a two hours' discussion of the 
question, whether quality were really distinct from sub- 
stance — stating as an instance, " I could pass my head 
through that hole, but not the size of my head." 

The cumbersome forms and quaint language of the 
dialectic system annoyed Luther not a little. He says, 
" The most celebrated and best school is at Paris, in 
France. It has twenty thousand students and upwards. 
The theologians there have the pleasantest spot in the 
whole city, being a street to themselves, with gates at 
each end : it is called the Sorbonne — a name derived, I 
fancy, from the fruit of the service-tree (sorbus), which 
grows by the Dead Sea, and which, beautiful without, 
are only ashes within. Even so the university of Paris 
shows a goodly multitude, but is the mother of many 
errors. In disputing, they bawl like drunken peasants 
in Latin and French, so that the auditors are obliged 
to stamp with their feet to silence them. Before one 
can take one's degree as doctor of theology, one is 
obliged to have been a student of their sophistical and 
futile logic for ten years. The respondent must sit a 
whole day, and dispute with every comer, from six in 
the morning to six in the evening." " If I were to 
write a treatise on logic, I would reject every foreign 
word, as proposition syllogismus, enthemena, exemplum, 
&c, and give them German synonyms." " Aristotle, 
Porphyry, the theologians of the sentences — these are 
the unprofitable study of this age. I desire nothing 
more ardently than to lay open before all eyes this false 



LUTHER. 189 

system, which has tricked the church by covering itself 
with a Greek mask, and to expose its worthlessness 
before the world." " If the syllogistic method were 
applicable to divine things, the doctrine of the Holy 
Trinity would be ' known/ and not ' believed.' ' 
"Aristotle is to theology as darkness to light." 

Luther had studied logic under Justus Jodocus 
of Eisenach, or, as he is commonly called, Dr Eisenach, 
a monk, and the author of two works, Summa Totius 
Logicce, 1501, and Epitome seu JBreviarium Dialectics. 
Luther seems to have entertained a great affection for 
his master ; but the latter felt deeply concerned at the 
former's reproachful and unqualified denunciations of 
the scholastic system — a system which appeared, in the 
doctor's eyes, as the sum and substance of all real 
knowledge and learning. And it is affirmed, that so 
much did he take the matter to heart, that his death 
was hastened, if not actually produced, by the opinions 
and sentiments of the great reformer on this subject. 

In Luther's letters we find these differences between 
his logical tutor and himself often alluded to. In an 
epistle, addressed to Spalatin, there is a remarkable 
passage containing his opinion of the school logic in 
reference to theology ; and so important are his state- 
ments, that although the passage is long, I cannot 
refrain from quoting it, because it embodies in fact, 
and in very clear terms, some of the leading philoso- 
phical difficulties which lie in the way between this 
logical system and revealed truth. 

" You ask," says Luther, " how far I think dialectic 
is useful to theology ; verily I do not see how it can be 
other than poison to a true divine. Grant that it may 



190 THEOLOGICAL LOGICIANS. 

be useful as a sport or exercise for youthful minds, still 
in sacred letters, where simple faith and divine illumi- 
nation are to be awaited, the whole matter of the syllo- 
gism is to be left below, even as Abraham, when about 
to sacrifice, left the youth with the asses. And this, 
John Eeuchlin, in the second book of his Cabbala, 
sufficiently confirms. For if any dialectic be necessary, 
that given by nature is enough, by which a man is led 
to compare one belief with another, and so to arrive at 
the truth. I have not unfrequently engaged in discus- 
sions with my friends as to the profit to be gained from 
this so sedulous study of philosophy and dialectic ; and 
truly with one consent we have marvelled at, yea be- 
wailed over, the calamity of minds finding in these 
studies no help, but rather a whole flood of hinderance. 
" Finally, I have written to Dr Isenach, the prince 
of dialecticians (as it seems) in this age, insisting most 
strongly on the same thing, which indeed cannot be 
denied ; to wit, that dialectic cannot help theology, but 
rather hinders it, because the same grammatical terms 
are used in a widely different sense in theology and in 
logic. How, therefore, I say, can dialectic be of any 
use, when, after "I enter on theology, the same term 
which in logic signified such a thing, I am compelled 
to reject, and to receive in another sense ? And, that I 
may not multiply words, take for example the follow- 
ing : — Body, in the tree of Porphyry, signifies a thing 
made up of matter and form; but such body cannot 
belong to man, seeing that in the Scriptures our body 
signifies matter only, not also form; as where it is said, 
' Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able 
to kill the soul.' Farther, I instance the absurd state- 



MELANCTHON. 191 

merit, that an angel is neither rational nor irrational ; 
as also, that it is of no use to the Scriptures for a man to 
be called sensitive, rational, corporeal, animated; and 
briefly, the whole of that arrangement of the tree of 
Porphyry, I have said, and still say, is more trivial 
than an old woman's fancy or a sick man's dream, and 
justly, therefore, is it called Porphyrean (that is, 
bloody), from the Christian souls, to wit, which it has 
slain. 

" The good man took it much to heart, and affirmed 
that my sophisms could not be credited even by my- 
self. But these worthies are the bondmen of Aristotle 
and Porphyry, and consider not what is said, but 
simply who says it. Hence it comes that they are not 
able to understand a single chapter of Scripture, much 
less to render it."* 

Melancthon's antipathy to the scholastic logic was 
not so bitter as that of Luther's ; but he by no means 
entertained a very high opinion of its merits. Speak- 
ing in general terms he says, " It was, however, the 
prevalent opinion, that logical philosophy was to be 
pursued merely in subservience to theological disputa- 
tion, and to furnish weapons for controversy. [Nothing 
but abstruse and subtle questions were proposed, which 
generated a war of words. It was characteristic of the 
scholastic philosophy to display all possible ingenuity 
in reasoning about nothing, or nothing better than the 
merest trifles. Dialectics were employed not to assist 
the understanding in the search for truth, which is their 

* Luther's Briefe, Ed. De Wette, vol. i. See also Baynes, " On the New 
Analytic of Logical Forms," Appendix, pp. 108-113, from which this extract is 
taken. 



192 THEOLOGICAL LOGICIANS. 

only legitimate application, but to perplex what was 
plain, to distinguish what did not differ, and to entangle 
the mind in a labyrinth of inexplicable absurdities. 
The topics of discussion were intention and remission, 
proportion and degree, infinity, formality, quiddity, 
individuality, and others equally intelligible and edify- 
ing ! Aristotle was considered as having reached the 
utmost limit of human knowledge — a convenient opin- 
ion, it must be admitted, for those who were desirous 
of being spared the trouble of thinking or examining 
for themselves ; and so preposterous was their attach- 
ment to this heathen oracle, that they blasphemed the 
great Teacher of the world by publicly reading to the 
people in sacred assemblies the Ethics of Aristotle, in- 
stead of the Gospel of Christ I" * 

Melancthon's opinions underwent, however, a change 
as to the Peripatetic system. He conceived that it 
was not, in its general tenor, so inimical to the Chris- 
tian faith as Luther conceived. Melancthon says, " I 
will add something concerning philosophy, and the 
reasons for believing that of Aristotle to be the most 
useful for the church. It is agreed, I think, by all, 
that logic is of prime importance, because it teaches 
method and order ; it defines fitly, divides justly, con- 
nects aptly, judges and separates monstrous associa- 
tions. Those who are ignorant of this art, tear and 
mangle the subjects of discourse as puppies do rags. I 
admire the simile of Plato, who highly extols it as re- 
sembling the fire which Prometheus brought from 
heaven, to kindle a light in the minds of men by which 
they might be able to form correct ideas. But he does 

* Melanc. Apol , p. 62. 



MELANCTHON, ETC. 193 

not furnish us with the precepts of the art, so that we 
cannot dispense with the logic of Aristotle. That of 
the Stoics is not extant ; and, instead of being a simple 
method of reasoning fit for the explanation of profound 
subjects, it appears to have been a complete labyrinth 
of intricacies, and, in fact, a mere corruption of the 
art."* 

The two chief ends which Melancthon proposed to 
himself in compiling his two treatises on logic, was to 
shorten the student's passage to a knowledge of the 
science, and to guide and direct him through the chan- 
nel of religious sentiment and doctrine. His contem- 
poraries give him credit for the accomplishment of both 
these purposes. And what was Melancthon's object in 
this respect, was alike the object which all the most 
active continental reformers had in view. They wished 
to avail themselves of whatever was rational and sound 
in the old logic ; but at the same time cultivating an 
acquaintance with it through the medium of more 
comprehensive and liberal principles of philosophical 
inquiry than those adopted by the generality of the 
schoolmen. 

The professors of logic in most of the Protestant 
colleges and universities, adopted the dialectic views of 
Melancthon. The most eminent among these were 
Simon Simonius, Philip Scherbius, Ernest Sonner, 
Michel Picart, Christ. Scheible, Cornelius Martini, 
Daniel Stahl, James Schegk, Conrad Hornejus, Christ. 
Dreyer, Hermann Conring, and Melchior Ziedler. 

The Eeformation effected in our own country a great 
change in logical pursuits and studies. In England, 

* Orat. de Aristotle. 



194 THEOLOGICAL LOGICIANS. 

though the syllogistic method was still preserved, yet 
there crept into all the seminaries of learning grave 
doubts as to its value and importance as a general 
branch of academical education. These doubts in the 
course of time gradually weaned the minds of the 
learned from logical studies of any kind ; and, speaking 
with considerable latitude of meaning, this has been 
the prevailing state of feeling, in this part of the island, 
from the first dawn of Protestant opinions till the pre- 
sent hour. 

In the report of the visitation of Oxford, ordered by 
Henry VIII. in 1535, we find the scholastic system of 
logic treated with great contempt. The king himself 
had indeed been at one time a zealous admirer of 
Thomas Aquinas ; but, after his rupture with the Eoman 
see, the schoolmen had but few merits in his estimation. 

In Scotland the case was somewhat different. Here 
the clergy took up the scholastic logic with great zeal 
and earnestness, and considered its general bearings on 
theological doctrines nearly in the same light as their 
Protestant brethren on the continent. Andrew Mel- 
ville, as we have already seen, introduced the logic of 
Eamus into the university of Glasgow in the latter part 
of the sixteenth century. James Melville, his brother, 
was appointed professor of logic when Andrew left for 
St Andrews. John Eutherford was one of the distin- 
guished logicians in Scotland at this period. He was 
a native of Jedburgh, in Eoxburghshire, but had been 
educated in France. He became principal of St Sal- 
vator's college at St Andrews, His work on the Art of 
Reasoning* is considered as one which decidedly marks 

* Comment, de Arte Disserendi. Edin. 1577. 



JOHN RUTHERFORD. 195 

the progress of sound knowledge in his own country. 
It is founded on the system of Aristotle, but differed in 
some essential particulars. " Treading in the steps of 
his master De Grouchi, Rutherford rejected the errors 
into which the ancient commentators upon Aristotle 
had fallen, and discarded many of the frivolous ques- 
tions which the modern dialecticians do so much de- 
light in discussing." * 

The university of St Andrews is the earliest, and for 
a long period was the most distinguished, academical 
institution in Scotland. Its foundation dates from 
1411, and its educational functions were classified under 
the title of a general study. Prior to this period there 
was no university in Scotland ; and those who were 
destined to follow the learned professions, had to seek 
their education in foreign countries. The university 
was modelled from those of Paris and Bologna. Soon 
after its foundation, logic was regularly taught by lec- 
tures ; and all graduates had to send in a petition 
stating their knowledge of the text of Aristotle. The 
regent assembled his class three hours every day, — 
reading and explaining the books of the Stagy rite, 
which the students were bound to bring with them. 
The first course began with dialectics or logic ; and 
then followed ethics, physics, metaphysics, and ma- 
thematics. To exercise the students in the art of 
argumentation, there were regular days appointed for 
public disputations.*)- In the early part of the sixteenth 

* M'Crie's Life of Melville. 

+ " We hard the Oration pro rege Deitaro. Than he gaiff ws a compend of his 
awin of Philosopi and the partes y r of. We enterit in the Organ of Arist. y* year, 
and leirnit to the Demonstrations. The secund yeir of my course we had the Demon- 
strations, the Topiks, and the Sophist captiones." — James Melville's Diary, p. 22. 



196 THEOLOGICAL LOGICIANS. 

century logical studies underwent a change. There 
was a dissatisfaction manifested at the unprofitableness 
of the Aristotelian system generally ; and it was en- 
acted that " the most profitable and needful parts only 
of the logic of the Stagyrite should be insisted on ; and 
that there should be likewise lectures on the Platonic 
philosophy, in order to counterbalance in some measure 
the formal and deadening effect of Peripateticism. 
This alteration was hailed by the liberal part of the 
university with great pleasure. Melville is generally 
considered as having been the chief instrument in 
effecting this reformation.* 

It would appear, however, that this modification of 
the scholastic logic was not well received by many of 
the more bigoted portions of the university; and 
Melville came in for his full share of the obloquy thrown 
on the innovators.") - " Disregarding the ignorant cla- 
mour and interested alarm which had been excited, he 
persisted in the course which he had taken ; and, when 
the subject was introduced in the public meetings of 
the university, at vacations and promotions, he refuted 
the arguments of his opponents with such readiness, 
force of reasoning, and overpowering eloquence, as re- 
duced them to silence. Before he had been two years 
at St Andrews, a favourable change was visible on the 
university. Many of those who were most strongly 
prejudiced against the new learning, as they called it, 
were induced to apply to the acquisition of languages ; 
instead of boasting perpetually of the authority of Aris- 



* Melville's Diary, pp. 58, 64. 

f "Their breadwinner, their honor, their estimation, all was guan, giff Aristotle 
should be so owirharled in the hairing of their shollars." — James Melville's Diary, 



MYSTICAL LOGICIANS. 197 

totle, and quoting him ignorantly at second-hand, they 
perused his writings in the original, studied the arts for 
purposes of real utility, and not for show and verbal 
contention ; and, becoming real philosophers and theo- 
logians, acknowledged that they had undergone " a 
wonderful transportation out of darkness into light." * 

MYSTICAL LOGICIANS. 

The mystical logicians of this period of history 
scarcely differ from those of their sect in former times, 
save, perhaps, by their somewhat greater extravagance 
and love of paradox. It must always, however, be 
taken into consideration, that there are every degree 
of mysticism, from the overheated zeal for grand and 
noble principles, to absolute folly and conceit. Where 
the mystical spirit begins, and the rational terminates, 
is often a very nice and difficult question to solve. 
Mysticism is unquestionably a phase of the intuitive, 
but a phase embodying more or less of a lofty reli- 
gious feeling. 

Nicolas de Cusa (a. d. 1401) was born at Treves, 
and was a philosophical logician of some note in his 
day. He maintained that the reasoning faculty of 
man only develops itself through the instrumentality 
of ideas of number; which ideas are its constituent 
elements. Human nature, considered in all its fulness, 
is simply that which belongs to man as man ; and 
every movement of this nature, in its argumentative 
phases, is solely for the attainment of God in man.f 

* M'Crie's Life of Andrew Melville, vol. i. p. 259. 
t Opera, Paris, 1514. 



198 MYSTICAL LOGICIANS. 

Paracelsus (a. d. 1493) denied there was any active 
or spontaneous power in the reason ; it was entirely 
passive. All science lies, as it were, in the depths of 
the human intellect, in the same manner as we con- 
ceive it lies in the mind of the Deity. No formal 
reasonings can develop it ; but man must retire into 
himself, and then he will recognise the truth by a 
species of divine illumination, to obtain which prayer 
is the means, and purity of heart an indispensable 
condition. 

Yan Helmont (a. d. 1577) adopts nearly the same 
theory as that of Paracelsus as to the nature of evi- 
dence. The former enters, however, more fully than 
the latter into the nature of logical science, and mi- 
nutely examines its methods, in order to shew their 
complete insufficiency for leading us to the fountain of 
truth. He maintains that the several relations which 
subsist between the terms of a syllogism, exist in our 
minds prior to the conclusion we draw from them ; 
and therefore all syllogistic modes of argumentation 
are nothing more than a bare repetition of anterior 
notions, the only uses of which are that of facilitating 
an exposition of the ideas of a speaker, and of aiding 
the recollection of them on the part of the hearer. 
All science has an independent existence apart from 
demonstration ; and the only way of realizing its con- 
clusions and principles is by intuition. Sound reason- 
ing or knowledge depends upon the entire annihilation 
of every intellectual operation. 

Jacob Bohme (a. r>. 1578) maintained, that it was 
impossible for any man to arrive at truth by any other 
means than by a direct illumination from heaven. At 



JACOB BOHME, ETC. 199 

the same period with Bohme, Fred. Aug. Frankonius 
flourished in Sweden as a mystical logician. He 
taught that every ordinary truth was a direct scintilla- 
tion from the Divine mind, and that in the acquire- 
ment of science men were entirely the instruments in 
the hands of Providence, who meted out such portions 
of general intelligence as suited the ends and purposes 
of the times. George Stjernhjelm, a few years after, 
followed in his wake with nearly the same class of 
dogmas. John Buraens also, a Swedish writer, illus- 
trated the nature of scientific truth through the 
medium of the doctrines of Zoroaster. 



200 ON THE NOVUM ORGAN CM, 



CHAPTEE IX. 

ON THE NOVUM ORGANUM, OR BACONIAN LOGIC. 

One of the great landmarks of logic, considered in its 
philosophical bearings, is the Novum Organum of Lord 
Bacon. It gave a new and powerful impetus to logi- 
cal investigations. We have seen, in several of the 
preceding chapters, how theories of reasoning fluc- 
tuated from Plato to Aristotle, and from Aristotle to 
Plato; but it was reserved for his lordship to with- 
draw the scientific world from these distinguished 
names, and fix its attention almost exclusively on him- 
self, and that mode of investigation and inquiry which 
he has so carefully pointed out, in the celebrated work 
now before us. 

It would be altogether unnecessary, in a treatise of 
this nature, to do any thing more than give a very 
concise outline of the nature and scope of the Novum 
Organum for general purposes. The Baconian method, 
or logic, as his lordship's work is often called, has 
been a standard topic of discussion for more than two 
centuries in every country in Europe, and has elicited 
various, and somewhat conflicting, opinions on its real 



OR BACONIAN LOGIC. 201 

nature and importance. Indeed, these are by no means 
agreed on at the present hour. But to state the dis- 
cussion fully, and give all the arguments for and 
against, would require many volumes ; consequently 
the reader must, on the present occasion, content him- 
self with our brief notice, however limited or imperfect 
it may appear. Should he require mure lengthened 
statements, there are plenty to be had in all languages, 
and at a very trifling cost of either money ur trouble. 

The great object of the Novum Organum is pointed 
out by his lordship in the following words: — " But 
whence," says he, " can arise such vagueness and 
sterility in all the physical systems which have hitherto 
existed in the world? It; is not certainly from any 
thing in nature itself ; for the steadiness and regularity 
of the laws by which it is governed, clearly mark 
them out as objects of certain and precise knowledge. 
Neither can it arise from any want of ability in those 
who have pursued such inquiries, many uf whom have 
been men of the highest talents and genius of the ages 
in which they lived; and it can therefore arise from 
nothing else but the perverseness and insufficiency of 
the methods that have been pursued. Men have sought 
to make a world from their own conceptions, and to 
draw from their own minds all the materials which 
they employed ; but if, instead of doing this, they had 
consulted experience and observation, they would have 
had facts and not opinions to reason about, and might 
have ultimately arrived at the knowledge of the laws 
which govern the material world. 

" As things are at present conducted," he adds, "a 



202 ON THE NOVUM ORGANUM, 

sudden transition is made from sensible objects and 
particular facts to general propositions, which are 
accounted principles, and round which, as round so 
many fixed poles, disputation and argument continually 
revolve. From the propositions thus hastily assumed, 
all things are derived by a process compendious and 
precipitate — ill suited to discovery, but wonderfully 
accommodated to debate. The way that promises 
success is the reverse of this. It requires we should 
generalize slowly, going from particular things to those 
that are but one step more general; from these to 
others of greater extent; and so on to such as are 
universal. By such means we may hope to arrive at 
principles, not vague and obscure, but luminous and 
well defined, such as nature herself will not refuse to 
acknowledge." 

The Novum Organum consists of two leading parts. 
The first is that which the author thought was fitted 
to prepare the mind for the full development of the 
inductive process. The first aphorism of the first book 
embraces, in fact, his whole theory of reasoning — 
" Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, does and 
understands only so far as he may have observed by sense, 
or mentally, of the order of nature — beyond this he neither 
knows nor can know." 

The divers modes in which men are led from the 
true method of interpreting nature, Bacon classifies 
under the head of idols. In the thirty-ninth aphorism 
of the first book, he states that " There are four kinds 
of idols (or false images) which beset the mind of 
man. To these, for instruction, we have given names, 



OR BACONIAN LOGIC. 203 

calling the first kind Idols of the Tribe; the second, 
Idols of the Cave ; the third, Idols of the Forum ; the 
fourth, Idols of the Theatre. 

" The excitation of notions and axioms by true in- 
duction, is certainly the fit remedy for discharge and 
removal of idols ; and yet an indication of the idols is 
of much profit, for the doctrine concerning idols has a 
like regard to the interpretation of nature, as the doc- 
trine concerning sophistical confutations has to the 
common logic. 

" Idols of the Tribe are planted in the human nature 
itself, and in the very tribe or nation of mankind. 
For it is untruly asserted, that human sense is the 
measure of things — nay, contrariwise, all the percep- 
tions, whether of sense or mind, are from analogy of 
man, not from analogy of the universe ; and the human 
intellect is like an uneven mirror to the rays of things, 
which mingles its own nature with the nature of things, 
and distorts and corrupts it. 

" Idols of the Cave are idols of the individual man. 
For every one, besides aberrations of the human 
nature in kind, has a den also, or certain individual 
cave, which breaks or vitiates the light of nature — 
either through the peculiar and individual nature of 
any one — or through his education and converse with 
others — or through his reading of books, and authorities 
of those he studies and admires — or through differences 
of impressions, as they happen in a mind pre-occupied 
and pre-disposed, or in one equal and sedate — and the 
like. So that plainly the human spirit (as it is disposed 
in several men) is an inconstant thing, and every way 
disordered, and, as it were, casual. Hence Heraclitus 



204 ON THE NOVUM OROANUM, 

has it well, that men seek for knowledge in their own 
little worlds, and not in the great and common world. 

" There are idols, too, as if by agreement and mutual 
confederacy of the human kind — which, on account of 
the commerce and consort of men, we call Idols of the 
market-place or Forum. For mankind associate by 
discourse ; but words are imposed from the apprehen- 
sion of the vulgar. Accordingly, the evil and foolish 
imposition of words besets the intellect in strange ways. 
Neither do the definitions or explications, by which 
learned men have been used to fortify and clear them- 
selves in some, at all retrieve the matter. But words 
plainly put a force upon the intellect, and trouble all 
things, and draw men away to idle and numberless 
controversies and fictions. 

" There are idols, lastly, which have immigrated into 
the minds of men from the sundry dogmas of philoso- 
phy, and even from perverted laws of demonstrations — 
and these we call Idols of the Theatre; because, as 
many philosophies as have been received or invented, 
we count so many fables produced and acted, which 
have furnished fictitious and scenic worlds. Neither 
do we talk only of the present, or even ancient philoso- 
phies and sects, since many other such fables may be 
framed and compacted; for of errors wholly different 
the causes are yet nearly common. Nor, again, do we 
understand this only of universal or entire philosophies, 
but of the many principles also, and axioms of science 
which have grown to strength from tradition, and 
trust, and negligence. But of these several sorts of 
idols, we are to speak more at large, and separately, for 
caution of the human intellect." 



OR BACONIAN LOGIC. 205 

Such is the description which Bacon gives of his 
Idols. His further illustration of them occupies nearly 
the entire portion of the first book of the Novum Or- 
ganum. The second part is devoted to a more extended 
development of his method of studying nature. Here 
his matter becomes more philosophical, if we may so 
term it, although more abstruse. His designations 
may be divided into three portions, — 1st, The discovery 
of forms ; 2nd, Tables to illustrate this discovery ; and, 
3d, The doctrine of instances. 

What Bacon meant by forms is extremely difficult to 
say. He gives us the following, among several defini- 
tions of the word : — " When we speak of forms, we 
understand nothing more than those laws and modes 
of action which regulate and constitute any simple 
nature — such as heat, light, weight, in all kinds of 
matter susceptible of them ; so that the form of heat, 
or the form of light, and the law of heat, and the law 
of light, are the same thing, nor do we ever lose sight 
of praticce and things as they are." * 

The tables which he gives as illustrative of the in- 
ductive method of reasoning, are taken from his Sylva 
Sylvarum, or, A Natural History in Ten Centuries. 
Many of the materials in this section of his work will 
not bear the examination of modern science. And the 
same thing may be stated in reference to his doctrine of 
instances, or facts illustrative of the discovery of forms. 

* This word form has cut a great figure in all logical systems, from Plato down- 
wards. Butler makes Hudibras say, that he 

" profess'd 

He had first matter seen undrest, 
And found it naked and alone, 
Before one rag of form was on." 



206 ON THE NOVUM ORGANUM, 

We must here, however, refer the reader to the Novum 
Organum itself as a justification of these observations. 

The Baconian logic proceeds upon the assumption 
of there being certain laws of nature, and that they are 
uniform and stable in their operation. The great mat- 
ter, then, in all physical inquiries in particular is, to 
bring the numerous facts which constitute them under 
general heads or principles ; and not to pronounce any 
thing as being either a cause or effect of another thing — 
or, in other words, as being a law of nature — until re- 
peated observations satisfactorily establish the fact 
beyond all cavil or dispute. His lordship's system may 
be viewed as a piece of general advice, admonishing 
philosophers to come to no hasty conclusions, but to 
leave their minds open to the freest current of observa- 
tion and experiment. Nature must be tested and in- 
terrogated; and we must be ever on the watch to 
record accurately and faithfully the result. We must 
neither generalize too soon nor too late. Every thing 
must be well and properly timed, and then our physical 
researches will proceed upon a satisfactory and enlight- 
ened basis. This is the only legitimate way in which 
true science can extend her dominion. 

His logic is, then, solely of a cautionary and admo- 
nitory character. It promulgates no new principle, 
because mankind have uniformly acted upon his sug- 
gestions from the earliest times; but they have not 
always viewed them in all their comprehensive fulness 
and import. They have been rash and froward when 
they should have been calm and circumspect, and been 
fond of theorizing when they should have been simply 
observing and recording facts and circumstances. They 



OR BACONIAN LOGIC. 207 

have too often hastened to be wise, and, like commer- 
cial aspirants who hasten to be rich, have often found 
a snare in their path. Accurate observation and cau- 
tious generalization are the two graces which preside 
at his logic ; and, except they act in harmony with each 
other, little good, in the way of promoting sound 
knowledge, can be effected. All theories should hang 
lightly and loosely about the true philosopher. He 
must ever be as ready to entertain a doubt as to search 
for and state a fact. To him systems must be mere 
terms of classification; and, when he sees need, he 
must make a cheerful surrender of every theoretical 
notion, no matter how long and warmly cherished, and 
consider himself again simply as a recorder of observa- 
tions and facts. 

Men in all ages and degrees of civilisation have sys- 
tematized or theorized, and must ever do so, whatever 
may be the number and accuracy of the facts with 
which they have to deal ; and Lord Bacon would un- 
doubtedly have conferred upon them a most invaluable 
mental instrument, had he been able to lay down any 
general and uniform principle to show when men were 
fully justified in framing a theory, or adopting a gene- 
ral system of scientific classification of the raw materials 
of their knowledge. This would indeed have been an 
instrument or organon of immense value. But the 
Baconian logic does nothing of this kind. ]STotwith- 
standing the great extension of physical science since 
Bacon's time, we are apparently no nearer obtaining 
any such instrument than were those interrogators of 
nature who preceded him. Beyond a general and 
loud proclamation of caution and circumspection in the 



208 ON THE NOVUM OROANUM, 

construction and promulgation of general truths of 
science, his lordship's system does nothing. But still 
the admonitions he gives are admirable as far as they go; 
and he deserves well of mankind for bringing them be- 
fore their attention in the way and manner he has done. 
The Novum Organum is founded on a grand idea — 
on the absolute unity of all knowledge. This was by no 
means new ; but the method Bacon took to realize this 
unity, differed from that which the scholastics adopted. 
His mode of proceeding was the very opposite of theirs. 
He built his unity on plurality — they took the unity 
and descended to particulars. He took his stand on a 
broad pyramidal basis of facts and observations, till he 
came to the highest point of knowledge, which is 
theology. He did not commence with this vital and 
sublime science, like many of his predecessors, but 
ended with it. " It is the duty," says he, " and virtue 
of all knowledge, to abridge the infinity of individual 
experience as much as the conception of truth will 
permit, and to remedy the complaint of vita hrevis, ars 
long a — which is performed by uniting the notions and 
conceptions of sciences — for knowledges are as pyra- 
mids, whereof history is the basis. So, of natural philo- 
sophy, the basis is natural history, the stage next is 
physic, the stage next the vertical point is raetaphysic. 
As for the vertical point, opus quod operatur JDeus a 
principio usque ad finem, we know not whether man's 
agency can attain unto it. But these three be the 
true stages of knowledge, and are to them that are 
depraved no better than the giants' hills, 

' Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam 
Scilicet, atqne Ossne fronclosum involvere Olympum.' 



OR BACONIAN LOGIC. 209 

But to those which refer all things to the glory of Grod, 
they are as the three acclamations, 'Sancte, Sancte, 
Sancte ; ' holy in the description or dilatation of His 
works, holy in the connexion or concatenation of them, 
and holy in the union of them in a perpetual and uni- 
form law." 

Again he says, " Horns are attributed by the 
ancients to Pan, or the universe, broad at the base, but 
tapering to a point ; for the whole nature of things is 
pointed like a pyramid. The individuals over which 
the base of nature extends are infinite; these are 
collected into species, themselves also numerous ; the 
species again rise into genera; and these too again 
contract into classes still more general, till all nature 
at last seems to unite in one — which is indicated by the 
pyramidal figure of the horns of Pan ; and no wonder 
that his horns strike the very heavens. For the lofty 
things of nature, or universal forms, in some sense touch 
divinity; and therefore that famous chain of Homer 
(the chain, that is, of natural causes) was said to be 
fixed to the foot of Jupiter's throne. And no one (as 
may be seen) has treated of metaphysic and the eter- 
nal and immutable truths of nature, withdrawing 
his mind for a time from the flux of things, without at 
the same time touching on natural theology — so ready 
and natural is the passage from the vertex of the pyra- 
mid to things divine." * 

This figure of the pyramid looks tolerable upon 
paper, but will not bear a minute examination. Men 
are so constituted that they cannot lay a broad founda- 
tion of inductive science before they arrive at any theo- 

* De Augin., lib. ii. 
O 



210 ON THE NOVUM ORGANUM, 

logical opinions. The very contrary is the course of 
nature. Theological, moral, and mental principles are 
among the very first productions or objects of human 
thought, and the topics of impassioned interest. This 
is not a matter of choice, but necessity. A man is not 
left at complete liberty to adopt any method of acquir- 
ing knowledge he may think proper ; the constitution 
of things does this, in a great measure, for him. 2tfo 
individual ever did rear such a pyramid of knowledge 
as Bacon here delineates, nor will any man ever do so 
till the end of time. The phenomena of human nature 
must, in a great degree, be the first objects of atten- 
tion and generalization; the universal conceptions of 
being and creation must occupy the reflective under- 
standing ; and the rules of duty and obligation form 
the current interchange of thought between man and 
man, in even the most rude and primitive state of 
existence. The scholastics, whose logical philosophy 
the Novum Organum intended to supersede, had a 
better claim to consider their deductive principles as 
the primary staples of all science and truth, and the 
first to be developed and treated of, than Bacon's judi- 
cious interpretation of nature could lay claim to. The 
scholastic theory had the ordinary course of nature, 
and the historical records of our race, to support it ; the 
Novum Organum, in its extreme principles, is a pure 
fiction of the imagination. This is the view which has 
been taken of it by many distinguished philosophers 
on the continent, and by some even in England. The 
idea of working upward, from a complete and accurate 
interpretation of nature to a knowledge of nature's 
God, may seem a feasible and unexceptionable maxim 



OR BACONIAN LOGIC. 211 

in common conversation or discourse ; but when viewed 
as the keystone to a logical and philosophical system, 
it cannot fail to prove both unsatisfactory and mis- 
chievous. 

Perhaps the true and sole conception which Bacon 
had of his own logical system was, that it should oper- 
ate as a check upon those extreme views which philo- 
sophers had entertained relative to human reason. 
They vastly overrated its powers and capabilities in 
working out the unity of science. Under this impres- 
sion he wished to call men back again to the study of 
the material universe, as a suitable counterpoise to this 
one-sided estimation of the value of logical methods. 
Philosophical logicians were too apt to be carried away 
by an extreme love of system ; hence he says, that the 
mind "needs not the addition of wings, but rather a 
burden as of lead, to bar all leaping and flying." The 
inductive science was the true remedy for all logical 
vices springing out of this cause. " As vulgar logic," 
says he, " which governs its subjects by syllogism, per- 
tains to all sciences, and not to physical science onlv, 
so likewise our logic, which proceeds by induction, 
embraces all." 

Lord Bacon's view of the syllogistic theory was not 
favourable to it. He says, (i The logic which is in use 
avails rather for establishing and fastening errors (which 
are founded in vulgar notions), than for inquisition of 

truth ; so it is hurtful more than profitable." 

" Syllogism is not applied to the entrances and rudi- 
ments of the sciences ; and to mediate axioms is applied 
in vain, since it is by many degrees unequal to the 
subtilty of nature. Accordingly it binds assent, not 



212 ON THE NOVUM ORGAN UM, 

things." " Syllogism consists of propositions, 

propositions of words, words are the symbols of notions. 
Therefore if notions themselves (which are the ground 
of the matter) be confused, and hastily taken up from 
things, there is no solidity in what is built upon them. 
The only hope, then, is in a true induction." * 

These opinions had a powerful, though not an im- 
mediate effect, upon the reputation and mode of teach- 
ing of the syllogistic logic. The great effect, however, 
of Lord Bacon's writings on this branch of learning, 
arose more from negative or indirect causes, than from 
his own openly declared sentiments on the nature and 
offices of the syllogism itself. He directed men's minds 
into other channels of philosophic inquiry ; and this 
had the natural tendency to humble the lofty preten- 
sions, and to call in question the general principles, of 
the old school of disputation. The influence of the 
Novum Organum in universities, was long in being 
sensibly felt on the prescribed modes of logical tuition. 
This is not to be wondered at.f Innovations are here 
invariably tardy. Adam Smith truly observes — " The 
improvements which have been made in several branches 
of philosophy have not, the greater part of them, been 
made in universities, though some no doubt have. The 
greater part of universities have not been very forward 

* Novum Org., Aph. 12, 13, 14. 

t " Considering the nature of the reformation brought abo\it by Bacon, and view- 
ing it, as it ought to be viewed, in the light of a simple return to the principles of 
unsophisticated reason, it was not to be expected that any material addition to the 
rules of investigation, considered as an art, could be made either by his immediate 
successors, or by more modern philosophers. The Novum Organum professed to 
accomplish little more than to induce men to reason on philosophical subjects, as 
they are accustomed to reason in the ordinary affairs of life ; to rescue them, in 
short, from the dominion of art, and restore them to the clear light and unfettered 
liberty of nature." — Jardiv's Outlines of Phil os. Education, p. 152. 



OR BACONIAN LOGIC. 213 

to adopt those improvements after they were made ; 
and several of these learned societies have chosen, for 
a long period, to be the sanctuaries in which exploded 
systems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and pro- 
tection after they had been hunted out of every corner 
of the world. In general, the richest and best endowed 
societies have been the slowest in adopting those im- 
provements, and the most adverse to admit any con- 
siderable change in the established forms of education. 
Those improvements were more easily introduced into 
some of the poorer universities, in which the teachers, 
depending upon their reputation for the greatest part 
of their subsistence, were obliged to pay attention to 
the current opinions of the world." * 

The different views which have been taken of the 
nature and value of the Baconian method of induction 
have been various, though on the whole flattering. The 
late Professor Napier, in a paper read to the Eoyal 
Society of Edinburgh, and inserted in its published 
Transactions, has given a very graphic and full account 
of the influence which the Novum Organum exercised 
over the minds of the learned in every country in 
Europe soon after its publication. This influence seems 
to have been great beyond ordinary conception. On the 
other hand, the work has fallen considerably in philoso- 
phical admiration, from modern critiques on its merits 
which have of recent years appeared both in England 
and on the continent. To enable the reader to form 
an opinion on the subject, we shall furnish him with a 
quotation or two from popular writers of acknow- 
ledged talents and reputation. 

" ;; " Wealth of Nations, vol. ii. p. 258. 



214 ON THE NO VUM OR(JANUM, 

" The great glory of literature/' says Hume, " in this 
island, during the reign of James, was Lord Bacon. If 
we consider the variety of talents displayed by this 
man — as a public speaker, a man of business, a wit, a 
courtier, a companion, an author, a philosopher — he is 
justly entitled to great admiration. If we consider him 
merely as an author and a philosopher, the light in 
which we view him at present, though very estimable, 
he was yet inferior to his contemporary Galileo — per- 
haps even to Kepler. Bacon pointed out, at a distance, 
the road to philosophy ; Galileo both pointed it out to 
others, and made himself considerable advances in it. 
The Englishman was ignorant of geometry ; the Floren- 
tine revived that science, excelled in it, and was the first 
who applied it, together with experiment, to natural 
philosophy. The former rejected, with the most posi- 
tive disdain, the system of Copernicus ; the latter forti- 
fied it with new proofs, derived both from reason and 
the senses. Bacon's style is stiff and rigid; his wit, 
though often brilliant, is also often unnatural and far- 
fetched. Galileo is a lively and agreeable, though 
somewhat a prolix writer." 

" Though it cannot be denied," says Professor Play- 
fair in answer to this, " that there is considerable truth 
in these remarks, yet it seems to me that the compari- 
son is not made with the justness and discrimination 
which might have been expected from Hume, who 
appears studiously to have contrasted what is most 
excellent in Galileo with what is most defective in 
Bacon. It is true that Galileo showed the way in the 
application of mathematics and geometry to physical 
investigation, and that the immediate utility of his 



Oil BACONIAN LOGIC. 215 

performance was greater than that of Bacon, as it im- 
pressed more movement on the age in which he lived, 
example being always so much more powerful than 
precept. Bacon, indeed, wrote for an age more en- 
lightened than his own, and it was long before the full 
merit of his work was understood. But though Galileo 
was a geometer, and Bacon unacquainted with the 
mathematics — though Galileo added new proofs to the 
system of the earth's motion which Bacon rejected 
altogether — yet it is certain, I think, that the former 
has more followers as equals in the world of science 
than the latter, and that his excellence, though so high, 
is less unrivalled. The range which Bacon's specula- 
tions embraced was altogether immense. He cast a 
penetrating eye on the whole of science, from its feeblest 
and most infantine state to that strength and perfection 
from which it was then so remote, and which it is per- 
haps destined to approach continually, but never to 
attain. More substitutes might be found for Galileo 
than for Bacon. More than one could be mentioned, 
who, in the place of the former, would probably have 
done what he did ; but the history of human knowledge 
points out nobody of whom it can be said that, placed 
in the situation of Bacon, he would have done what 
Bacon did : no man whose prophetic genius would have 
enabled him to delineate a system of science which had 
not yet begun to exist — who could have derived the 
knowledge of what ought to be from what was not — and 
who could have become so rich in wisdom, though he 
received from his predecessors no inheritance but their 
errors. I am inclined therefore to agree with D'Alem- 
bert, that when one considers the sound and enlarged 



216 ON THE NOVUM ORGAN UM, 

views of this great man, the multitude of objects to 
which his mind was turned, and the boldness of his 
style, which unites the most sublime images with the 
most rigorous precision, one is disposed to regard him 
as the greatest, the most universal, and the most elo- 
quent of philosophers." 

" The vulgar notion," says Mr Macaulay, " about 
Bacon, we take to be this, that he invented a new 
method of arriving at truth, which method is called 
Induction ; and that he detected some fallacy in the 
syllogistic reasoning which had been in vogue before 
his time. This notion is about as well founded as that 
of the people who, in the middle ages, imagined that 
Virgil was a great conjurer. Many, who are far too 
well informed to talk such extravagant nonsense, enter- 
tain, we think, incorrect notions as to what Bacon 
really effected in this matter. 

" The inductive method has been practised ever 
since the beginning of the world by every human 
being. It is constantly practised by the most ignorant 
clown, by the most thoughtless schoolboy, by the very 
child at the breast. That method leads the clown to 
the conclusion, that if he sows barley he shall not reap 
wheat. By that method the schoolboy learns that a 
cloudy day is the best for catching trout. The very 
infant, we imagine, is led by induction to effect milk 
from his mother or nurse, and none from his father. 

" Not only is it not true that Bacon invented the 
inductive method, but it is not true that he was the 
first who correctly analysed that method and explained 
its uses. Aristotle had long before pointed out the 
absurdity of supposing that syllogistic reasoning could 



OK BACONIAN LOGIC. 217 

ever conduct men to the discovery of any new prin- 
ciple ; had shown that such discoveries must be made 
by induction, and by induction alone ; and had given 
the history of the inductive process, concisely indeed, 
but with great perspicuity and precision." * 

" The Baconian logic/' says Mr Hallam, " deduces 
universal principles from select observation ; that is, 
from particular, and, in some cases of experiment, from 
singular instances, It may easily appear to one con- 
versant with the syllogistic method less legitimate than 
the old induction, which proceeded by an exhaustive 
enumeration of particulars, and at most warranting but 
a probable conclusion. The answer to this objection 
can only be found in the acknowledged uniformity of 
the laws of nature ; so that whatever has once occurred 
will, under absolutely similar circumstances, always occur 
again. This may be called the suppressed premise of 
every Baconian enthymem, every inference from ob- 
servation of phenomena which extend beyond the 
particular case. When it is once ascertained that 
water is composed of one proportion of oxygen to one 
of hydrogen, we never doubt but that such are its in- 
variable constituents. We may repeat the experiment 
to secure ourselves against the risk of error in the 
operation, or of some unperceivecl condition that may 
have effected the result ; but when a sufficient number 
of trials has secured us against this, an invariable law 
of nature is inferred from the particular instance : 
nobody conceives that one pint of pure water can be of 
a different composition from another. All men, even 
the most rude, reason upon this primary maxim ; but 

* Essays, vol. ii. p. 406. 



218 ON THE NOVUM ORGANUM, 

they reason inconclusively, from misapprehending the 
true relations of cause and effect in the phenomena to 
which they direct their attention. It is by the sagacity 
and ingenuity with which Bacon has excluded the 
various sources of error, and disengaged the true cause, 
that his method is distinguished from that which the 
vulgar practise." * 

The following remarks from Stewart's Life of JReid 
present as correct and candid a view of the Baconian 
method as any to be found elsewhere : — f The influ- 
ence of Bacon's genius on the subsequent progress of 
physical discovery, has been seldom duly appreciated — 
by some writers almost overlooked, and by others con- 
sidered as the sole cause of the reformation in science 
which has since taken place. Of these two extremes 
the latter certainly is the least wide of the truth ; for 
in the whole history of letters no other individual can 
be mentioned whose exertions have had so indisputable 
an effect in forwarding the intellectual progress of man- 
kind. On the other hand it must be acknowledged, 
that before the era when Bacon appeared, various 
philosophers in different parts of Europe had struck 
into the right path; and it may perhaps be doubted 
whether any one important rule, with respect to the 
true method of investigation, be contained in his 
works, of which no hint can be traced in those of his 
predecessors. His great merit lay in concentrating 
their feeble and scattered lights — fixing the attention 
of philosophers on the distinguishing characteristics of 
true and of false science by a felicity of illustration 
peculiar to himself, seconded by the command of 

* Lit. Middle Ages, vol. ii. p. 420. 



Oil BACONIAN LOGIC. 219 

powers of a bold and figurative eloquence. The method 
of investigation which he recommended had been pre- 
viously followed in every instance in which any solid 
discovery had been made with respect to the laws of 
nature ; but it had been followed accidentally and 
without any regular preconcerted design ; and it was 
reserved for him to reduce to rule and method what 
others had effected, either fortuitously or from some 
momentary glimpse of the truth. These remarks are 
not intended to detract from the just glory of Bacon ; 
for they apply to all those, without exception, who 
have systematized the principles of any of the arts. 
Indeed they apply less forcibly to him than to any 
other philosopher whose studies have been directed to 
objects analogous to his — inasmuch as we know of no 
art of which the rules have been reduced successfully 
into a didactic form, when the art itself was as much in 
infancy as experimental philosophy was when Bacon 
wrote." * 

* Sect. 2. 






: 

MBfi. 



220 LOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF HOBBES, 



CHAPTEE X. 

LOGICAL SPECULATION'S OF HOBBES, GASSENDL AND 
DESCAETES. 

We have witnessed, in the two previous centuries, the 
extraordinary activity of the logical understanding, 
and how generally and earnestly men were engaged in 
examining into the established modes of discovering 
and promulgating truth, on all subjects cognisant to 
the human mind. The influential and important prin- 
ciples which lay in the background to this logical 
movement, were chiefly those which related to the 
inward nature of man — to man as a social, political, 
moral, and theological being. On matters of philoso- 
phical inquiry, arising out of these divisions of his con- 
stitution, there were silently, though steadily, prepa- 
ring important and sweeping theories and speculations, 
which were at no distant period to ripen into practical 
systems, calculated to exercise no small influence on 
his condition and prospects. These general views of 
human nature could not be fully developed nor worked 
out by a dry and formal system of logical rules. All 
such barren collections of technicalities were repudiated 
by the ardent and comprehensive minds of the age, 



GASSENDI, AND DESCARTES. 221 

who were bent on renouncing all kinds of authority, 
and of hewing out to themselves new paths to know- 
ledge and science. Great differences of opinion on the 
leading principles of political science, on the foundation 
of moral sentiments, on the doctrines of theology, and 
on the rudimental nature of mind itself, obliged philo- 
sophers to refuse at once an acquiescence in any uni- 
form logical system which immediately had to deal 
with their respective theories. It therefore behoved 
every new system to have a new logical instrument of 
its own — otherwise its propounder could never hope 
either to gain proselytes or fame. 

The philosophic mind, being now in a high state of 
excitement, called in question the truth of every 
branch of knowledge, and nothing could satisfy it short 
of commencing afresh at the very elements of things, 
and of re-constructing the entire edifice of human 
thought and speculation. It was from this cause that 
we now distinctly recognise a mingling of all the chief 
ingredients of mental investigation with logical prin- 
ciples and rules, and perceive treatises on the art of 
reasoning issuing from the press — more or less imbued 
with distinct portions of political, moral, intellectual, 
and religious philosophy. The proportions of all, or 
any one of these, which might be amalgamated with 
logical maxims and forms, depended entirely on the 
views the writer entertained, and the ultimate object 
he wished to accomplish. If a man had a political 
theory to establish, he sought out a logic to correspond 
with it ; and if a theological system was to be consoli- 
dated, a logical scheme must likewise be had to agree 
and harmonize with its general nature and character. 



222 LOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF HOBBES, 

And the same thing may be remarked of every other 
science or department of human inquiry. All direct or 
formal allegiance to any particular logical system was 
thrown off; and every speculative mind felt itself fully 
at liberty to mould its logical tools to the nature of its 
special habits or undertakings. 

We date, therefore, from this period the general 
embodiment of considerable portions of mental philoso- 
phy with strictly logical forms and maxims — a practice 
which has been, in latter times, so commonly followed 
in every country in Europe. The intimate relationship 
subsisting between the mind itself, and its laws and 
formal manifestations, as displayed in the reasoning 
process, has undoubtedly been one of the leading 
incentives to this mode of treating logical science. But 
still there were other causes which had a share in this 
effect ; and these are fairly traceable to that indiscri- 
minate license in which all speculators thought they 
had an undoubted right to indulge, — to mould their 
instrument of ratiocination in any way and manner 
best suited to the attainment of the grand object they 
had in view. 

The philosophers whom we have now before us in 
the seventeenth century, were in many essential points 
possessed of more intellectual vigour, and a stronger 
stamina of enthusiasm, than the current mass of logical 
writers who had for two or three centuries preceded 
them. The men of this day had not, perhaps, more 
learning, but they had certainly more talent than their 
predecessors. The former were not made-up philoso- 
phers, but full of original energy, ambitious projects, 
and theoretical skill. Thev would not allow anv mere 



GASSENDI, AND DESCARTES. 223 

prescriptive authority on formal matters to stand in the 
way of their inquiries, nor sacrifice their cherished 
systems to any mere punctilious attentions to what 
might be considered logical etiquette or formalism. 
Their great object was to press forward, to open up 
new and hitherto unknown routes to knowledge and 
science, and to inscribe their names on the highest 
pinnacles of philosophic fame and distinction. Many 
of them had bidden farewell to all that lay behind 
them, in the shape of speculative knowledge and learn- 
ing ; fully determined to labour henceforward on their 
own individual account, and for their own individual 
honour and aggrandizement. What others had said 
or done before, was nothing to them. The unfettered 
exercise of their faculties imparted additional vigour to 
their movements ; and, breathing the air of perfect 
freedom, and conscious of their own strength, they 
were neither overawed by the responsibilities of innova- 
tion, nor the number or magnitude of their toils. 

The names we have placed at the head of this chap- 
ter are well known throughout the speculative world. 
They undoubtedly figure more in the character of 
philosophers than as mere logicians ; but it would be 
difficult to name other three men, living contemporane- 
ously with each other, whose opinions and writings 
have exercised a greater indirect effect upon the science 
of reasoning in modern times. They were decidedly 
three of the most active and logical understandings of 
their age. We shall take especial care, however, to 
shape our remarks on their several systems, so as to 
keep as closely within the boundaries of purely logical 
science as we possibly can. Their general philosophical 



224 LOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF HOBBES, 

principles do not fall within our present historical 
range. 

Thomas Hobbes, b. 1588, n. 1679. — Hobbes was one 
of the most able men of his time, and occupies an im- 
portant station in the history of speculative knowledge 
in the seventeenth century. 

Hobbes' system of philosophy was evidently of a 
material cast ; and, on this account, he was too clear- 
headed to admit into his logic any principle or formal 
arrangement which might seem to be at variance with 
his leading views on human nature. All thought, he 
says, is engendered by sensation. Reasoning, in every 
form it assumes, is resolvable to seeking either the 
whole by the addition of all its parts, or a part by the 
subtraction or withdrawal of the rest. All deductive 
and inductive reasonings are simply forms of equation — 
or, in other words, all thoughts are expressible in ma- 
thematical formulas ; and every thing which cannot be 
put into such formulas can have no reality, at least in 
reference to our understandings. 

All words, according to Hobbes, employed in pro- 
cesses of reasoning — expressing, or attempting to ex- 
press, the incorporeal or spiritual, the infinite, &c. — 
have no meaning whatever, because they have no 
representative sensations in the mind. All such terms 
ought therefore to be banished from systems of logical 
philosophy and instruction. 

The Computatio sive Logica, which contains the au- 
thor's views on the art of reasoning, is part of his great 
work, Elementa Philosophic. He thought favourably of 
the syllogistic theory, both as an instrument for demon- 
stration and useful instruction. His notion of the 



GASSENDI, AND DESCARTES. 225 

abstract nature of the syllogism is in some points 
original. 

ft The thoughts/' says Hobbes, " in the mind answer- 
ing to a direct syllogism, proceed in this manner, — 
first, There is conceived a phantasm of the thing named, 
with that accident or quality thereof for which it is in 
the minor proposition called by that name which is the 
subject ; next, The mind has a phantasm of the same 
thing, with that accident or quality for which it hath 
the name, that in the same proposition is the predicate ; 
thirdly, The thought returns of the same thing as 
having that accident in it for which it is called by the 
name, that is the predicate of the major proposition ; 
and, lastly, Remembering that all these are the accidents 
of one and the same thing, it concludes that these three 
names are also names of one and the same thing ; that 
is to say, the conclusion is true. For example, when 
this syllogism is made, Man is a living creature — a 
living creature is a body — man is a body — the mind con- 
ceives first an image of a man speaking or discoursing, 
and remembers that that which so appears is called 
man ; then it has the image of the same man moving, 
and remembers that that which appears so is called 
living creature; thirdly, it conceives an image of the 
same man as filling some place or space, and remem- 
bers that what appears so is called body ; and, lastly, 
when it remembers that that thing which was extend- 
ed, and moved, and spake, was one and the same thing, 
it concludes that the three names of the thing, man, 
living creature, and body, are names of the same thing, 
and that therefore man is a living creature is a true 
proposition. From whence it is manifest, that living 



226 LOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF HOBBES, 

creatures that have not the use of speech, have no con- 
ception or thought in the mind answering to a syllogism 
made of universal propositions ; seeing it is necessary 
to think not only of the thing, but also by turns to 
remember the divers names, which for divers consider- 
ations thereof are applied to the same."* 

Hobbes was a rigid nominalist in logic, and conceived 
that words, and words only, were the things with which 
the mind is conversant in a reasoning process. At least 
this is the conclusion to which we are led from many 
passages in his writings connected with the acquisition 
of knowledge. We shall, however, cite a few passages 
from his Leviathan, relative to the nature and offices of 
words as used in general reasoning : — " One universal 
name is imposed on many things for their similitude in 
some quality or other accidents ; and whereas a proper 
name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals re- 
call any one of these many." "The universality of 
one name to many things, hath been the cause that 
men think the things are themselves universal, and so 
seriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all 
the rest of the men that are, have been, or shall be in 
the world, there is yet something else that we call man, 
namely, man in general, deceiving themselves by taking 
the universal or general appellation for the thing it 
signineth."f " Logic is," he says, " the art of compu- 
tation." "Logicians add together two names to make 
an affirmation, and two affirmations to make a syllo- 
gism, and many syllogisms to make a demonstration ; 
and from the sum or conclusion of a syllogism they 
subtract one proposition to find another."! " Reason 

* Coin put., p. 50. i Leviathan, c. 4. J Ibid., c. 5. 



GASSENDI, AND DESCARTES. 227 

is nothing but reckoning (that is, adding and subtract- 
ing) of the consequences of general names agreed upon, 
for the marking and signifying of our thoughts." 

In the author's Logica we find the same doctrine 
maintained. "An universal/' says he, " is not a name 
of many taken collectively, but of each thing taken 
separately. Man is not the name of the human family 
in general, but of each single member of it — as Peter, 
John, and the rest, separately. Therefore this univer- 
sal name is not the name of any thing existing in na- 
ture, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, 
but remains so by some word or name. It thus hap- 
pens that when an animal, or a stone, or a ghost, or 
any thing else, is called universal, we are not to under- 
stand by this term, that any man, or stone, or any 
thing else, was, or is, or can be, an universal ; but only 
that these terms, animal, stone, and the like, are uni- 
versal names, — that is, names common to many things ; 
and the ideas or conceptions corresponding to them in 
the intellect, are the images or phantasms of single 
animals or other things. And consequently we do not 
need, in order to comprehend what is meant by an 
universal, any other faculty than that of imagination, 
by which we remember that such words have excited 
the ideas in our minds, sometimes of one particular 
thing, sometimes of another."* " If speech be peculiar 
to man, as for ought I know it is, then is understanding 
peculiar to him also ; understanding being nothing else 
but conception caused by speech." " True and false 
are attributes of speech, not of things ; where speech 
is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood, though there 

* Cap. ii. § 9. 



228 

may be error. Hence as truth consists in the right 
ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeks 
precise truth hath need to remember what every word 
he uses stands for, and place it accordingly."* 

On the nature and offices of definition in processes 
of reasoning, he makes the following observations : — 
" Every man who aspires to true knowledge should 
examine the definitions of former authors, and either 
correct them or make them anew. For the errors of 
definitions multiply themselves according as the reckon- 
ing proceeds, and leads men into absurdities, which at 
last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew 
from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of their 

errors In the right definition of names lies the 

first use of speech, which is the acquisition of science. 
And in wrong or no definitions lies the first abuse, 
from which proceed all false and senseless tenets, which 
make these men that take their instruction from the 
authority of books, and not from their own medita- 
tions, to be as much below the condition of ignorant 
men, as men endued with true science are above it. 
For between true science and erroneous doctrine, igno- 
rance is the middle. Words are wise men's counters ; 
they do but reckon by them ; but they are the money 
of fools." f 

On the nature of human knowledge generally, 
Hobbes remarks, " There are two kinds of knowledge ; 
the one, sense or knowledge, original, and remembrance 
of the same ; the other, science, or knowledge of the 
truth of propositions, derived from the understanding. 
Both are but experience, one of things without, the 

* Leviathan. f Ibid. 



GASSENDI, AND DESCARTES. 229 

other from the proper use of words in language ; and 
experience being but remembrance, all knowledge is 
remembrance. Knowledge implies two things, truth 
and evidence ; the latter is the concomitance of a 
man's conception, with the words that signify such 
conception in the act of ratiocination." " Evidence is 
to truth as the sap to the tree, which, so far it creepeth 
along with the body and branches, keepeth them alive ; 
when it forsaketh them they die ; for this, evidence, 
which is meaning with words, is the life of truth." 
" Science is evidence of truth, from some beginning or 
principle of sense. The first principle of knowledge is, 
that we have such and such conceptions ; the second, 
that we have thus and thus named the things whereof 
they are conceptions ; the third is, that we have joined 
these names in such a manner as to make true propo- 
sitions ; the fourth and last is, that we have joined 
these propositions in such a manner as they could be 
concluding, and the truth of the conclusion said to be 
known."* 

Hobbes defines method to be " the knowledge we 
acquire by true ratiocination of appearances, or ap- 
parent effects, from the knowledge we have of some 
possible production or generation of the same ; and of 
such production, as has been or may be, from the 
knowledge we have of the effects. Method is, there- 
fore, the shortest way of finding out effects by their 
known causes, or of causes by their known effects." f 

Gassendi, b. 1592, d. 1655. — The most important 
event in the life of Glassendi was the publication of his 
Exercitationes Paradoxic^, published in 1624. This 

* Hum. Nat., c. 6. + Coinput., p. 66. 



230 LOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF HOBBES, 

was a bold and fierce attack upon the logical system of 
Aristotle. Though the work raised up many enemies 
against him, yet it extended his fame, and obtained 
him Church preferment. The censures in the treatise 
were, however, so severe and general, that Gassendi 
found it expedient to qualify his opinions on the sub- 
ject of logic, and to allow the scholastic system some 
portion of honour and merit. 

These modified logical opinions, cherished in after 
life, are to be found in G-assendi's Syntagma Philo- 
sophicum. The work is divided into three parts, logic, 
physics, and ethics. In the first two books on the 
logic, we have a history of the science from Zeno to 
Descartes, and on the criterion of truth. 

In this historical sketch we have an account of the 
logic of Zeno, of Elea ; Euclid, of Megara ; of Plato, of 
Aristotle, of Epicurus, of Eaymond Lully, of Ramus, of 
Bacon, and of Descartes. These several dissertations 
amount collectively to thirty-six pages folio. 

The author's Institutiones Logicce are divided into four 
parts, — 1st, The conception or idea of things ; 2nd,. 
Propositions ; 3d, .The Syllogism ; and 4th, Method. * 

We must seek for Gassendi's logical opinions in his 
system of mental philosophy. He may be said to have 
followed a sort of middle path between Hobbes and 
Descartes. Gassendi conceived that sensation was the 
source of all human knowledge; and hence his often 
repetition of the ancient maxim, " that there was 
nothing in the mind which had not been previously in 
the senses." But the position was qualified in this 
manner, Sensation furnishes us with the perception of 

* Opera Omnia, vol. i. Lugd. 1658. 



GASSENDI, AXD DESCAETES. 231 

facts, but the mind makes a comparison of facts ; and 
from this mental act or movement there spring up 
particular notions, and general ideas and principles.* 

Gassendi's writings were more influential on logical 
science, from the spirit of discussion which they awak- 
ened in Europe than from any positive innovations he 
made in the mode of teaching science itself. His 
speculations became known in every seat of learning; 
his great and acknowledged erudition, his love of truth, 
his intellectual courage, and the opposition he encoun- 
tered, were favourable to the extension of his opinions ; 
and his indefatigable industry enabled him to turn 
these varied advantages to the most profitable use. 

Descartes, b. 1596, d. 1650. — This distinguished 
man was a native of Haigh, in Touraine, and received 
his education at the Jesuits' College of Fleche. Here 
he studied philosophy; but soon joined the French 
army in Holland. His innate love of study was, how- 
ever, too powerful for the pleasures and perils of the 
camp, and he retired, while quite a young man, into 
private life, there to devote himself henceforward to the 
more congenial and noble occupations and pursuits of 
the philosopher. 

Descartes is to be considered both in the light of a 
theoretical and practical logician. In the former capa- 
city he lays down the principles on which all evidence 
and science rest ; and in the latter he treats of those 
common, but important rules, which guide the reason- 
ing faculty to great and interesting results, and pre- 
serve it from pursuing erroneous and futile methods of 
investigation. 

* Logic, p. 93. 



232 LOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF HOBBES, 

From the incessant and discordant disputes on the 
nature of truth, and the fundamental axioms of science, 
which had preceded Descartes in the schools of logic 
and philosophy, he was led to entertain desponding 
thoughts relative to the standard of scientific truth 
generally, and to meditate on the apparent impos- 
sibility of the human understanding ever being able to 
extricate itself from the jungle of difficulties into which 
the ingenuity of men, from age to age, had led it. 
Thinking long and earnestly on this topic, he was in- 
duced to conceive that there must certainly be some 
method or other which, if pursued, would enable candid 
and inquiring minds to throw off this incubus of doubt ; 
and, following up the first suggestion, he thought he 
saw in the distance, like a nebulous cloud in the horizon, 
a certain principle which pointed him to something 
like certitude and truth. Setting aside all the stand- 
ards of evidence of which he had ever heard or read, 
he began the inquiry himself, and in himself; and this 
inquiry led him to repose an unconditional and absolute 
confidence in the principle of his own internal conscious- 
ness, Cogito, ergo .sum, was his first and solid stepping- 
stone to rational conviction. What he himself felt 
must be true, if there be any thing true in nature what- 
ever. This appeared to be a maxim of immense value 
to the prosecution of scientific certainty, and he hoped 
to be able to shew, by a full and comprehensive devel- 
opment of it, that the reasoning faculty of manjiad 
something satisfactory and solid to rest upon. " What- 
ever doubts," says he, " I may have, I cannot doubt 
of my own existence." 

Having made this maxim of consciousness a starting- 



233 

point, he proceeded to demonstrate certain other im- 
portant truths, some of which, however, lie within the 
provinces of philosophy and theology rather than logic. 
Among the most vital of these was the existence of a 
Deity, which Descartes considered was vitally con- 
nected with the logical elements of all truth and 
science. The problem he attempted to solve assumed 
this form. To find an idea which could not subsist as 
an intellectual conception, without its object itself 
having also a positive existence — an idea which should 
be invested with subjective possibility, as far as it had 
objective reality. He makes the idea of a supremely 
perfect Being as the principle which connects or binds 
the ideal with the real. This idea of supreme perfec- 
tion implies or involves existence, inasmuch as existence 
is itself a decided perfection. " If we ask," says he, 
" not in respect of a body, but in respect to any thing, 
whatever that thing may be, which has within itself all 
the perfections which can be embodied within it, 
whether existence is to be reckoned among them, we 
may at first perhaps be in some doubt about it, be- 
cause our mind, which is finite, not being in the habit 
of considering them separately, may not perceive at the 
first glance how necessarily they are joined together. 
But if we examine with care whether existence belongs 
to a Being supremely powerful, and what sort of exist- 
ence that really is, we shall find ourselves in a position, 
first, to affirm, that at the least possible existence agrees 
with Him, as well as with all other things of which we 
have of ourselves any clear idea, even those which are 
composed of fictions of our own understanding; and, 
secondly, because we cannot think that His existence is 



234 LOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF HOBBES, 

possible, without knowing at the same time that He 
can exist by His own innate power or force ; — hence 
we conclude that He really exists, and that He has 
been from all eternity. It is very evident from the 
light of nature, that that which exists by virtue of its 
own force or power, exists always ; and thus we come 
to know that necessary existence is contained in the 
idea of a supremely powerful Being, not by a fiction of 
the understanding, but because it belongs to the true 
and immutable nature of such a Being to exist; and 
we readily know that it is impossible for this supremely 
powerful Being not to have in himself all other perfec- 
tions that are contained in the idea of God, in such 
order and character, that by their own proper nature, 
and without any fiction of the understanding, they are 
always joined together and exist in the Divine essence. 
Just, in like manner, as I affirm my own existence, 
because the idea of it is contained in the notion or con- 
ception of thinking ; so, likewise, I affirm the existence 
of the supremely perfect Being, because the idea of ex- 
istence is contained in the very idea of such a Being. 
The existence of ,an external reality rests, therefore, 
upon the same logical basis as the internal reality." 

The logical rules deducible from Descartes' method, 
may be stated under the four following heads, — 1st, 
Nothing is to be admitted as true or certain but what 
is clearly and obviously so — that is, there is to be 
nothing more admitted in the conclusion than what 
presents itself distinctly to the understanding; 2nd, 
Every question should be analysed into as many sepa- 
rate parts as possible, in order that every part may be 
easily recognised and conceived, and its relation to the 



GASSENDI, AND DESCARTES. 235 

whole more readily ascertained ; 3d, Every examina- 
tion should be conducted with order, commencing with 
objects the most simple and easiest known, and ascend- 
ing step by step to truths of a more complex and 
difficult character. 4th, We must calculate with great 
care and circumspection, that nothing is omitted in the 
consideration of the question before us. 

And here it may be remarked, that the chief incen- 
tive to Descartes' inquiry as to the foundation of logical 
philosophy, proceeded from a theological source. We 
have here before us another striking illustration of the 
all-powerful influence of revelation on logical studies 
and inquiries, which we have already noticed at some 
length in the fourth chapter. The train of thought 
which led Descartes to institute investigations into the 
nature of truth, was precisely the same as that which 
displayed itself in the mind of Plato, Aristotle, and 
others — only qualified and rendered more precise and 
definite in its aim by the knowledge which the French 
philosopher had of the sacred canons. It appeared 
obvious to the ancients, that the doctrines of an intelli- 
gent First Cause, and the immortality of the soul, had a 
direct and necessary bearing upon all abstract maxims 
or principles of reasoning ; and the same thing, in the 
case before us, occurs to Descartes. He seems to have 
said to himself — of what importance are any discussions 
about truth, if there be no intelligent Being in the 
universe ? If, moreover, men die like the grass or the 
beasts of the field, of what consequence to him whether 
a thing be what you term true or false ? What can 
moral truth, or political truth, or judicial truth, or any 
other kind of truth, be to a being that is born but to 



236 LOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF HOBBES, 

die, and for ever perish ? It is only a contradiction in 
terms to talk of truth, while it is denied in the same 
breath that there is any intelligent principle in nature. 
Truth and intelligence are but two words for the same 
idea. And how did that idea ever enter into the mind 
of man ? From whence did it proceed ? Why should 
truth be the eager object of all our inquiries and pur- 
suits, if there be no great intelligent cause in nature 
on which it can rest ? Why connect truth with man ? 
Why not talk of animal truth, of vegetable truth, of 
fossil truth, or of granite truth, if man has neither an 
intelligent Creator nor a spirit within him ? 

Such, I have no doubt, constituted the substance of 
the inquiries which Descartes often put to himself, in 
meditating on his philosophical and logical method. 
We have the strongest proof that such trains of thought 
really did pass through his mind, not only from the 
general scope of his writings, but from the language 
used in one of his meditations. He says, " I have 
always conceived that the two grand questions — the 
existence of God, and the immortality of the soul, were 
the chief of those which ought to be demonstrated 
rather by philosophy than by theology. For although 
it is sufficient for us, who are of the faithful, to believe 
in God, and that the soul does not perish with the 
body, it certainly does not appear to be possible to per- 
suade the infidels to any religion, nor hardly to any 
moral virtue, unless we first prove to them these two 
doctrines by natural reason." 

This famous logical method of Descartes took its 
rise, therefore, from a purely theological source. The 
connexion between the elementary principles of religion 



GASSENDI, AND DESCARTES. 237 

and the standard of truth, had, it is true, been often 
noticed before, and had indeed constituted the theories 
of many logical speculators ; but he saw that connexion 
in a new light, and illustrated its character and influ- 
ence after his own fashion. 

There are many objections made to the chief prin- 
ciple of Descartes' method, by different philosophers of 
note, all of which he endeavoured to obviate or explain 
away. In his posthumous work, On the Search after 
Truth, in one of his replies to the objection, that 
to prove one's own existence by the act of think- 
ing, we should previously know what existence and 
thought are, we find one of the most acute and pro- 
found passages on the nature of verbal definition gene- 
rally, to be found in any writer. The aim of the pas- 
sage is to shew that there are certain elementary 
principles of thought which circumscribe the range of 
definitions of all kinds ; and without these elementary 
principles, or intuitive ideas, such a thing as reasoning 
would be impossible. Descartes gives here an impor- 
tant lesson on the general use of definition — a lesson 
which ought not to be thrown away on those modern 
writers on logic, who seem to lay such stress upon what 
they call the correct defining of terms, as to lead their 
readers to imagine that the whole art or science of 
reasoning depended upon its exercise. 

" I agree with you," says Descartes, " that it is ne- 
cessary to know what doubt is, and what thought is, 
before we can be fully persuaded of this reasoning. I 
doubt, therefore I am ; or, what is the same, I think, 
therefore I am. But do not imagine that for this 



238 LOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF HOBBES, 

purpose you must torture your mind to find out the 
next genus, or the essential differences, as the logicians 
talk, and so compose a regular definition. Leave this 
to such as teach or dispute in the schools. But who- 
ever will examine things by himself, and judge of them 
according to his understanding, cannot be so senseless 
as not to see clearly, when he pays attention, what 
doubting, thinking, being are, or to have any need to 
learn their distinctions. Besides, there are things 
which we render more obscure in attempting to define 
them ; because, as they are very simple and very clear, 
we cannot know and comprehend them better than by 
themselves. And it should be reckoned among the 
chief errors that can be committed in science, for men 
to fancy that they can define that which they can only 
conceive, and distinguish what is clear in it from what 
is obscure ; while they do not see the difference between 
that which must be defined before it is understood, and 
that which can be fully known by itself. Now, among 
things which can be thus clearly known by themselves, 
we must put doubting, thinking, being. For I do not 
believe any one ever existed so stupid as to need to 
know what being is before he could affirm that he is ; 
and it is the same of thought and doubt. Nor can he 
learn these things except by himself, nor be convinced 
of them but by his own experience, and by that con- 
sciousness and inward witness which every man finds 
in himself when he examines the subject. And as we 
should define whiteness in vain to a man who can see 
nothing, while one who can open his eyes and see a 
white object requires no more ; so to know what 



GASSENDI, AND DESCARTES. 239 

doubting is, and what thinking is, it is only necessary 
to doubt and to think."* 

" Nothing/' says Mr Hallam, whose translation is 
here adopted, " could more tend to cut short the ver- 
bal cavils of the schoolmen, than this limitation of 
their favourite exercise, definition. It is due there- 
fore to Descartes, so often accused of appropriating 
the discoveries of others, that we should establish his 
right to one of the most important that the new logic 
has to boast." f 

Out of this scientific method of inquiry sprung the 
little practical treatise of Descartes on logic, entitled, 
Rules for the Direction of the Understanding. This 
abounds with many general and valuable remarks on 
the cultivation of the reasoning powers, and on the 
best modes of strengthening them, and giving them, 
particularly in early life, a proper direction. He here 
evinces his dislike to syllogistic forms of argumenta- 
tion. " Truth," says he, " often escapes from these 
fetters, in which those who employ them remain en- 
tangled. We frequently witness this in the case of 
those who make no use of logical forms whatever, ex- 
perience showing that the most subtle of sophisms 
delude none but the sophists themselves; never those 
who trust to the power of natural reason. And to 
convince ourselves how little this syllogistic art serves 
towards the discovery of truth, we may remark, that 
the logicians can form no syllogism with a true conclu- 
sion, unless they are already acquainted with the truth 
that the syllogism develops. Hence it follows, that the 
vulgar logic is entirely useless to him who would dis- 

* Vol. ii., p. 369. f Lit. Mid. Ages, vol. ii., p. 453. 



240 LOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF HOBBES, 

cover truth for himself, though it may assist in ex- 
plaining to others the truth he already knows, and 
that it would be better to transfer it as a science from 
philosophy to rhetoric." * 

As an example of the many popular observations 
contained in this work, we shall just quote one, rela- 
tive to the mode which Descartes himself followed in 
the acquirement of knowledge — a mode not unworthy 
of the attention of young men of the present day. 
The passage is quoted by Mr Hallam for a different 
purpose ; but its intrinsic excellence will support a 
transference of it to these pages. " I confess," says 
Descartes, " that I was born with such a temper, that 
the chief pleasure I find in study is not from learning 
the arguments of others, but by inventing my own. 
This disposition alone impelled me in youth to the 
study of science ; hence, whenever a new book pro- 
mised by its title some new discovery, before sitting 
down to read it, I used to try whether my own natu- 
ral sagacity could lead me to any thing of the kind, 
and I took care not to lose this innocent pleasure by 
too hasty a perusal. This answered so often, that I at 
length perceived that I arrived at truth, not as other 
men do, after blind and precarious guesses, by good- 
luck rather than skill ; but that long experience had 
taught me certain fixed rules, which were of surprising 
utility, and of which I afterwards made use to discover 
more truths." 

It must be acknowledged, however, that there are 
some of the rules in this work very loosely stated, and, 
if carried into practice, would contract human know- 

* Vol. ii., p. 255. 



GASSENDI, AND DESCARTES. 241 

ledge to a very great extent. In one place, Descartes 
counsels us never to trouble ourselves about objects 
except those which the mind appears capable of ac- 
quiring on unquestionable and irrefragable proof. As 
he was a distinguished mathematician, and considered 
arithmetic and geometry as affording a species of evi- 
dence the most conclusive, he uses language which is 
apt to lead the reader to conclude, that every other 
branch of knowledge affords a species of evidence less 
satisfactory than arithmetical and geometrical rela- 
tions, and consequently less to be relied on. He says, 
" From this we may conclude, not that arithmetic and 
geometry are the only sciences which we must learn, 
but that he who seeks the road to truth, should not 
concern himself with any matter of which he cannot 
have as certain a knowledge as of arithmetical and 
geometrical demonstrations." If this were Descartes' 
real opinion, it stands directly opposed to some of the 
leading canons of his own philosophical method. In 
fact, if the rule were taken in accordance with its lite- 
ral meaning, it would cut off nine-tenths of the learn- 
ing and knowledge of mankind. 

In this little treatise there are twenty-one rules for 
the government of the understanding ; but the reader 
will find the first six or seven the most valuable and 
philosophical in their aim. 

Before closing this brief notice of Descartes' logic, 
I cannot refrain from inserting a few lines from Mr 
Hallam, who seems to entertain a very high opinion of 
its general merits. He says, " I consider The Rules 
for the Direction of the Understanding, as one of the 
best works on logic (in the enlarged sense) which I 

Q 



242 LOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF HOBBES, 

have ever read — more practically useful, perhaps, to 
young students than the Novum Organum ; and 
though, as I have said, his illustrations are chiefly ma- 
thematical, most of his rules are applicable to the gen- 
eral discipline of the reasoning powers. It occupies 
little more than one hundred pages ; and I think that 
I am doing a service in recommending it. Many of 
the rules will, of course, be found in later books ; some 
possibly in earlier."* 

The Cartesian system spread widely after the death 
of its founder. All the churches and public institu- 
tions of learning in Holland, were filled with able men 
devoted to its leading views and principles. Mr Hal- 
lam observes, that " The old scholastic philosophy 
became ridiculous : its distinctions, its maxims, were 
laughed at, as its adherents complain ; and probably a 
more fatal blow was given to the Aristotelian system 
by Descartes than even by Bacon. The Cartesian 
theories were obnoxious to the rigid class of theolo- 
gians ; but two parties of considerable importance in 
Holland, the Arminians and the Coccejans, generally 
espoused the new philosophy. Many speculations in 
theology were immediately connected with it, and it 
acted on the free and scrutinizing spirit which began 
to sap the bulwarks of established orthodoxy." f 

Descartes was viewed, however, by some parties as 
an obnoxious innovator. The University of Ley den, 
in 1651, condemned his doctrines, on the ground that 
they sapped the foundation of Aristotle's system ; and, 
about the same time, the University of Utrecht made a 
formal declaration of the same import, j 

* Lit. Middle Ages, vol. ii. p. 456. f Ibid., vol. iii. p. 316. 

X Tessel. Hist. Phil. Cartesian*, p. 55. 



GASSENDI, AND DESCARTES. 243 

It is almost impossible to estimate the amount of 
influence, direct and indirect, which the logical specu- 
lations of Descartes have exercised over the science of 
method and reasoning since his day. Nearly all the 
modern theories of truth and evidence touch upon it in 
some direction or other. Dugald Stewart conceives, 
that the true philosophy of modern times may be 
dated from the Principia of Descartes rather than the 
Novum Organum of Bacon, or even the works of 
Locke. Victor Cousin maintains, that Descartes esta- 
blished in France the same method that Bacon did in 
England ; and that he did this with less grandeur 
of imagination, but with more exactness and precision. 
" The Cartesian philosophy," says Mr Hallam, " in 
one sense carried in itself the seeds of its own decline : 
it was the Scylla of many dogs ; it taught men to 
think for themselves, and to think often better than 
Descartes had done. A new eclectic philosophy, or 
rather the genuine spirit of free inquiry, made Carte- 
sianism cease as a sect, though it left much that had 
been introduced by it. We owe thanks to those Car- 
tesians of the seventeenth century for their strenuous 
assertion of reason against prescriptive authority ; the 
latter end of this age was signalized by the overthrow 
of a despotism which had fought every inch in its re- 
treat, and it was manifestly after a struggle on the 
continent with this new philosophy, that it was ulti- 
mately vanquished." * 

* Lit. Middle Ages, vol. iii. p. 317. 



244 LOGICAL SCIENCE FROM DESCARTES 



CHAPTEB XL 

LOGICAL SCIENCE FROM DESCARTES TILL THE PUBLICATION 
OF LOCKE'S ESSAY IN 1690. 

After the writings of Bacon, Hobbes, Gassendi, and 
Descartes became known throughout the continent and 
England, logical systems became modified and varied 
in a surprising manner. This change is less observable 
in the universities than out of them ; but in every 
direction we find writers intensely occupied in the cul- 
tivation of the principles of logical philosophy, and in 
moulding the formal and educational treatises on the 
subject into a conformity with the general theories of 
reasoning adopted by different authors. A love of 
change seemed to have taken possession of the philo- 
sophic mind of Europe. 

The predominating phase belonging to the class of 
writers in this portion of history, is that of seeking out 
new logical methods of inquiry, which would, in some 
degree at least, supply the deficiency which arose out 
of the mere verbal and phenomenal character which 
logic had assumed from Bacon's time. Principles of 
logical philosophy had been propounded, which directly 



TILL THE PUBLICATION OF LOCKE'S ESSAY. 245 

closed the door against theology, In treating of man's 
moral obligation, in conjunction with religious senti- 
ment and feeling, there was needed a solid and subjec- 
tive element, altogether apart from mere verbal defini- 
tions and external experience, in order to render it 
intelligible, and to effect the hidden though powerful 
instincts of the heart. We must see, in fact, the con- 
nexion between God and ourselves. This must be 
brought fairly and directly before us. Looking merely 
at the outward forms or constitution of things, was not 
sufficient ; the everyday actions and feelings of men 
were always demanding some comprehensive and gene- 
ral rules of a subjective character, by which they might 
be measured, guided, and estimated. Logical methods, 
therefore, which were based on mere verbal arrange- 
ments and psychological phenomena, gave only a one- 
sided and imperfect view of man's nature, and the na- 
ture of truth generally. It. was from considerations of 
this kind, that many of the most influential writers we 
are now about to notice handled the subject of scientific 
evidence, and attempted to lay down such logical rules 
as would embrace the abstract principles of theology, 
as well as those phenomena more directly connected 
with external nature. 

The generality of these logical methods we are now 
about to sketch, had therefore a threefold object — to 
shew the connexion of thought with language ; to dwell 
upon physical and mental phenomena as they are de- 
veloped in our sensational system; and to unfold and 
bring to open day the fundamental conceptions of 
Divinity as they lie in the depths of the human heart. 
It was requisite that each distinct object which these 



246 LOGICAL SCIENCE FROM DESCARTES 

logical methods embraced, should be individually dwelt 
upon, and its offices and limitations accurately defined, 
so that the entire structure of scientific truth and 
knowledge should be of fair and goodly proportions. 
Philosophical inquiry was to be unfettered, and science 
embraced in all its fulness and comprehensiveness; a 
unity of character was to be impressed upon it, and 
that unity was to rest on the theological element as its 
basis. The grand object of all reasoning, as now 
taught, was to elevate man in the scale of intellectual 
existence, and to make him a more moral, religious, 
and happy being than heretofore. This was the burden 
of all the logical treatises and speculations given to the 
world at this period, which enjoyed any thing like a 
general or European reputation or popularity. They 
aimed at the improvement of the entire man in head 
and in heart. 

Indeed, at no period did the important element of 
theological authority and sentiment exercise a more 
marked influence over logical systems than at the pre- 
sent epoch. Religious principles were regularly and 
systematically incorporated with almost every dialectic 
method. They formed an essential ingredient in the 
philosophic mind. They dictated the modes in which 
truth should be sought after and promulgated. Logic 
had no limits save the entire science of man in all his 
relations in life. On the evidence belonging to the 
several branches of knowledge, springing out of these 
relations, logical writers spake with authority and 
power. There was no hesitation or compromise ; nor 
was there allowed any appeal from their decisions. The 
spirit which animated them sprung from the ennobling 



TILL THE PUBLICATION OF LOCKE'S ESSAY. 247 

doctrines they espoused relative to the reason or soul 
of man. They felt it incumbent to raise it from the 
mire. It had often been made an ignoble thing, and 
perishable withal ; like the leaf that spangles on the 
tree, now full of beauty and verdure, but soon doomed 
to fade and drop from its stem, to be again resolved 
into its original elements. A logic which taught, or 
attempted to teach, a more elevating doctrine, was 
therefore received by Christian societies with ardour 
and gratitude, and as possessing an especial and intense 
interest in the eyes of those who had the guidance of 
general education. Man was no longer considered as 
only a finer specimen of the animal, but had within an 
immaterial and immortal principle, which the coldness 
of the grave could not destroy. This was the true 
secret of that influence which many of the works we 
are now about to notice exercised over the logical studies 
and opinions of the world. 

And as a necessary consequence, in some measure, 
of this vigilant search after subjective logical methods, 
and the desire to render them extensively useful, and 
to bring them to bear on all departments of human 
knowledge, was a practice which now sprung up, of 
expounding logical principles and rules through the 
medium of some particular subject or science. Some 
writers took mathematics, some law, some divinity, and 
some the interpretation of Scripture facts and doc- 
trines. 

Godfrey William Leibnitz. — Few names in modern 
philosophy have been more influential on logical science 
than that of Leibnitz, especially in Germany and the 
north of Europe. His speculations, though of a general 



248 LOGICAL SCIENCE — LEIBNITZ. 

and abstruse character, have nevertheless a pointed 
reference to the great questions connected with scien- 
tific truth and certainty. His logical investigations are, 
however, so much mingled with mental theories and dis- 
cussions, as to render it a difficult matter to separate 
the former from the general mass of his philosophy, 
and present them, in all their unalloyed purity, to 
the attention of the general reader. Wherever we cast 
the eye over his productions, we meet with the hypo- 
thetical element in rich and varied abundance. 

To a certain extent Leibnitz was an expounder of the 
Cartesian philosophy; but his theory of the universe 
leads to conclusions very different from the theory of 
Descartes. The monads, or ultimate atoms of Leibnitz, 
play an important part in his cosmogony ; and all his 
speculations on the nature of scientific truth, have a 
close affinity with the doctrines involved in this peculiar 
theory. A knowledge of it is certainly desirable, in 
order to see the nature of his logical views; but its 
development requires more space than is at our com- 
mand. We must therefore attempt to make his 
notions on the nature of reasoning somewhat intelli- 
gible, without going over the entire range of his philo- 
sophy. 

According to Leibnitz, all rational perceptions are 
connected together by a law which is superior to that 
of memory. This law rests, however, on two principles, 
and these form the basis of every species of reasoning 
or dialectic argumentation. The one principle is the 
sufficient reason, and the other the principle of contra- 
diction. 

By the principle of the sufficient reason, we consider 



LOGICAL SCIENCE LEIBNITZ. 249 

that no fact can occur without reason sufficient for its 
occurrence in a particular manner, rather than other- 
wise. All theories or arrangements of facts rest upon 
this principle. 

The principle of contradiction enables us to mark 
and distinguish what is false or untrue ; because what- 
ever implies at one and the same time an affirmation 
and a negation, involves a contradiction — as if, for ex- 
ample, we were to affirm that the same thing could be 
and not be at the same moment. This principle of 
contradiction is the principle of identity, and the basis 
on which all necessary truths rest. 

The principle of sufficient reason deals with facts, 
and the principle of contradiction with indemonstrable 
truths. Apparently these two principles are distinct 
when considered in reference to two different species of 
knowledge ; yet the one is derived from the other. The 
necessity of a sufficient reason for every thing which 
exists, is itself a necessary or fundamental truth in all 
reasonings, because the negative of it cannot be con- 
ceived. Ultimately, therefore, the principle of contra- 
diction is the sole and common root from which all 
scientific truth springs. 

These principles, developed by great talent and ori- 
ginal genius, extended themselves in every direction 
throughout Germany and other neighbouring states, 
and exercised a marked influence over logical studies 
and systems of logic very soon after their promulgation. 

In respect to the syllogistic mode of reasoning, 
Leibnitz expresses himself a qualified admirer of it. In 
his criticisms on the observations which Locke made 
upon it, he maintains that, though he agreed in the 



250 LOGICAL SCIENCE LORD HERBERT. 

main with the English philosopher's statements, he still 
thought that the syllogism ought not to be indiscrimi- 
nately condemned. It has its value chiefly as an in- 
strument of classification, and for the prompt and 
ready disposal of knowledge previously obtained or 
agreed upon by disputants. Even if it be admitted 
that men ignorant of artificial logic, reason sometimes 
more promptly and correctly than those intimately 
skilled in it; yet this does not prove its absolute in- 
utility, any more than because we occasionally find per- 
sons quick and correct at arithmetical accounts, who 
nevertheless know scarcely any thing of formal figures, 
that therefore the science of numbers is of little use. 
Syllogisms have undoubtedly been greatly abused, and 
too often made the instruments of ingenious trifling and 
sophistication ; but still they may prove advantageous 
in quickening the faculties of the mind, and imparting 
to them a vigour and energy which they would not 
otherwise possess. 

Lord Herbert of Cherbury was a speculative logical 
writer of this period of some note and eccentricity. 
His general views- were decidedly sceptical as to the 
nature and extent of general evidence ; but his influ- 
ence on the current of philosophic thought has hitherto 
been but slender and limited. 

His lordship's work, De Veritate (1624), is an at- 
tempt to point out the sure means of discerning and 
discovering truth, — distinguishing, however, the truth 
from revelation, from probability, from possibility, and 
from falsehood. General or absolute truth rests upon 
seven fundamental axioms, — 1st, Truth exists ; 2nd, It 
is coeval with the things to which it relates ; 3d, Its 



LOGICAL SCIENCE BLAISE PASCAL. 251 

existence is every where ; 4th, It is self-evident ; oth, 
There are as many different truths as there are differ- 
ences among things ; 6th, We recognise these differ- 
ences by our natural faculties; and, 7th, There is a 
general truth attached to all these several truths. An 
analysis of these axioms gives the following results : — 
All truth is distinguished into the truth of the thing or 
object, — the truth of appearance, the truth of percep- 
tion, and the truth of the understanding. 

The powers of the human mind being limited, we 
can only know or grasp the truth of things in a corre- 
sponding degree. There must be a given or determined 
relation between the truth of things as they are in 
themselves and our intellect ; but this relation is not 
always an object of accurate perception. In order to 
seize it in all its totality or unity of being, it requires 
we should know all the properties of things, which 
knowledge is denied us. A conditional or limited view 
of this relation is therefore all we can obtain ; and this 
depends upon three principles, — 1st, That objects be 
neither immensely large or minutely small ; 2nd, That 
every object should have its principle of difference, or 
its individuality, distinctly marked out from other 
things with which it may be connected ; and, 3d, That 
this individualization should be in accordance or har- 
mony with some sense or perceptive organ. All truth 
must rest upon these primary conditions. 

All the faculties of the human soul, so far as the 
discovery and appreciation of truth is concerned, are 
four — instinct, internal perception, external sensation, 
and reason. 

Blaise Pascal, — Pascal is not a regular logical 



252 LOGICAL SCIENCE — BLAISE PASCAL. 

writer, but lie lias treated of some of the principles of 
reasoning in a way which, has excited the attention of 
many eminent logicians since his day. He says but 
little, but that little is of weighty import. 

He had meditated long and deeply on the nature of 
truth in every department of human knowledge and 
speculation, and had fixed in his own mind the precise 
amount of evidence which each science yielded. In 
point of logical certainty, he gave the preference to 
geometry, because, he says, geometers are the only 
reasoners who always keep the true laws of demonstra- 
tion uniformly before them. These, according to his 
system of classification, are eight in number. 1st, To 
define nothing which cannot be expressed in clearer 
terms than those in which it is already expressed ; 2nd, 
To leave no obscure or equivocal terms undefined ; 
3d, To employ in the definition no terms not already 
known ; 4th, To omit nothing in the principles from 
which we argue, unless we are sure it is granted ; 5th, 
To lay down no axiom which is not perfectly self-evi- 
dent ; 6th, To demonstrate nothing which is as clear 
already as it can be made ; 7th, To prove every thing 
in the least doubtful by means of self-evident axioms, 
or of propositions already demonstrated ; 8th, To sub- 
stitute mentally the definition instead of the thing 
defined. 

Pascal affirms that the first, fourth, and sixth rules 
are not absolutely requisite to avoid erroneous conclu- 
sions, but the other five rules are indispensable. He 
also remarks, that although they may be found in our 
ordinary books of logic, yet none but geometers have 
recognised their importance, or been guided by them. 



LOGICAL SCIENCE — POET-ROYAL LOGIC. 253 

All other rules than those now given are mischievous 
or useless ; they embody, he maintains, the entire art 
of demonstration.* 

The Port-Koyal Logic. — The work which goes 
under this name forms an important landmark in mo- 
dern logical science. It was the production of several 
writers — Arnauld, Nicole, Sacy, Lancelot, and others ; 
but chiefly the two first. Indeed, according to the 
manuscript of the younger Eacine, they were the sole 
writers of it ; for it is there stated, that the disserta- 
tions and additions are by Nicole ; the first parts are 
by Arnauld and Mcole together ; and the fourth, On 
Method, by Arnauld alone. The first edition appeared 
in 1662, under the following title : — La Logique, ou 
V Art de Penser ; contenant outre les Megles communes, 
plusieurs Observations nouvelles, propres a former le juge- 
ment. 

It is stated in the advertisement, that its production 
arose from the following circumstance : — In the course 
of a conversation, it was mentioned as a somewhat 
remarkable thing, that a person had made himself well 
acquainted with the greater part of logic in fifteen 
days. This led one of the company to remark in a 
sportive mood, that if Mr So-and-so would take the 
trouble, he would engage to learn him all that was 
really useful in logic in four or five days. From this 
random proposal it was resolved to make the attempt. 
An abstract of the science was determined upon, which, 
it was thought, would not occupy more than one day ; 
but, instead of this limited time, it took four or five 
days, and at the end of this period the work was sub- 

* ffiuvres. i. 66. 



254 LOGICAL SCIENCE — PORT-ROYAL LOGIC. 

stantially finished, nearly in the state we now have it. 
The treatise has been translated into nearly every lan- 
guage in Europe.* 

The following is the definition of logic given by the 
authors of the Port-Royal : — " Logic is the art of 
directing reason aright in obtaining the knowledge of 
things, for the instruction both of ourselves and others. 
It consists of the reflections which have been made on 
the four principal operations of the mind — conceiving, 
judging, reasoning, and disposing" 

The logic of the Port-Royal is divided into four parts. 
I. Containing reflections on Ideas, or on the first opera- 
tion of the mind, which is called conceiving, — This part 
embraces the nature and origin of our ideas — their 
relation to their objects — the ten categories of Aristotle 
— the ideas of things and signs — ideas relative to their 
simplicity or composition — of ideas relative to their 
generality, particularity, and singularity — of genus, 
species, difference, property, and accident — of complex 
terms, universal and particular — of clear and distinct, 
of obscure and confused ideas — examples of these from 
morals — of the causes of confusion and obscurity of 
our thoughts and discourses — of the nature and influ- 
ence of definition, and of the ideas which the mind 
adds to those which are expressed by words or signs. 

Part II. Containing the reflections which men have 
made on their judgments. — This section of the work 
contains the nature of words relative to propositions — 
of the verb — of what is implied by a proposition — of 
simple, accidental, and compound propositions — of the 

* There are three English translations of the work ; one in 1680, another in 1716, 
and the third by Mr Baynes, 1850. I have quoted from the last. 



LOGICAL SCIEXCE — PORT-KOYAL LOGIC. 255 

falsity incident to complex propositions — of affirmation 
and negation, subject and attribute, relative to propo- 
sitions. 

Part III. Reasoning. — The nature of reasoning — 
the syllogism — rules relative to its figures and modes — 
of sophistical and bad reasoning in civil life and in 
common discourse. 

Part IV. Of Method. — What is implied in this — 
two kinds of it — method of composition — method of 
geometers, axioms, demonstration — method of the 
sciences — what can be known by faith, human and 
divine — rules for the direction of reason — of the judg- 
ments we should form relative to future events. 

Arnauld's system of reasoning is essentially an expo- 
sition of Descartes' doctrines on the same subject, 
though there was a difference between these two philo- 
sophers on some matters of minor import. The word 
idea is used in the Port-Eoyal logic in its widest and 
most common acceptation ; standing for notions, per- 
ceptions, images, volitions, conceptions, desires, &c. 
This is an important point to be kept in view, in judg- 
ing of the nature and merits of this celebrated and 
popular treatise. 

The great end of all logical studies is, according to 
Arnauld, to perfect our judgments on subjects connect- 
ed with human nature — to view man aright in his 
several relations, as a moral, political, and religious 
being. This is emphatically dwelt upon in the follow- 
ing observations : — " The main object of our attention 
should be, to form our judgment, and render it as 
exact as possible ; and to this end the greater part of 
our studies ought to tend. We employ reason as an 



256 LOGICAL SCIENCE — POET-ROYAL LOGIC. 

instrument for acquiring the sciences ; whereas, on the 
contrary, we ought to avail ourselves of the sciences as 
an instrument for perfecting our reason — -justness of 
mind being infinitely more important than all the 
speculative knowledge which we can obtain by means 
of sciences the most solid and well established. This 
ought to lead wise men to engage in these only as far 
as they may contribute to that end, and to make them 
the exercise only, and not the occupation of their men- 
tal powers. 

" If we have not this end in view, the study of the 
speculative sciences, such as geometry, astronomy, and 
physics, will be little else than a vain amusement, and 
scarcely better than the ignorance of these things, 
which has at least this advantage — that it is less labo- 
rious, and affords no room for that empty vanity which 
is often found connected with these barren and unpro- 
fitable knowledges. These sciences not only have nooks 
and hidden places of very little use ; they are even 
totally useless, considered in themselves and for them- 
selves alone. Men are not born to employ their time 
in measuring lines, in examining the relations of angles, 
and considering the different movements of matter — 
their minds are too great, their life too short, their time 
too precious, to be engrossed with such petty objects ; 
but they ought to be just, equitable, prudent, in all 
their converse, in all their actions, and in all the busi- 
ness they transact, and to these things they ought spe- 
cially to discipline and train themselves. This care and 
study .are so very necessary, that it is strange that this 
exactness of judgment should be so rare a quality."* 

* Discourse I. 



LOGICAL SCIENCE POET-ROYAL LOGIC. 257 

The Port-Koyal logic was one of the boldest attempts 
to overthrow the Aristotelian system that had been 
made up to the time of its publication ; and its anti- 
pathy to that system is more decided and general than 
what at first sight appears from the work itself — inas- 
much as the syllogistic rules are retained and given at 
full length, But this is evidently done under the im- 
pression that it would not have been prudent to carry 
opposition to a greater extent. The whole of the chapters 
of the work, from the third in part third, to the twelfth, 
are considered as consisting of matters of no practical 
utility. These contain the rules for the various modes 
and figures of the syllogism. The authors say in refer- 
ence to these — " More of doubt arose in relation to 
certain matters difficult enough and but of little use — 
such as the conversion of propositions and the demon- 
stration of the rules of figure ; but we have determined 
not to omit them, since their very difficulty is not alto- 
gether without its use." 

The ten categories are given at length in the work ; 
but the authors remark that " these are the ten cate- 
gories of Aristotle, about which there has been so much 
mystery, although in truth they are in themselves of 
very little use ; and not only do not contribute much 
to form the judgment, which is the end of true logic, 
but often are very injurious, for two reasons, — First, 
we regard the categories as something founded on 
reason and truth, whereas they are altogether arbitrary, 
and are founded only in the imagination of a man who 
had no authority to prescribe a law to others ; and the 
second reason which renders the study of the cate- 
gories dangerous is, that it accustoms men to satisfy 

R 



258 LOGICAL SCIENCE — PORT-ROYAL LOGIC. 

themselves with words, and to imagine that they know 
all things, when they know only arbitrary names, which 
form in the mind no clear and distinct idea of the 
things."* 

The fourth part, on method, is a valuable portion of 
the work. Pascal's rules of evidence are here adopted, 
but enlarged and illustrated at greater length. Method 
is considered one of the most useful and important 
portions of logical science. It substantially consists of 
a series of several reasonings, by which we incontest- 
ably prove some truth. 

" The Port-Eoyal logic," says Mr Hallam, " though 
not perhaps very much read in England, has always been 
reckoned among the best works in that science, and 
certainly had a great influence in rendering it more 
metaphysical, more ethical (for much is said by Arnauld 
on the moral discipline of the mind, in order to fit it 
for the investigation of truth), more exempt from 
technical barbarisms, and trifling definitions and divi- 
sions. It became more and more acknowledged, that 
the rules of syllogism go a very little way in rendering 
the mind able to follow a course of inquiry without 
error, much less in assisting it to discover truth ; and 
that even this vaunted prerogative of securing us from 
fallacy is nearly ineffectual in exercise. The substitu- 
tion of the French language in its highest polish, for 
the uncouth Latinity of the Aristotelian, was another 
advantage of which the Cartesian school legitimately 
availed themselves."")' 

M. Crousaz observes in his Logic, that the Port-Eoyal 
logic exercised a more powerful influence in reforming 

* Tart I., chap, ill, t Lit. Middle Ages, vol. iii. p. 322. 



LOGICAL SCIENCE MALEBRANCHE. 259 

academical instruction throughout the whole continent 
of Europe, than the writings of either Bacon or Des- 
cartes. We may also acid the testimony of Stewart, 
who says, " Ho publication, certainly, prior to Locke's 
Essaij, can be named, containing so much good sense, 
and so little nonsense on the science of logic ; and very 
few have since appeared on the same subject, which 
can be justly preferred to it in point of practical 
utility."* 

Father Malebranche. — This philosopher based his 
logical evidence upon theology. His Recherche de la 
Verite was published in 1674, and excited considerable 
attention among the scientific men of Europe. 

The grand principle of his system is, that we see all 
things in Grod. In this he follows the example of 
Descartes and many others ; only he works out the 
problem in a very original and talented manner. All 
scientific truth must ultimately rest upon an infinitely 
true and perfect being ; no other foundation is con- 
ceivable. This idea of the Divine nature implies, on 
the one hand, the existence of its object ; and, on the 
other, all the individual ideas, which can never be any 
thing else save particular aspects or phases of the One 
universal idea of being. " The union," says he, " of 
the soul to God, is the sole means by which we acquire 
a knowledge of what is true. This union has, however, 
been rendered so obscure by our original transgression, 
that few can understand what is implied by it — to 
those who are blindly led by the dictates of sense and 
passion, it appears imaginary. The same cause has so 
strengthened and fortified the connexion between the 

* Dissert., p. 80. 



260 LOGICAL SCIENCE MALEBKANCHE. 

soul and the body, that we consider them as one sub- 
stance, of which the latter portion is the principal part. 
It is from this reason that we may be all apprehensive 
that we do not clearly distinguish the confused sounds 
with which the senses fill the imagination, from that 
pure voice of truth which speaks to the soul. The 
body speaks in a tone louder than Grod himself; and 
our pride makes us presumptuous enough to judge 
without waiting for those words of truth, without 
which we cannot really judge at all." 

The work is divided into six books. The five first 
are devoted to pointing out the errors of judgment 
arising out of the senses, the understanding, the imagi- 
nation, the natural inclinations or desires, and the pas- 
sions. The sixth book contains the logical method of 
avoiding these. 

The Aristotelian logic, though rapidly falling in- 
to discredit among enlightened laymen in almost 
every country in Europe, had still a numerous host of 
firm and zealous friends in most of the universities, 
and particularly in the bosom of the Catholic Church 
generally , The -theories of Descartes and Leibnitz, 
the common-sense views of Arnauld, and the philo- 
sophy of Bacon, were making a deep impression among 
thinking men in every direction ; but in proportion as 
this innovating spirit gained strength, in the same 
ratio did alarm spread itself among the advocates of the 
purely syllogistic theory. The Jesuits were conspicu- 
ously active in retaining the ancient method of instruc- 
tion ; and the Sorbonne of Paris, in 1693, raised its 
voice in their behalf, by ordering Aristotle to be main- 
tained in all his integrity and power. 



LOGICAL SCIENCE — DIGBY, WHITE, GLANVIL. 261 

These conflicting opinions gave rise to various logi- 
cal speculations, having for their ostensible object a 
reformation of the science to some extent, but the real 
aim of which was to give support to one or other of 
the leading systems which divided the philosophical 
opinion of Europe. The religious element predomi- 
nated in most of these logical publications, though 
there were exceptions of a sceptical cast to the gene- 
rality of the rule. 

Edward Digby wrote his De Duplici Methodo libri 
duo, unicam P. Rami Methodum Refutantes, in 1589 ; 
a work of considerable merit. The main object of it 
is, to point out the advantages of method in the expo- 
sition of those principles and rules which lead the mind 
to sound reasoning. His views on this subject are 
very much in unison with those developed by James 
Concio, already noticed. Thomas White, a Soman 
Catholic clergyman, argues for the supremacy of the 
syllogistic theory, and maintains that it is admirably 
calculated to promote sound knowledge. His observa- 
tions are contained in a work, entitled, An Exclusion 
of Sceptics from all title of dispute ; being an Answer to 
the Vanity of Dogmatizing. White taught publicly at 
Lisbon, Douay, Rome, and Paris. Joseph Grlanvil, the 
author of The Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661), against 
which White directs his censures, has a violent attack 
upon the Aristotelian logic, which, it is affirmed, is 
nothing but a play upon words. " It tells us nothing," 
says the author, " but what a child may understand." 
This publication was afterwards entitled Sceptis Scien- 
tifica ; and has received the high commendation of 
Dugald Stewart, who observes, that it is " one of the 



262 LOGICAL SCIENCE — SIK KE.NELM DIGBY, ETC. 

most acute and original productions of which English 
philosophy had then to boast."* Glanvil likewise stig- 
matizes the system of Aristotle in severe terms, in his 
Plus Ultra, or the Progress and Advancement of Know- 
ledge since Aristotle (1668). His own views on the 
nature of scientific truth may be gathered from the 
following observations : — " The philosophy that must 
signify either for light or use, must not be the work of 
the mind turned in upon itself; but it must be raised 
from the observations and applications of sense, and take 
its account from things, as they are in the sensible 
world. The illustrious Lord Bacon hath noted this as 
the chief cause of the unprofitableness of the former 
methods of knowledge, namely, that they were but the 
exercises of the mind, making conclusions, and spinning 
out notions from its own native store ; from which 
mode of proceeding nothing but dispute and air could 
be expected." f 

Sir Kenelm Digby, grandson of Edward Digby, just 
noticed, was a stout defender of the Aristotelian logic. 
His opinions on this subject will be found in his Insti- 
tutiones Peripateticce. John Morris, in his Essay to- 
wards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World, 
endeavoured to illustrate the logical philosophy of 
Plato, relative to general truths and essences. In this 
he follows the footsteps of Malebranche. Wallis's 
work, Institutio Logicce ad Communes Usus Accommo- 
data (1687), became generally well known among 
logicians in England. And Oldfield's Essay towards 
the Improvement of Reason, founded upon some of the 
logical principles of the Port-Royal, obtained some 

* Dissert,,, p. 217. t Plus Ultra, \\ 52. 



LOGICAL SCIENCE BUKGEKSDICIUS, KEG1S. 263 

limited notice in its day. About this time appeared 
Aldrich's Compendium Artis Logicce. We have the 
Artis Logicce of the immortal John Milton, who de- 
fines logic to be " the art of reasoning well." His 
work is divided into two parts ; the one relates to the 
nature and invention of different kinds of arguments, 
and the other to the disposing of them in formal order. 
The last division is worked out in conformity to the 
logical views of Peter Ramus. Method, Milton says, 
is of vital moment in logic. 

Fran. Burgersdicius was a distinguished logician at 
this period, and published his Instit. Logicce ad Aristo- 
telis prcecepta Concinatce at Cambridge in 1647, and at 
Geneva in 1651. Smiglecius likewise obtained no in- 
considerable reputation in the path of logical literature.* 
Louis de la Forge examines the nature of truth through 
a Cartesian medium in his Traite de V Esprit de V Homme 
(1666). Of what does knowledge or truth consist? 
He answers the question thus : " To know is simply to 
perceive that which is internally represented in the 
mind." Innate ideas are of three classes — the sub- 
stance which thinks, the substance which is extended, 
and the third is a composition of both. Pierre Sylvain 
Regis followed nearly in the footsteps of De la Forge. 
The logic of Regis will be found in his Systeme de la 
Philosophic (1690). At the commencement he states, 
"All I have said being due to M. Descartes, whose 
principles and method I have followed even in explana- 
tions that are different from my own." In accordance 
with his master, he tells us that all knowledge from 
reasoning is acquired "by a simple and internal in- 

* " La Logique de Smiglecius est un bel ouvvage." — Rapin. 



264 LOGICAL SCIENCE — HUET, FOUCHEK. 

tuition, which precedes all acquired knowledge, and 
which I call consciousness." In the author's logic, he 
professes to be guided by the doctrines of the Port- 
Royal, although he does not give any account of the 
figures and modes of the syllogism.* Huet, Bishop of 
Avranches, discusses several of the leading principles of 
logic in his several works, Traite Philosophique sur la 
Faiblesse de V Esprit Humain, Demonstratio JEvangelica, 
Qucestiones Alnetance, and the Censura Philosophice 
Cartesiance. Huet's notions of scientific evidence in- 
clined to scepticism. " We demand," says he, " a 
criterium of truth — a sign, a stamp to which conviction 
shall be attached. But where is this criterium ? It is 
not in man, and nature declares she knows nothing of 
it. It cannot be in the instruments we use, for our 
senses and imagination deal only in deceptive impres- 
sions ; and the understanding and reason offer no 
grounds for certainty, since they are both a hidden 
mystery to us. Nor need we look for it in the active 
energy of the mind itself. In fine, to obtain a criterium 
of truth, we must previously know what truth is ; whilst 
again, to know truth, we should still require a criterium. 
Of what importance is a rule, if it be not a right one '? 
And how can we know it is right ?"f 

We find a portion of the same scepticism in the 
Dissertation sur la Recherche de la Verite, ou sur la 
Logiques des Academicians of the Abbe Foucher. He 
also maintains the doctrine that there are no necessary 

* " Nous ne dirons rien des figures ni des syllogismes en general : car Men que 
tout cela puisse servir de quelque chose pour la speculation de la logique, il n'est au 
moins d'aucun usage pour la practique, laquelle est I'unique but que nous nous 
sommes proposes dans co traite." — P. 37. 

f Traite, ch. 8. 



LOGICAL SCIENCE HIRNHAIM, DERODON. 265 

truths connected with the sciences of physics and morals ; 
they are only to be found in mathematics, and in the 
demonstrations of the existence of a Deity. The logi- 
cal opinions of P. Marsenne will be found in his work, 
La Verite des Sciences contre les Sceptiques. As an 
antidote in some measure to the doubt pervading some 
of these speculations, we have the treatise of Jerome 
Hirnhaim of Prague, entitled, De la Certitude des Con- 
naissances Humaines (1671). He maintains that all 
the reasonings of men are grounded upon a few ele- 
mentary principles of an intuitive character, — as the 
belief of our own existence, the faith in the testimony 
of others, and the firm conviction of our perceptions of 
right and wrong." 5 " 

David Derodon was a logician of great eminence in 
his day. He taught logic in several universities in 
France, but ultimately settled at Geneva, where he 
officiated for many years as professor of philosophy. 
His general principles of logic are founded on Aris- 
totle's system, which, viewed as a whole, he considers 
based on incontestable evidence. Being, however, of 
an original and independent mind, Derodon did not 
take the commonly received doctrines of reasoning mi- 
grant ed, but urged many special grounds of dissent 
from some notions prevalent in his time. The most 
important of these related to the predicaments, to the 
definitions of universals, to the nature of genus and 
species, and to the discrepancies of opinion on some 
points of little importance, between Aristotle and the 
logical views of Plato, Democritus, and Epicurus.")* 
About the same time Duhamel flourished, who likewise 

* De la Certitude, chap. vii. + Logiea, Part. i. % 5. 



266 LOGICAL SCIENCE DUHAMEL, BAYLE. 

proved himself a profound logician, and who was ap- 
pointed secretary to the French Academy at its estab- 
lishment. His work, Philosophia Vetus et Nova ad 
Usum Scholce Accommodata (1684), contains many 
valuable observations on the art of reasoning. He 
thinks Bacon's inductive method not altogether satis- 
factory, chiefly on the ground that induction, from its 
very nature, must prove a fallacious guide in many 
instances by the imperfect manner it is performed by 
the mass of mankind. Duhamel conceives that the 
best logical method, both for the discovery and pro- 
mulgation of truth, is to combine, in fair proportions, 
theoretical with practical knowledge. They ought 
always to go hand in hand in the study of nature. 
"Investigations of causes," says he, "is confirmed by 
experience ; but experiments by themselves are often 
only blind and fortuitous kinds of things, unless there 
be some light thrown on their causes." 

The " logic " of Peter Bayle is contained in the fourth 
volume of his collected works, and is given in Latin and 
French. He defines logic to be " the art of forming 
those instruments. which guide us to truth." His views 
on logic as a science are compounded of the opinions of 
Aristotle and Descartes. He ends his work with a 
short chapter on method, which contains some sound 
remarks on giving our argumentative labours a fixed 
and determinate direction. His constitutional scepti- 
cism is discernible, however, in many portions of the 
Logique ; and in his other treatises we see evident signs 
how prone his mind was to toy with subtle and extra- 
logical questions. A striking instance we have of this 
in his Dictionary, under the article " Chrysippus." 



LOGICAL SCIENCE BAYLE. 267 

" What is it, said some of the ancient sophists, which 
constitutes what we call little, much, long, broad, small, 
or great ? Do three grains of corn make a heap ? The 
answer must be — no. Do four grains make a heap ? 
You must make the same answer as before. They con- 
tinued their interrogatories from one grain to another 
without end ; and if you should happen at last to answer, 
' Here is a heap,' they pretend your answer was absurd, 
inasmuch as it supposed that one single grain makes 
the difference between what is a heap, and what is not. 
I might prove by the same method, that a great 
drinker is never drunk. "Will one drop of wine fuddle 
him ? ~No. Two drops, then ? By no means ; neither 
three nor four. I might thus continue my interroga- 
tories from one drop to another ; and if, at the end of 
the nine hundred and ninety-ninth drop, you answered, 
He is not fuddled, and at the thousandth, He is, I 
should be entitled to infer that one single drop of 
wine makes the difference between being drunk and 
being sober— a most absurd proposition. If the inter- 
rogations went on from bottle to bottle, you could 
easily mark the difference in question. But he who 
attacks you with a sorites, is at liberty to choose his 
own weapons ; and, by making use of the smallest con- 
ceivable increments, renders it impossible for you to 
name a precise point which fixes a sensible limit be- 
tween being drunk and being sober ; between what is 
enough, and what is too much. A man of the world 
would laugh at these sophistical quibbles, and would 
appeal to common sense — to that degree of knowledge 
which, in common life, is sufficient to enable us to 
establish such distinctions. But to this tribunal a 



268 LOGICAL SCIENCE — BOSSUET. 

professed dialectician was not permitted to resort ; he 
was obliged to answer in form ; and, if unable to find a 
solution according to the rules of art, his defeat was 
unavoidable. Even at this day, an Irish tutor who 
should harass a professor of Salamanca with similar sub- 
tilties, and should receive no other answer except this — 
Common sense, and the general consent of mankind, suffi- 
ciently shew your inferences are false — would gain the 
victory ; his antagonist having declined to defend him- 
self with those logical weapons with which the assault 
had been made." 

Bossuet's logical opinions had some influence in his 
day, chiefly among the most refined and philosophical 
of the French clergy. His Logique is divided into 
three books, in accordance with the three powers or 
faculties of the understanding — conception, judgment, 
and reasoning. There are general precepts given at 
the end of each book for the guidance of the mind in 
its pursuit of knowledge. The work was composed for 
the Dauphin of France, and is written in a very plain 
and popular style. He defines truth to be that which 
exists, and falsehood that which has no existence. 
Truth being eternal, it must of necessity rest upon 
Deity. All necessary truths and principles existed 
prior to the human understanding ; and consequently 
we can only be said to find truths, not to create them. 
Huygens, professor of logic in the University of 
Louvain, and the celebrated Fenelon, entertained nearly 
the same notions of the philosophy of logic as Bossuet 
did. Thev both argue for the intuitive nature of all our 
primary maxims of reasoning, and that the idea we 
entertain of the absolutely true, is intimatelv and neces- 



LOGICAL SCIENCE — FOKTEtfELLE, MARIOTTE. 269 

sarily connected with our general conceptions of a 
Divine and Intelligent power. Fontenelle's view of 
logical truth did not differ widely from those of the 
three last-named authors. In his Fragments on Human 
Reason, the Human Mind, and Instinct, he lays down 
the proposition generally, that any cumbrous dialec- 
tical framework is calculated to retard rather than ad- 
vance our knowledge and intellectual improvement. 
His opinion is, that all universal propositions and 
scientific maxims are the result of often repeated ex- 
periments or observations. Necessary truths he terms 
natural axioms. These natural axioms constitute the 
basis of all human reasoning, and may be divided into 
two great classes — those which are derived from the 
external world, and those appertaining to our internal 
nature. What Fontenelle calls the laws of thought, 
seem to be of the same character as those subsequently 
developed by the common sense school of philosophy. 

The Abbe Mariotte's work, Essai de Logique, Con- 
tenant les Principes des Sciences (1678), contains ex- 
cellent illustrations of those principles on which the 
certainty of human knowledge is based ; and the same 
thing may be said of several other French works on 
logic, which appeared at, or a little before this time. 

The logical works of Italy and Spain at this period 
are not of a character to require any special enumera- 
tion. In Spain particularly, every thing remained just 
as it was in the clays of Thomas Aquinas. IsTo new or 
foreign element had been introduced into the formal 
treatises appropriated to logical education. Kapin 
even affirms, that the logicians of this country had 
made, for the last two centuries, a decidedly retrograde 



270 LOGICAL SCIENCE KEMPE, ETC. 

movement, instead of advancing, by the practice of 
introducing into logic a great number of childish and 
frivolous questions and subtilties, which had no other 
effect than to bewilder the intellect. 

In the north of Europe logical studies were prose- 
cuted with ordinary diligence, There were several 
works of importance published in Sweden during the 
seventeenth century. In 1623 we have Alexander 
Kempe discussing the merits of Aristotle's logic, and, 
on many vital points, calling its validity in question. 
He argues that the syllogism is too slender a basis for 
rational argumentation. He is followed by Joh. Ches- 
neiopherus in 1629, who, in his Logica, incorporated 
many of the notions of Ramus. P. Aurivillius defended 
the logic of Aristotle, and stoutly maintained it was the 
only safe guide to the understanding. Enander, in 
1640, became a very popular lecturer on logic, and 
partially made known some of the peculiar views of 
Bacon and Descartes on the subject. Students from 
the remotest parts of the kingdom came to hear him. 
His rival was J. Boethius, a professor of logic. For- 
sius and George .Olavi were dialecticians of a mystical 
character. The logical works of Laurens, Javelin, and 
Gezelius, are purely treatises of a formal or scholastic 
order. 

In Holland and Belgium we have the following au- 
thors, among many others, who cultivated logic : — Joh. 
Schalerus, P. Nannius, P. Cornelius Brederod, Martinus 
Schookius, M. Paludanus, Baldinus Junius, Gerardus 
de Boot, Guil. Philippi, Jacob Speecq, A. Verhel, 
Anth. Senguerdius, A. Deusinghins, Gisb. ab Ysen- 
doorn, and Cornelius ab Hooghelandc. 



LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE. 271 



CHAPTEE XII. 

THE LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE. 

It may safely be affirmed, that Locke's Essay on the 
Human Understanding (1690), has given birth to a 
more diversified series of logical systems and specula- 
tions, as well as modes of tuition, than any other single 
work since the days of Aristotle. Though not profess- 
edly a logical treatise, yet it contains so many views 
and facts connected with the reasoning process, and has 
proved so suggestive to the minds of men, relative to 
the government of the understanding, that novel logical 
doctrines and systems have sprung up on all sides of 
us, from the publication of the Essay till the present 
day. It has been the great dialectical innovator for 
nearly two centuries — aiming at the solution of all pro- 
blems on the broad principles of common sense and 
common reason, arising out of the varied and subtle 
movements of the reasoning faculty. 

Locke's influence over the logical studies of modern 
times, has arisen chiefly from two sources — the one 
metaphysical, and the other dialectical. The mental 
powers are so minutely analysed, so accurately and 



272 LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE. . 

plainly mapped out, that the entire structure of the 
inward man is laid bare to every inquirer ; and then 
again, the logical apparatus which moved, guided, and 
directed the individual parts to their several offices and 
ends, was so simple and effective, and so much in unison 
with the everyday current of thought, that men have 
been led to think that every thing necessary to be 
known was to be found in the Essay, and nowhere else. 
By a single sentence or a passing remark, he some- 
times throws a flood of light upon some logical precept, 
and shows its relation to the entire economy of the 
reasoning faculty. Then, again, he deals with the 
science or art of argumentation in its widest significa- 
tion — pointing out the most striking phenomena — 
harmonizing scattered and disjointed facts — and guid- 
ing the judgment to some important generalization or 
abstract truth. 

It is not necessary to give more than a brief outline 
of so well-known a book as the Essay on the Human 
Understanding. And this outline must also be limited 
to that portion of the Essay which directly bears upon 
logical principles and rules. With the philosophy of 
the treatise, properly so called, we have nothing to do, 
further than to obtain that very general conception 
of its character and scope, which is absolutely neces- 
sary to a ready comprehension of the author's logical 
theory. 

The mental philosophy of Locke is based upon two 
principles — the origin of our ideas, and the principle of 
human knowledge, — that is, the agreement of ideas with 
objects- 
There are two sources of the origin of our ideas — 



LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE. 273 

sensation and reflection. All ideas of things distinct 
from the thinking subject are derived from sensation, 
or the effects of external bodies upon our several senses 
of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and touching. 

All ideas of the modes of being, or of the operations 
of the intellect — such as ideas of perception, thought, 
doubt, belief, knowledge, will, reasoning, intelligence, and 
the like — are derived from the power of reflection. 

The principle of knowledge, or the correspondence 
of ideas with things, embraces that portion of the au- 
thor's speculations which have a direct reference to 
logical systems. 

Locke defines knowledge to be the perception of the 
agreement or disagreement of our ideas. It can be 
viewed in three different aspects, — 1st, In reference to 
its objects ; 2nd, In reference to its nature ; and, 3dly, 
In reference to its origin. 

Knowledge, in reference to its objects, is of four 
kinds, — 1st, A knowledge of identity and diversity ; 
2nd, A knowledge of relation ; 3d, A knowledge of co- 
existence ; and, 4th, A knowledge of real existence. 

Knowledge, in reference to its nature, is of two kinds 
— actual and habitual. 

Knowledge, in reference to its origin, is of three 
kinds — intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive. 

Locke prescribes the limits of human knowledge in 
this manner: — 1st, We have knowledge no further 
than we have ideas ; 2nd, We have knowledge no fur- 
ther than we have perceptions of the agreement or 
disagreement of these ideas ; and, 3d, That this per- 
ception is either by intuition, demonstration, or sen- 
sation. 



274 LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE. 

Truth is defined by Locke to be the joining or sepa- 
rating of signs, according as the things signified by 
these signs agree or disagree among themselves. He 
again divides truth into two kinds — moral and meta- 
physical. Moral truth consists in speaking as we think, 
whether the thing spoken of be as we state or not. 
Metaphysical truth is, when thought corresponds with 
the real existence of things. 

A proposition is defined to be a sentence affirming 
the agreement or disagreement of two ideas — such as, 
Plato was a philosopher ; white is not black. Every 
proposition consists of three members, — namely, the 
subject, the predicate, and the copula. 

Judgment and probability are two important instru- 
ments in Locke's logical system. Judgment is defined 
to be the joining or separating ideas, as they are pre- 
sumed, not perceived, to agree or disagree. Probability 
consists in the appearance of agreement or disagree- 
ment of ideas through the means of other intermediate 
ideas, whose connexion is not invariable, but only more 
or less frequent. 

Probable evidence forms the greatest portion of all 
the evidence we have for the truth of any thing. It is 
based on two principles — experience and testimony. 

Experience is of two kinds — partial and general ; 
and testimony is regulated by six distinct circumstances, 
namely, — 1st, The number of the witnesses ; 2nd, Their 
integrity ; 3d, Their skill or knowledge ; 4th, Their 
intention or aim ; 5th, The consistency of their rela- 
tion ; and, 6th, Contrary testimony. 

Reason is treated of by Locke at considerable length. 
AH reasoning consists of four parts or elements, — 1st, 



LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OP LOCKE. 275 

The finding out of proofs ; 2nd, The disposing of them 
in proper order ; 3d, The perceiving of their mutual 
connexion ; and, 4th, The making a right use of them. 
It is in this division of his work that he treats of the 
syllogistic logic. Of the syllogism generally, he says, 
" It serves our reason but in one only of the foremen- 
tioned parts of it ; and that is, to show the connexion 
of the proofs in any one instance, and no more : but in 
this it is of no great use, since the mind can conceive 
such connexion where it really is, as easily — nay, per- 
haps better — without it." " If we will observe the 
actings of our own minds, we shall find that we reason 
best and clearest when we only observe the connexion 
of the proof, without reducing our thoughts to any rule 
of syllogism." . . . . " All who have so far considered 
syllogism as to see the reason why, in three propositions 
laid together in one form, the conclusion will certainly 
be right, but in another not certainly so, I grant are 
certain of the conclusion they draw from the premises 
in the allowed modes and figures. But they who have 
not so far looked into these forms, are not sure by 
virtue of syllogism that the conclusion certainly follows 
from the premises — they only take it to be so by an 
implicit faith in their teachers, and a confidence in 
those forms of argumentation ; but this is still but be- 
lieving, not being certain. Now if, of all mankind, 
those who can make syllogisms are extremely few in 
comparison of those who cannot — and if, of those few 
who have been taught logic, there is but a very small 
number who do any more than believe that syllogisms 
in the allowed modes and figures do conclude right, 
without knowing certainly that they do so — if syllogisms 



276 LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE. 

must be taken for the only proper instrument of reason 
and means of knowledge — it will follow, that before 
Aristotle there was not one man that did or could know 
any thing by reason ; and that, since the invention of 
syllogisms, there is not one of ten thousand that did." 

" God has not been so sparing to men to make them 
barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to 
make them rational, — that is, those few of them that 
he can get to examine the grounds of syllogisms as to 
see, that in about threescore ways that three proposi- 
tions may be laid together, there are but fourteen 
wherein one may be sure that the conclusion is right. 
God has been more bountiful to mankind. He has 
given them a mind that can reason without being in- 
structed in methods of syllogism." 

" Of what use," says he again, " then, are syllogisms ? 
I answer, their chief and main use is in the schools, 
where men are allowed without shame to deny the 
agreement of ideas that do manifestly agree ; or, out of 
the schools, to those who from thence have learned 
without shame to deny the connexion of ideas, which 
even to themselves is visible. But to an ingenuous 
searcher after truth, who has no other aim but to find 
it, there is no need of any such form to force the allow- 
ing of the inference ; the truth and reasonableness of it 
is better seen in ranging of the ideas in a simple and 
plain order. And hence it is that men in their in- 
quiries after truth never use syllogisms to convince 
themselves." " Eules of syllogism serve not to furnish 
the mind with those intermediate ideas that may show 
the connexion of remote ones. This way of reasoning 
discovers no new proofs, but is the art of marshalling 



LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE. 277 

and ranging the old ones we have already." . . . . "A 
man knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogis- 
tically. So that syllogism comes after knowledge, and 
then a man has little or no need of it." * 

Again he says, " Having here had an occasion to speak 
of syllogism in general, and the nse of it in reasoning 
and the improvement of our knowledge, it is fit, before 
I leave this subject, to take notice of one manifest mis- 
take in the rules of syllogism, — namely, that no syllo- 
gistical reasoning can be right and conclusive but what 
has at least one general proposition in it. As if we 
could not reason, and have knowledge about particu- 
lars ; whereas in truth, the matter rightly considered, 
the immediate object of all our reasoning and know- 
ledge is nothing but particulars. Every man's reason- 
ing and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in 
his own mind, which are truly, every one of them, 
particular existences ; and our knowledge and reason 
about other things is only as they correspond with 
those of our particular ideas." j- 

The logical theory of Locke may, I conceive, be 
substantially and fairly illustrated in the following man- 
ner : — It consists of three divisions or members — ideas, 
faculties, and reason or intelligence. He considers 
ideas as the raw material out of which propositions and 
arguments of every kind spring. Hence his maxim, 
that the more ideas a man has, the more soundly and 
comprehensively is he likely to reason. He considers 
them as the foundation of all logical operations ; and 
to have correct conceptions of their various orders and 

* Essay, ehqh-xvi. 0^.^,0^.17. t Book IV., chap. xvii. 



278 LOGICAL PEINCIPLES OF LOCKE. 

chief characteristics, is a necessary preliminary to every 
rational movement of the mind. 

The author having fixed the science of reasoning on 
ideas, he next directs attention to the faculties or 
powers of the mind. These are the instruments which 
operate on ideas. These powers are all, individually 
and collectively, susceptible of improvement from exer- 
cise ; therefore a knowledge of their nature and offices 
in the mental economy is of essential service in their 
use and application. It is incumbent to examine into, 
and to obtain clear conceptions of what these various 
original powers and faculties are, which are thus em- 
ployed about ideas, either in their creation through the 
inward power of reflection, or in that power of recalling 
them before the mind's eye, and regulating their move- 
ments in the process of mental conviction. These are 
the instruments which the logician must wield when- 
ever he makes a display of his art, either to satisfy his 
own mind, or to bring the force of truth to bear on the 
minds of others. 

]SText comes reason or intelligence, whose office is 
to direct the faculties in all their dealings with our 
ideas, — in guiding, directing, and moulding them to 
some given end or object, which is invariably a general 
idea or conception, and which lies in ihe bosom of the 
intelligent principle, so to speak, till circumstances de- 
velop or quicken it into life and activity. The reason, 
therefore, exercises an efficient and superintending 
power over the entire mental machinery. It is not 
itself a mere intellectual faculty or process : it is more. 
It embraces the whole man. It enters into every thing 



LOGICAL PEINCIPLES OF LOCKE. 279 

in the shape of knowledge. Whether we deal with 
facts, experiments, or observations, we never get beyond 
the sphere of reason. As the author observes, " If 
general knowledge consists in a perception of the 
agreement or disagreement of our own ideas, and the 
knowledge of the existence of things without us be had 
only by our senses, what room is there for the exercise 
of any other faculty but inward sense and inward per- 
ception ? What need is there for reason ? Yery much, 
both for the enlargement of our knowledge and regu- 
lating our assent ; for it has to do both in knowledge 
and opinion, and is necessary and assisting to all our 
other intellectual faculties." 

We can see from the general scope of Locke's Essay, 
that he aims at the laying down certain comprehensive 
rules for the discovery and promulgation of truth. He 
makes the distinct portion of his philosophy subser- 
vient to this end. He looked upon his own system in 
the same light as Bacon did his, as forming an entire 
and consolidated organon for the successful prosecution 
of all science and knowledge. But there was this great 
difference between these two distinguished logicians, — 
Locke engrafted his logic upon certain primary prin- 
ciples of mind, very dogmatically and pointedly en- 
forced ; whereas Bacon dealt simply with the sensible 
and material things around him, and only ventured to 
suggest admonitory cautions and maxims as to their 
arrangement, and the discovery of their causes. Locke's 
theory of human knowledge and logical truth, was 
therefore more fraught with the elements of dispute 
and misapprehension than Bacon's ; and more likely 
to give rise r when reduced to any practical bearing, to 



280 LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE. 

more diversified opinions as to its intrinsic nature and 
merits. And this is just what we find has been the 
case. The logical aim of Locke has been more severely 
and minutely criticized, and more generally misappre- 
hended and misconstrued, than that of Bacon's. The 
theory of scientific evidence maintained by the latter, 
was preserved from oscillating beyond a given point by 
the material agencies within which it was encircled ; 
but the system of Locke opened out at once a bound- 
less range of discussion and speculation, calculated to 
affect questions of the most vital character. 

A very cursory glance at the chief parts of the Essmj 
of Locke, will teach us that his logical method is pre- 
cisely the same as the inductive method which Bacon 
applied to the study of physical science. The philo- 
sophy of mind is a science of facts revealed to us by 
consciousness. This is Locke's fundamental position, 
and the basis of all his logical illustrations. His mental 
power of reflection is the instrument which corresponds 
to the artificial instruments and reproductive processes 
of the Baconian hypothesis. 

We cannot close these remarks on Locke's logical 
views without a passing word on his little tract, On the 
Conduct of the Understanding. This has occasionally 
been incorporated as a distinct chapter in his Esscaj, 
for which it was originally intended by its author. It 
is a valuable fragment. Its general scope is, to impress 
upon the youthful mind in its pursuit of knowledge 
the moral and religious obligation attending every ex- 
ercise of the judgment and understanding; and that 
every display of the logical art should be guided and 
influenced by a conscientious love of truth. This 



LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE. 281 

small essay of seventy-five octavo pages has often 
been employed as a logical text-book in some of 
our English universities. Indeed, its utility, as an 
instrument of early •philosophical education, is highly 
spoken of by Mr Hallam, whose learning, judgment, 
and candour, give at all times great weight to his 
opinions. He says, " Aristotle himself, and the whole 
of his dialectical school, had pointed out many of the 
sophisms against which we should guard our reasoning 
faculties ; but these are chiefly such as others attempt 
to put upon us in dispute. There are more dangerous 
fallacies by which we cheat ourselves — prejudice, par- 
tiality, self-interest, vanity, inattention, and indifference 
to truth. Locke, who was as exempt from these as 
almost any man who had turned his mind to so many 
subjects where their influence is to be suspected, has 
dwelt on the moral discipline of the intellect in this 
treatise better, as I conceive, than any of his predeces- 
sors." Again, "I cannot think any parent or instruc- 
tor justified in neglecting to put this little treatise in 
the hands of a boy about the time when the reasoning 
faculties become developed. It will give him a sober 
and serious, not flippant or self-conceited, independency 
of thinking ; and while it teaches how to distrust our- 
selves, and to watch those prejudices which necessarily 
grow up from one cause or another, will inspire a rea- 
sonable confidence in what he has well considered, by 
taking off a little of that deference to authority, which 
is the more to be regretted in its excess, that, like its 
cousin-german party- spirit, it is frequently united to 
loyalty of heart and the generous enthusiasm of youth."* 

* Lit. Middle Ages, vol. iii. p. 388 



282 LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE. 

The monuments of Locke's influence over the logical 
mind of Europe, are to be seen in every direction. He 
founded a school of his own, and gathered around him 
a body of ardent and intelligent disciples, in whose 
labours we recognise the sagacity and truthfulness of 
their master. His method and his principles have 
taken a deep root in the minds of men ; and though 
these, in some cases, have given rise to speculations at 
variance with the general spirit of his logical philo- 
sophy, yet, on the whole, his labours have proved highly 
serviceable in the extension of rational knowledge and 
scientific thought among the masses of mankind. 



PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 283 



CHAPTER XIII. 

THE PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY, FROM THE 
PUBLICATION OF LOCKE'S « ESSAY," TILL THE END OF THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 

The writings of Bacon, Descartes, Leibnitz, and Locke, 
were not long in making their way into all the chief 
seminaries of learning in Europe. Although viewed in 
various lights in reference to logical science, yet they 
unitedly produced a great effect upon the established 
methods of developing its rules and principles for the 
purposes of general instruction. It was now attempted 
to place logic, both in its scientific and formal relations, 
upon a more comprehensive basis — to give it a popular 
and useful direction — and to supplant that lethargic 
system of the schools which had for so long a period 
retained possession of the public mind in every country 
of Europe. 

In no part, however, of the continent was there a 
greater change effected by the writings in question 
than in Germany. We recognise the new doctrines of 
the philosophy of reasoning in almost every logical 
work of the eighteenth century. This change effected 



284 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 

the scientific more than the formal rules of logic. The 
profound thinkers of Germany turned their attention 
to the abstract principles of the ratiocinative art, with 
a view of discovering some short and certain route to 
• all knowledge, which, they conceived, must certainly 
lie embosomed in some of the forms and principles of 
the intellect itself. With this design, they turned all 
their thoughts inwardly, scrutinized every movement of 
mind and feeling, and sought to reduce the entire 
phenomena of existence to some single principle or 
general law. And so intent were they on this mode of 
proceeding, and so full of hope that their fondest wishes 
would be realized, that they plunged at once into the 
most unfathomable speculations, and gave eager chase 
to the most attenuated and nebulous forms of thought, 
in order that they might have something to boast of in 
the way of originality, if a higher object could not be 
attained. Hence it is that the philosophical logicians 
of Germany stand so conspicuously apart from, and 
have so few points of intellectual contact with, their 
brethren in every other quarter of the world. The 
German savans .philosophise to themselves, and for 
themselves. Their logical systems, viewed in their 
scientific relations, stand like colossal and unshapely 
buildings in the heart of a desert plain — monuments of 
intellectual labour, but totally unsuggestive of a single 
rational motive why they were ever conceived or con- 
structed. 

In spite, however, of their general arid and unsatis- 
factory character, there was a lofty spiritual aim in all 
the logical speculations of Germany. They had no- 
thing in them directly low and grovelling. One of the 



DESCARTES AND LEIBNITZ. 285 

most prominent elements in this spiritualism was the 
theological, which ofttimes, it must be allowed, made 
its appearance under very questionable aspects, but still 
a distinct and individual element it was of great power 
and efficiency. The religious feelings of mankind were 
clearly and forcibly demonstrated to constitute one of 
the main pillars of truth in general ; and the peculiar 
way in which this was often done, threw no small portion 
of light upon the fundamental doctrines of theology, 
considered as an embodiment of scientific truth. ]5Tot- 
withstanding, therefore, all the mystical vagaries of the 
German logicians — and they have been neither few in 
number, nor insignificant in influence — they have not 
treated theology with an open and disdainful contempt. 
They have generally acknowledged her authority and 
influence in the science of reasoning, although the 
manner they have often chosen to manifest their alle- 
giance was calculated, in the eyes of sober thinkers, to 
militate against both. 

The logical systems of Bacon and Locke did not ex- 
ercise any thing like the same degree of influence over 
the German mind as those of Descartes and Leibnitz. 
The latter, in particular, reigned for a long period with 
almost undivided sway and authority in the province of 
philosophical logic. 

We can hold out but slender hopes that what we 
shall advance on the logic of Germany, will in any de- 
gree prove intelligible to the general reader. To gain 
an insight into it, some knowledge of the metaphysics 
of the country is indispensably requisite ; but, as we 
cannot enter upon so vast a subject, he must needs 
grope his way, as he best can, through what we have to 



286 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 

state on the matter. If he can make himself in some 
measure familiar with the German mode of prosecuting 
mental science, and of the phraseology currently em- 
ployed, his case will not prove quite so hopeless and for- 
lorn. But, under the most favourable circumstances, 
it will be prudent to keep his expectations of realizing 
any great stock of useful knowledge within somewhat 
narrow bounds. 

Following Leibnitz, we have Tschirnhausen and 
Christian Thomasius : the father of the latter, Jacob 
Thomasius, author of Logica (Leipsic, 1695), had been 
the tutor of Leibnitz, and one of his most ardent ad- 
mirers, Neither Tschirnhausen nor Thomasius entered, 
however, very fully into his logical philosophy, although 
they viewed it favourably, and, to some extent, founded 
their own individual views upon it. In his Medicina 
Mentis (1696), Tschirnhausen develops some prin- 
ciples of logic with clearness and great acuteness. 
Thomasius thought logic and history the two eyes 
of all human knowledge. The abstract principle on 
which he considered all reasoning rested was this, — that 
sensation furnished the rough materials of knowledge ; 
but the reason, a faculty of a complex character, elabo- 
rated out of them all those fundamental principles 
relative to human nature which constitute what we 
term the science of man. It is a false view of truth to 
consider it as a thing relative to the intellect alone : 
it is the product of the sentiments and feelings of the 
soul, as well as of the mind, strictly so called. Hence 
all truths concerning human nature are under the di- 
rect influence and control of two distinct principles — 
intelligence and will. The entire body of scientific truth 



TSCHIRNHAUSEN, THOMASIUS, WOLFF. 287 

relative to man — as a social, moral, religious, and think- 
ing being — must always be viewed in reference to these 
two separate sources from which they flow. It is from 
not keeping this distinction before them, that logicians 
in all ages have, in the opinion of Thomasius, com- 
mitted such egregious blunders in the construction of 
their systems. 

The great logical instructor of Germany, after Leib- 
nitz, was Wolff. He devoted a long and laborious 
life to illustrating the principles of the author of the 
Pre-established Harmony, and applying them to the 
science of logic, both philosophical and formal. Wolff 
stands, even in Germany, as a striking monument of 
indefatigable application and methodical skill.* 

The Philosophia Mationalis sive Logica of Wolff has 
gone through many editions, and been moulded into 
innumerable digests and epitomes. The author de- 
fines logic to be that science which directs and guides 
our faculties to a knowledge of truth. He divides logic 
again into innate and acquired. All men reason with- 
out a knowledge of any formal rules ; but they reason 
more steadily and comprehensively from an acquaint- 
ance with logical maxims and precepts. 

In the first part of his work he treats of the leading- 
principles of logic — of notions, judgments, and reason- 
ing. In the second part, he shews the method of dis- 
tinguishing the true from the false ; how to discover 
truth ; the scheme of composing or arranging our ideas ; 
the most effective plans of communicating truth to 

* " M. Wolff a rainene les principes et les regies cle la logique a la demonstration. 
Nous n'avons rien de plus exact sur cette science que la grande logique latine de ce 
philosophe." — Encycl. Fran^ais. 



288 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 

others ; the best means of promoting general know- 
ledge ; and, lastly, how to bring the entire mass of our 
acquired information to bear upon our conduct of life. 

He makes constant appeals to the force and great 
value of geometrical reasonings ; and he conceived it 
was quite possible to introduce mathematical forms or 
symbols into argumentations on all subjects connected 
with human nature. 

In his logical work, Wolff endeavours to combine 
and classify all the chief elements of Leibnitz's philo- 
sophy, so far as they could be brought to bear on logic 
as a distinct and separate branch of study. This cir- 
cumstance has naturally circumscribed his reputation 
as an original thinker into very narrow limits. He 
makes the two great principles of the Leibnitzian 
theory — the sufficient reason and the principle of con- 
tradiction — play an important part in his logical specu- 
lations. They appeared to him to embrace doctrines 
of great utility in the art of general reasoning. 

As a key to his entire views of logic, we may refer to 
his two leading points, empirical reason and pure reason. 
The former deals with the elements or products of sen- 
sation, the latter with necessary truths. 

It was a favourite opinion of Wolff's, that all our 
reasonings could be greatly facilitated by having re- 
course to a uniform system of signs. He conceived 
that hieroglyphical emblems or figures might be so 
applied as to represent fully and forcibly all general 
notions and propositions. 

The knowledge of Wolff's logic was not confined to 
Germany alone. Deschamps made it known in France ; 
and in Sweden, and other neighbouring countries, it 



WOLFF, RUDIGER. 289 

was expounded by able writers and professors. The 
Swedish logicians, Wallachius, Brunnmark, and Kyrger, 
differed with Wolff as to the application of the sufficient 
reason to logical views, although they bore testimony to 
the general soundness and importance of his system, 
taken as a whole. There were also some ardent ad- 
mirers of the logic of Wolff in the Low Countries, in 
Poland, and in Italy. 

The admirers and opponents of Wolff in his own 
country were numerous and respectable, both in point 
of talent and reputation. The logical portion of his 
writings was variously contemplated, as it happened to 
agree with, or militate against, some favourite meta- 
physical or theological theory. As the religious and 
mental philosophy of the country became more varied 
in its character and aim, and foreign elements of specu- 
lation became likewise more generally known and cul- 
tivated, there arose a greater diversity of opinion as to 
all logical systems and modes of tuition among the 
active and leading spirits of Germany. We find every 
where fragments of all sorts of theories, and often very 
capriciously and fantastically tacked together. We 
find some favourite theme of Locke dovetailed into 
another of Leibnitz, and an aphorism of Bacon paying 
homage to Descartes or Spinoza. Still, amid all this 
apparent variety and contradiction, logic preserved its 
German physiognomy and unity. It retained its 
transcendental type, and the grand distinction between 
empirical and pure reason was steadily kept in view. 

Andrew Eudiger was the contemporary of Wolff, 
and opposed to many of his logical views. In his 



290 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 

Philosophia Synthetica (1707) and other works, he 
argues strenuously and forcibly for the great impor- 
tance of logical science. He entertained an idea, that 
the chief source of all error was fairly traceable to the 
imperfect and one-sided treatises on the subject which 
commonly fell into the hands of young students. Being 
of a captious and fastidious turn, he was led to search 
for imperfections more among the forms than the prin- 
ciples of dialectics ; and this induced him to make so 
many divisions and technical alterations in his logical 
works, that his readers were more perplexed than bene- 
fited by his labours. Yet his views were generally 
sound, and of a decided and enlightened eclectic cha- 
racter. Against the application of mathematical forms 
and reasonings to other branches of knowledge he 
raised his voice, and boldly maintained that such a 
course, if carried out to its legitimate results, would 
prove subversive of all sound and useful knowledge. 

The learned Budeus was hostile to the leading 
speculations interspersed throughout the logic of Wolff, 
and particularly to his application of the doctrines of 
the pre-established harmony, and the principle of con- 
tradiction. In his work, JBedenken ilber die Woljffianische 
Philosophic, he charges Wolff with undermining the 
orthodoxy of his students, by the introduction into his 
scheme of public tuition of the elements of heresy and 
infidelity. Syrbius was a logician of independent mind, 
and seemed always under the active influence of a sin- 
cere love of truth, although he was a little wayward 
and mystical. He thought that a knowledge of the 
mental faculties was indispensable to every mode of 
conducting regular and systematic logical studies, but 



CRUSIUS, D ARIES, ETC. 291 

that this knowledge should be as free from theoretical 
bias as possible. 

Crusms thought the principle of contradiction not of 
so much importance in philosophical logic as Leibnitz 
and his followers conceived it to be. He confined its 
application solely to mathematics. He thought there 
was another principle of much more utility and influ- 
ence in all our reasonings on matters connected with 
our internal constitution. — namely, the impossibility of 
conceiving certain things otherwise than true. There 
were two portions of this principle — incompatibility and 
inseparability ; and these lay at the basis of many of 
our most important conclusions relative to moral and 
metaphysical truths. Gottsched was an admirer of the 
logical principles of Locke, who, he conceived, had 
done especial service to the general cause of truth and 
rational knowledge. He departed, nevertheless, from 
some of the leading maxims of the English philosopher 
— particularly by giving a conspicuous station to the 
principle of contradiction and sufficient reason. Accord- 
ing to Gottsched, reasoning, in all its higher and more 
lofty manifestations, is a complex operation, calling 
into activity nearly every power or faculty of the intel- 
lect. Sensation, perception, attention, and abstraction, 
form inseparable ingredients in every judgment or 
conclusion of the understanding. 

Daries, professor of logic at Jena, in his Via ad 
Veritatem (1740) entered profoundly into the prin- 
ciples of logical philosophy. His lectures created a 
lively interest throughout many parts of Germany. 
He was an admirer of Wolff to some extent ; and for 
Descartes and Leibnitz he entertained an enthusiastic 



2.92 PROGRESS OP LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 

veneration. Locke and Bacon were likewise familiar 
to him. In his logical labours he paid great attention 
to the rules of definition. He remarks, in reference to 
the introduction of new terms into speculative subjects, 
that, in the progress of language, words become often 
less expressive and significant, and seldom convey at 
once a clear view of a subject, and a logically connected 
abstract of it. Hence arise so often an apparent ne- 
cessity for creating a new scientific terminology. But 
on all sciences founded on human nature, this expe- 
dient only removes the immediate and more pressing 
impediments, without solving the real difficulty. In- 
deed, novel words and phrases introduce new difficulties. 
Their coinage may be unlucky ; their acceptation is 
always tardy ; their powers of verbal combination are 
very limited; and the necessity of learning a new 
language, in order to understand some new view of 
an old science, renders to most persons that science 
unpalatable. 

Daries likewise treats of induction, and of the mode 
the mind follows in arriving at truths from this source. 
He discusses the nature of philosophical theories, and 
endeavours to account for them in this manner : — In 
the investigation of any subject, however limited, where 
a train of reasoning is required, the mind instinctively 
or intuitively forms to itself some theory or general 
conception under which the facts or things under con- 
sideration are to be arranged ; and then, in the second 
place, it does not rest satisfied with this, but is invariably 
inquisitive relative to the final cause of every event or 
occurrence. The intellect in all reasoning is thus in- 
fluenced by two separate powers, which, when exten- 



SCHLETEWEIN, RENSCH, PLOUCQUET, ETC. 293 

sively cultivated and developed, are the impelling 
motives to that spirit of theorizing so visibly imprinted 
on the mental history of mankind, and which is the 
prolific source of all scientific arrangement and inves- 
tigation. Man, in his search after truth, deals there- 
fore at the outset with a priori principles or conceptions, 
and reasons downwards to particular things. Were 
this not the case, science, properly so called, would, 
according to Daries, be impossible. 

Schletewein of Jena, and Holhnann of Grottingen, 
both attempted to popularize the study of logic, by 
freeing it from unnecessary and cumbrous terms and 
divisions. Augustus F. Muller made the science a 
somewhat material and formal thing, founding it upon 
pure sensation, or the products of the senses. The 
logic of Eeimarus, published at Hamburg and Kiel in 
1756, became very popular throughout Germany. It 
is characterised by clearness of statement, and its 
moral and religious tendency. 

Eeusch was a logician whose views were chiefly taken 
from Leibnitz and Locke. The faculties of sensation 
and reflection of the latter, were mingled with the prin- 
ciple of contradiction and the sufficient reason of the 
former. His Sy sterna Logicum (1741), obtained con- 
siderable reputation for many years after its first 
publication. Walch resolves all logical science into 
experience. Every thing must result from observa- 
tion. No truth can stand apart from it. Sensation 
and sentiment are the foundations of all human rea- 
sonings. 

Ploucquet, in his Methodus Calculandi in Logicis 
(1764), and other works, laboured hard to introduce 



294 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 

new elements into the science of logic. His great aim 
was to reduce all human knowledge to one or two 
simple principles or rules, and to establish upon these 
a logical method which would, mechanically as it were, 
convey knowledge on every branch of science with in- 
fallible certainty and great expedition. Reasoning 
was to be reduced to its simple elements, and, by means 
of algebraical signs, rendered a matter of pure calcula- 
tion. Logic was only, according to Ploucquet, the art 
of deducing by an immutable rule the known from the 
unknown, and this is amply sufficient for the explana- 
tion of every department of human inquiry. He re- 
duces all judgments on facts or experience to identical 
propositions, by the aid of the principle of sufficient 
reason* 

John Henry Lambert was a philosophical logician of 
distinguished eminence. He was a native of Alsace, 
and published his Novum Organum in 1763. The 
logical principles he advances are chiefly taken from 
Leibnitz, Wolff, Locke, and Bacon. He was of opinion 
that mathematical reasoning was susceptible of appli- 
cation to every subject of human knowledge. It was 
this notion which induced him to lay so much stress 
upon verbal and technical terms and classifications. 

In several of the logical works we have just enume- 
rated, and in others we have not particularly specified, 
there is an element of speculation which is entitled to 
a passing notice. Some logicians talk of reason, and 
the reasoning faculty, as a power rather than an intel- 
ligence ; as something which produces an effect without 
having any appreciable consciousness of its doing so. 

* Method., S§ 10. 18, 104. 



KANT. 295 

The peculiar nature of German philosophy leads the 
minds of its cultivators to this mode of thinking and 
writing. The constant dwelling on the subjective ele- 
ment, and considering it in all its totality, induce the 
mind to impart a sort of materiality to it, and to 
assimilate its workings to those of objective agencies 
or powers. But truth is, in all its phases, necessarily 
allied to intelligence; and this intelligence is itself 
under the influence of the active and voluntary powers 
of the individual. Eeasoning is not, therefore, a gene- 
ral and blind energy or impulse, directed to a particular 
end, and guided by nothing higher nor extrinsic to 
itself. Under no conceivable circumstances can we 
form a notion of truth as belonging to any thing or 
quality whatever, as being purely the result of any such 
impersonal and fortuitous energy or power. 

The general scope of the logical speculations of 
which we have attempted to give a mere sketch, gra- 
dually prepared the way for the introduction of Kant's 
system — a system which has imparted to the logical 
philosophy of Germany a peculiar and interesting 
character. His views on logic, strictly so termed, are, 
however, so intimately connected with his entire theory 
of metaphysical science, that it is next to impossible to 
discuss his hypothesis of reasoning without offering 
some short notice of his speculations on mental science. 

Kant asked himself the question, Is human know- 
ledge composed solely of elements furnished by expe- 
rience? He answered this in the negative. He 
maintained that we have certain notions altogether 
independent of sensation, and which are the product 
of the understanding itself. And, in the first place, 



296 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 

he noticed the mathematical sciences, which are ground- 
ed on notions of this stamp. He maintained that the 
judgment we form, that the radii of a circle are all 
equal to one another, is not the fruit of experience, 
but is something permanent, necessary, and universal ; 
whereas experience deals with nothing but particular 
facts. There are therefore cognitions of an a priori cast, 
entirely distinct from any sensible element. Kant ex- 
tended his inquiries into our other notions relative to 
the constitution of human nature, and he likewise form- 
ed judgments here of the same a priori character, and 
subject in their application to the same conditions and 
limits which mark all truths of a mathematical kind. 

There are thus, therefore, two sorts of judgments. 
In the one the attribute or predicate is contained in 
the subject, as, for example, an infinitely perfect being is 
good. This judgment does nothing, however, but de- 
velop a notion, without adding to it any other notion, 
and in this point of view does not enlarge the circle of 
our knowledge. Such judgments Kant termed ana- 
lytical judgments. The second kind of judgments are 
those in which the attribute is not contained in the 
subject, as, every phenomenon has a principle or cause. 
This principle or cause is not contained in the simple 
notion of phenomenon. Judgments of description in-, 
crease our knowledge, inasmuch as they consist in an 
affirmation or statement of something not comprised in 
the bare conception of the subject. This second class 
of judgments Kant terms synthetic ones. 

Having now obtained two species of judgments, the 
analytical and synthetical, it became necessary to shew 
how they mutually co-operated to produce that which 



KANT. 297 

we call human knowledge. This is the problem he 
undertook, in his metaphysical system, to solve. His 
speculations to this end are divided into three principal 
branches ; the criticism of theoretical reason ; the criticism 
of pure reason ; and the criticism of another mode of rea- 
son, whose office or nature is to establish the harmony or 
alliance of the theoretical and practical reason. 

Leaving the reader, now, to other sources of infor- 
mation on these abstruse points, we come to state the 
categories of Kant, which form the groundwork of all 
his logical speculations. These he reduces to four ; 
and he affirms they contain all the several judgments 
which the human mind can form — 

First — Quantity, \ \\ 

i-ii < Plurality, 

which embraces, j . J 

( Universality, 

Second — Quality, \ ea 1 7* 
i-ii < -Negation, 

which embraces, j . 6 . 

(^ Limitation. 

Third-KELATiON, ( Substance and Accident, 

which embraces, 1 Causality and Dependence. 
( Action and Eeaction. 

Fourth-MoDALiTY, ( Possibility Impossibility. 

i-ii < Existence, .Non-existence, 

which embraces, ) . ' 

( Necessity, Contingency. 

These categories are not the result of experience; 
they are solely the universal and necessary laws of the 
understanding. All our notions fall within them, and 
they are the forms of the intellect, as time and space 
are the forms of our sensibility. 

The particular treatise which goes under the deno- 



298 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 

mination of Logic, was a posthumous work of Kant's. 
It is necessary we should see what notions he enter- 
tains of the nature and province of logic. He affirms 
that we can neither think, nor make use of our under- 
standings, otherwise than in accordance with certain 
rules. All these rules are either necessary or contin- 
gent. The former embrace those without which no 
use of the understanding would be possible ; the latter, 
those without which a certain determinate use of it 
would not take place. When we reflect inwardly, we 
discover those rules of the understanding which are 
absolutely necessary in every respect, and without 
regard to any specific objects of thinking, because, 
without them, we could not think at all. Hence we 
have an a priori knowledge of them ; because they com- 
prise, without any reference to external objects, merely 
the condition of the use of the understanding generally, 
whether relative to matters of pure reason or of expe- 
rience. Hence it is that all necessary and universal 
rules of thinking must relate to the form of the mind, 
and not to the matter. Logic is, therefore, the science 
of the necessary -laws of the understanding and of the 
reason, or the mere form of thinking generally. Logic 
is to be considered as the foundation of all other 
sciences, but it is not an organon of the sciences. An 
organon presupposes an exact knowledge of the sciences 
— of their objects and their sources. The mathema- 
tics, for instance, is a science which comprises the ground 
of extending our knowledge in certain other directions, 
and on this account may fitly enough be termed an 
organon. But logic is but the use of the rules of the 
understanding, and cannot go into the sciences, and 



KANT. 299 

anticipate their matter. It is not for enlarging, but 
solely for judging and regulating our knowledge. It is 
simply a canon of the understanding and the reason, 
and must not borrow principles, either from science 
or experience ; it must comprehend nothing save its 
a priori laws, which necessarily appertain to the under- 
standing itself. 

Those logicians, therefore, who amalgamate psycho- 
logical principles with logic, act erroneously. This 
mode of inquiry leads but to a knowledge of contin- 
gent laws ; whereas in logic the inquiry is not after 
contingent, but necessary rules — how we think, but not 
how we are to think. It is to teach us the right use 
of the understanding, as the use is in perfect agreement 
or harmony with itself. 

Logic is a demonstrative science, for it is occupied 
with the empirical use of the understanding and of 
reason ; and about the universal and necessary laws of 
thought, which depend upon a priori principles, and 
from which all its rules can be derived, and proved to 
be those to which all cognitions of the reason must be 
conformable. 

Universal logic is to be distinguished from transcen- 
dental logic. The latter represents an object as the 
naked product of the understanding ; whereas universal 
logic extends to all objects in general. 

Logic is divided by Kant into the analytic and the 
dialectic. The analytic discovers all the operations of 
reason which we perform in the act of thinking in gene- 
ral. It is the analysis of the forms of the understand- 
ing and of reason, and justly styled the logic of truth. 
The dialectic is the logic of appearances, and arises 



300 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 

from the abuse of the analytic, and was the foundation 
in former times of the mere art of formal disputation. 
The ordinary division of logic into popular and scien- 
tific, Kant considers unjustifiable. Natural logic is 
not logic, but simply an anthropological science, which 
deals with the natural use of the understanding, and 
which has only empirical principles to rest upon. 
Scientific logic, comprising the universal rules of 
thinking, is that alone which deserves the name of 
logic. 

The division of logic into theoretical and practical is 
likewise wrong. Universal logic, considered as a canon 
of the understanding, and abstracted from all objects, 
is not susceptible of any practical application. The 
same objections lie against the common division of 
pure, and applied or mixed logic. The latter is not 
entitled to be called logic at all. It is mere psychology, 
whose object is to consider how our thinking is usually 
carried on, not how it must go on. Neither, according 
to Kant, can the division of logic into common and 
speculative be sustained. He likewise says that 
common sense can be no foundation of logical science ; 
because this sense is the faculty of knowing the rules of 
thinking in the concrete, whereas logic must be a 
science which embraces the rules of thinking in the 
abstract. 

Kant enters upon the discussion as to the nature of 
truth. The question, What is truth ? relates, he says, 
to two distinct things, — to that which is without us, 
and to that which is within us ; or, technically, to ob- 
jective and subjective materials. With respect to the 
first, the objective materials, they can furnish us with 



KANT. 301 

no criterion of truth ; but the subjective materials can 
furnish such a criterion. A universal criterion of truth 
from objects around is not possible ; because it would 
be impossible to embrace all the modes in which objects 
differ from one another, even if we could know all the 
objects themselves. But a subjective criterion is pos- 
sible, because truth from this source consists entirely 
in the agreement of the act of thinking with itself. The 
universal criteria of formal truth are consequently 
nothing but universal logical marks of the agreement 
of cognition with itself, or with the invariable laws of 
the understanding and of the reason. 

All formal universal criteria, though they cannot 
constitute objective truth, are to be considered as its 
conditio sine qua non. 

The formal criteria of logical truth are, — 1st, The 
proposition of contradiction ; and, 2d, That of sufficient 
reason. The first determines the logical possibility of 
a cognition, and the latter the logical reality. 

There are three principles connected with the criteria 
of formal truth, — 1st, The principle of contradiction 
and of identity, which determines for problematical 
judgments the internal possibility of a cognition ; 2nd, 
The principle of sufficient reason, on which the logical 
reality of an act of thinking depends, as forming matter 
for assertive judgments ; and, 3d, The principle of the 
exclusive third Qprincipium exclusi medii inter dua con- 
tradictor ici), in which the logical necessity of a cogni- 
tion is founded. 

The distinction between theoretical and practical 
cognition or thinking is this : — Practical cognitions are, 
— -1st, Imperatives, and opposed to theoretical cogni- 



302 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 

tions ; and, 2nd, The grounds to possible imperatives ; 
and, in this point of view, opposed to all speculative 
thinking. Every imperative proposition expresses or 
implies a possible freedom of action by which a certain 
end is to be realized. Theoretical cognitions are such 
as express, not what must be, or ought to be, but what 
really is ; consequently they refer not to acting, but to 
being or existence. It is the nature of the practical, 
however, to absorb all the theoretical ; for the absolute 
value of all thinking is to be estimated from its prac- 
tical results. And it must be borne in mind here, that 
the practical reason, as unfolded in Kant's entire system 
of philosophy, contains four doctrines — the liberty 
of the will, the obligation to virtue, our existence in 
a future state, and our responsibility to a supreme 
Creator or Governor of the universe. 

These general principles, and others of a like philo- 
sophical character — respecting the nature of belief, 
probable and mathematic evidence, cause and effect, 
&c. &c. — are given as an introduction to the study of 
logic proper, which consists of two parts. The first 
contains the General Doctrine of Elements ; and the 
second, the General Doctrine of Method. 

The first item in the elements of logic are conceptions. 
All cognitions or thoughts are either intuitions or con- 
ceptions. An intuition is a single, and a conception a 
universal representation. The cognition, or knowledge 
of conceptions, is termed thinking or cogitation. 

Matter and form belong to every conception. The 
object constitutes the matter of the conception, the 
universality its form. 

The origin of all logical conceptions may be traced 



KANT. 303 

to three sources, — 1st, Comparison, or the comparing 
of representations with one another relative to the 
unity of consciousness ; 2nd, Reflection, or reflecting 
how the several representations may be comprehended 
in one individual act of the consciousness ; 3d, Ab- 
straction, or the separation of all that by which any 
given number of representations are distinguished from 
one another. 

The sphere of our conceptions is in a direct ratio 
with the number of things which come under our con- 
sideration and reflection. 

The universal rules relative to the subordination of 
our conceptions are, — 1st, Whatever agrees with, or is 
repugnant to, the superior conceptions, likewise agrees 
with, or is repugnant to, all the inferior ones which are 
contained under them ; and 2nd, Conversely, whatever 
agrees with, or is repugnant to, all inferior conceptions, 
likewise agrees with, or is repugnant to, their superior 
ones. 

A. judgment, according to Kant, is the representation 
of the unity of the consciousness of various represen- 
tations, or the representation of their relation, provided 
they make up a conception. Matter and form belong 
to every judgment as its constituent elements. Logic 
cannot occupy itself with the matter, but only with the 
form of conceptions. All the logical forms of judg- 
ments are comprehended under the four categories — 
Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. 

The syllogism is treated of in the third section of the 
first part ; and Kant's discussion of the subject does 
not differ in any material point from our common 
treatises on syllogistic rules. Syllogising, he tells us, 



304 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 

is that function of thinking by which one judgment is 
derived from another. 

In the second part of Kant's logic, which treats of 
Method, he observes that all thinking or knowledge, 
considered as a whole, must be conformable to some 
general rules. These rules relate either to manner, 
which is free, or to method, which is co-active. 

All thinking, in its scientific relations, must be 
arranged according to some method. All science re- 
quires a systematical cognition, regulated by digested 
rules. Logical method has to treat of the form of a 
science, or of the way of proceeding, in order to connect 
the varied cognitions of any particular department of 
knowledge. All methods should be characterised by 
distinctness, profundity, systematical order, and com- 
prehensiveness. 

Method is divided by Kant into several kinds, as 
the following — the scientific or popular method; the 
systematical or fragmentary method; the analytic or 
synthetic method ; the syllogistic or tabellary method ; 
the acroamatic or erotematic method ; and meditation, 
by which is understood, reflection or methodical 
thinking. 

The general doctrines implied and set forth, both in 
Kant's philosophical and formal logic, may be summed 
up as follows. 

What we denominate human knowledge, taken in its 
widest extent, is composed of two elements ; the expe- 
rimental, or a posteriori element, and the pure reason 
element, or that derived from an a priori source. If the 
intelligence or reason did not apply its forms to the 
intuitions furnished from sensation, these intuitions 



KANT. 305 

could never become cognitions, or objects of thinking. 
They would be lifeless and abortive. On the other 
hand, these forms of the understanding would be with- 
out any signiflcancy were they to stand alone, without 
the intuitions which the senses furnish. To consti- 
tute real knowledge, there must be here an action and 
reaction of one element on the other. 

All the notions of the pure reason are destitute of 
objective reality, and this arises from the reason not 
acting upon the intuitions of sense, but only on the 
forms of the judgments which the intellect produces. 

In attributing to these notions of the pure reason 
an objective reality, we act erroneously, because we are 
straining to comprehend existences which are beyond 
the sphere of the sensible world. The limits of our 
knowledge are the limits of our experience. 

We likewise act erroneously when, instead of em- 
ploying the notions furnished by the pure reason in 
arranging and systematizing our judgments, we apply 
them immediately to the results of experience. This 
mode of inquiry gives rise to the antinomies, which are 
a series of judgments terminating in contradictory or 
inconceivable results. These antinomies are placed as 
sentinels, as it were, to apprise the philosophic inquirer 
that all such modes of proceeding as give rise to them 
are decidedlv erroneous and vicious. 

What we term the laws of nature are nothing but 
the laws of our own intelligence. We impose the laws 
of our mind upon nature. The order which we attri- 
bute to the operations of nature, are at bottom only the 
order of our intellectual perceptions, determined by the 
fundamental forms of the understanding. 

u 



306 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GERMANY. 

The logical principles of Kant, which more immedi- 
ately sprang out of his Critic of Pure Reason, created 
a lively sensation, not only throughout the author's 
own country, but, to some extent, in other European 
states. It roused the spirit of inquiry, and was the 
prolific parent of that huge mass of German speculation, 
which has astonished and perplexed the philosophic 
minds of men wherever it has been heard of and studied. 

Reinhold, in his Versuch einer Kritik der Logik, 
founded logical science on the representative faculty, 
which is a modification of the pure reason of Kant. 
There are six rules in reference to philosophical logic 
which it is of great importance to keep in view, — 1st, 
All elementary truths should be immediately perceived ; 
2d, Every fundamental truth should have an existence 
of all knowledge from experience ; 3d, This funda- 
mental truth should be simply the expression of a fact ; 
4th, It ought to be recognised by all men; 5th, It 
must be entirely separated from sensation ; and, 6th, 
It ought, however, to appertain, in a certain logical 
manner, to all experience and to all our thoughts. 

Abicht, in his Verbesserte Logik oder Wahrheits- 
Wissenschaft (1795), defines logic to be simply the 
perception of truth. Three questions are embodied in 
all reasoning, — 1st, What is the surest and most direct 
road to knowledge? 2nd, What is the criterion of 
truth ? and, 3d, What is the best mode of communicat- 
ing truth and science to others ? Salomon Maimon 
attacked the categories of Kant in his Die Kategorien 
des Aristoteles (1794), on the general ground that no 
objective reality could be inferred from them. Jacob 
Sigismond Beck published his Lehrbuch der Logik in 



PLATTFEK, ANCILLON, ETC. 307 

1796, which contains some remarks on the logical 
principles involved in the Pure Reason of Kant. 

Plattner was a distinguished logician who followed 
in the wake of Kant. He took an enlightened and 
comprehensive view of logical truth. And the same 
remark is applicable, to a certain extent^-toL the logical 
speculations of Eberhard, Tetens, Schaumann, and 
Maass. 

In the Transactions of the Berlin Academy, estab- 
lished in 1700, and which enjoyed for many years an 
European reputation in matters of speculative science, 
many interesting papers on logical topics will be found 
— chiefly from the pens of Formey, Begnelin, Beausobre, 
Merian, Maupertuis, Boyer, and Ancillon. 



308 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN FRANCE. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN FRANCE, FROM THE 
PUBLICATION OF LOCKE'S "ESSAY" TILL THE END OF THE 
. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 

The historical aspect of logic in France, in its scientific 
relations, from the time of Locke till the termination 
of the last century, is altogether of a different cast from 
that which we have just noticed in Germany. The 
philosophic mind of France had little constitutional 
relish for abstruse systems. It preferred something 
palpable, clear, definite, and material. Bacon, Locke, 
and Gassendi, had more charms for the French logi- 
cians than Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant. Hence it 
is that, speaking generally, the current of logical philo- 
sophy chiefly ran, during the period of which we are 
now speaking, in the channel which the three first- 
named philosophers opened out for the prosecution and 
development of scientific truth. Here and there we 
recognise the logical influence of Descartes and Leib- 
nitz ; but it has only been within the last half century 
that the French have manifested a lively interest in 
these two distinguished men. 

The logical works of the French writers, in this 



PROGEESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN FEANCE. 309 

century, are characterised by a vehement desire for 
analysis and simplification. They labour to reduce the 
entire reasoning powers to a single element, and to 
account for the whole mental economy by the operation 
of an individual principle. This principle was, with 
them, the result of some outward influence from ex- 
ternal bodies on our senses; and reasoning, in all its 
forms and aspects, was but the necessary or mechanical 
product of this sensational power. The laws of nature 
were invoked, attention was riveted upon them, and 
all the rational operations and sentiments of the inward 
man deduced from them. The French logicians re- 
fused to look into the intellect itself — to recognise any 
subjective element beyond the authority of sensation — 
or, if the great facts of mental consciousness were occa- 
sionally noticed or appealed to, it was only for the 
purpose of being indiscriminately buried in the mass of 
external perceptions and material agencies. This mode 
of analysing logical science necessarily led to a one- 
sided view of man and of human knowledge generally — 
increasing the objective at the expense of the subjective 
element, and thereby destroying the proper balance 
between them. The majority of French logicians never 
saw that the fundamental principles of thought were 
altogether different from the phenomena which seemed 
to suggest them. They looked upon them as pure 
abstractions — things set apart merely from the pheno- 
mena, but in no sense superior to them, or having any 
higher office to perform in the logical economy of the 
understanding. 

The early and enthusiastic reception in France of the 
logical philosophy of Locke, tended greatly to produce 



310 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN FRANCE. 

this mode of treating logic. 'Not forming a fair esti- 
mate of the general scope and design of the English 
philosopher's system, the French thinkers unfortunately 
stumbled on what was purely physical and mechanical 
in his plan, and obstinately shut their eyes against the 
intellectual and spiritual portion of his admirable trea- 
tise. They aimed at reforming and improving Locke, 
while they only mutilated and disfigured him. Their 
constitutional appetency for what was clear and pointed, 
naturally induced them to shrink from the very appear- 
ance of every thing bordering on profound reflection or 
abstract refinement ; and commentaries and abridge- 
ments of Locke, sound and clever as far as they went, 
getting once hold of the public mind, there could be 
no effective check given to the spread of misconception 
and error. Consequently, we meet with repetitions of 
his logical notions in every direction, without the 
slightest reference to any statements or explanations 
calculated to qualify and correct their import and ten- 
dency. 

There was a bold and uncompromising nominalism 
displayed in the entire logical literature of France 
within this period. Words, and words alone, were the 
things which constituted the elements of argumen- 
tation. We find it stated again and again, that it is 
the sole province of logic to regulate language. Think- 
ing is only known to us through the medium of speech ; 
and consequently, every idea in a proposition must have 
some internal or external sign to represent it. There 
is a necessary relation between the sign and the thing 
signified. The professed object of logic being to make 
us acquainted with what is going on in our minds, it is 



CROUSAZ. 311 

clear, say the French logicians, that any change made 
in the symbols we adopt to express our ideas, must 
completely alter the nature of any propositions we lay 
before the understanding of others for their compre- 
hension or guidance. Unless the different parts of 
speech are accurately arranged with regard to each 
other, no sound logical conclusion can be arrived 
at. 

This verbal hypothesis, though in strict keeping with 
the general spirit of French philosophy in the eighteenth 
century, threw logical speculations comparatively into 
the background. They became little heeded and cul- 
tivated. Man was considered only as a being possessed 
of a superior instinctive power, not differing in essence 
from other portions of the animal creation. This no- 
tion lay at the root of a great proportion of the logical 
systems and speculations current among the French 
literati. Of course, this mode of considering logic 
naturally led to narrow and degraded views of human 
nature. It was likewise dogmatic and imperious in its 
tone and spirit. Every thing which savoured of spiritu- 
ality was scouted as ridiculous and fanatical, and the 
result of an imbecile or misguided understanding. 

The Logic of M. Crousaz, professor of philosophy in 
the university of Lausanne, was for many years a popular 
work on the continent, and particularly in France. It 
is contained in three thick and closely printed volumes. 
He divides logic into two great parts — natural and 
artificial. The first leads him to treat of all the powers 
and faculties of the mind ; and the latter to the nature 
of language, the syllogism, &c. The treatise closes 
with a dissertation on method, which, he maintains, to 



312 PROGRESS OY LOGICAL SCIENCE IN FRANCE. 

be useful in logical matters, must always be full, brief 
and certain. 

The logic of Crousaz is decidedly founded upon 
Locke's views of the nature of mind generally, and the 
faculty of reasoning in particular. Gibbon, in his 
published correspondence, bears testimony to the value 
of Crousaz's labours. "The logic of Crousaz," says 
he, " had prepared me to engage with his master Locke 
and his antagonist Bayle, — of whom the former may 
be used as a bridle, and the latter applied as a spur to 
the curiosity of a young philosopher." " But what I 
esteemed most of all : from the perusal and meditation 
of De Crousaz's logic, I not only understood the prin- 
ciples of that science, but formed my mind to a habit 
of thinking and reasoning I had no idea of." 

Dumarsais's Logique is grounded on the Port-Royal 
system. It attempts to shew that the more our ideas 
are multiplied, and the more correct notions we have 
of the nature and operation of our minds, the more 
likely are we to reason, on other branches of knowledge, 
with clearness and profundity. The author conceives 
that the power of mental abstraction is one of the chief 
habits which logicians should strive to cultivate to its 
highest state of perfection, inasmuch as it is the foun- 
dation of all those conceptions we form of general truths 
and propositions. Dumarsais falls in with the common 
current of French thought in reference to the influence 
of language in reasoning, and ascribes to the proper 
adaptation of words, both in speech and writing, the 
most important logical results. He adopts the maxim 
of Leibnitz on this point, that language is the mirror of 
the understanding. 



313 

The Abbe Terrason, in his work La Philosophie de 
V Esprit, maintains that logic is not a branch of 
knowledge from which philosophy derives its essential 
rules and maxims of investigation ; on the contrary, it 
is an emanation from philosophy itself, which sheds 
its influence and power over the understanding gener- 
ally, thereby guiding the judgment to a full compre- 
hension of all the truths of science and art. 

Father Buffier, a French Jesuit, is the author of a 
work on logic which has obtained considerable cele- 
brity as well in his own country as in foreign seats of 
learning. In order, however, to comprehend accurately 
the general scope of this work, it is necessary we should 
peruse some of his philosophical dissertations, particu- 
larly those under the heads of First Truths and Meta- 
physics. His Logic is substantially a formal exposition 
of the principles entertained in these two essays. The 
end or object of logic is, the author says, to form just 
conceptions, and to reason well. For these ends, there 
must be rules for the government of the mind. Buffier 
here follows the scholastic plan, by determining the 
rules to be three — apprehension, judgment, and reason- 
ing; and though he admits the importance of other 
rules, such as relate to comparison, doubt, method, and 
the like, yet he resolves all these into the three primary 
ones laid down at the commencement of his work. 

The Logic is divided into two parts, — the first is in 
the form of letters, and the second under the arrange- 
ment of distinct articles, to the number of twenty-six. 
The syllogism is treated of in the first division, and the 
nature and origin of our ideas in the second. 

Buffier says that logic is nothing but a mass of rules 



314 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN FRANCE. 

for the ready direction of the mind in its several opera- 
tions. This is the total of all logical discussion. The 
end of logic is, whatever the intelligent mind purposes 
to accomplish. 

Whether logic be a science or an art, Father Buffier 
says, depends entirely upon the meaning attached to 
the two words science and art. If we call all true 
knowledge acquired by certain modes of reflection, or 
by rules, science, then logic is a science. Whether logic 
be an art, depends solely on the conceptions men have of 
the term, as relating to material or spiritual matters. 

The name of Father Buffier is intimately associated 
with the history of philosophical logic in France during 
this century. His peculiar views on the subject con- 
nect him with the common-sense school of logicians, 
which will be more particularly dwelt upon in a sub- 
sequent part of this volume. Suffice it to state, in 
passing, that Buffier' s work On First Truths aimed at 
shewing, that not only the ancient but even modern 
philosophers, have involved the nature and offices of the 
reasoning faculty in such abstruseness and difficulty, as 
to demand far too large a share of reflection to be com- 
prehended by men of ordinary capacity and learning. 
To simplify the matter, he endeavours " to know truths 
in their very source — to analyse those to which we 
must ascend, in order to ascertain whatever is necessary 
to be proved, and which constitute the utmost boundary 
of human inquiry— to deduce principles capable of dis- 
pelling the mist of vulgar prejudice, the perplexity of 
the schools, and the prepossessions even of certain 
learned and modish philosophers." 

In order to accomplish this desirable purpose, it was 



BUFFIEK. 315 

necessary to refer to the primary truths of common 
sense in all our logical investigations, of which the fol- 
lowing is the author's definition : " Common sense is 
that quality or disposition which nature has placed in 
all men, or evidently in the far greater number of them, 
in order to enable them all, when they have arrived at 
the age and use of reason, to form a common and uni- 
form judgment with respect to objects different from 
the internal sentiment of their own perception, and 
which judgment is not the consequence of any anterior 
principle." Burner says again, " The original source 
and first principle of every truth which we are capable 
of comprehending, is the interior sense we each of us 
have of our own existence, and which we feel within 
ourselves. This is, I say, the foundation of every other 
truth, and the basis of all human knowledge. Nothing 
else can give us a more home conviction, that the object 
of our thought is as truly existent as our thought itself; 
for the object, the thought, and the inward sense we 
have of them, are really nothing else but ourselves, who 
think, exist, and have an interior sense of those things." 
The perceptions of common sense are grounded on 
the following principles : — 

1. There are other beings and other men in the 
world besides ourselves. 

2. There is in them something that is called truth, 
wisdom, prudence; and this something is not merely 
arbitrary. 

3. There is something in ourselves which we call in- 
telligence or mind, and something which is not that 
intelligence or mind, and which is named body ; so that 
each possesses properties different from the other. 



316 PROGRESS OP LOGICAL SCIENCE IN FRANCE, 

4. What is generally said and thought by men, in all 
ages and countries of the world, is true. 

5. All men have not combined to deceive me. 

6. What is not intelligence or mind cannot produce 
all the effects of intelligence or mind ; neither can a 
fortuitous jumble of particles of matter form a work 
of such order, and such regular motion, as a watch. 

Burlier defines, as first truths, all propositions so clear 
and obvious that they can neither be proved nor refuted 
by other propositions. 

Father B-egnault, another Jesuit, followed the foot- 
steps of Buffler, in an attempt to trace the first prin- 
ciples of reasoning to their proper source. Begnault's 
work, La Logique en forme d'entretiens, ou V Art de 
tr ouver la Verite" (1742), is written in the form of 
dialogue between master and pupil, and thrown into 
the most popular form for easy comprehension. It 
enjoyed considerable reputation in France generally; 
and, among the order of ecclesiastics to whom the author 
belonged, it was for many years considered a valuable 
and indispensable manual of the science. 

Diderot, in many parts of his philosophical writings, 
reduces reasoning to a mere species of sensation. He 
says, " Every idea must necessarily, when brought to 
its state of ultimate decomposition, resolve itself into a 
sensible representation or picture ; and since every thing 
in our understanding has been introduced there by the 
channel of sensation, whatever proceeds out of the 
understanding is either chimerical, or must be able, in 
returning by the same road, to re-attach itself to its 
sensible archetype. Hence an important rule in phi- 
losophy — that every expression which cannot find an 



DIDEROT, D'ALEMBEItT. 317 

external and a sensible object to which it can thus 
establish its affinity, is destitute of signification." * Hel- 
vetius affirms, likewise, that all truths may be reduced 
to simple facts, or identical propositions ; A = B. The 
reasoning process is nothing more, he says, than the 
development of this simple law of our intellectual ex- 
istence. - )" 

In D'Alembert's Histoire de Philosophie (1760), the 
reader will find, in the fifth essay of the fourth volume, 
a dissertation on logic. It is brief, only extending to 
eight pages. But, small as it is, it contains many re- 
marks of great value and profundity. The purport 
of it is, that geometry is the only department of human 
study where vigorous demonstration can be obtained ; 
that all attempts to introduce mathematical forms of 
reasoning into subjects of human nature or theology are 
absurd; and that a rational conjecture is a legitimate 
and useful instrument in every general system of logic, 
although it is too commonly passed over by logicians 
as a matter of little moment. 

The logical doctrines of the Encyclopedic (1745), a 
work which exercised a powerful and striking influence 
over the philosophical opinions of Europe for many 
years, are contained in the articles " Logique" and 
" Syllogism." Logic is defined to be the art of think- 
ing justly, and of exercising our mental faculties in the 
best manner in the investigation and promulgation of 
truth. 

In the article " Logique," the question is raised, 
whether formal or artificial logic is in any degree 
useful for the prosecution and attainment of general 

* CEuvres, torn. vi. f (Euvres, torn. iii. p. 218. 



318 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN FRANCE. 

knowledge and science; and it is answered in the 
negative ; and the reasons given for this opinion are 
mostly a repetition of those found in Locke's Essay on 
the Human Understanding. 

In the article " Syllogism" it is affirmed, that the 
notion that the syllogistic theory was, in a great degree, 
useful to the cause of truth or real science, was one of 
the great heresies of the scholastic ages. 

The logical speculations and writings of Condillac 
made a deep and lasting impression on the scientific 
mind of France. He took Locke's Essay for his guide. 
The logical portion of his voluminous works are con- 
tained under the general head of Cours dEtude. 
Here we have the development of his logic under three 
different aspects — the Art of Reasoning, the Art of 
Thinking, and Logic. The illustrations of the Art of 
Reasoning are mostly taken from the mathematics and 
the physical sciences. The author here asserts that 
there are three grand sources of evidence on which all 
reasoning is based — the evidence of fact, the evidence 
of sentiment, and the evidence of reason. 

In the Art of Thinking, Condillac gives an account 
of the origin of our ideas of truth. As a fundamental 
principle, he lays it down that sensations constitute 
the origin of all our knowledge. He likewise treats of 
the use of signs, of analysis, synthesis, method, &c, on 
all of which topics there is much useful and interesting 
information. 

In Condillac's Logic, he conceives that all reasoning 
may be ultimately resolved into the same form and 
certainty as mathematical evidence. The mode of 
accomplishing this, would be to effect such improve- 



CONDILLAC. 319 

ments in language as to make it represent certain 
fixed and determined ideas. In this portion of his 
speculations he endeavours to mould the logical views 
of Bacon, Locke, and Descartes, into one harmonious 
and consistent code of logic, both scientific and practi- 
cal. Still, however, the entire framework of reasoning 
is never raised beyond the standard of sensational 
knowledge. " Judgment," says he, " reflection, the 
passions, in short, all the faculties of the soul, are 
nothing but sensations which transform themselves 
differently." Again, " When there is an act of double 
attention, comparison is the result ; to attend to two 
ideas, is to compare them ; the operations are identi- 
cal. We cannot, however, do this, without recognising 
either a resemblance or difference between them ; this 
recognition is to judge. The operations of comparing 
and judging are only attention ; and it is in this manner 
that sensation becomes successively, attention, com- 
parison, and judgment." 

On the character of the Logique of Condillac, the 
author of his life and writings, in the last edition of 
the Encyclopcedia Britannica, gives us the following 
opinion : — " The object of this work is to give a con- 
densed account of the principles of analysis, taken in 
the acceptation already mentioned. This process, 
he observes, is taught by nature, and is always con- 
ducted with accuracy when man is in quest of the 
means of supplying the urgent necessities of his being. 
It is when curiosity forms to him a separate order of 
objects for his gratification, that we become precipitate 
in grasping at conclusions, and embracing them with 
readiness, though not the produce of that rigorous 



320 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN FRANCE. 

exactness of method which necessarily imposes on his 
earlier pursuits. In giving an account of the origin of 
ideas and the mental faculties, he exemplifies his views 
of analysis, and at the same time prepares the way for 
further applications of the mental powers of his pupils. 
He adheres to his doctrine of the supreme and exclu- 
sive influence of language in conducting all intellectual 
pursuits. Generalization and classification are, with 
him, nothing more than the contrivance of generic 
terms. The art of reasoning is made to consist in the 
formation of an appropriate language for the different 
sciences. He considers the justness of our reasonings 
as depending on the degree of perfection of the lan- 
guages which we possess. The superior certainty of 
mathematical as compared with other knowledge, is 
ascribed by him to the superior certainty of mathema- 
tical language. Hence his favourite illustrations of the 
progress of the mind are taken from arithmetic and 
algebra. This principle is certainly carried by him to 
great excess in the framing of his general positions; 
yet we find him on other occasions recommending to 
his readers to cultivate the unbiassed study of nature, 
and to choose their words rather from the correctness 
of their application to objects as they have fallen under 
actual observation, than from having their meaning 
fixed by the unsatisfactory formality of verbal defini- 
tions. He lays down some highly useful rules for the 
prosecution of knowledge. His errors arise chiefly 
from a strained effort to give to his subject a degree 
of simplicity not adapted to its nature. Hence some 
of his maxims are more quaint than just ; but com- 
pared with the complicated systems of logic previously 



DESTUTT-TRACY. 321 

in use, that of our author formed an improvement which 
merited the grateful reception that was given to it ; and 
even at the present day. if we pardon the paradoxical 
generalities by which it is disfigured, we may profitably 
trace, in company with the author, the steps by which 
many intellectual attainments are made, and the means 
by which the process admits of being facilitated."* 

Destutt-Tracv, in the third volume of his EUmens 
ct Ideologie, treats of logic. He considers it under two 
aspects — scientific and technical. He follows the lead- 
ing principles of Condillac on the subject. He declares 
Locke's Essay to be the best logical treatise that ever 
appeared. 

Destutt-Tracy affirms that all our perceptions and 
ideas are real to us, and must be the sole foundation of 
all our reasonings. The larger treatise in his Logic is 
divided into nine chapters, but they contain no account of 
the syllogism whatever. There is prefixed to the end of 
the volume another small work taken from Hobbes, for 
the special use of students, entitled, Principes Logiques. 
In this the author alludes to the syllogism, and observes 
that it is not expressive of the entire act of reasoning. 

The theory of all truth and reasoning lies in a small 
compass — in the sensibility of our frame. We recog- 
nise four modifications of this sensibility: — 1. Those 
impressions which arise from the present action of ex- 
ternal objects on the senses. 2. Those which result 
from past action. 3. Those which give rise to relation, 
and are susceptible of comparison. And 4. Those 
impressions which arise from our wants, and which 
compel us to seek a gratification of them. The first class 

* Article Condillac. 



322 PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN FRANCE. 

of impressions gives rise to feeling simply, the second to 
memory, the third to judgment, and the fourth to will. 
This constitutes the entire man. 

We cannot refrain from noticing a small work by 
an unknown author, entitled, Principes de la Logique 
(1793), which displays an enlightened spirit, and a 
correct conception of logic, both as a science and an 
art. It is divided into two parts. In the first the 
author observes, that little or no advancement can be 
made in sound knowledge, unless we take a compre- 
hensive view of the powers of the. mind, and institute a 
rigid examination into the origin of all those primary 
principles of thought and feeling which constitute what 
we term humanity. Mere technical arrangements and 
forms of reasoning will of themselves prove useless, in 
the way of giving a decided progressive character to 
valuable and popular truths among the great bulk of 
mankind. Truth, even in matters of science, is a thing 
to be felt as well as understood ; and, unless we con- 
duct our logical operations on the broad basis of human 
nature, we run a certain risk of failing in realizing any 
increase of knowledge applicable to the great end or 
purposes of human life. There is unquestionably much 
in this study of scientific logic that is difficult and 
perplexing ; because every man is apt to look at the 
subject from his own nature. Hence arise doubt, par- 
tiality, one-sidedness, and misapprehension, But still, 
if a love of truth animates our inquiries, and guides us 
in all our conclusions, we shall soon find that a com- 
prehensive logic is one of the most direct and powerful 
instruments in elevating and improving the intellect 
of a nation. 



PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN FRANCE. 323 

In the second part of the author's volume, he goes 
into an examination of the nature of formal propo- 
sitions, and gives a short account of the rules and 
attributes of the syllogism. These he conceives are 
useful; but the mind should look beyond them, and 
only recognise their validity as a part, and not the 
whole, of the mental economy of reasoning. 



324 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN HOLLAND AND BELGIUM 



CHAPTEE XV. 

LOGICAL SCIENCE IN HOLLAND AND BELGIUM, FROM THE 
PUBLICATION OF LOCKE'S "ESSAY" TILL THE END OF THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 

In Holland and Belgium, logical speculation presents, 
during this period of history, but few materials for 
lengthened comment. Such works as appeared from 
time to time, were characterised by a serious and con- 
templative air, dwelling on the moral obligations implied 
in every art of reasoning, and looking on logic as one 
of the chief instruments for the extension of general 
information and science. These views were supported 
and strengthened by the fervid and profound religious 
feelings which generally pervaded the entire community 
of these countries. 

The opinions of Descartes and Leibnitz exercised, for 
the whole of the eighteenth century, great influence in 
this section of the European continent. The method 
of the former, and the pre-established harmony and the 
principle of contradiction of the latter, constituted the 
basis of the logical philosophy generally cultivated. 
Bacon and Locke were well known, and on many 
points highly appreciated. 

The logical treatise of Gravesande was, for many 



GRAVESANDE, LE CLERC, HULSCHOFF. 325 

years after his death, a general favourite in several of 
the most distinguished seats of learning on the con- 
tinent. He classifies our complex or general notions, 
shews the nature and use of propositions, points out the 
principle which guides the intellect in judging of pro- 
bable and necessary truths, and singles out very care- 
fully the chief sources of our errors in reasoning ; and 
lays down also many excellent rules for fixing the 
attention of students, and strengthening their memories 
and understandings. In addition to all these, he shews 
the use of analysis and synthesis, and the advantages 
to be derived from the use of theories in many depart- 
ments of human knowledge. 

o 

The Logica, sive ars Ratiocinandi of John le Clerc, 
forms the first volume of his Opera Philosophica (1722). 
He was a native of Geneva, but settled and died in 
Holland. His Logic is divided into four parts : on Ideas, 
on Judgments, on Method, and on Argumentation. It 
is an excellent work of its kind, incorporating much 
valuable philosophical thought with the common rules 
and principles of logical science. 

Allard Hulschoff was a native of Groningen, and born 
in 1734. He was the author of several works which 
discuss the leading principles of philosophical logic. 
He dissented particularly from the doctrines of Leib- 
nitz and Wolff; and maintained, in fact, that their 
several views led to scepticism and infidelity. All the 
principles of truth, and all the modes of investigating 
and promulgating it, must have a direct reference to a 
Deity. This was the fundamental maxim which Hul- - 
schoff took as his starting-point. Every portion of the 
inward man has an especial sympathy with a spiritual 



326 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN HOLLAND AND BELGIUM. 

being, whose existence and attributes form the ground- 
work of all human knowledge. 

Dion. Van de Winpersse published his Institutiones 
Logicce at Groningen in 1767. He was a professor at 
the university of that place, and afterwards at Ley den. 
His logical work had long a considerable reputation in 
Holland, and formed the text-book in many seats of 
learning. His views of logic as a science are of an 
eclectic character. About the same period Elie Luzac 
published at Groningen his Pecherches sur quelques 
Principes des Connaissances Humaines. He upholds 
the logical opinions of Leibnitz and Wolff. A few years 
later Dan. Wyttenbach wrote his Prcecepta Philosophice 
Logicce (1781), which, though of a scholastic, is of a 
judicious character. He maintained for many years an 
angry controversy with Yan Hemert on the nature of 
Kant's Pure Reason. Wyttenbach was violently op- 
posed to Kant's general system of logical truth, and 
invariably predicted that it would, before many years 
passed over, be entirely neglected and forgotten. 

Paul Yan Hemert introduced Kant's philosophical 
logic into Holland. His views of truth in its highest 
attributes are the following: — All science is distin- 
guished by four qualities — it is general, special, true, 
and necessary. Error is the result of the contracted 
nature of the human mind. The senses by themselves 
could never lead to truth. Truth lies in the reason. 
The nature of this reason Yan Hemert discusses at 
great length. He shows the objective character of our 
sensational system — what constitutes the basis of syn- 
thetic unity, the origin of analytical judgments, the 
nature and offices of analogy, of union and diversity, of 



KIKKER. 327 

matter and form, of idealism and realism, so far as they 
affect our judgments and modes of reasoning; the 
limitations of human knowledge, and its division into 
theoretical and practical. These topics are all treated 
of in reference to the great question, What is truth ? 

Johann Kinker, who was born near Amsterdam in 
1764, took a lively interest in the dissemination of 
Kant's philosophy in Holland. According to Kinker's 
notions, the mind, in its acquisition of general know- 
ledge, runs the following course : — Objects act directly 
upon it through the external senses. We then, by a 
determined inward act or process, collect a certain 
number of these perceptions together, and this collec- 
tion constitutes a conception. The mind, in like man- 
ner, combines a certain quantity of those conceptions 
under one head; and by this means reasoning and 
argumentation are produced. Propositions of every 
kind, when fully analysed, will be found to be the 
result of this simple process. 

In Belgium the principles of some of the French 
logicians gained a footing in the latter part of this cen- 
tury. The systems of Condillac and Destutt-Tracy 
were known and admired among a certain class of 
thinkers ; but in the colleges and seminaries of learn- 
ing, they never, so far as I know, formed a part of the 
general routine of logical instruction. The clergy, both 
in Belgium and Holland, kept a watchful eye over these 
French theories ; and, though unable to prevent their 
introduction altogether, they were always powerful 
enough to check their general growth and cultivation. 



328 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY AND SPAIN. 



CHAPTEK XVI. 

PROGRESS OF LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY AND SPAIN, 
FROM THE TIME OF LOCKE'S "ESSAY" TILL THE END OF 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 

From the days of Bruno, Cardan, and Campanella, 
logical and other kindred speculations on mind had 
been very little cultivated in Italy. Philosophy in 
general had been unfruitful for nearly an entire cen- 
tury. Bacon, Locke, and Grassendl, had made a partial 
impression on the reflective mind of the nation ; but 
still their respective modes of handling logical methods 
and rules had, at the commencement of the eighteenth 
century, been but'little influential on the philosophical 
literature of the country. The spirit of enlightened 
innovation was heard but here and there in a whisper ; 
a general apathy and indifference predominated in all 
the seminaries of learning ; and the deathlike stillness 
which every where prevailed, formed a striking and 
saddening contrast with the philosophical vigour and 
activity of the Italian mind of the preceding century. 

The first manifestations of what we may justly enough 
call the second or modern revival of speculation in Italy, 
were in the direction of logical philosophy. And we 



LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY AND SPAIN. 329 

here witness, what is visibly imprinted on the entire 
history of abstract literature, that the first impulse 
experienced in the several epochs of intellectual pro- 
gression has invariably assumed a dialectical character. 
This was the case in Greece. Socrates, Plato, and 
Aristotle, by their respective logical methods, gave 
order and consistency to the scattered fragments of 
human knowledge, and thereby imparted to them a 
useful and practical efficiency. The Christian system 
conferred new logical canons on the nature, importance, 
and promulgation of truth. In the various philoso- 
phical epochs of mental history, from the first intro- 
duction of this system to the time of Charlemagne, we 
find the logical element the chief innovator, and ruling 
and claiming precedence over every other. The first 
intellectual movement at the commencement of the 
middle ages, by the Arabian philosophers and the 
scholastic divines, is indicated by an inquiry into the 
nature of particular and universal ideas, and the offices 
they respectively hold in the logical economy of the 
mind. And every phase of scholastic learning, mapped 
out by the hand of the mental historian, is solely cha- 
racterised by the novel methods of philosophising, and 
the fresh rules of logical deduction, then brought con- 
spicuously before the public mind for general discussion. 
And when this lingering, though vehement conten- 
tion, on the merits and abstract nature of logical forms 
and principles, had exhausted itself, we contemplate 
with pleasure the first dawn of intellectual freedom in 
Italy, at the grand revival of letters and literature under 
the fostering care and munificence of the Medici family. 
But here, again, philosophy presents the same aspect. 



330 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY AND SPAIN. 

It was in reference to the comparative value of ancient 
logical methods and systems, that the energetic and 
active spirits of that day displayed their learning, and 
taxed their ingenuity. When the discussions in this 
direction came to a close, we are introduced to the 
important logical epoch of Bacon, whose name is im~ 
perishably imprinted on the memorials of modern 
philosophy, not for the amount of what he himself 
knew, but on account of his pointing out the path or 
logical method for the guidance and direction of those 
who might come after him. This was the crowning 
glory of the Lord of Verulam. Then after him we have 
Hobbes, Locke, Descartes, Leibnitz, — all of whom have 
become landmarks in the history of modern speculation, 
chiefly from the development of their respective plans 
of logical method, and their liberal and enlightened 
suggestions as to the most sound and efficient rules for 
the improvement and guidance of the human faculties, 
in the pursuit of general truth and science. 

And this predominance of the logical element in the 
history of human progress, presents nothing but what 
a priori reasonings would lead us to expect. Know- 
ledge of all kinds is a personal thing, and must die 
with the possessor, unless means be taken to perpetuate 
it. The disproportion between those who have a large 
share of scientific information, and those who are com- 
paratively destitute of it, and to whom it is desirable it 
should, in as ample a measure as possible, be commu- 
nicated, is, and ever must be, great and palpable. The 
inquiry, then, which every reflective mind institutes 
within itself is, How shall I be able to impart the 
knowledge I have to others ? Which is the shortest 



vico. 331 

and most effective plan of instruction ? How shall I 
gain possession of the minds of others at the least 
possible cost of time and labour? How shall I most 
surely secure myself and others from erroneous concep- 
tions of what I do wish to communicate ? How shall 
I clothe or present truth in the most engaging and 
fascinating forms ? These, and a thousand questions 
of a like nature, pass through the minds of all who are 
engaged in the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge. 
And the great object with every philosophical inquirer 
is, and ever will be, to lay his hands on such intellec- 
tual instruments as are best fitted to accomplish the 
urgent business he has in hand, of communicating what 
he knows to the minds of others. It is this necessity 
of our condition which sets us at all times in eager 
pursuit for logical methods, and which has, through the 
vicissitudes of ages, sustained that lively interest which 
mankind have felt in every scheme or plan which pro- 
mised aid to the reasoning powers or faculties of our 
nature. The moment knowledge is obtained, there is 
a strong and instinctive desire to communicate it ; and 
we set to the task of finding out those formal and 
scientific rules of thought which we conceive most 
likely to effect our purpose. This is one of the most 
conspicuous attributes of our mind, when viewed in its 
active and practical manifestations. 

This innate desire after logical methods and rules is 
strikingly illustrated in the state of Italian philosophy 
at the period we are now treating of. We have the 
illustrious Vico before us, with his Scienza Nuova, or 
New Science. He felt himself dissatisfied with all the 
logical methods that had gone before him, and was 



332 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY AND SPAIN. 

bent upon finding out, if he could, a more comprehen- 
sive and satisfactory one. It was to be a regular 
organon, to account for all knowledge, and to lead the 
mind, by short and unerring steps, to the real source of 
all our rational conceptions and judgments. Bacon, 
Locke, and Descartes, had only given a one-sided and 
partial view of the reasoning powers of man, and of the 
fundamental principles of scientific thought. But Vico 
was prepared, in his New Science, to place human 
knowledge on a solid basis. He did not invoke a pro- 
found metaphysic to effect this end. He wished to 
direct the attention of philosophers and logicians more 
to the outer world of human action and passion, than 
to refined abstract contemplation. The materials for 
his theory, he contended, were scattered around him in 
rich and varied profusion ; and it only required the 
application of some comprehensive principle to combine 
and arrange them into a consistent and harmonious 
unity. 

There are, according to Vico, two essential matters 
connected with the cultivation of all knowledge which 
it is requisite we" should know, — namely, the end or 
object of all studies, and the best means of prosecuting 
them. The grand object of all knowledge is, to refine 
and exalt human nature, and to bind us more closely 
to Deity. There are three elements of all divine and 
human science — knowledge, will, and power. The 
whole rests on intelligence ; not on a blind, unaccount- 
able, or irrational power. The eye of this intelligence 
is reason ; and the eternal flambeau of reason is Deity. 
These three elements furnish us with conceptions of 
our own personal existence, and we can in turn explain 



vice 333 

them again by the power of thought. The first prin- 
ciples of all wisdom and truth rest upon God ; denuded 
of this spiritual and immaterial conception, they are 
unintelligible.* 

In order to develop the principles of truth and cer- 
tainty, we must analyse or reduce them to their ori- 
ginal elements, which are, — 1st, Human manners and 
customs, and social and civil institutions ; and, 2d, 
Language, which is the key to the human understanding. 
It is from these that the primary principles of a com- 
prehensive logic can be revealed to our minds. Let 
us look into man as he is portrayed in his aggregate 
union with his kindred, and we shall be sure to find all 
those general ideas on which human science rests.f 

" Logical philosophy," says Vico, " contemplates 
reason, and forms the science of truth. Philology, or 
language, recognises the authority of human judg- 
ments, and this creates the consciousness of conviction. 
Logicians and grammarians deceive themselves if they 
neglect to give mutual aid to each other. The inten- 
tion of our being is, that there should be a mutual 
reaction between them. Human judgment, uncertain 
in its nature and conclusions, obtains by their union 
the infallible sanction of common sense in matters of 
urgency and utility. This common sense, the guide of 
the argumentative powers of men, is an unreflecting 
judgment, which is felt, or rather formed, by a com- 
munity, a people, a nation, and, in fact, by all mankind. 
Uniform ideas, under the guidance of uniform logical 
principles, created among an entire people who have no 

* Del Metodo, t. 2. + Scienza Nuova, pp. 10, 15, 60. 



334 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY AND SPAIN. 

individual knowledge of each other, must be stamped 
with the seal of truth."* 

The foundation of all logical science, when brought 
to the test of practice, is to be found, says Yico, in 
method. It must embody the formal processes of 
thought, as well as universal ideas of science or truth. 
In order, however, to enable us to fix on true scientific 
methods, we should endeavour to form right conceptions 
of the end or purpose which every chain of reasoning 
is intended to accomplish. A desire to know the truth 
is indispensable to finding it. We should bear in mind 
that all true science or wisdom perfects the understand- 
ing and regulates the conduct. The most momentous 
of all kinds of knowledge is that which relates to Deity ; 
and the rule which should guide our faculties in the 
pursuit of truth is, that we select only those things 
for logical inquiry which are fitted to produce the 
greatest amount of good to mankind.")" 

G-enovesi was a distinguished logician, and introduced 
into Italy a knowledge of the writings of Locke and 
Leibnitz, and likewise the logical systems of Tschirn- 
hausen, Christian" Thomasius, Wolff, and Rudiger. His 
works are, Elemental Artis Logico-Criticce (1767)? and 
Delia Logica (1799). 

Genovesi's logic is founded on a psychological view 
of the mind. He points out three formidable obstruc- 
tions to sound knowledge, which he calls maladies of 
intellect, with the object of pointing out the means by 
which they may be removed. He distinguishes four 
kinds or sorts of ignorance — the want of notions or 

* Del Metodo, t. 3. Paris, 1844. t Ibid., t, 2. 



GENOVESI. 335 

ideas ; a want of the power of conception ; our in- 
capacity of recognising the relations of one thing to 
another ; and the want of perceiving the relation of 
ideas to a common end or object. There are likewise 
four species of erroneous judgments : in our primary 
conceptions or general notions ; in our conclusions ; in 
our trains of reasoning ; and in our method. He 
attributes errors to three sources, — those which arise 
from the mind itself; those which relate to material 
substances ; and those which spring from the influence 
of external agencies generally. 

All knowledge is referred by Genovesi to four pri- 
mary principles — consciousness, sensation, testimony, 
and reasoning. Our various ideas or conceptions may 
be all arranged, for logical purposes, under four heads, 
according to the way or manner in which we consider 
them, — 1st, Whether considered relatively to their 
origin ; 2d, Relatively to themselves ; 3d, In relation to 
the objects they represent ; and, 4th, According to the 
way or mode in which they may be represented to us. 

Under the first point of view, ideas are adventitious, 
fictitious, and natural. Adventitious ideas are those 
arising from sensation, from material bodies, their diffe- 
rent qualities, forms, and modes of action. Fictitious 
ideas are formed in our understandings from similitude, 
proportion, association, abstraction, and deduction. 
Natural ideas, which some call innate, constitute the 
foundation of the conceptions we have of our own 
existence, all the internal phenomena of the thinking 
principle, and the notions we have of truth, justice, 
right, intelligence, and the like. 

Ideas under the second general aspect are intelligible 



336 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY AND SPAIN. 

or sensible, simple or compound. Under the third 
aspect they are positive or negative, adequate or in- 
adequate, singular or universal, absolute or relative, 
abstract or concrete, real or chimerical. Ideas under 
the last aspect are either clear or obscure, distinct or 
confused. 

Every system of logic, G-enovesi conceives, ought to 
be based on a knowledge of the power or faculties of 
the mind. 

The nature of truth and its criterium are discussed 
at considerable length. There are four kinds of it, — 
moral, natural, metaphysical, and logical. His general 
opinion is, that every department of human knowledge 
has a peculiar species of evidence belonging to itself. 
There is, for example, the criterium of reasoning ap- 
plied to all the abstract sciences ; physical certainty to 
all matters belonging to natural history and philo- 
sophy ; and moral evidence to whatever relates to 
human nature. 

The following observations are from the pen of a 
modern Italian author on the merits of Genovesi as a 
philosophical logician : — " Few can lay juster claims to 
the title of a reformer of Italian philosophy than 
Genovesi, who not only made it known to, but re- 
spected by, the learned of other countries. He knew 
how to enrich it with sound logical strictures, profound 
metaphysical discussions, and correct moral reflections. 
However numerous and distinguished the philosophers 
who have trodden the same path before him, or who 
have anxiously endeavoured, by profound meditations 
and sound maxims, to assist the mind to think closely 
and clearly (and Bacon, Malebranche, Locke, Wolff, 



SCARELLA, BALDINOTTI, ETC. 337 

and others, have almost exhausted every thing which 
could be said upon the subject), still Genovesi knew 
how to embellish his subject with original speculations 
and remarks, and to furnish his readers with a system 
of logic, not only full and complete for philosophical 
purposes, but highly useful to private individuals, and 
for the purposes of civil society." * 

The JElementa Logicce (1762) of J. B. Scarella is a 
work of merit, considered as a popular manual of logic. 
It is founded on a knowledge of the mental faculties, 
and is eclectic in its character ; the author having 
culled out whatever he thought useful from the writings 
of Descartes, Locke, and Leibnitz. Scarella's theo- 
retical view of logical science rested upon two principles 
— that the senses furnish one set of truths, and the 
mind, from its own internal resources, another. J. 
Gualberto de Saria, in his Rationalis Philosophice In- 
stitutiones, illustrated the logical principles of Genovesi 
with great eclat at Pisa, and other cities in Italy, His 
labours are chiefly directed to the laying down useful and 
general rules for the government of the understanding 
in its prosecution of science. Claude Fromond wrote 
a work entitled Delia Logica (1762), in which he 
attempted, and with considerable success, to popularise 
logic, by stripping it of many of those formal techni- 
calities and minute divisions which the scholastic times 
had imposed upon it. His own terminology is often, 
however, more troublesome and perplexing than the 
old language he has displaced. 

Baldinotti was a philosophical logician of distinction 
and note. In his De Recta Mentis Institutione (1787), 

* D. Jxien. Andres. Venice, 1800. 
Y 



338 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY AND SPAIN. 

he lays down the general principles of a comprehensive 
logical system, embracing human knowledge in its 
totality. Though every system of this kind must rest 
on mental philosophy, yet the application of all the 
general rules of a philosophical logic must be illustrated 
from the models of thought and wisdom which posterity 
has left us, and the actual discoveries in science which 
history records. A successful prosecution of truth lies 
more in the mode of treating it than is commonly 
imagined. Scientific knowledge must be prosecuted in 
a given way and manner : we must bring the mind to 
grasp many principles and objects at one and the same 
time, to view them in all their varied relations to each 
other, and then to draw the lessons they are fitted to 
impart with logical precision and fidelity. A philo- 
sophical spirit is a spirit which regulates itself by means 
of a method or a congeries of methods — all tending to 
some given end or purpose, and at the same time 
paying a most rigid adherence to unity of action and 
result/' 

The name of Facciolati stands high in the logical 
literature of Italy. His logical works are the following 
— JRudimenta Logica, Institutiones Scholce Peripat., 
Acroases Dialectics. He grounds his system on the 
views of Aristotle. There are two sources of certainty 
- — the one historical, and the other the internal or living 
sense, which testifies our own feelings and existence. 
The rules of reasoning are developed by Facciolati with 
much care and minuteness ; and his suggestions for the 
government of the understanding in the pursuit of truth, 
are at once profound and practical. Franc. Soave, in 

* De Recta Meat. Instit,, p. 583. 



MAZAKELLI, ETC. 339 

his Institutiones de Logica, illustrates the leading prin- 
ciples of Locke's Essay, which he considered the best 
work that had then appeared on the logical training of 
the mind. Soave pays great attention to the bearings 
of language on logical operations; but he denounces 
the employment of mathematical forms of reasoning in 
moral subjects, as destructive of all sound knowledge. 

Mazzarelli, in his 11 buon uso della Logica in Materia 
di Religione (1787), discusses the science of logic 
through the medium of theology. Taking the Scrip- 
tures as the foundation of all truth — the standard by 
which its character and value are to be estimated — he 
institutes the inquiry, how far the ordinary notions en- 
tertained of logic are in unison with the declarations 
and doctrines contained in the sacred canons. We 
cannot reason soundly in theology, he maintains, unless 
we take into account the special nature of the evidence 
which the science of religion presents. Its fundamen- 
tal principles being both of an abstract and declaratory 
nature, they demand the application of special logical 
rules to demonstrate every proposition connected with 
them ; which rules may, or may not, as circumstances 
require, be requisite in other branches of speculative 
inquiry. The author illustrates these views in a variety 
of ways, and accompanies his illustrations with many 
profound and excellent remarks on the science of 
general reasoning. 

In the speculations on scientific logic advanced 
from time to time in the Transactions of the Academy 
of Turin, the reader will find many topics handled 
with acuteness and ability. Saint-Eaphael, Tiraboschi, 
Denina, Lampredi, and M. Falette-Barrol, have dis- 



340 LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY AND SPAIN. 

cussed, from various points of view, the primary prin- 
ciples relative to the abstract nature of truth, and to 
the operations of the mental faculties, as manifested in 
the process of general reasoning, and the development 
of scientific methods of investigation. Many of the 
papers inserted in the Transactions, from the pens 
of these authors, evince a truly philosophical and en- 
lightened spirit. 

Yincenzo Micheli discusses the logical principles of 
Leibnitz and Wolff at considerable length. He enters 
with great fervour into the questions of necessary con- 
nexion, sufficient reason, and the principle of contradic- 
tion, with a view to shew their fundamental bearing 
upon all the deductions of the understanding. 

The logical philosophy of Italy, during the period 
now under review, presents, on the whole, an intelligent 
and improving aspect. Questions were examined 
under the influence of a sincere love of truth, and an 
ardent desire to bring logical studies to bear upon the 
ordinary pursuit of knowledge, in such a manner as to 
facilitate its acquisition and dissemination. This was 
the general character of the published or regular 
treatises on logic ; but with respect to the teaching of 
the science in the old-established universities and col- 
leges in the several states in the kingdom, there was 
little or no change visible during the eighteenth cen- 
tury. Almost all the ordinary epitomes or abstracts of 
the science, more directly used for educational purposes, 
were entirely confined to the illustration of the old 
scholastic doctrines, — no new element of modern philo- 
sophy being admitted into the formal and technical 
arrangements of the subject. The logical instruction 



VERNE Y. 341 

directed and imparted by collegiate institutions, em- 
braced therefore a very limited range, compared with 
that which was afforded by the philosophical treatises 
of the most able of the Italian logicians.* 

The logical writings of Spain during the eighteenth 
century are but few in number, and of little intrinsic 
merit. We have the Logic of Louis- Antoine Verney 
(1750), which contains some enlightened philosophical 
views of the science. The author lays great stress upon 
method. He arranges all human knowledge under 
three categories, — substances, modes, and relations. 
Universal notions are necessary to every act of reason- 
ing ; and the mind forms them by contemplating those 
qualities which objects have in common, and abstract- 
ing that in which they differ. Language enables us to 
record these general conceptions ; but, though an 
indispensable instrument in all dialectic exercises, it is 
nevertheless one which gives rise to a vast number of 
errors. Our judgments are of three kinds, — nominal, 
real, and ideal. Verney considers this a most impor- 
tant division, and thinks logicians have committed 
serious blunders by not keeping it in view. Besides 
errors from this source, there are others to which the 
understanding is liable from the delusions of the senses, 
the power of imagination, and the abuse of the theo- 
retical spirit. Truth is the result of an act of compa- 
rison between the subject and the attribute. 

* I regret I have not been able to meet with the Milan edition of Galileo's works, 
which contains his views of logical science. 



342 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

PROGRESS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRE- 
LAND, FROM THE TIME OF LOCKE'S "ESSAY" TILL THE END 
OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 

The history of the science of logic in Great Britain, 
during this period, is marked by some features of in- 
terest and importance. One of the principal of these 
is, the almost utter discredit into which the syllogistic 
or school logic fell in general estimation. It was almost 
unanimously scouted and condemned, by writers of 
every grade and system, as a useless and sophistical 
instrument ; and even where it was still retained in 
treatises on logic, it was viewed more in the light of an 
antiquarian relic "than as a thing possessing any intrinsic 
value in any plan of general education. 

It is necessary to premise here, that this chapter will 
be devoted almost exclusively to works not immediately 
connected with university or academical systems of 
tuition, but solely such as treat of logic as a part or 
division of mental philosophy. I shall give an ac- 
count, in a subsequent chapter, of the systems of logical 
instruction which have, for a certain number of years, 
been followed in most of the universities and colleges 
of our own country. 



TYRWITT, LEE. 343 

Firsts then, I shall notice a small and very scarce 
volume, though, a little out of chronological order, writ- 
ten by one Thomas Tyrwitt, hearing the date of 16-52, 
entitled, Solid Reasons for Philosophizing. It appears 
to have been printed and published at Winchester. It 
is entirely directed against the logical doctrines con- 
tained in the Novum Organum of Bacon. Tyrwitt 
maintains that the svstem of reasoning laid down in 
that celebrated treatise, cannot lead the mind to right 
conclusions as to the moral and religious nature of man; 
matters which are, he says, of the deepest importance 
both to individuals and society. He observes, that 
" the mode or fashion of going from fact to fact, and 
testing and cross- questioning nature in every possible 
form, cannot satisfy the wants of the mind; for the 
power of creation, and the arrangement of materials, 
are the things which, in seeking after knowledge, we 
are constantly in search after." In another place, he 
prophesies that his lordship's view of science " will 
only tend to be a will-o'-the-wisp to mankind."* 

The publication of Mr Locke's Essay excited great 
attention throughout England; and many were the 
pens directed against particular portions of his treatise. 
Among his opponents, Dr Lee holds a distinguished 
place, chiefly from directing his remarks, embodied in 
his Anti- Scepticism (1702), to those parts of Mr Locke's 
work which have a logical bearing and import. Lee's 
observations on the nature of propositions in general, 
are in many instances both ingenious and sound ; and 
there will be found, in this part of his work, many prin- 
ciples faintly shadowed forth, relative to the nature 

* Pp. 132,. 1S4. 



344 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 

and province of reasoning generally, which subsequent 
English writers have more fully developed, and made 
the groundwork of their logical theories. 

On the abstract nature of truth, and of the mind's 
manner of perceiving and estimating it, we have a great 
deal of valuable information and acute reasoning, in 
Morris's Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (VJOY). 
There is much of the same kind of speculation relative 
to the logical foundation of truth, and to those faculties 
of the mind more immediately connected with the rea- 
soning process, as that which characterises the writings 
of Malebranche, and others of the same school. The 
first volume of Morris is the most interesting. 

Dr Watts' Logic (1*728) was the first popular fruit, 
in England, of the speculations of Locke, on the mental 
powers and faculties, as connected with reasoning, and 
the advancement of knowledge generally. The work 
has been a great public favourite for more than a cen- 
tury and a quarter ; and such is its happy adaptation 
of logical materials, that it promises fair to maintain its 
position, in spite of changes of opinion and systems, for 
many years to come. 

The author says, that " logic is the art of using reason 
well in our inquiries after truth, and the communica- 
tion of it to others." Again, he says, " The design of 
logic is, to teach us the right use of our reason, or 
intellectual powers, and the improvement of them in 
ourselves and others." 

He divides his Logic into four parts, according to the 
old scholastic fashion, but with a very extended mean- 
ing and application ; namely, perception (used as syno- 
nymous with conception or apprehension), judgment, 
reasoning, and disposition. 






WATTS. 345 

The first part is appropriated to long discussions on 
the general nature of our ideas — the objects of our 
conceptions ; the general divisions or kinds of them ; the 
words or signs by which these ideas or conceptions are 
expressed ; and general and special rules and directions 
how to mould and direct these mental materials to a 
given end or purpose. The second part relates to 
judgments and propositions. The author enters into 
an examination of the nature and offices of these ; the 
various sorts of them ; what general directions should 
be observed, in order that we may judge soundly ; and 
what special rules should likewise be attended to, in order 
to arrive at right conclusions on particular subjects and 
questions. Reasoning, properly so called, is treated of 
in the third part. This embraces the nature of syllo- 
gistic forms ; the doctrine on which they are founded ; 
the nature of erroneous judgments, and how they may 
be avoided ; and general rules for the guidance of our 
reasoning powers on all subjects to which they may be 
directed. The fourth and last part relates to disposi- 
tion or method. This must be fully considered, along 
with all the general and special rules which come under 
it, in applying it to human knowledge in all its bear- 
ings and ramifications. 

Watts' Improvement of the Mind is a supplement to 
his Logic. It embodies a vast amount of just and use- 
ful observations on the government of the mind, and in 
connexion with education generally. Dr Johnson, in 
his Life of Watts, observes that " few books have been 
perused by me with greater pleasure than his Improve- 
ment of the Mind, of which the radical principles may 
indeed be found in Locke's Conduct of the Understand- 



346 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 

ing ; but they are so expanded and ramified by Watts, 
as to confer on him the merit of a work in the highest 
degree useful and pleasing. Whoever has the care of 
instructing others, may be charged with deficiency in 
his duty if this book is not recommended." 

Dr Duncan's Logic (1760) is a work of precisely 
the same cast and character as that of Dr Watts. 
Duncan was professor of moral philosophy at Aberdeen, 
and this gave his volume no small degree of influence, 
not only in his own country, but even in England. It 
is plainly and simply written, and has proved a really 
useful and instructive volume. It has, like Watts' 
work, gone through many editions ; but it has not by 
any means been so popular, in the southern part of the 
island, as the Logic of the English divine. 

Dr Duncan's volume proceeds on the same logical 
hypothesis as Locke assumed in his Essay. The un- 
derstanding is represented as advancing from one step 
of knowledge to another, and exerting various distinct 
acts, according to the degrees of progress it makes. 
To watch and record these steps is the chief office of 
the logician. The principal divisions into which logic, 
as a science, is mapped out, are used to explain the pro- 
cedure of the mind in its different stages of improve- 
ment. The rules and observations requisite for this 
purpose must be drawn from a knowledge, more or 
less extensive, of the mind itself, viewed chiefly in a 
psychological aspect ; and therefore some account of its 
various powers and faculties becomes necessary, agree- 
ably to this theory, in order to give clearness and force 
to the illustrations of logical or scientific rules and 
methods. 



duncan. 347 

The doctor has followed the same scholastic division 
of logic as Watts has done. There are four books. 
The first treats of simple apprehension — a subject 
which embraces a copious account of the origin of our 
ideas, the various kinds or sorts of them, the manner 
in which knowledge is derived from them, — together 
with some observations on the rise, progress, and nature 
of language in general, and its specific application to 
logical subjects in particular. The second book is de- 
voted to the consideration of our judgments or intui- 
tions. Here the doctrine of propositions is developed, 
and their division into self-evident and demonstrable 
made apparent. The third book brings us to the 
syllogism, which is illustrated in the ordinary way 
of most school treatises on the subject. The fourth 
book ends with method. This the doctor thinks impor- 
tant. It can only be made use of with advantage, he 
remarks, when our mental faculties have been exer- 
cised, and some decided progress in general knowledge 
made. He observes, that "when a man, accustomed 
to much thinking, comes, after any considerable interval 
of time, to take a survey of his intellectual acquisitions, 
he seldom finds reason to be satisfied with that order 
and disposition according to which they made their 
entrance into his understanding. They are there dis- 
persed and scattered without subordination, or any just 
and regular coherence ; insomuch that the subserviency 
of one truth to the discovery of another does not so 
readily appear to the mind. Hence he is convinced of 
the necessity of distributing them into various classes, 
and combining into one uniform system whatever re- 
lates to one and the same subject. !N~ow, this is the 



348 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 

true and proper business of method, — to ascertain the 
various divisions of human knowledge, and so to adjust 
and connect the parts in every branch, that they may 
seem to grow one out of another, and form a regular 
body of science, rising from first principles, and pro- 
ceeding by an orderly concatenation of truths." 

The two treatises of Watts and Duncan tended 
greatly to obliterate from the public mind of this 
country, every vestige of esteem and reverence for the 
scholastic logic. But, besides these, there were other 
writers whose speculations, partly metaphysical and 
partly logical, tended still more to increase the disre- 
gard of the principles and forms of the Aristotelian 
system. These antagonists of formal logic were most 
energetic and zealous in the northern portions of the 
island. Among their number, 'Dr Campbell stands 
conspicuous. His Philosophy of Rhetoric (1762) is a 
work which, during the latter part of the last century, 
exercised a marked influence, indeed, over the general 
current of logical thought in Great Britain. And his 
treatise is not destitute of influence even at the present 
day. He appears to have entertained very decided 
opinions on the nature of the syllogistic theory of 
reasoning. He says, " The method of proving by 
syllogism appears, even on a superficial review, both 
unnatural and prolix. The rules laid down for distin- 
guishing the conclusive from the inconclusive forms of 
argument, the true syllogism from the various kinds of 
sophisms, are at once cumbersome to the memory, and 
unnecessary in practice. No person, one may venture 
to pronounce, will ever be made a reasoner who stands 
in need of them. In a word, the whole bears the 






CAMPBELL. 349 

manifest indications of an artificial and ostentatious 
parade of learning, calculated for giving the appearance 
of great profundity to what in fact is very shallow. 
Such, I acknowledge, have been, for a long time, my 
sentiments on the subject. On a near inspection, I 
cannot say I have found reason to alter them, though 
I think I have seen a little further into the nature of 
this disputative science, and consequently into the 
grounds of its futility." 

Dr Campbell says again, in reference to the general 
character of the scholastic logic, " that the disputation 
of the schools became to be so much a mechanical ex- 
ercise, that if once a man had learned his logic, and 
had thereby come to understand the use of his weapons, 
and had gotten the knack of wielding them, he was 
qualified, without any other kind of knowledge, to de- 
fend any position whatsoever, how contradictory soever 
to common sense, and to the clearest discoveries of 
reason and experience." 

After making some observations on the abstract 
nature of the svllooism, which he thinks is resolvable 
into a mere identical proposition, the doctor sums up 
the whole discussion with these words : — " What shall 
we denominate the artificial system or organ of truth, 
as it has been called, of which we have been treating ? 
Shall we style it the art of reasoning ? So honourable 
an appellation it by no means merits, since, as hath 
been shewn, it is ill adapted to scientific matters. 
Shall we then pronounce it the science of logomachy, 
or, in plain English, the art of fighting with words, and 
about words? And in this wordy warfare shall we 
say that the rules of syllogising are the tactics ? This 



350 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GEEAT BRITAIN. 

would certainly hit the matter more nearly ; but I 
know not how it happens, that to call any thing logo- 
machy or altercation would be considered as giving bad 
names ; and when a good use may be made of an in- 
vention, it seems unreasonable to fix an odious name 
upon it which ought only to discriminate the abuse. I 
shall therefore only title it the scholastic art of dispu- 
tation. It is the schoolmen's science of defence."* 

Lord Karnes was another Scottish writer who spoke 
lightly of the school logic. In his Sketches of the His- 
tor y of Man (1770), he says: "The slow progress of 
useful knowledge during the many ages in which the 
syllogistic art was most highly cultivated as the only 
guide to science, and its quick progress since that art 
was disused, suggest a presumption against it; and 
this presumption is strengthened by the puerility of the 
examples which have always been brought to illustrate 
its rules." " The ancients seem to have had too high 
notions, both of the force of the reasoning power in 
man, and of the art of syllogism as its guide. Mere 
reasoning can carry us but a very little way in most 
subjects. By observation and experiments properly 
conducted, the stock of human knowledge may be en- 
larged without end ; but the power of reasoning alone, 
applied with vigour through a .long life, would only 
carry us round like a horse in - a mill, who labours 
hard, but makes no progress.'-' " When the power of 
reasoning is so feeble by nature, especially in subjects 
to which this syllogistic theory can be applied, it would 
be unreasonable to expect great effects from it. And 
hence we see the reason why the examples brought to 

* Vol. i. p. 182. 



LORD KAMES, BEATT1E. 351 

illustrate it by the most ingenious logicians have rather 
tended to bring it into contempt." " Although the 
art of categorical syllogism is better fitted for scholastic 
litigation than for real improvement in knowledge, it is 
a venerable piece of antiquity, and a great effort of 
human genius. We admire the pyramids of Egypt, 
and the wall of China, although useless burdens on the 
earth. We can hear the most minute description of 
them, and travel hundreds of leagues to see them. If 
any person should with sacrilegious hands destroy or 
deface them, his memory would be had in abhorrence. 
The predicaments and predicables, the rules of syllogism, 
and the topics, have a like title to our veneration as 
antiquities. They are uncommon efforts, not of human 
power, but of human genius ; and they make a remark- 
able period in the progress of human reason." 

Speaking of reasoning in general, his lordship says, 
that " all real knowledge of mankind may be divided 
into two parts, — the first consisting of self-evident pro- 
positions ; the second, of those which are deduced by 
just reasoning from self-evident propositions. The 
line which divides these two parts ought to be marked 
as distinctly as possible, and the principles that are 
self-evident reduced, as far as can be done, to general 
axioms."* 

Lord Karnes' Introduction to the Art of Thinking 
contains little or nothing of a logical character. 

Dr Beattie's Essay on Truth (1770) had a great 
effect in strengthening the antipathy against the scho- 
lastic logic throughout Great Britain. The work was 
exceedingly popular. On the general influence and 

* Sketches, vol. iii. 



352 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 

tenor of this species of logic on the character and 
minds of those who cultivate it, he observes : — " The 
apparent tendency of the school logic is, to render men 
disputatious and sceptical, adepts in the knowledge of 
words, but inattentive to fact and experience, It makes 
them fonder of speaking than thinking, and therefore 
strangers to themselves, — solicitous chiefly about rules, 
names, and distinctions, and therefore leaves them 
neither leisure nor inclination for the study of life and 
manners. In a word, it makes them more ambitious 
to distinguish themselves as partisans of a dogmatist, 
than as inquirers after truth. It is easy to see how far 
a man of this temper is qualified to make discoveries in 
knowledge. To such a man, indeed, the name of truth 
is only a pretence ; he neither is, nor can be, much 
interested in the solidity or importance of his tenets : 
it is enough if he can render them plausible — nay, it is 
enough if he can silence his adversary by any means. 
The captious turn of an habitual wrangler deadens the 
understanding, sours the temper, and hardens the 
heart ; by rendering the mind suspicious and attentive 
to trifles, it weakens the sagacity of instinct, and ex- 
tinguishes the fire of imagination : it transforms con- 
versation into a state of warfare, and restrains the lively 
sallies of fancy, so effectual in promoting good- humour 
and good-will, which, though often erroneous, are a 
thousand times more valuable than the dull correctness 
of a mode-and-ngure disciplinarian."* 

Lord Monboddo, in his Ancient Metaphysics (1779), 
is an enthusiastic admirer of the Aristotelian logic. He 
argues that Mr Locke and all his followers have com- 

* Essay on Truth, p. 389. 



LORD MONBODDO. 353 

pletely mistaken the theory of general reasoning, which 
has no other foundation than the syllogism. 

Before Aristotle's time, Lord Monboddo says, " Many 
philosophers no doubt reasoned very well, and made 
great discoveries, but they reasoned as the women and 
children spake ; for though women and children, who 
have been well educated, may speak very well, they do 
it by mere habit, without being able to give any account 
how they do it : the reason of which is, that they can- 
not analyse language into its elements." " The philo- 
sophers before Aristotle could reason very well ; but as 
they could not analyse reason, so they could not give 
any rational account why one argument was conclusive, 
and another inconclusive." 

Lord Monboddo keeps no terms with the common 
sense school of logic. He observes : " Common sense, 
they will say, is sufficient to let us know what certainty 
and conviction are, and when we ought to be convinced, 
and when not. But I will tell them, that not only 
common sense is not sufficient for this purpose, but even 
the most uncommon sense and the greatest natural 
genius ; and, in order to know what truth and science 
are, they must either have invented themselves a great 
system of science, such as Aristotle has delivered in his 
books of analytics, or they must have learned it from 
others." 

Lord Monboddo defines logical truth to be " the 
perceiving by the act of the mind, comparing together 
its own ideas or perceptions ; and it is distinguished 
from what is called metaphysical or transcendental truth, 
which belongs only to single ideas." 

z 



354 LOGICAL SCIENCE IK GEE AT BRITAIN. 

All demonstrative reasoning presupposes, according 
to his lordship, not only the existence of general ideas, 
but that there is a principle of subordination running 
through one to another; that is, one general idea or 
conception is more comprehensive than another, and 
the less general is contained in, and makes a part 
of, the more general one. It is this constitution of 
things which makes the syllogism, and imparts to it 
its demonstrative character. 

Lord Monboddo's notion of the nature of truth is, 
that it ultimately rests on a theological basis. There 
are numerous passages of his work illustrative of this 
idea. Without religious principle, logical science is 
unintelligible. He says : " From what I have said of 
the subordination of ideas, we may observe the progress 
of things upwards, and the wonderful tendency of all 
things in nature towards one principle of union. This 
is to be found in all the several classes of beings, which 
still rise one above another till they end in that one 
category to which they belong. And here the analysis 
of logic ends ; but where logic ends theology begins, 
and shews that all the ten categories terminate in one 
principle, and have one common origin, the Intellect 
Divine, the source of every thing existing, or that can 
exist in the universe, where all things exist in the most 
perfect unity ; for there is not first or last there, nor 
the succession of ideas as in our minds, but all things 
are present at once, and the past, the present, and the 
future, what is precedent and what is consequent, are 
seen in one view. In this manner, not only logic, but 
every other science, ends in theology, the summit of all 
philosophy, and which to know is the perfection of 



HUME. 355 

human nature."* Again he says : " Truth and science 
are to be deduced from a much higher source than the 
human mind, even from Grod himself." " Here we 
may see with what propriety God is called in Scripture 
the God of Truth ; for in him are all ideas or species 
of things, with all their connexions, dependencies, and 
relations one to another." 

We must call a moment's attention to the writings 
of David Hume, who deeply interested himself in the 
fundamental principles of reasoning. All human know- 
ledge, he affirms, may be embraced in two categories — 
impressions and ideas. Impressions comprehend the 
entire mass of our sensational knowledge ; and ideas 
stand for all those thoughts which relate to the higher 
functions of the mind — as remembering, imagining, 
reasoning, &c. His notions, however, on the relation 
of all sciences whatever to the science of human nature, 
are so interesting, and have been, in fact, so suggestive 
to other writers on the principles of logical science, 
that we must allow this able and subtle writer to state 
his own case in his own words : — 

"It is evident," says he, "that all the sciences have 
a relation, greater or less, to human nature ; and that, 
however wide any of them may seem to run from it, 
they still return back by one passage or another. Even 
mathematics, natural philosophy, and natural religion, 
are in some measure dependent on the science of man, 
since they lie under the cognisance of men, and are 
judged of by their powers and faculties. *. If therefore 
the sciences of mathematics, natural philosophy, and 
natural religion, have such a dependence on the know- 

* Ancient Met., vol. i. p. 484^ 



356 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 

ledge of man, what may be expected in the other 
sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more 
close and intimate ? The sole end of logic is, to ex- 
plain the principles and operations of our reasoning 
faculty, and the nature of our ideas ; morals and criti- 
cism regard our tastes and sentiments ; and politics 
consider men as united in society, and dependent on 
each other. . ; .Here, then, is the only expedient from 
which we can hope for success in our philosophical 
researches, to leave the tedious lingering method which 
we have hitherto followed, and, instead of taking now 
and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march 
up directly to the capital or centre of these sciences — 
to human nature itself, which, being once masters of, we 
may every where else hope for an easy victory. From 
this station we may extend our conquests over all those 
sciences which more intimately concern human life, and 
may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more 
fully those which are the objects of pure curiosity. 
There is no question of importance whose decision is 
not comprised in the science of man, and there is none 
which can be decided with any certainty before we 
become acquainted with that science. In pretending, 
therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we 
in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, 
built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only 
one upon which they can stand with any security." 

We come now to notice an entire class of writers 
whose united speculations have given birth to several 
new views of logical truth, and of the utility of logical 
systems generally. This class is denominated the 
common sense school of philosophers. Its doctrines are 



COMMON SENSE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHERS. 357 

known wherever science is cultivated. Though not 
strictly expounders of regular and formal treatises of 
logic, yet they discussed the leading principles of the 
science, and came to entertain certain opinions regard- 
ing it considerably at variance with pre-existing theories 
and maxims. The principal writers who constituted 
this school, and to whose labours we shall now briefly 
direct attention, are Doctors Reid, Beattie, and Oswald, 
and the late Professor Dugald Stewart. In shaping 
our present course, we shall avoid all theological and 
purely metaphysical discussion, and confine our remarks 
as closely as possible to the bearing which these specu- 
lations have on the broad and scientific principles of 
logic, and on the nature of those mental powers con- 
sidered more immediately called into requisition in 
every act of reasoning and argumentation. 

For the sake of those whose knowledge of mental 
philosophy may be but scanty, we beg to premise that 
there have been various and somewhat conflicting defi- 
nitions of common sense current among modern philo- 
sophers and logicians ; but the general meaning of the 
term, as we shall here use it, is mainly the same as that 
given of this sense by Father Buffier, to whom it origi- 
nally belongs, and which has been inserted in a previous 
chapter of this volume. We shall, however, give this 
definition again : — " Common se?ise is that quality or 
disposition which nature has placed in all men, or evi- 
dently in the far greater number of them, in order to 
enable them all, when they have arrived at the age and 
use of reason, to form a common and uniform judgment 
with respect to objects different from the internal sen- 
timent of their own perception, and which judgment is 



358 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 

not the consequence of any anterior principle." The 
reader will readily perceive that this common sense is 
not like those senses of seeing, hearing, tasting, and 
the like, which recognise the existence and qualities of 
external bodies by a species of intuitive discernment ; 
but it is simply that quality or attribute of mind which 
men, by virtue of circumstances and age, become expe- 
rimentally possessed of, and by which they are enabled 
to form a common and uniform judgment on divers 
classes of objects or things which come before them. 
This explanation will be found to coincide substantially 
with those definitions given of this common sense by 
nearly all writers who have discussed the subject. 

The logical doctrines which sprang out of, or received 
great support from, this common sense school of philo- 
sophy, may be stated under the following general 
heads : — 

1st, The doctrine which this school maintained re- 
lative to the reasoning powers was, that there was a 
natural logic, which was quite sufficient of itself to 
guide men in their ordinary intercourse of life, and to 
enable them to sit in judgment on all the most impor- 
tant truths and questions more immediately connected 
with their own inward nature — their mental, moral, 
and religious feelings. No formal or artificial systems 
or rules are here required. The uniformity which 
human life has presented in all times, and that com- 
plete certainty with which we expect certain conse- 
quences from certain causes, are irrefragable proofs of 
the existence of this natural logical talent. The great 
mass of human knowledge relative to man — as a think- 
ing, moral, social, and religious being — is purely derived 



COMMON SENSE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHERS. 359 

from consciousness, and common sense or experience; 
and the principles which embody the entire science of 
man, are the exponents of the common sense feelings 
and common sense ideas of the generality of men. 
These principles can neither be detected by any formal 
logical rules, nor their truth tested by them in any way 
whatever. They rest on a foundation altogether their 
own, and refuse to be brought under the technical 
forms and discipline of the mere school logician. " All 
reasoning," says Dr Beattie, " terminates in first prin- 
ciples ; all evidence is ultimately intuitive ; common 
sense is the standard of truth to man." Again he 
says, " There are few faculties, either of our mind or 
body, more improvable by culture than that of reason- 
ing ; whereas common sense, like other instincts, arrives 
at maturity with almost no care of ours. To teach the 
art of reasoning, or rather of wrangling, is easy ; but it is 
impossible to teach common sense to one who wants it."* 
Common sense, it is substantially affirmed by the 
same school, exercises a larger share of direct authority 
over the formation and consolidation of some sciences, 
than many philosophers imagine. Some fixed idea is 
laid hold of by the mind in ordinary cases, which lies, 
as it were, on the surface of things ; and it serves as a 
kind of methodical nucleus, around which are arranged 
a multitude of individual things susceptible of scientific 
classification, and which collectively constitute a body 
of truth, having to the individual all the attributes of 
a regular science. Many men are to be found who 
have a very considerable portion of information on 
many branches of knowledge, who have derived it 

* Essay on Truth, p. 41. 



360 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 

entirely from a shrewd and painstaking method which 
they have accustomed themselves to follow in every 
step of their search after science. Such persons often 
become quite bewildered when you attempt to shew 
them the logical beauty and cogency of pursuing their 
inquiries in accordance with some comprehensive and 
logical system of investigation. They cannot seize hold 
of the mere formal thread of thought ; and, therefore, 
work out the problem in their own way and fashion. 
The common sense views they adopt are grounded 
upon conceptions not very accurately defined, nor sus- 
ceptible of intelligible development to others ; but to 
themselves they serve the purpose of giving a full 
and faithful interpretation of the things of which they 
are in search. All such scientific conceptions are 
involved in a cloud of mystery whenever we attempt to 
penetrate their abstract nature, to inquire into the 
manner they are formed, or the bond or link which 
connects them with the general faculties of the mind ; 
but of their real individual existence there can be no 
possible doubt whatever. Numerous illustrations, con- 
firmatory of these statements, might be derived from 
the history of every department of human know- 
ledge. 

Even in those cases where writers of this school did 
not feel themselves fully justified in going the extent 
of maintaining, that natural logic, such as they con- 
ceived it to be, was of itself sufficient for the purposes 
of ordinary education ; yet it has been invariably con- 
tended, that formal logic was of little or no use without 
the aid of the natural. Buffier, who was no enemy to 
the old or technical dialectics, affirms his conviction, 



COMMON SENSE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHERS. 361 

that no logical system can be efficient unless both the 
common sense and formal systems be united. He says, 
" The perception, in fact, of first or common sense 
truths is, as it were, the key to all the sciences ; the 
source or cause of every just decision ; the surest guide 
to the most accurate knowledge; the very soul and 
essence, in some sort, of all truth in general, which 
logic attains only in part, though it has the honour to 
be styled the organ of truth — but it is no more than 
the organ of truth consequentially. And this supposes 
principles already known; so that, as experience demon- 
strates, a man may be an excellent logician, and yet 
fall into considerable errors from an imperfect know- 
ledge of the first truths ; whilst those which are to be 
drawn from the inmost recesses and most immediate 
operations of the human mind, belong to that more 
extensive science which forms the subject of this treatise. 
If it shall be considered by some truly metaphysical, 
they will not perhaps be mistaken ; but, whatever it may 
be, it must so closely accompany, precede, or follow logic, 
that they mutually lend a necessary support to each 
other. Logic, therefore, remains in some measure incom- 
plete until it be joined to this, which likewise, in various 
places, supposes the former; but those two articles 
being united, furnish any thing that relates to the 
science of the human understanding, and teach us to 
form thence the true art of thinking justly, and with 
precision — the object most deserving the attention of 
man — the most solid fruit of science."* 

It is almost unnecessary to remark, that this opinion 
of Buffi er's has been entertained, with some modifica- 

* Premieres Verites, p. 2. 



362 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 

tions, by a majority of the most acute logicians of every 
country in Europe. 

2d, The common sense school maintained, that 
reason was not a single faculty or power, but a complex 
operation, involving the exercise of nearly the entire 
intellectual apparatus. It required a due balance to be 
sustained of all the separate powers of which it was 
composed. If there were any irregularity in the con- 
stitution of the inward man — any power more vigorous 
than another, and out of keeping with it — there was a 
corresponding derangement in the reasoning capabili- 
ties of the individual, and his chances of being a sound 
and comprehensive reasoner proportionally diminished. 
The question was reduced to one of actual experience. 
This opinion was a favourite one with the late Dugald 
Stewart ; and every reader of his admirable works will 
readily bring to mind some of those fine discriminations 
of individual character, which throw such an agreeable 
charm over many of his abstruse speculations on the 
powers of reasoning generally. Indeed, this doctrine 
of the compound character of the argumentative or 
logical talent, forms at bottom the only substantial 
grounds for the majority of these rules for what is called 
the government of the understanding — a phrase scattered 
up and down in almost every logical treatise published 
within the two last centuries. For example, memory, 
which instantaneously follows sensation, and serves as 
a kind of repository or storehouse for all the materials 
of our experience and observation, is a faculty as neces- 
sary, even for the simplest form of logical argument, as 
the act of comparison itself, from which an inference is 
said by logicians directly to proceed. And the same 



COMMON SENSE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHERS. 363 

thing may be remarked relative to the share which 
other intellectual powers have in the general result 
of all reasoning whatever. Even in mathematical 
science itself, no progress can be made in it without the 
active assistance and co-operation of the power of 
memory with other faculties of the intellect. 

3d, It is a part of the logical creed of the common 
sense metaphysicians, that the various departments of 
human knowledge have particular kinds of evidence or 
certainty belonging to each ; and, therefore, it is espe- 
cially requisite that the logical principles appertaining 
to every individual science should be carefully noted, 
and considered in all reasonings and conclusions 
regarding it. Physical science rests on one kind of 
evidence, mathematical science on another, moral evi- 
dence on a third, and so on. There must be no con- 
founding of the one with the other. It would be pre- 
posterous, say the writers of this school, to attempt to 
solve a moral, political, or religious question by the 
forms and rules of mathematical reasoning. This species 
of reasoning rests entirely on intuitive conceptions, and 
consists of an uninterrupted series of axioms. It is 
solely conversant about number and extension. On the 
other hand, moral evidence is made up of many detached 
or isolated ingredients. When we reason about virtue 
and vice, pain and pleasure, right and duty, there is no 
standard by which to estimate their different agree- 
ments in numbers and figures. In moral evidence we 
have degrees ; in demonstrative we have none. It is 
therefore of essential importance that logical systems 
should treat of these distinctions in the several sciences, 
in order that rules may be laid down for the govern- 



364 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BEITAIN. 

merit and instruction of the understanding in the pro- 
gress of general knowledge. 

kth, The common sense logicians had a great aver- 
sion to formal systems of logic. All such systems, say 
they, have their hold on the minds of men chiefly from 
their shutting out from attention these general ideas 
which form the staple, as it were, of thought and intel- 
ligence, and are almost ever present to the intellect 
when in a state of activity. Human thought is so in- 
timately blended with questions of good, right, truth, 
justice, advantage, enjoyment, and questions connected 
with practical life and consequences, that when any 
mere collection of formal rules are presented to the 
mind's attention, and repeated over and over, the 
interest flags, and they become positively nauseous and 
unpleasant. 

We cannot handle any thing in the shape of know- 
ledge, without having present in the intellect, in a state 
more or less vivid and distinct, certain general ideas, 
such as existence, causation, power, efficiency, agency, 
&c. These are perpetually obtruding their presence 
upon us, and imperatively demanding a share of our 
immediate attention. 

The disadvantages arising from an artificial and 
purely formal system of logic being estimated at more 
than it is really worth, are graphically pointed out by 
Dugald Stewart in the following passages : — 

" For my own part, so little value does my individual 
experience lead me to place on argumentative address, 
when compared with some other endowments subser- 
vient to our intellectual improvement, that I have long 
been accustomed to consider that promptness of reply 



COMMON SENSE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHERS. 365 

and dogmatism of decision, which mark the eager and 
practised disputant, as almost infallible symptoms of a 
limited capacity — a capacity deficient in what Locke 
has called large, sound, roundabout sense. In all the 
higher endowments of the understanding, this intellec- 
tual quality, to which nature, as well as education, 
must contribute, may be justly regarded as an essential 
ingredient." " If these observations hold with respect 
to the art of reasoning or argumentation, as it is culti- 
vated by men undisciplined in the contentions of the 
schools, they will be found to apply with infinitely 
greater force to those disputants who, in the present 
advanced state of human knowledge, have been at 
pains to fortify themselves, by a course of persevering 
study, with the arms of the Aristotelian Logic. Persons 
of the former description often reason conscientiously 
with warmth from false premises, which they are led 
by passion, or by want of information, to mistake for 
truth. Those of the latter description proceed syste- 
matically on the radical error of conceiving the reason- 
ing process to be the most powerful instrument by 
which truth is to be attained, combined with the secon- 
dary error of supposing that the power of reasoning 
may be strengthened and improved by the syllogistic 
art."* 

5th, The Scotch philosophers insisted upon the intro- 
duction of nearly all questions relating to mind into 
systems of a logical character. They were not, how- 
ever, the originators of this mode of procedure — they 
only carried out the opinions and plans of their pre- 
decessors to a greater extent: Disliking the formal 

* Phil, of Mind, p. 432. 



366 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GEE AT BRITAIN. 

logic, the common sense school more earnestly insisted 
on the utility, and even necessity, of extending our 
examinations into the most abstruse and profound 
questions of intellectual philosophy, and of laying bare 
the entire framework of the mind itself. Hence logi- 
cians were called upon, before entering on the formal 
rules of their science, to give some account of the 
faculties of the mind, cause and effect, the belief in 
testimony, the nature of experimental and intuitive 
judgments, and the like. It was impossible, these 
writers maintained, that a person could make any 
advances in logic unless he were conversant with all 
the leading questions relative to the science of mind. 

6th, The common sense philosophers imparted a 
nominalism to the logical speculations of their times. 
Though Drs Eeid and Beattie entertained some opinions 
on the nature of universals, which might bring them 
within that class of logicians called Conceptualists, yet 
they were by no means very decided on this point. 
Their general leaning was evidently towards the 
nominal theory. Stewart was uncompromisingly at- 
tached to this' theory likewise ; but it is curious to 
witness, that he was only bold on the subject when an 
enemy was in the field : for when musing in security, 
and in a joyous and contemplative mood, he often 
expresses himself somewhat puzzled by the theory of 
language, which he generally and strenuously main- 
tained. It may be remarked that the most ultra view 
of universals agrees better with the leading principles 
of the common sense theory of logic than with any 
modifications of the nominal hypothesis. 

7M, The formation of what they termed a philoso- 



COMMON SENSE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHERS. 367 

phical logic was a favourite theme with the most influ- 
ential of the common sense school. Wishing to make 
logic a great and universal instrument, both for the 
discovery and promulgation of truth, they conceived it 
could only be made effective for this end by being 
placed on a much more extended and solid basis than 
it had hitherto been. Among the things desiderated 
for this purpose, was a thorough knowledge of the 
philosophy of mind ; because without this no just opi- 
nion could be formed of the classifications and objects of 
human knowledge, nor of the rules for the investigation 
and communication of truth. 

The anticipated advantages to be derived from such 
a philosophical logic, are enumerated by Dugald Stewart 
to be the following : — 1st, Such " an instrument would 
be of the highest importance in all the sciences to ex- 
hibit a precise and steady idea of the objects which 
they present to our inquiry. What was the principal 
circumstance which contributed to mislead the ancients 
in their physical researches ? AYas it not their confused 
and wavering notions about the particular class of truths 

which it was their business to investigate?" "If 

we examine, in like manner, the present state of morals, 
of jurisprudence, of politics, and of philosophical criticism, 
I believe we should find that the principal circum- 
stance which retards their progress is the vague and 
indistinct idea which those who apply to the study of 
them have formed to themselves of the objects of their 

researches." "A philosophical logic would 

assist us in our particular scientific investigations, — 1st, 
By keeping steadily in our view the attainable objects 
of human curiosity; so, 2d, By exhibiting to us the 



368 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 

relation in which they all stand to each other ; and, 
3d, The relation which they all bear to what ought to 
be their common aim, the advancement of human 
happiness ; 4th, It would have a tendency to confine 
industry and genius to inquiries which are of real 
practical utility ; and would, 5th, Communicate a dig- 
nity to the most subordinate pursuits which are in any 
respect subservient to so important a purpose." .... 
" From such a system of logic, too, important assistance 
might be expected for reforming the established plan of 
public and private education ? It is melancholy to reflect 
on the manner in which this is carried on in most, 
perhaps I might say in all, the countries of Europe ; 
and that, in an age of comparative light and liberality, 
the intellectual and moral characters of youth should 
continue to be formed on a plan devised by men who 
were not only strangers to the business of the world, 
but who felt themselves interested in opposing the 
progress of useful knowledge." 

2d, "Another very important branch of a rational 
system of logic ought to be, to lay down the rules of 
investigation which it is proper to follow in the different 
sciences. In all these the faculties of the understand- 
ing are the instruments with which we operate; and, 
without a previous knowledge of their nature, it is 
impossible to employ them to the best advantage. In 
every exercise of our reasoning and of our inventive 
powers, there are general laws which regulate the 
progress of the mind ; and, when once these laws are 
ascertained, they enable us to speculate and to invent 
for the future with more system, and with a greater 
certainty of success." " The method of com- 



COMMON SENSE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHERS. 369 

municating to others the principles of the different 
sciences, has been as much neglected by the writers on 
logic as the rules of investigation and discovery ; and 
yet there is certainly no undertaking whatever in 
which their assistance is more indispensably requisite."* 

8th, All reasonings and judgments, according to the 
common sense of philosophy, must relate to two orders 
or classes of truths, — contingent and necessary. 

Reasonings involving contingent judgments have the 
following common sense principles as their basis : — 

1st, Every thing which is attested to me by the 
power of consciousness and the internal sense must 
really exist. 

2d, The thoughts of which I am conscious are 
thoughts of a being whom I call i", or myself. 

3d, The things which memory distinctly recalls to 
me really happened. 

ith, I am certain of my own personal identity from 
the remotest period to which my memory can carry 
me. 

5th, Objects which I perceive by the aid of my senses 
really exist, and are as I perceive them to be. 

6th, I exert some degree of power upon my actions 
and determinations. 

7th, The natural faculties by which I distinguish 
truth from error are not delusive. 

8th, My fellow-men are living and intelligent crea- 
tures like myself. 

9th, Certain expressions of countenance, certain 
sounds of the voice, and certain gestures, indicate cer- 
tain thoughts and certain dispositions of mind. 

* Phil, of Mind, vol. i. p. 31. 
2 A 



370 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 

10th, We have naturally some regard for the testi- 
mony of men in matters of fact, and even for human 
authority in matters of opinion. 

11th, Many events which depend upon the free-will 
of our fellow-men, may nevertheless be foreseen with 
more or less probability. 

12th, In the order of nature, that which is to take 
place will probably resemble that which has taken place 
in similar circumstances. 

The necessary truths of common sense are of a 
grammatical, logical, mathematical, esthetical, moral, 
and metaphysical character. 

The logical philosophy of the common sense philo- 
sophers contains little or nothing which can be called 
original. It is a compound of the doctrines of Bacon, 
Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, and Leibnitz, and was the 
natural result of the state of mental science for nearly 
a couple of centuries before. It is firmly and consis- 
tently put together, and made to bear on important 
and interesting questions connected with the science of 
human nature. It has had, and always will have, great 
influence on logical principles and studies ; chiefly for 
this reason, that it is based on the most complete 
observation of our internal feelings and constitution. 
Every thing arising out of the operations of the intel- 
lect is brought out to open day, and contrasted with 
the rules of philosophic investigation, and the promul- 
gation of scientific truth, in every department of human 
knowledge.* 

The common sense school of logic entertained lofty 

* See the several philosophical works of Reid, Campbell, Beattie, Oswald, and 
Dueald Stewart. 



COMMON -SENSE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHERS. 371 

and refined views of human nature and human science. 
It displayed, in all its phases, a healthy and invigo- 
rating tone. It viewed truth, and the means and appli- 
ances to obtain and disseminate it, through the medium 
of all that was sacred and elevating. Setting out with 
the open and direct intention of attacking infidelity 
and scepticism in their strongholds, it threw a whole- 
some moral responsibility about logical science, which 
removed it far from every thing sophistical, formal, and 
trifling. It can bear a favourable contrast with the 
logical philosophy of France at the same period, where 
human reason was tested in a very ignoble and scurvy 
manner. The labours of the common sense philo- 
sophers were likewise opportune as well as wise. They 
tended to counteract, in no small degree, the silly and 
trashy logical literature so prevalent among our Gallic 
neighbours during the eighteenth century, and pre- 
vented the philosophic mind of Europe generally from 
running headlong into the same course of folly and 
flippancy. 

This philosophic school of logicians aimed likewise 
at being extensively useful. They wished to arm 
human reason at all points, with a view that it might 
be benefited as extensively as possible from scientific 
truth of all kinds. Their logic was a logic for the 
millions. The name they bore indicated the number 
of their students, and the universal character of their 
instructions. It was not one portion of the intellectual 
frame they studied to strengthen at the expense of 
another; but they directed their attention to that 
mental cultivation which preserves the vigour and 
symmetry of the entire inward character, and imparts 



372 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 

to it real beautv and usefulness. This school conceived 
there was an analogy between the body and the mind ; 
the expertness and flexibility of the fingers might be 
purchased at the expense of the strength of the limbs, 
or the general health. So likewise with the intellect. A 
quickness and cleverness in small matters might be 
obtained at the expense of solid and enduring qualities. 
To make the mental soil really generally productive, it 
must be deeply trenched, and not merely scratched on 
the surface. Truth is a thing of paramount interest to 
every human being of whatever station and condition ; 
and the great question is, How shall we bring it home 
to every man's mind in all its comprehensiveness and 
variety ? The most solid means of doing this are obvi- 
ously the best. If, say Dr Eeid and his followers, we 
make a young man acquainted with the different kinds 
of evidence, the best means of applying them, and store 
his mind with sound and general rules of investigation 
and reasoning on all important subjects, he will be 
better fitted for the miscellaneous duties of life, than if 
merely skilfully versed in dialectical forms and subtil- 
ties. This was the practical view the common sense 
school took of the nature and offices of logic. 



LOGICAL SCIENCE IX THE NORTHERN NATIONS. 373 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

OF LOGICAL SCIENCE IN SWEDEN, NORWAY, DENMARK, 
POLAND, RUSSIA, &c, &c, FROM THE PUBLICATION OF 
LOCKE'S "ESSAY" TILL THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY. 

The northern nations of Europe became pretty early 
acquainted with the speculations of Bacon, Descartes, 
Locke, and other writers on the principles of logic. 
But the progress of innovation and change was here 
comparatively slow, and a longer time elapsed ere the 
philosophic mind in these regions was roused to that 
pitch which gives birth to new systems, or to great 
modifications of old ones. 

In Sweden, Andrew Eydelius entered warmly, in 
the latter part of the seventeenth century, into the 
philosophical opinions of Descartes. We have his 
Compendium Logices, which is a scholastic work both 
in matter and arrangement. His opinions on the 
general principles of logical science are to be found in 
his other publications devoted to mental philosophy. 
M. GL Block was also a Cartesian, and maintained that 
the philosophical method of Descartes was the only 
foundation on which science could be prosecuted with 



374 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE NORTHERN NATIONS. 

success. His works bear the date 1708. Joh. Bilberg, 
in his Dissertations on the method of Descartes, mani- 
fests his admiration of it, but takes the liberty of differ- 
ing from his master upon some points of his system. 
Bilberg affirms, that Descartes' philosophy of reasoning, 
taken as a whole, gives an undue preponderance to the 
subjective over the objective element. From Descartes' 
notion, that assurance is not the same as the standard 
or criterium of truth, he likewise dissents ; because he 
maintains that assurance must be prior to the reasons 
on which we rest certainty, and is the only safe and 
conceivable guide to solid conviction.* 

Wolff's logic was a great favourite in Sweden for the 
greater part of the eighteenth century. Many Swedish 
logicians, however, abridged and epitomized his system, 
so as to render it less perplexing and cumbrous for 
young students. There is a number of these abridge- 
ments to be found, in almost every direction, in the 
northern portions of the Continent, 

The logic of Wallarius (1706) was popular, though 
of a scholastic type. About the middle of this century, 
Lallenstedt and J. Plenning entered profoundly into 
the principles of philosophical logic, and discussed 
various portions of the systems of Descartes, Leibnitz, 
and Wolff. The nature of method, considered accord- 
ing to the Cartesian hypothesis, as an instrument for 
a scientific end or purpose ; the identification of sub- 
stance and power — an important ingredient in the 
Leibnitzian philosophy; and the formal definitions of 
Wolff — constituted the leading topics of logical discus- 
sion in the works of these authors. Nearly about the 

BleditationSj p. 256. 



STKOKVICH, KOLMARK, CHRISTIERNIX. 375 

same time, P. Holstrom, A. Wahlstroin, S. Sinus, Elis. 
HyphofF, A. J. Molander, B. Westtersten, C. Mester- 
ton, 0. Ronigk, H. Moller, and A. Axelson, severally, 
in their respective philosophical publications, treated of 
the leading principles of logical science, chiefly through 
the medium of the theories of Descartes and Leibnitz. 

The logical speculations of Locke were well known 
in Sweden in the middle of this century, and highly 
prized by some philosophers of note. Among the 
number was M. Yan Strokvich, who published an 
epitome of the Englishman's work, with notes and 
illustrations. The Swedish author's treatise, Logica, 
eller Stutkonsten, &c. (1721), gave rise to a contro- 
versy on some of the leading logical tenets of Locke's 
book, which, for a time, was carried on with great zeal 
and some bitterness among the logicians of Stockholm. 
But the fullest and most complete account of Locke 
On the Conduct of the Understanding, is from the pen 
of G. P. Leopold, whose work was published at the 
close of the last century, and became exceedingly 
popular among general readers of logical treatises. 

P. Kolmark made an amalgamation of the respective 
theories of Locke and Wolff, in reference to logical 
science. His work was favourably received, and in 
some colleges made a text-book. 

The intelligence of the publication of Kant's logical 
views was transmitted to Sweden at an early period, 
and created a lively interest among the logicians of 
that country. P. E. Christiernin attempted to unite 
the Critique of Pure Reason with some of the leading 
tenets of Locke. His work was published at Upsal 
in 1794, and considered a valuable treatise on the 



376 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE NORTHERN NATIONS. 

abstract principles of logic. Bjurbaeck and J. Gottmark 
were also distinguished writers on the same subject. 
Magnus Blix, Dan. Boethius, and C. A. Ehrensvand, 
discussed logic in conjunction with mental philosophy, 
and their several works were highly esteemed by the 
learned of their own country, but beyond which they 
were little known. 

As far as I have been able to penetrate into the 
subject, it appears that the general mode of teaching 
logical science in the universities of Sweden, during 
this period of history, was a combination of the leading 
principles of mental philosophy with the ordinary forms 
of the syllogistic logic. This mode of introducing 
topics of intellectual speculation, with a view of illus- 
trating the nature of reasoning in general, became 
prevalent in the early portion of last century; but 
towards its close there was little or no notice taken of 
the logical peculiarities and bearings of the Kantian 
system in any of the ordinary seminaries of education 
in this country. The common summaries and text- 
books on logic, which have fallen in my way, present 
here, as in most other places, a great degree of simi- 
larity both as to matter and formal arrangement. 

Denmark and Norway have paid considerable atten- 
tion to logical studies in their several academical insti- 
tutions. The systems usually adopted here during the 
last century, bore a great resemblance to those taught 
in the Swedish universities during the same period of 
time. About the middle of the last century logic 
began to be discussed in Denmark and Norway, in con- 
junction with a portion of mental philosophy — such, 
for example, as the nature of our simple and compound 



ROTHE TYGE, NIELS TRESCHOW, ETC. 377 

ideas, the laws of memory, the power of abstraction, 
and the like. Then followed the nature or kinds of 
propositions, the forms of the syllogism, and a few 
closing observations on method. This was the uniform 
routine of logical instruction, in these two countries, 
during the period of history of which we are now 
treating. 

Apart, however, from mere academical tuition, there 
were several philosophers in these countries who took 
a more comprehensive view of the reasoning powers of 
man, and who have recorded their several opinions in 
respectable philosophical treatises. Eothe Tyge dis- 
cussed logic through the medium of theology. He 
embraced the opinions of Malebranche, and defended 
them with great zeal and ability. Christian Bartholin 
followed in his footsteps, but gave a more popular turn 
to his discussions and investigations. Chr. Horneman 
was a distinguished professor in the University of 
Copenhagen, and illustrated the logical system of 
scientific truth common to the views of Kant and 
Locke combined. Niels Treschow is one of the ablest 
Danish logicians of this period. He entered very fully 
into the systems of Locke and Hume, and into the 
logical foundations of what is meant by existence, 
eternity, space, time, intelligence, and the like. On 
the logic of Bacon, and the categories of the principal 
German writers, he displays great skill and erudition. 

The logical systems commonly taught in the colleges 
and universities scattered over Hungary, Bohemia, 
Moravia, and Galacia, were, as far as I have been able 
to collect any positive information on the subject, 



378 LOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE NORTHERN NATIONS. 

chiefly compounded of the old scholastic views. Towards 
the latter end of the last century, there were here and 
there new doctrines from the German school intro- 
duced into logical discussions ; but these were not suf- 
ficient to force any change in the established mode of 
treating the art of reasoning in these several coun- 
tries. 

Logical studies formed a general and necessary 
portion of academical education in Poland during the 
last century. They were founded on the Aristotelian 
theory ; but, towards the latter part of the century, 
there were several novel ingredients incorporated 
with them, chiefly from the domain of German philo- 
sophy. 

Logic was introduced into the Russian empire in 
the middle of the sixteenth century, and was cultivated 
in the purely Aristotelian fashion till the commence- 
ment of the last century. A change then took place, 
chiefly through the instrumentality of JSTikodim Sellj, a 
Russian monk, who had entered very profoundly, not 
only into the scholastic logic, but into all those 
abstract questions which many of the middle age logi- 
cians coupled with it. In 1756, Nikolaj Popofskj 
gave public lectures on logic at the University of 
Moscow, which he popularized to a great extent — 
giving at full length many of the most valuable por- 
tions of Locke on the government of the mind. After 
the death of this professor, Michael Katschenofskj suc- 
ceeded him, and imparted additional life to logical 
studies at the same university. He was intimately 
acquainted with the speculations of Descartes, Leibnitz. 



PODSCHIWALOFF. 379 

Malebranche, Locke, and Wolff. A still wider logical 
range of inquiry was instituted by Wassilj Sergeje- 
witch PodschiwalofF, who became professor of logic 
and polite literature. In addition to the German and 
English systems of logical speculation, he introduced 
some of the doctrines of the French school. 



380 REMARKS ON EASTERN AND INDIAN LOGIC. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

A FEW BRIEF REMARKS ON THE EASTERN AND INDIAN LOGIC. 

I confess it is chiefly from a compliance with recent 
custom, that I here offer these few remarks on the 
systems of logic known in the Eastern nations and in 
India. I have no doubt whatever of the existence of 
such logical forms as have of late years been brought 
prominently forward among European literati; but I 
have a great doubt of such logical views becoming of 
any value whatever in the cause of general knowledge 
or science, or of ever having any fair claim to be ad- 
mitted as an integral part of the Catholic philosophy 
of mankind. It is absurd to conceive that a logic can 
be of any value from a people who have not a single 
sound philosophical principle, nor any intellectual 
power whatever to work out a problem connected with 
human nature, in a manner that is at all rational or 
intelligent. Reasoning, at least in the higher forms of 
it among such semi-barbarous nations, must be at its 
lowest ebb ; nor does there seem to be any intellectual 
stamina, in such races of men, to impart to it more 
vigour and rationality. 

Gotama is considered the founder of the logic of 



EEMARKS ON EASTERN AND INDIAN LOGIC. 381 

India. In his system there are six "Predicaments" 
or " Objects of Proof/' — namely, Substance, Quality, 
Action, Community, Particularity, and Kelation. To 
this some of the Indian sages add another, — Privation, 
or Negation. 

The intellect is the substratum of eight different 
qualities, — namely, Number, Quantity, Individuality, 
Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Subsequence, and 
Faculty. 

Many of these categories relate, however, more to 
systems of cosmogony than to logic proper. It is re- 
quisite, therefore, in order to give any thing like an 
adequate conception of this science as interpreted in 
India, that we should enter a little more fully into 
particulars. 

In the discovery and promulgation of truth, on 
whatever subject, there must be a method ; and this 
method embraces the enunciation or pro-position, which 
is the name of any object, or a proper name ; then 
follows the definition, which fixes or determines the 
qualities or attributes of the subject ; and then, lastly, 
there comes the investigation, whose office it is to dis- 
cuss the nature and application of this definition. 

Connected with this logical method, Gotama enume- 
rates sixteen dialectical categories: — 1. Proof; 2. The 
object or matter of proof; 3. Doubt; 4. Motive; 5. 
Example ; 6. The truth demonstrated ; 7. The regular 
argument ; 8. Eeduction to the absurd ; 9. Acquisition 
of certainty; 10. Debates ; 11. Conference or interlo- 
cution; 12. Controversy ; 13. Fallacious assertion; 14. 
Fraud and unfair controversy ; 15. Futile reply ; and, 
16. Defect in judgment. 



382 REMARKS ON EASTERN AND INDIAN LOGIC 

The sixteen categories have, however, been compress- 
ed, by some commentators, into three general catego- 
ries, — namely, 1st, That which treats of proof; 2d, 
Whatever relates to the object of proofs ; and the 3d 
Refers to what is termed the organization of proofs. 

First Category — Principle of Proof. — The entire 
principles which constitute proof may be divided into 
four kinds,- — 1st, Perception. 2d, Induction, which is 
of three sorts : consequent when it ascends from effect 
to cause ; antecedent when it descends from cause to 
effect ; and analogous when based on resemblances or 
affinities. 3d, Comparison. And, 4th, Affirmation, 
which embraces revelation and tradition. 

Second Category — Objects of Proof — The objects of 
proof are, — 1st, The soul, which is the seat of eternal 
knowledge or intelligence. 2d, The human body, the 
seat of this soul, considered both in its active and pas- 
sive state ; under the first relation it is the fountain or 
source of exertion ; under the second it is the seat of 
enjoyment. 3d, The organs of sensation : these re- 
late to the various material elements, — as earth, water, 
light, air, and the ethereal element which produces 
hearing. 4th, The objects of the senses constitute an 
important medium of proof: these are derived from the 
above enumerated primary elements. 

The other objects of proof are, — the intelligence. 
which embraces notions and recollections ; the manas, 
considered as the instrument of intelligence ; activity or 
determination, from which vice and virtue proceed ; 
transmigration, or the future condition of the soul ; 
retribution, punishment ; and lastly, salvation or deliver- 
ance. 



REMABKS ON EASTERN AND INDIAN LOGIC. 383 

Third Category — The Organization of Proofs. — This 
general class of proofs is divided into three heads : the 
first embraces legitimate and conclusive proofs; the 
second relates to the discussion which brings proofs 
into play ; and the third refers to false proofs or so- 
phisms. 

Legitimate or conclusive proofs are those in which 
doubt is expressed by the position of the question ; the 
motive or reason ; then the example, which is a point 
upon which, in every controversy, the parties are fully 
agreed. 

Demonstrative truth is that which is recognised 
either universally or individually ; either hypothetically 
or by concession. The regular and complete argument 
is the syllogism, which is composed of five members, — 
the proposition, the reason, the example, the applica- 
tion, and the conclusion. 

This is the form of the Hindu svllogism : — 

1 . The mountain is burning ; 

2. For it smokes. 

3. That which smokes burns, as the kitchen-fire. 

4. Accordingly the mountain smokes ; 

5. Therefore it burns. 

We have also, in connexion with the organization of 
proofs, the JEteductio ad Absurdum, which consists in 
deducing from (false) premises conclusions manifestly 
inadmissible, which compels the mind to renounce the 
premises. Then, again, we have the acquisition of 
certainty, which is the result of proof. Debate is that 
which consists of two persons with contrary principles, 
each endeavouring to subvert his antagonist's position. 



384 REMARKS ON EASTERN AND INDIAN LOGIC. 

Interlocution is a conference between two persons, in 
order to arrive at truth. Disputation is defined to be 
that state when one of the controversialists seeks to 
overthrow the opinion of his adversary without intend- 
ing to put forward his own individual opinion or system. 
False proofs or sophisms are fallacious assertions, having 
the semblance of reason without the reality. 

Thus we see that the categories of G-otama are in 
part a classification of the chief objects of philosophical 
investigation, and the other part a development of the 
scientific methods and processes of investigation itself. 
Both comprehend the subjective and objective elements 
of human knowledge, 

In comparing the European syllogism with the 
Hindu logic, it has been observed, that the three last 
propositions correspond exactly to our syllogism, with 
this single difference — that the first, or major term, con- 
tains invariably an example. Under this designation the 
logicians of India comprehend either a sensible object 
or some particular point admitted, or supposed to be 
admitted, by those to whom the argument is submitted, 
and which in this relation becomes a positive fact. By 
means of the example, as an integrant part of the 
syllogism, and inherent in the major premiss, the 
general proposition is not presented, except as realized 
in a positive fact, and thus abstraction assumes a body 
and form. 

When the five members of the Hindu syllogism is 
considered, we shall readily perceive that it is in reality 
formed of two syllogisms, constructed in an inverse 
order. Setting out from the third, which is the major 






REMARKS ON EASTERN AND INDIAN LOGIC. 385 

proposition, and which is placed in the centre, we find 
successfully the minor and the conclusion, whether we 
go backward to the two anterior, or forward to the two 
posterior propositions. This construction of the syllo- 
gism, it is contended, is in strict harmony with the 
constitution of the human mind, which alternately 
proceeds by analysis and synthesis. The first syllogism, 
which commences with particular propositions in order 
to arrive at a general truth, corresponds to the analy- 
tical process of reasoning; while the second, which 
begins with the general in order to arrive at the parti- 
cular propositions, furnishes an example of the synthetic 
process. However ingenious this may appear, still, it 
is argued, the Indian syllogism is vastly more cum- 
bersome and unwieldy than the European, and less 
susceptible of ready and expert application. 

The followers of Jina, an ancient and celebrated sect 
in India, hold that there are five great principles or 
causes which unite in the production of all events. 
These are, — Time, Nature, Fate, or JSTecessity, Works, 
or the principle of Retributive Justice, and Mental 
Effort, or Perseverance. 

The same sect hold likewise that there are six cate- 
gories, — namely, Motion, Rest, Vacuum, Time, Life, 
and Matter. 

The intellectual or inward soul of man is, according 
to the doctrine of the Persians, composed of five sepa- 
rate parts, each having peculiar offices or duties to 
perform. These are, — 

1. The Feroher, or principle of sensation. 

2. The Boe, or principle of intelligence. 

2 B 



38 G REMARKS ON EASTERN AND INDIAN LOGIC. 

3. The JRouan, or the principle of practical judgment. 

4. The Akho, or principle of conscience. 

5. The Jan, or principle of animal life.* 

* For further information on the subject of this chapter, I beg to refer to The 
Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. i. ; The Asiatic Researches of Cal- 
cutta, vol. ix. ; to Mr Fraser's account of Persia in the Edinburgh Cabinet Library ; 
and to the History of Philosophy adopted by the university of France. 



NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE. 387 



CHAPTER XX. 

ON THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 
IN THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE, 
FROM THE YEAR 1800 TILL THE PRESENT DAY. 

Within the last fifty years, and particularly within the 
latter part of this period, the study of logic has been 
greatly on the increase, both in collegiate institutions, 
as well as among the philosophic portion of the reading 
community. Able works on the science have made 
their appearance in every country ; and very opposite 
and conflicting discussions, as to both its abstract and 
practical utility, have marked the character of the 
generality of these productions. 

The distance over which we have to travel, and the 
scanty portion of space left us, must be our apology for 
tripping somewhat hastily over the ground in this 
chapter. As there must be limits to all things in this 
world, so must there likewise be limits to a historical 
sketch of logic. As a general principle, it is desirable 
both to know and to communicate all things ; though, 
when this principle comes to be applied, it is often 
found to be neither very edifying nor practicable. 

Commencing with Germany, it may be observed that 



388 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

Kant's theory was the great starting-point, either in 
the way of supporting, modifying, or opposing, to most 
of the logical treatises of the country during this pre- 
sent half century. This theory obtained such a firm 
hold of the philosophic mind of the nation during the 
first twenty years of its history, that the philosophers 
and logicians of Germany seemed spellbound, and 
unable to set a single foot beyond the prescribed circle 
of the Critique of Pure Reason. The entire mass of 
logical speculation of modern times, rests upon an in- 
genious system of ringing the changes on the leading 
ideas or principles involved in Kant's views, and those 
of his immediate followers and critics. 

Fred. Bouterweck viewed the principles of logical 
science through a spiritual medium. Self or conscious- 
ness is the basis of reasoning in all its forms and aspects. 
In the apodictic logic, reason examines and interrogates 
itself. Every train of reasoning, of whatever length it 
may be, is of a purely subjective character. The reason 
is a living, active, and creative principle. 

Krug taught logic at Wittenberg, Frankfort, Konigs- 
berg, and Leipsic, and published his work on the science 
in 1806. In his exposition of the nature of truth, he 
maintains that every proposition rests upon intuitive 
certainty. Human nature and the understanding are 
our boundaries ; consequently we can only seek for 
proof within this prescribed range. The principle of 
absolute reality is the principium essendi, and the ideal 
principle is the principium cognoscendi: the first pos- 
sesses the attribute of perfect unity, and the second is 
either material or formal. Mathematical evidence, 
Krug conceives, has a decided superiority in point of 



IX THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 389 

certitude to the evidence from human nature. The 
latter never rises above the degree of probability. 

J. F. Fries was an influential and able writer on 
logic. Being dissatisfied with Kant's system, ho pub- 
lished A New Critique of Pure Reason. His theory of 
the logical elements is based on intuitional knowledge, 
faith in testimony, and the notions of a Deity. " Sea- 
son is the law of truth, and embraces an immediate 
knowledge, purged of all alloy of doubt and error. It 
reposes on the inward convictions of the existence of a 
Deity ; the supreme good ; the elements of all beauty, 
virtue, truth, right, and justice." Fred. Yon Calker 
supported Kant's leading views in his logical philosophy. 
Truth consists in the harmony of a knowledge of the 
objective with a notion of the subjective ; and science 
is the agreement of consciousness with perception and 
intuition — an agreement involved in our belief of reality. 
Science requires proofs ; and those are derived from 
demonstration and deduction, acquired through the 
means of pure and empirical intuition. Bardili founded 
his logic on purely ontological principles. Being is the 
basis of all human knowledge and reasoning. The 
Deity is the first principle of all reality, of all thought, 
of all truth, science, and being. 

Fichte viewed all logical results through the medium 
of a lofty transcendentalism. His several treatises 
contain many profound and singular doctrines relative 
to truth and the general operations of reasoning ; but 
they are treated of in such a manner as to bring them 
more within the province of mental philosophy than 
logic 

Schelling, in his system of philosophy, did not treat 



390 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

of logic in a regular and formal manner, but merely 
touched upon the principles of scientific certainty in 
some particular directions. His categories of all human 
knowledge will afford a glimpse of his leading views on 
logical arrangement and evidence. 

1. The Absolute, the whole in its primary form 
(God), manifests himself in, 

2. Nature (the Absolute, according to its secondary 
forms). 

It then produces itself in two relative orders, viz. — 

The Real. The Ideal. 



Under the following powers :- 
Weight— Matter. 
Light — Movement. 
Organization — Life. 



Truth — Science. 
Goodness — Eeligion. 
Beauty — Art. 



Above, as reflected forms of the universe, place 
themselves, — 

Man, the Microcosm. The State. 

The System of the World (the External Universe), 
— History. 

Klein follows Schelling in his logical views. He 
maintains that all formal developments of logical rules 
are merely general expressions of metaphysical prin- 
ciples. Logic he divides into two parts; the analytical 
and dialectical. All the higher manifestations of the 
reasoning faculty rest upon intuitive principles. Un- 



Ifl THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 391 

less these be granted, such a science as logic is impos- 
sible. F. Ant. Nuesslein founded all sound and practical 
logical tuition on psychology. According to his idea, no 
logical hypothesis is intelligible unless it rests on a 
notion of Deity. Wagner, in his Logik, views the 
science of reasoning in a different light from any of his 
contemporaries. His aim is to give a purely mathema- 
tical form to all logical rules, much after the same 
fashion as Lully and Bruno. Baader and Henry 
Steffens are both somewhat mystical in their notions 
as to the nature and application of philosophical logic. 
Hegel, in his Wissenschaft der Logik (1816), denies 
that logic is merely expressive of the forms of thought : 
it constitutes its very essence and reality. Logic dis- 
plays three different states or conditions. We simply 
consider, and look at a thing. We then separate that 
thing from others, for nothing can exist in absolute 
unity; it must have two aspects, or a positive and a 
negative side ; and then out of these arises a certain 
relation, which alone constitutes truth, reality, being, the 
absolute. There is thought in its immediate existence : 
thought is communicated, and thought is forming a full 
and complete conception of its ownself. The formal 
arrangement of Hegel's Logic runs thus : — 

1. Thought in its immediate Existence or Being. 

Quality : comprehends Being (Seyn), Existence (Da- 
seyn), Independent Existence (Fiir-sichseyn). 

Quantity : Pure Quantity (Reine Quantitat), Divisible 
Quantity (Quantum), and Degree (Gracl.) 

Measure (Maas) : The union of Quality and Quantity. 



392 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

2. Thought or Mind as communicated.. 
Ground of Existence: Pure Notions of Essence, 

Essential Existence (Existenz), Thing (Ding). 
Phenomenon : Phenomenal World (Welt der Erschein- 
ung), Matter and Form (Inhalt und Form), Rela- 
tion (Yerhaltniss). 
Reality : embracing the union of the ground of Existence 
and Phenomenon. — Relation of Substance, Relation 
of Cause and Effect, Action and Reaction. 

3. Thought on Mind as forming a Conception of Itself . 

Subjective Notion : Notion as such (Begriff als salches), 
Judgment (Urtheil), Inference (Schluss). 

Objects : Mechanical Powers (Mechanismus), Chemi- 
cal Powers (Chemismus), Design (Teleologie). 

Idea : Life (Leben), Intelligence (Erkennen), Absolute 
(Absolute). 

John Fred. Herbert was an able logician, and ex- 
pounded the principles of the science through the views 
of his mental philosophy, which was, on the whole, of 
an enlightened and eclectic character. Eskharshausen 
maintained that there were seven categories of the un- 
derstanding and judgment ; namely, — 1st, That which 
recognises external objects ; 2d, That which enables us 
to pay attention to them ; 3d, That which reflects upon ' 
them ; ^th, That which confers variety and multiplicity 
to our perceptions ; 5th, That which passes a judgment 
on any thing ; 6th, That which discovers the relations 
among divers things ; and, 7th, That which unites into 
one general conception the truth of many individual 
things. Krausc, in his Logik, makes all logical and 



IN THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 393 

scientific truth rest on two ground pillars — Organized 
Knowledge, embracing Unity, Infinity, Absolute ; and 
Super-Essential Knowledge, wliicli includes — 1st, Sen- 
sible Knowledge — External, Internal ; 2d, Intellectual 
Knowledge — Conception (the common and abstract), 
Super-Sensible (the universal and necessary). 

H. C. W. Sigwart defines logic, in his work on the 
science, to be that which unfolds the laws of thought. 
Scientifically considered, his work embraces the entire 
theory of human knowledge, and has the whole frame- 
work of the mind for its basis. Practical logic, he says, 
is that which influences our thoughts, so as to enable us 
to form mental prepositions and conclusions. Rixner 
considers logic as a universal science under the relation 
of quantity ; and views it under two aspects — as true 
science and apparent science. J. Hermann Fichte founds 
all human knowledge on four phases of consciousness. 
The third phase gives rise to abstract ideas or concep- 
tions, out of which logic takes its rise, embracing con- 
ception, judgment, reasoning, inference, &c. 

Such is the general outline of the logical philosophy 
of Germany. It is a compound of many things ; and 
yet there is a unity of character about it, sufficient to 
sustain its nationality and distinctness from the dialec- 
tical speculations and systems of every other people. 
There is this peculiarity, among many more, about the 
logical as well as the mental speculations of the country, 
that they will not bear transplanting to any other 
region. As a totality, or whole, they are suited to 
Germany, and Germany is suited to them. And even 
if any one of the leading principles of their logical 
theories were detached from the aggregate mass, and 



394 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

engrafted on a French, or English, or Italian stock, it 
would impart such a grotesque quaintness to the whole, 
that it would mar and neutralize all scientific and 
popular plans of instruction. All attempts to mix and 
blend German logic with any other, have hitherto, in 
every country, proved utter failures. 

With perfect unity, there is likewise great variety in 
the logical systems of this country. The chief reason 
of this is, that the professors of logic, as well as pro- 
fessors of every other branch of study, are allowed the 
most perfect liberty to treat their respective subjects 
according to their own personal views and opinions, 
and altogether apart from the prevalent political and 
ecclesiastical sentiments of the day. Another important 
circumstance increases this variety of logical systems ; 
namely, the wide field which a logic chair offers to a 
mind ambitious of fame and distinction. The great 
mental activity which prevails in all the German uni- 
versities, arises from the national mind being deprived 
from playing any great part, either in the grand game 
of politics or of commerce. The love of distinction is, 
therefore, driven to open out other channels for its field 
of operation ; and none proves more inviting, both for 
social honour and government patronage, than a logic 
chair, filled by a professor who can collect a crowd 
about him, either from the singularity of his doctrines, 
or his brilliant manner of developing and illustrating 
them. Novelty becomes here one of the chief ingre- 
dients in a popular and successful logical chair. 

Logic is more generally taught in Germany at the 
present clay than in any other country in the world. 
All matriculated students must undergo an cxamina- 



IS THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 395 

tion in logic previous to their admission to the univer- 
sities. The Gymnasia, or public schools of the country, 
give a regular course of logical tuition to the scholars. 
Indeed, so generally is the science of logic cultivated, 
that it has been estimated that there are not ten out 
of every hundred of the gross amount of students 
throughout all the universities who have not had logical 
instructions, more or less full and complete, before they 
go to college. The extent of the study may, therefore, 
be in some measure calculated, when we take into 
account the number of universities, and the number of 
students who attend them. The following will, I con- 
ceive, prove a pretty correct statistical account of the 
subject : — 

The University of Berlin has 2140 students; Bonn 
700; Halle 700; Breslau 700; Greifswalde 400; 
Konigsberg 450 ; Tubingen (Wirtemberg) 850 (in 
1844); Munich (Bavaria) 1330; Leipsic (Saxony) 
900 ; Gottingen (Hanover) 640 (in 1844) ; Heidelberg 
(Baden) 698 (in 1844); Jena (Saxe- Weimar) 420; 
Erlangen (Bavaria) 303 ; Wiirzburgh (Bavaria) 485 ; 
Giessen (Hesse-Darmstadt) 446 ; Marburgh (Hesse- 
Cassel) 294 ; and Freiburg (Baden) 273. 

There are the Austrian universities of Vienna, 
Prague, and Gratz (Styria), which have unitedly 2500 
students, but whose constitution is different from the 
German universities of the West. Then, again, there 
are the German universities of Strasburg, Rostock 
(Mecklenburg) ; Keil (Holstein) ; and those of the 
Swiss towns of Basle, Berne, Freiburg, and Zurich, 
which number upwards of 4000 students, — making a 
grand total of neariy fourteen thousand. 



396 NATURE A^D CHAEACTEll OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

Turning now to France, we perceive, during the last 
fifty years, an increased interest felt in reference to 
logical science, both in its philosophical and educational 
character and relations. More elevated views have 
likewise been taken of it ; so that it is not now the 
same mechanical, material, or instinctive thing, which 
most of the French logicians made it during the last 
century. The principal cause of this favourable change 
is the more refined and spiritual tone which has been 
imparted, in this country of late years, to mental philo- 
sophy generally. Logical science, from its intimate 
relation to metaphysical inquiries, infallibly partakes of 
their fortunes, whether they be for good or for ill. 

During the better half of this period, France pre- 
sents logical studies under a varied and unsettled 
aspect. This was common to other countries as well 
as herself. The philosophical opinions of a nation are 
but slowly changed or modified. The logical notions 
of the preceding century had sunk deeply into the 
minds of the learned, and had tainted the ordinary 
channels of education at their fountain-heads. In 
attempting to return to a healthier condition of think- 
ing, a mental struggle was inevitable. This manifested 
itself in various ways, and with a variable intensity at 
different times ; and the spirit of reformation had to 
fight its way, step by step. During this state of trial 
and probation, we can recognise, with sufficient distinct- 
ness, four orders of logical philosophers: — those who 
took the pure sensualism of the last century ; those who 
viewed logical science through the medium of theolo- 
gical doctrines ; those who favoured a logical eclecticism ; 
and a fourth, who were imbued with the fanatical and 



IN THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 397 

irrational dogmas of St Simonism. If we cast an eye 
over the logical productions of France, from the com- 
mencement of the present century till 1830, we shall 
see these rival and struggling classes mapped out very 
clearly and distinctly. After this period, the contest 
seemed to lie between the rationalism of Descartes and 
the a priori school of intuition. 

Among the most able and distinguished French 
logicians of the early part of this present century, we 
may place the name of M. De Gerando. His work, 
Des Signes et de V Art de Penser (1801), enters very 
fully into one of the most subtile and important ques- 
tions connected with logical science, — namely, the 
relation which verbal signs bear to the mental faculties 
in a process of reasoning. M. De Gerando considers 
all questions as to the precise nature and province of 
logic, when viewed as an educational instrument, must 
remain involved in darkness, until some progress is 
made in the solution of this problem. It is impossible 
for us to enter into this question in a full and regular 
manner : we must, therefore, refer the reader to M. De 
Gerando 's pages for further information on this inte- 
resting though perplexing subject. Suffice it to say, 
that this learned writer has successfully and clearly 
pointed out some of the principal errors into which 
Condillac and his disciples had fallen, relative to the 
use of language as a medium of thought. A few 
observations from the author's work must close our 
remarks on this division of De Gerando's logical 
labours. 

" The same task," says he, " which must have been 
executed by those who contributed to the first forma- 



398 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

tion of a language, and which is executed by every 
child when he learns to speak it, is repeated over in 
the mind of every adult when he makes use of his 
mother tongue : for it is only by the decomposition 
of his thoughts that he can learn to select the signs 
which he ought to employ, and to dispose them in a 
suitable manner. Accordingly, those external actions, 
which we call speaking and writing, are always accom- 
panied with a philosophical process of the understand- 
ing, unless we content ourselves, as too often happens, 
with repeating over mechanically what has been said 
by others. It is in this respect the languages, with 
their forms and rules, conducting (so to speak) those 
who use them into the path of a regular analysis — 
tracing out to them, in a well-ordered discourse, the 
model of a perfect decomposition — may be regarded, 
in a certain sense, as analytical methods" " In asserting 
that languages may be regarded as analytical methods, 
I have added the qualifying phrase, in a certain sense; 
for the word method cannot be employed here with any 
exact propriety. Languages furnish the occasions and 
the means of analysis — that is to say, they afford us 
assistance in following that method, but they are not 
the method itself. They resemble signals and finger- 
posts, placed on a road to enable us to discover our 
way ; and if they help us to analyse, it is because they 
are themselves the results, and, as it were, the monu- 
ments of an analysis which has been previously made : 
nor do they contribute to keep us in the right path, 
but in proportion to the degree of judgment with which 
that analysis has been conducted."* 

* Des Signes, pp. 138, 180. 



IN THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 3.99 

The formation of a philosophical logic- — similar in its 
character and intended offices as that contemplated by 
the late Dugald Stewart, of which we have previously 
given some account — was a favourite speculation of M. 
De Gerando. He expected great things from such an 
extension of logical science. One of the fundamental 
errors connected with general education, he contended, 
was, that the reasoning power was not directed in a 
healthy and vigorous manner to the consolidation of 
knowledge in general. Truth was too much addressed 
to the memory, and too little to the understanding. 
Men commonly consider the memory in the light of an 
inexhaustible magazine, from which a plentiful stock 
of information may be obtained whenever required; 
but the French logician conceives this is but one part, 
and comparatively an insignificant part too, of a really 
sound and philosophical education. The most impor- 
tant thing is to acquire the habit of employing our 
knowledge to some useful end or purpose. Unless this 
be steadily kept in view, acquired information is but of 
little utility. 

M. Noel's work, Loyique de Condillac (1802), is a 
sort of running commentary on the system of Condillac. 
It presents nothing that is new or interesting. M. 
Mongin throws a little novelty into his Philosophic 
JEUmentaire (1803), by merging all logic into universal 
grammar. He considers the entire force of mental 
propositions to lie in the modes of disposing of the 
respective terms in which they are couched. This 
doctrine had but a very limited number of admirers in 
France. Daube (1805) followed in nearly the same 
steps, but with no more success. His system is now 



400 NATURE AND CHARACTER OP LOGICAL LITERATURE 

almost entirely forgotten. J. S. Flotte, in his Logique 
(1805), defines the science to be " a collection of 
observations made by philosophers, on the mode of 
conducting the faculties of the mind, so as to avoid 
error and arrive at truth." 

The philosophical writings of Lancelin, Keratry, 
Laromiguiere, Royer-Collard, and Maine de Biran, 
tended greatly to direct men's minds to the higher 
principles of logical science, and to fix it upon a more 
spiritual and refined basis. It was chiefly through the 
labours of Royer-Collard that the logical opinions of 
the common sense school were made fully known to the 
philosophic mind of France. He gathered around him 
numerous followers, to whom he imparted his zeal, his 
method, and his principles. 

Whilst this change was going on among professed 
philosophers and logicians, the theologians of France 
were not idle. They viewed the science, which had 
for its aim the detection of error and the discovery of 
truth, in their own way and fashion. They felt, and 
enlarged upon, the insufficiency of mere abstract 
philosophy to solve all the problems connected with a 
process of reasoning, and the nature and character of 
truth. They fell back, therefore, on those a priori 
notions of spiritual knowledge which form such a con- 
spicuous element in the human understanding, and 
which are so strikingly developed, illustrated, and 
enforced, in the system of revelation. They attempted 
to form, in fact, a complete theory of scientific truth — 
a regular philosophical organon — by the aid of such 
intuitive conceptions, joined to the abstract character 
of a revelation itself, and the positive authority of the 



IN THE SEVEEAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 401 

Church. These respective historical and mental ele- 
ments were amalgamated and combined with singular 
adroitness and ability, and brought to bear on the 
grand object in view, with a power of reasoning, and a 
copiousness and elegance of illustration, never surpassed 
in any similar intellectual enterprise. We can do 
nothing more, however, than barely draw attention to 
the several writings of Le Maistre, Lamenais, Bonald, 
D'Eskstein, Ballanche, Battain, and the philosophical 
disquisitions published from time to time in the 
Universite Catholique. Here a great mass of discussion 
will be found, bearing on the various principles of 
logical philosophy, and throwing no inconsiderable 
degree of light upon the nature of language as an 
instrument of reasoning, on the standard of truth, on 
the sources of erroneous judgments, and on those 
various powers of the mind, called into requisition in 
every process of argumentation having for its direct 
aim the establishment of the vital truths which engross 
the attention of general humanity. 

J. P. Brissot's work, De la Verite, ou Meditations sur 
les moyens de parvenir a la Verite dans toutes les Con- 
naissances Humaines, is a species of logic based on the 
common sense view of the phenomena of reasoning. It 
is decidedly practical in its aim and matter, and contains 
many highly useful statements and observations. F. 
Perron attempts to give a new scheme of logic in his 
JEssai d'une Nouvelle Theorie sur les Idees Fondamentales. 
He affirms that all previous logical systems have been 
erroneous from the Grecian downwards, and have been 
founded on perfectly gratuitous and arbitrary principles. 
Writers have assumed certain logical conditions as 

2 c 



402 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 



the relatii 



of 



, among tiie relations 01 our fundamental 
and have clothed them with the attributes of 



subsisting 
ideas 

necessity, universality, immutability, and the like. This 
is a radical error. These logical conditions do not 
possess a more a priori origin than any thing else 
belonging to the understanding. M. Perron also 
maintains that the categories of the intellect have been 
strangely misunderstood by logicians in general. 

Man, according to this writer, has but one thinking 
faculty; this is, however, of a very comprehensive 
character. What we perceive of external objects con- 
stitutes their veritable properties or modes of existence. 
Our knowledge commences with concrete perceptions ; 
and what are usually termed the categories are not 
certain forms of thought — pure conceptions of the 
reason — but simply generalizations of individual objects 
or things. This the author endeavours to demonstrate 
from considerations drawn from space and time, cause 
and effect, the finite and the infinite, &c. 

In M. Perron's logical system there are nine cate- 
gories which, he conceives, embrace every relation 
subsisting among all things of which the mind can be 
conversant. These are — 

1. If they are? . . Category of Existence. 

2, What are they ? 



3. How are they ? 

4. By What? . 

5. Why? 

6. Where? 

7. When? 

8. How many ? 

9. In what relations ? 



Essence. 

Mode. 

Causality. 

End. 

Space. 

Time. 

Number. 

Eelation. 



IN THE SEVEEAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 403 

M. Delariviere, in his Logique Classique (1829), says 
that logic is the science of internal and external discourse 
— of which rhetoric and general grammar form a part. 
M. Hauchecorne founds logic on a knowledge of 
the mental constitution. It is both natural and arti- 
ficial; and is that science or art which guides the 
understanding in all the affairs of life. Logic, accord- 
ing to M. Grentz, is the entire art of thinking, or that 
which governs the mind in the search and promulga- 
tion of truth. 

A portion of the general philosophy of Victor Cousin 
(1831) has a direct and important bearing on logical 
science. His philosophical method rests on conscious- 
ness ; observation of facts, and experiment and reasoning 
in dealing with them, constitute the foundation of all 
human knowledge. M. Cousin maintains that Des- 
cartes and Locke developed the true scientific method 
of philosophizing, though their respective speculations 
have been often misunderstood and misrepresented. 
Logic proper is based on psychology : it can have no 
other basis. To place it, with the majority of German 
logicians, on ontology, is to launch at once into every 
thing theoretical and mystical. Consciousness has 
three faculties, — sensibility, activity, and reason ; to 
the last, logic especially belongs. This reason is not 
an individual thing: it is impersonal; it is governed 
by necessary and absolute conceptions. Its analysis gives 
us three classes of these conceptions, — 1st, The idea 
of infinite, variously expressed by the terms unity, abso- 
lute cause, the absolute, &c. ; 2d, The idea of the finite, 
expressed likewise by the words plurality, phenomenon, 
relative cause, the conditioned, the limited, &c. ; and 



404 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

3d, The idea of relation between what is infinite and 
finite. Those three elements are the result of the syn- 
thesis of thought, and constitute the unity of reason. 

The convictions of this reason are not particular or 
personal convictions, but universal truths — truths for 
all intelligences — truths that are the same to the Divine 
mind as to our own. They are truths in themselves 
— absolute, unalterable by any power of will. 

The absolute laws of thought may be reduced to two 
categories, — the law of causality and the law of sub- 
stance. These are two primary principles, from which 
all logical deductions proceed. They are contem- 
poraneous unity in consciousness. The law of sub- 
stance is logically the first in order of time, and that of 
causality the second. 

Logic is defined by Cousin to be the legitimate passage 
from the idea to being — that is, the law of our existence, 
which authorizes or commands us to say, this is; it 
exists. 

Logic may be considered under two aspects, — natural 
and reflective. The first rests on facts, and is purely 
affirmative in its character; the second on reflective 
affirmation — that is, a necessity of denying or affirm- 
ing. 

M. Damiron, in his Cours de Philosophic (1836), 
devotes an entire volume to logic, which he discusses 
on a comprehensive plan, and in a liberal and enlight- 
ened spirit. He commences his work by making some 
preliminary observations on the nature and province of 
logic ; then on the character of our judgments and the 
criterium of truth ; on perception, and its laws and 
rules ; on a posteriori generalizations ; on reasoning in 



IX THE SEVEKAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 405 

general ; of the syllogism ; of analogy and probability ; 
on language considered in relation to thought; on 
our sensibility connected with the rules of judgment ; 
on habit ; on the sources of error ; and on the exposi- 
tion of method, relative to a proper history of philo- 
sophy. 

There are several later writers on logic in France 
whose works will repay perusal, but which we cannot 
notice at any length. The principal of these are, — 
Charma, Dufour, Larguet, Perrard, and Javari. 

The logical disquisitions of Belgium and Holland 
have been influenced to some extent, since the com- 
mencement of the present century, by the prevailing 
systems of mental philosophy both in Germany and 
France. 

In Holland, however, the change is less perceptible 
than in Belgium. Among the Dutch philosophers the 
logic of Wyttenbach has been long in general use, and 
highly esteemed. Paul Yan Hermert introduced the 
logical principles of Kant into this country during the 
latter part of the last and the beginning of the present 
century. We shall find many of the leading views of 
the German logician discussed with great ability in Van 
Hermert's Elements of the Philosophy of Kant. The 
Dutch writer maintains that there are four categories 
on which all scientific knowledge rests, — namely, the 
general, the special, the true, and the necessary. 

M. Aitzema, in 1821, translated into the national 
language the logical system of M. Snell, which is 
founded on the principles of Kant. In 1828, the 
Society of Public Good published lessons on logic for 
the use of young men who had quitted school. This 



406 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

is a short and popular book, the author of which was M. 
Alex. Bake, rector of the Latin school of Leeuwarden. 

M. BTieuwenhuis is one of the most able philosophical 
logicians in Holland. His Commentary on the system 
of Descartes (1828), and his Initio, Philosophies Theo- 
retics (1833), shew an intimate acquaintance both with 
the history and philosophy of logic. And the same 
remarks are applicable to the writings of Van Heusde* 
— a logician whose reputation has extended far beyond 
the limits of his own country. In his Initia he treats 
of the dialectics of Plato ; and in his Socratic School 
we have a learned dissertation on the nature of scientific 
truth. The author asks, What is logic ? The answer 
he gives is, that it is the art of communicating know- 
ledge according to the principles of sound reason. 
Logic is by no means to be confounded with the dia- 
lectics of the schools. 

There have been two parties who have cultivated 
logical science in Belgium, — one connecting it with a 
system of rationalistic philosophy ; and the other dis- 
cussing it, both in its scientific principles and formal 
arrangements, with an especial reference to certain 
theological purposes and doctrines. There is not, 
however, such a wide difference between the logical 
treatises of these two parties as one might be led at 
first sight to imagine. In their leading principles and 
forms there is a great resemblance among them all. 

We have De Meuport's Essai sur la Theorie du 
Raisonnement prefixed to his edition of Condillac's 
Logic, in which he discusses several of the leading 

* "De Socratische School of Wijsgeerte, voor de Negentiende Eeuw," Utrecht, 
1834. " Initia Philosophise Platonic®, " 1831. 



IN THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 407 

principles of the science of reasoning. Though his 
opinions are attached to the French philosopher's work, 
yet he differs from him on many essential points in 
reference to logic. Meuport makes reasoning a more 
spiritual and complex operation than Condillac does. 
Professor Liebaert filled the logic chair at the univer- 
sity of Louvain during the entire period that the 
country was under the government of France. The 
system of instruction he pursued is laid down in his 
Tractatus de Logica (1818), which is divided into two 
parts, — the one lays down the general laws of thought ; 
and the second treats of the various kinds of truth, and 
the various degrees of certainty which belong to eachkind. 
About the same period we have Elements de Logique 
(1817), from the pen of a clergyman — a work which 
has for its especial object to direct and strengthen the 
minds of youth before they enter upon the study of the 
higher branches of philosophy. 

We have a full and systematic account of the philo- 
sophy of logic in M. Ignt. Deuzinger's two works, Prima 
Lineamenta Logices (1818), and Compendium Logices 
(1823). These are both treatises of great merit. 
Logical science in Belgium owes at this period great 
obligations to the several writings of M. Yan Meenen, 
who combated with zeal and talent the theory of logic 
propounded by Condillac and his partisans, which had 
found favour in that country among some influential 
cultivators of speculative philosophy. Jean Herman 
Janssens, in his Logique, views the science of reasoning 
in connexion with those principles of philosophy culti- 
vated by the Catholic Church. He was professor at 
the university of Louvain. In the Expose des Facultes. 



408 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

des Lois, el des Operations de V Ame (1838) of M. 
Becart, we have a very familiar and useful dissertation 
on logic. 

The Principes de Logique (1833) of Baron ReifTen- 
berg is an able and instructive work. He looks at 
logic through the medium of philosophical rationalism. 
He defines logic to be the science of those laws to which 
we submit our reason in the search after truth. It is 
divided into four portions, — namely, the Idea, Judg- 
ment, Eeasoning, and Method. M. Gibon, in his 
Gouts de Philosophie (1842), maintains that all the 
conceptions of the human understanding may be classed 
under three heads, — Ontology, Psychology, and Logic, 
We have two works proceeding from the university of 
Louvain, — namely, E. Tandel's Cours de Logique 
(1841), and Logicce seu Philosophice Pationalis Elementa 
of President Ubaghs. The last is a most profound and 
able work. 

From the political connexion which subsisted between 
France and Italy, from the commencement of the 
present century to the end of the general war, there 
necessarily arose a corresponding philosophical intimacy 
between the two countries. And this was manifested 
in reference to logical literature, as well as in many 
other branches of science. Most of the prevailing 
systems of mental philosophy current in France in 
modern times, have now found their way, with some 
little interruptions in certain localities, to most of the 
Italian states, and form a certain portion of the current 
literature of the day in the several universities and 
seats of learning in the kingdom. 

But foreign opinions have not as yet effected any 



IX THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 409 

great change in modes of discussing logical science in 
Italy. In most of the Italian works on the subject, the 
writers discuss the science from a religious point of 
view. There is less latitude of philosophical inquiry 
on the vital principles of the art of reasoning observable 
here, than in England. France, or Germany. Nearly 
all the regular text-books in common use in colleges 
are of a decidedly scholastic and formal stamp, — seldom 
venturing beyond the rules of syllogism, and a few 
scattered remarks on the nature of propositions, the 
sources of error, &c. But out of the direct range and 
authority of the colleges, we find treatises on logic 
of a more comprehensive and scientific character ; but- 
even here the influence and power of the Church are 
brought to bear upon the current investigations on the 
subject, and to impart to them a specific form and 
complexion. 

Cardinal Gerdil, Tamasia, Lallebasque, and G. 
Grones, were not strictly logical writers ; but in their 
respective treatises on mental philosophy, there are 
many of the first principles of logic discussed in an 
able and erudite manner. Yincenzo Bini, in his Corso 
JElementario di Lezioni Logico-Metafisico-Morali (1818), 
develops the principles of logic, and shews their depen- 
dence upon mental and moral science. B. Poli follows 
nearly in the same path, in his Corso di Filosofia (1828), 
only he enters more fully and systematically into the 
nature of the human mind. The second volume is 
devoted to logic. It is treated in a purely elementary 
manner — the author having very fully discussed the 
nature of the reasoning faculty in the first volume of 
his treatise. Gaetano Ventura enters profoundly into 



410 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

the science of method. In his De Methodo Philoso- 
phandi (1828), he shews that method in logic presup- 
poses a previous exercise of our faculties, and that a 
certain stock of general information must be obtained 
before it can be put in operation. This, Yentura 
affirms, is implied by every logician when he speaks of 
method. We must know various kinds of truths before 
we can discourse upon their connexions and relations, 
or take any step in arranging them in such a manner 
as to carry conviction to the minds of others. All 
logical methods proceed on the principle of analysis. 
The mind looks at an entire system, or a large 
assemblage of general principles, and then seems to set 
about the work of analysis or separation with a view 
of realizing one general idea, which is known only to 
itself, and which is often obtained by a mental process, 
which entirely eludes the most searching efforts of con- 
sciousness. Every thing must be taken to pieces ; every 
corner and crevice of the system must be examined, 
before the several parts can be put together and adjusted 
agreeably to the. scientific idea which we have in our 
own minds, and which we set out in our inquiries 
to establish and realize. These are the leading steps 
of the mental process in every philosophical method.* 

The Esercizio Logico (1824) of Sig. Cuoco is a plain 
and familiar work, and has been well spoken of by 
Italian critics. Gr. D. Eomagnosi was one of the ablest 
of modern Italian writers in logic. His philosophical 
works are published in nineteen volumes. He differed 
from the general tenets held by several French logicians ; 
especially those of Cousin and Damiron. On the 

* Do Methodo. § 6. Edit, Venice, 183,1 



IN THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 411 

subject of logic, in his twelfth volume, many profound 
and just remarks are to be found on the operations of 
the mind : more particularly in the second book on 
invention. He shews the intimate connexion which 
subsists between this faculty and that of attention, and 
how the concentration of the latter power aids the mind 
in its creative energies. In the third and fourth 
books, on judgment and reasoning, the author endea- 
vours to prove that, though these two powers are nearly 
allied to each other, yet there is sufficient ground for 
a logical distinction between them. 

The abstract foundation of all logical truth the 
author develops in his essay, Vedute Fondimentali sulV 
Arte Logica. He considers the phenomena connected 
with the direct investigation of truth to be one of the 
most difficult to analyse of any presented to our notice. 
It is only by the most patient and careful attention to 
the inward movements of the mind, that we can possibly 
detect any of those laws which regulate its procedure 
in abstract reasonings.* 

The opinions of Antonio Eosmini, as to the founda- 
tion of logical science, have attracted a considerable 
share of attention, both in Italy and in other continen- 
tal countries. The account given of the foundations of 
human knowledge by Condillac, Eeid, Hume, Kant, 
and Stewart, did not appear satisfactory to him ; and, 
in consequence, he was determined to set out in search 
of a new org anon for himself. He seized hold of the 
idea of Being, and made it the starting-point of his 
system. He maintained, in his Nuovo Saggio (1830), 
that this idea was an innate idea — a notion, indeed, 

* Opera, torn. 12. 



412 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

which had often been entertained before. But he 
commenced to split this idea into fragments as it were, 
and hence arose his confusion and troubles. In the 
general working out of his theory, he stated matters 
which gave offence to some leading Catholic philo- 
sophers, both in his own country and in France, who 
censured his doctrines, and represented them as of a 
decidedly pantheistical character. Our limits will not 
permit entering into the nature or merits of this con- 
troversy; therefore we must refer the reader to the 
works on the subject. We shall merely give Eosmini's 
definition of this general idea of Being, which he affirms 
is the real foundation of all science and truth. He 
says, — 1st, This idea is not concrete, but abstract, and 
the ultimate possible abstraction. 2d, It is not indivi- 
dual or particular, but generic and universal. 3d, It 
is not personal, but common. 4th, It is not real, but 
ideal ; not effective, but possible. 5th, It subsists in 
itself, and is not a derivation from the resources of the 
human mind. 6th, It is not determined, but entirely 
indetermined. 7-th, It is not God. 8th, It is not an 
idea of, or any thing appertaining to, God. And, 9th, 
It is not the word (verb) of God.* 

Pietro Bottura's Logica (1833) is a work which 
enters fully into the general principles of logic. We have 
here treated of the nature of definition ; the grounds 
of human judgments, which are intuition, experience, 
and testimony ; on the nature of affirmative and nega- 
tive propositions ; and of the several kinds of demon- 
stration which arise from the genera and species of 
things. In addition to these leading points of his 

■ Tom. ii. pp. 712, 719, 722, 750. 



IN THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 413 

logic, Bottura points out at some length the errors in- 
volved in the logical theories of Condillac, Tracy, and 
others of the French school. Sig. Fabriano makes 
logical science rest on one of the great and primary 
divisions of the mind itself. This idea is developed in 
his Prospetto degli Studj Filosofici (1833). 

The Lezioni di Logica e di Metafisica (1841) of 
Baron Pasquale Grallupi is an important Italian work. 
The part devoted exclusively to logic is in the first 
volume. He takes a wide range in the treatment of 
his subject. In the respective works of Tommaseo, 
Sig. Manio, Salvatore Mancino, and Gioberti, there are 
important discussions on many of the leading principles 
of logical science. Count Terenzio Mamiani discusses 
the nature of method in his DeW Ontologia del Metodo 
(1841) at considerable length. He makes it rest on 
five principles, — namely, invention, induction, demon- 
stration, synthesis, and analysis. 

Logical speculations in Spain have undergone con- 
siderable change within these fifty years. In the first 
quarter of the present century, several of the French 
systems of logic found their way into the universities of 
the country ; chiefly with the view, however, to com- 
ment and refutation. The leading principles of Bacon, 
Descartes, and Locke, relative to logic, were discussed 
in a small work called Logica (1815), written by a 
Father Bostos. It displays a philosophical mind, and 
a candid and ingenuous spirit. The work points out 
what the writer conceived were the leading errors of 
the Novum Organum ; and then passes on to the 
consideration of Descartes and Locke, who find more 
favour in his eyes. The Elementos de Logica (1847) of 



414 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

D. Teodoro de Almeida is a popular treatise, written 
expressly for the instruction of young persons. It is a 
sensible work. 

We have a volume on logic from the pen of D. Ramon 
Marti de Eixala, one of the professors in the university 
of Barcelona, entitled, Corso di Filosofia Elemental- 
Compriendiendo la Theoria de las Ideas, la Gramatica 
general y la Logica (1847). The work is divided into 
three parts — Ontology, Grammar, and Logic. The 
last division contains a definition of logic ; the nature 
of perception, abstraction, analogy, &c. ; the nature of 
reasoning and judgment ; on authority and testimony, 
and the several kinds of demonstrative proofs ; and, 
finally, on method. 

The Logica (1850) of Don Jaime Balmes of Barce- 
lona is a work of talent, and displays an enlightened 
spirit. He thinks the syllogistic logic does not com- 
prehend the entire science : a knowledge of the opera- 
tions of the mind, and the particular evidence belonging 
to individual sciences, should be taken into account in 
every system of logical tuition. 

In most of the colleges of Spain the old scholastic 
logic prevails. It is very rare that we find any new 
principle introduced into the ordinary text-books used 
for university purposes. 

The state of logical literature in Portugal at the 
present time, is much upon a par with that of Spain. 
Some translations of French systems of logic, of the 
early part of the present century, are to be met with ; 
but most of the treatises on the science for educational 
purposes are of the ordinary scholastic character. A 
knowledge of logic is rendered imperative in the pro- 



IN THE SEVEEAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 415 

fessions of law and divinity in all the universities of the 
kingdom. 

In Sweden, at the early part of this century, we find 
B. H. Hoijer prosecuting logical subjects with great 
zeal and success. He wrote several able works on 
mental science generally, in which there are many 
scattered dissertations connected with the philosophy 
of reasoning. His aphorisms of transcendental logic 
was published at Upsal in 1812. He founds all 
operations connected with the especial prosecution of 
truth, no matter on what science, on the faculties of 
the mind, particularly those of an intuitive and reflec- 
tive character. Samuel Grubbe, a professor in the 
university of Upsal, undertook to develop the intellec- 
tual intuition of Schelling, and to apply it to the science 
of logical method. Grubbe attempted to reduce every 
thing to one single idea, and maintained the possibility 
of rearing upon it a complete system of knowledge, 
both as to mind and matter. He argues that this 
intellectual intuition, though admitted to be a pure 
assumption, does not place the speculations of Schelling 
upon a more insecure foundation than almost every 
other theory of knowledge is reared upon, however 
rational and popular it may appear to be. The great 
problem is, to demonstrate the finite from the infinite ; 
the relative from the absolute ; and the particular from 
the general. This, Grubbe thought he had accom- 
plished by his fuller illustration of this celebrated 
German theory. 

A. Lidbeck approved of the general logical theory of 
Schelling, and the commentaries upon it by Grubbe ; 
but he likewise thought that an eclectic system, framed 



416 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE 

out of the several systems of Wolff, Baumgarten, Sul- 
zer, and Kant, would be a near approximation to the 
true method of philosophizing. This system he deve- 
loped, and it proved popular for a time, but soon gave 
way to other more exciting novelties. Among the 
number of these, was G-eyer's treatise on the Nature of 
Truth. This is conducted much upon the same plan 
as Dr Beattie's Essay on Truth. Geyer connected the 
discussion as to the distinct nature of truth, and our 
specific faculties and powers of discerning and commu- 
nicating it, with the leading principles of theology. 
He treats of the evidence from the external senses ; of 
mathematical demonstration ; of cause and effect ; of 
analogy, testimony, &c. ; and shews their several logi- 
cal dependences upon the leading principles of religion. 
In 1820, Sodensten attempted, and with some success, 
to frame a system of logic out of the joint views of 
Wolff and Locke. 

C. M. Schoerbing, in attempting to dispense with 
all empirical sources of scientific evidence, ran into the 
opposite extreme of spiritual pantheism. He identifies 
truth and the Deity, thus destroying those notions of 
identity and personality requisite to purposes of all 
sound reasoning. In the logical philosophy of Atter- 
born and Almquist, two modern writers of great abi- 
lities and reputation, some subtile and original views 
are developed. 

In most of the logical works used in the Swedish 
universities within the last fifty years, there is more 
metaphysical matter introduced than is observable in 
similar works in this country published during the last 
century. The French theories of reasoning seem to 



IN THE SEVERAL NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT. 417 

have gained some ground in Sweden, particularly 
within the last ten or fifteen years. 

Henry StefFens, in the early part of this century, 
made the several logical theories of Germany pretty 
well known in Denmark and JSTorway. His writings 
are of an eclectic character, Fred. C. Sibbern took 
Hegel for his guide ; and in his Logik als Denklehre, 
&c. (1835), attempted to illustrate the system of the 
German philosophers, but with little success. The 
mystical views of Sibbern fell into disrepute. Heiberg 
was somewhat more successful. Though professing 
himself generally favourable to Hegel's doctrines, yet 
he gave them a more solid and common-sense direc- 
tion, in his Einleitenden Vortrag zum Logischen Cursus 
(1840). 

There are about 700 students in the University of 
Copenhagen, and nearly two-thirds of them attend the 
logic class. 

The German systems of logic have made some pro- 
gress within these thirty or forty years in Poland. 
J. S. Fuchs is a commentator of Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason; and Etienne Gyorgyi has a work on 
logic, which is a compound of the notions of Kant, 
and those of Locke and Wolff. This work was pub- 
lished at Posen in 1805. Sioism. Carlowszkv is a later 
Polish logician, whose works bear the date of 1830, 
and are of popular and academical character. There 
were public lectures in several districts of Poland in 
1840-41, on the logical systems of Schelling and 
Hegel ; but they are said to have failed in rendering 
these respective systems clearly understood. 

Logical literature has made great advances in seve- 

2d 



418 NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOGICAL LITERATURE. 

ral districts of the Eussian dominions within the last 
fifty years. There are few works published on the 
subject in Germany and France but what find their 
way to some of the seats of learning in that country. 
In the universities of Moscow, Krakow, Kiew, Kasan, 
St Petersburg, and Dorpat, regular courses of logical 
instruction are given every year ; and the general sys- 
tem followed in most of these places, is that of a mix- 
ture of formal with theoretical logic — the latter element 
varying with the opinions of the teacher. 



BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC. 419 



CHAPTER XXL 

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 
TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN AND 
IRELAND DURING THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS. 

We purpose confining the following statements solely 
to the manner in which logic has been taught in the 
several seminaries and seats of learning in our own 
country. We shall not make any direct allusion to 
such logical works as legitimately belong to the philo- 
sophical literature of the kingdom, and which are 
intended for general study and perusal. These will 
afterwards be noticed in due order. 

Cambridge and Oxford, being among the earliest 
university foundations of Europe, naturally, in reference 
to their studies and plans of education, partook of the 
spirit of ancient times; and the predominating elements 
in that spirit were, controversial divinity and dialectical 
or logical disputation. As has already been noticed, 
the Grecian logic became, after the introduction of the 
Christian religion, one of the chief instruments in the 
hands of theological disputants. There were, from 
the first, considerable difference of opinion relative to 
the Christian system, both as to doctrine and ritual 



420 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

observances ; and the ancient logic, with its forms, 
essences, entities, categories, and predicables, was 
soon found to be a powerful engine in disputatious 
warfare by every heated and zealous partisan. The 
consequence was, that logic became cultivated in all 
the universities in Europe more than any other art or 
science; and Cambridge and Oxford, from their very 
foundation, lay claim to a fair share of these logical 
honours. 

The University of Cambridge was at a very early 
period a logical seminary. We are told that, in 
the year 1109, Joffred, abbot of Croyland, intending 
to rebuild his monastery, which had been destroyed 
by fire, deputed G-islebert, with three other monks, 
to the manor of Cottingham, near Cambridge. These 
persons, it is stated, were talented and learned, well 
skilled in philosophical problems and in dialectics. 
They went daily to Cambridge, and hired a barn, in 
which they gave public lectures. As a part of this 
instruction it was appointed that, at ten o'clock, brother 
Terricus, an abl'e sophist, should read to the elder por- 
tion of the audience Aristotle's Logic, according to the 
commentaries of Porphyry and Averroes. 

In the reign of Henry VIII. a change was made in 
logical studies at this university, by order of that 
monarch. He ordered the work of Eudolphus Agri- 
cola, De Dialectica Inventione, to be used in conjunction 
with the works of Aristotle, instead of the logical com- 
mentaries of Duns Scotus and Barleses. It is said that 
the writings of Agricola, which had then become very 
popular in many parts of Europe, and had been trans- 
lated into French and Italian, exercised a considerable 



TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 421 

influence in effecting a change in the philosophical 
opinions of this seat of learning. 

Sir Eobert Read was a very popular lecturer on logic 
at Cambridge in 1584. It is said that there were very 
few students who did not avail themselves of his public 
instructions, which consisted of an hour five days of 
the week. 

In the course of the seventeenth century, the logical 
views of Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and Leibnitz, became 
known in Cambridge ; but they were not by any means 
generally adopted. Bacon was better known than any 
of the other three philosophers ; and about the middle 
of this century his Novum Organum seems to have been 
rather popular than otherwise. Anthony Wood says, 
Glanvil lamented that his friends did not send him to 
Cambridge ; because he used to say, that the new philo- 
sophy, and the art of philosophizing, were more culti- 
vated there than at Oxford. 

For more than a century, Cambridge has been greatly 
behind in the study and cultivation of logical philo- 
sophy; so much so, indeed, as to have become the 
object of reproachful contumely and scorn. The Edin- 
burgh Review of 1833 observes, " In Cambridge the 
fortune of the study is indicated by the fact, that the 
Elements of Logic of William Duncan of Aberdeen have 
long dispensed a muddy scantling of metaphysic, 
psychology, and dialectic, in the university where 
Downam taught." 

Oxford, as well as Cambridge, is highly celebrated 
for its early logical history. It occupies a conspicuous 
position in the scholastic ages. Anthony Wood, in his 
account of Oxford, revels with delight at its logical skill 



422 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

and reputation in the middle ages. " What university/' 
says he, " I pray, can produce an invincible Hales, an 
admirable Bacon, an excellent well-grounded Middleton, 
a subtile Scotus, an approved Burley, a resolute Bacon- 
thorpe ? all which persons flourished within the compass 
of one century. I doubt that neither Paris, Bologna, 
nor Rome, that great mistress of the Christian world, or 
any place else, can do what the renowned Bellosite 
(Oxford) hath done. And, without doubt, all impartial 
men may receive it for an undeniable truth, that the 
most able arguing in school divinity did take its begin- 
ning in England, and from Englishmen." * 

In the middle of the thirteenth century, Robert 
Gros teste, afterwards Bishop of Lincoln, lectured at 
Oxford on scholastic logic to large audiences. A short 
time after (in 1308) we find Duns Scotus teaching 
logic at Clare Hall. 

The Baconian logic had made some progress at 
Oxford in 1623, when the university presented an 
address to Bacon, who is represented " as a mighty 
Hercules, who had by his own hand greatly advanced 
those pillars in the learned world, which, by the rest of 
the world, were supposed irremoveable." 

Edward Sandys was a popular teacher of logic at 
Oxford in 1629, according to the system of Aristotle. 
He did not, however, adhere strictly to this system; 
for it is said that he was very partial to both Bacon 
and Locke, and frequently alluded to their respective 
logical views in his public lectures. 

In the fourth of Archbishop Laud's Statutes of 
Oxford (1636) it appears, "that the lecturer in logic 

* A the. Oxoniensis. vol. i. 



TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 423 

is, on Mondays and Thursdays, at eight o'clock in the 
morning, publicly to expound either the introduction 
of Porphyry, or some part of Aristotle's logic, by 
clearly and tersely explaining the text ; and he is not 
to dwell long on questions about the method or analysis 
of the book or text, but in the usual way to raise ques- 
tions pertinent to the subject of the book, and to resolve 
them with brevity and force." " The auditors of this 
lecturer are to be all scholars, from the end of their 
first year till they are presented for the degree of 
Bachelor of Arts." 

These Statutes were, however, gradually lost sight of; 
and a general laxity as to logical studies and philo- 
sophy was induced throughout the entire university. 
This subject has been of late so fully and accurately 
depicted by Sir William Hamilton, that I shall make 
no apology, on the present occasion, for quoting his 
remarks. 

" During the scholastic ages," says he, " Oxford was 
held inferior to no university throughout Europe ; and 
it was celebrated, more especially, for its philosophers 
and dialecticians. But it was neither the recollection 
of old academical renown, nor any enlightened per- 
suasions of its importance, that preserved logic among 
the subjects of academical tuition, when the kindred 
branches of philosophy, with other statutory studies, 
were dropt from the course of instruction actually 
given. These were abandoned from no conviction of 
their inutility, nor even in favour of others of superior 
value : they were abandoned when the system under 
which they could be taught was, for a private interest, 
illegally superseded by another, under which they could 



424 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

rest. When the college fellows supplanted the univer- 
sity professors, the course of statutory instruction 
necessarily fell with the statutory instruments by which 
it had been carried through. The same extensive, the 
same intensive, education which had once been possible 
when the work was distributed among a body of pro- 
fessors — each chosen for his ability, and each concen- 
trating his attention on a single study — could no longer 
be attempted when the collegiate corporations, a for- 
tuitous assemblage of individuals, were authorized to 
become sole teacher of the whole academical encyclo- 
paedia. But while the one unqualified fellow-tutor 
could not perform the work of a large body of quali- 
fied professors, it is evident that, as he could not 
rise and expand himself to the former system, the 
present, existing only for his behoof, must be con- 
tracted and brought down to hirn. This was accord- 
ingly done. The mode of teaching, and the subjects 
taught, were reduced to the required level and extent. 
The capacity of lecturing, that is, of delivering an 
original course Df instruction, was not now to be 
expected in the tutor. The pupil, therefore, read to 
his tutor a lesson out of a book — on this lesson the 
tutor might, at his discretion, interpose an observa- 
tion, or preserve silence ; and he was thus effectually 
guaranteed from all demands beyond his ability or 
inclination to meet. This reversed process was still 
denominated a lecture. In like manner, all subjects 
which required in the tutor more than the fellow's 
average of learning or acuteness, were eschewed. Many 
of the most important branches of education in the 
legal system were thus discarded ; and those which it 



TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 425 

was found necessary or convenient to retain in the 
intrusive, were studied in easier and more superficial 
treatises. This, in particular, was the case with logic. 

66 Until the statutory system was superseded, an 
energetic and improving exercise of mind, from the 
intelligent study of the most remarkable monument of 
philosophical genius imposed on all, was more especially 
secured in those who would engage in the subsidiary 
business of tuition. This, and other conditions of that 
system, thus demanded a far higher standard of quali- 
fication in the tutor, when the tutor was still only a 
subordinate instructor, than remained when he had 
become the exclusive organ of academical education. 
When, at last, the voice of the professors were silenced 
in the university and in the colleges, the fellows had 
been able to exclude all other graduates from the new 
principal office of tutor, the study of logic declined with 
the ability of those by whom the science was taught. 
The original treatises of Aristotle were now found to 
transcend the college complement of erudition and 
intellect. They were accordingly abandoned ; and with 
these the various logical works previously in academical 
use, which supposed any reach of thought, or an 
original acquaintance with the organon. The Compend 
of Sanderson stood its ground for a season, when the 
more elaborate treatises of Brerewood, Crakanthorpe, 
and Smiglecius were forgotten. But this treatise, the 
excellent work of an accomplished logician, was too 
closely related to the Organon, and demanded too 
frequently an inconvenient explanation, to retain its 
place, so soon as another text-book could be introduced, 
more accommodated to the fallen and falling standard 



426 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

of tutorial competency. Such a text-book was soon 
found in the Compendium of Aldrich."* 

Oxford's modern logical history is brief, and soon 
told. Aldrich's logic appeared in 1691. Of the nature 
and merits of this work, the learned and able writer 
we have just quoted, observes, " Absolutely considered, 
it has little or no value : it is but a slight eclectic 
epitome of one or two logical treatises in common use 
(that it is exclusively abridged from Wallis is incorrect); 
and when he wanders from, or mistakes his authorities, 
he displays a want of information to be expected, 
perhaps, in our generation, but altogether marvellous 
in his. It is clear that he knew nothing of the organon, 
and very little of the modern logicians. The treatise 
likewise omits a large portion of the most important 
matters ; and those it does not exclude are treated with 
a truly modifying brevity. As a slender introduction 
to the after study of logic (were there not a hundred 
better), it is not to be despised; as a full course of 
instruction, as an independent system of the science, it 
is utterly contemptible. Yet, strange to say, the Com- 
pend of Aldrich, having gradually supplanted the Com- 
pend of Sanderson, has furnished, for above a century, 
the little all of logic taught in these latter clays by the 
university of Bradwardin and Scotus."f 

About five and twenty years ago, Dr Whately's 
Elements of Logic made their appearance at Oxford, 
and were instantly effective in giving a new and vigo- 
rous impulse to dialectic pursuits. We shall notice this 
work in the following chapter. In the mean time we 
may mention, that the doctor informs us that at the 

* Edin. Review, 1833. t Ibid. 



TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 427 

period of the publication of his work logical studies 
were at the lowest ebb at the university. He says, " a 
very small proportion even of distinguished students 
ever became proficients in logic, and by far the greater 
proportion pass through the university without knowing 
any thing at all of the subject. I do not mean that 
they have not learned by rote a string of technical 
terms, but that they understand absolutely nothing 
whatever of the principles of the science." 

A great change has been effected in Oxford of late 
years, and almost solely through the labours of Dr 
Whately. Since the publication of his Elements, many 
excellent works have made their appearance from this 
venerable seat of learning, in different departments of 
logical science, some of which will be noticed more 
particularly in the following chapter of this volume. 

The logical systems taught in King's College, and 
University College, London, since their respective esta- 
blishment about twenty years ago, have been of an 
eclectic character, partly philosophical, and partly 
formal or syllogistic. 

We shall now briefly direct attention to the Scottish 
universities in reference to logical studies. These are 
Edinburgh, Glasgow, St Andrews, and Aberdeen. 

As we have already noticed, the leading Scottish 
divines, at the time of the Reformation, took a decided 
part against the scholastic logic, and did every thing 
they could to effect a change in the general routine of 
logical studies within the boundaries of their jurisdic- 
tion. The feeling against what was then considered 
one of the chief instruments of papal power, still mani- 
fested itself long after the principal events of the Eefor- 



428 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

mation had become merely matters of history. But 
so far back as 1647, more than two hundred years ago, 
the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, on 
account of several complaints having reached it relative 
to the manner of teaching the Aristotelian logic, 
appointed commissioners to inquire into the alleged 
grievances, and to suggest a remedy. In one, among 
the several acts of this commission, it is declared, " that 
the dyting (dictating) of long notes has, ill times past, 
proved not only a hindrance to the necessary studies, 
but also to the knowledge of the text itself, and to the 
examination of such things as are taught ; it is therefore 
recommended by the commissioners to the dean and 
faculty of arts, that the regents (the professors who had 
charge of educating the youth) spend not so much 
time in dyting of their notes ; that no new lesson be 
taught till the former be examined ; that every student 
have the text of Aristotle in Greek ; and that the 
regent first analyse the text, viva voce, and thereafter 
give the sum thereof in writing." 

In 1696, a parliamentary commission issued a variety 
of particular regulations respecting the course of logic 
and metaphysics in all the universities of Scotland. 
These regulations had for their object the purging of 
those institutions of heresy and infidelity. In 1699, 
this commission orders the several principals of univer- 
sities " to go through the whole system of philosophy 
(logic and metaphysics), to compendize it, and to make 
their remarks thereon, as they shall think fit ; and to 
present their remarks to the commission against their 
first meeting in June next, with certification ; if they 
fail, the commission will censure them for their con- 



TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 429 

tempt." In a second meeting of the commissioners, a 
few days after the promulgation of this order, they 
enumerated sixteen separate propositions in the pre- 
scribed courses of logic and metaphysics, which they 
find to be erroneous, and which they forbid to be 
taught, because they were contra fidem et bonos mores. 
About the same date, this same commission ordered 
the university of St Andrews to send to the university 
of Edinburgh copies of the systems of logic and meta- 
physics taught at St Andrews. 

The causes of these alleged heresies arose from cer- 
tain tenets which had been industriously circulated 
throughout the Scottish universities on the Epicurean 
philosophy, taken from the commentaries on it, pub- 
lished by the celebrated Gassendi. 

It does not, however, appear that any very great 
changes in the abstract principles of logical studies 
were ever recommended by the Scottish divines as a 
body. What changes were subsequently effected in 
the several universities of Scotland, of a systematic 
character, arose from individual teachers of the science, 
and the progress of philosophy in general. 

We shall now make a few statements and remarks 
on the several universities of Scotland in regular order. 

Glasgow University. — This university has been 
distinguished, for the last century especially, for the 
importance attached to logical studies ; and also for the 
great and, in the opinion of many, judicious changes 
introduced into the mode of treating the science of 
logic generally, both as to its principles and forms. 

The logic of Ramus was introduced here at the time 



430 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

of the Reformation ; and, up to a comparatively modern 
date, continued to be exclusively taught within the 
walls of this university. 

In 1727, a royal visitation of the university took 
place, and certain changes in the mode and times of 
giving lectures on logic and metaphysics were recom- 
mended by it ; but these alterations only effected the 
plan of teaching logic, and did not in the least effect 
any alteration in the mode of discussing the principles 
of the science. 

In 1750, Adam Smith, the author of The Wealth of 
Nations, was appointed to the logic chair in Glasgow, 
but he only held it for one year. 

In 1774, Dr Jardin was appointed professor of 
logic in Glasgow university — a man of active mind and 
sound judgment. He made great alterations in the 
mode of studying logic. He tells us that his " class 
opened on the 10th October with reading and com- 
menting on some portions of the memorabilia of So- 
crates, which exercise continued two or three weeks, 
until the greater part of the students were assembled. 
On the 1st of November, the proper business of the 
course began with an explanation of Aristotle's logic. 
This subject occupied the attention of the class till 
about the beginning of February, when the professor 
entered upon metaphysics" The doctor goes on to 
inform us how the public feeling against the scholastic 
or old logic gradually increased, until it was found 
absolutely necessary to make great changes in the 
mode of teaching logical science. He says : " Having 
myself attended the logic class in this university, I 
remember well the general impression which was made 



TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 431 

upon my mind by the lectures then delivered, and also 
the opinion which was entertained of them by the more 
intelligent of my fellow-students. The sentiment which 
universally prevailed among us was, that though the pro- 
fessor explained the subjects of which he treated with 
great perspicuity and distinctness, yet no useful or per- 
manent effects could possibly result from his prelections, 
either in the way of promoting activity of mind, or of 
establishing sound scientific principles." . . . - " This 
conviction of the general uselessness, and even positively 
hurtful consequences, of spending six or seven months 
in the study of logic and metaphysics, was not confined 
to the youth within the walls of the college. From the 
time that the lectures began to be delivered in English, 
the eyes of men were opened to the unsuitable nature 
of the subjects of which they treated ; and the defects 
of the system, as embracing a very important part of 
public education, became every day more striking, and 
called more loudly for a radical reform. It was ob- 
served by those who interested themselves in this 
question, that the subjects introduced in the logic 
class, even when perfectly understood, had little or no 
connexion with that species of knowledge which was 
necessary to prepare the student either for the specu- 
lative pursuits of science, or for the active business of 
life. The local situation, too, of this university — in 
a great commercial city, where a quick perception of 
utility, and a clear insight into the adaptation of means 
to ends, may be supposed to predominate — gave fre- 
quent occasion to animadversions on our scheme of 
preparatory instruction. Intelligent persons who sent 
their sons to the logic class, although not themselves 



432 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

proficient in literature, could not fail to observe that 
the subjects to which their attention was directed had 
no relation to any profession or employment whatever ; 
that the discussions connected with them had no ana- 
logy to those trains of thinking which prevail in the 
ordinary intercourse of society ; and, in short, that 
nothing could be derived from prelections on such 
topics which was likely in the smallest degree either to 
adorn conversation, or to qualify the student for the 
concerns of life."* 

Dy Jar din goes on, in his Essay, to state that he 
found it was absolutely necessary to effect a great 
change in his logical instructions; and, after much 
anxious thought, he came to the conclusion of ground- 
ing his system entirely upon an analysis of the mental 
faculties. "The particular department," says he, " of 
mental science I have selected for the business of this 
class, is an analysis of the powers of the understanding, 
— perception, attention, consciousness, reflection, me- 
mory, imagination, abstraction, judgment, and reason- 
ing. The object of this analysis, I need hardly observe, 
is to communicate distinct notions of those original 
faculties — their operations and offices — their connexion 
and intimate dependence upon each other." 

This formed the basis of Dr Jardin's logical theory. 
He did not, however, altogether discard the syllogism. 
He thought it a useful instrument in particular cases. 
The following remarks convey his views on the subject 
of logic generally, as fully as can well be done in so 
short a compass : — 

te It is by minute attention to the progress of the 

* Outlines of a Philo. Education, p. 25. 



TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 433 

reasoning faculties, in the different situations in which 
man is placed, that we shall most successfully lay the 
foundations of an act of reasoning ; for here especially, 
according to Lord Bacon, we must obey nature, observe 
her dictates, and follow the course she prescribes. She 
imperatively enjoins that the first efforts of art should 
be directed to the improvement of those powers of the 
mind by which we form clear, just, and distinct notions 
— by which we discriminate likewise differences and 
relation among the various subjects of our knowledge — 
as being the only solid basis for an enlightened educa- 
tion. It is indeed impossible to teach men to reason 
until they have been first taught to know — that is, to 
form clear and accurate conceptions of the things about 
which they are to reason ; and, when the former pro- 
cess shall be correctly accomplished, few rules will be 
necessary to direct them to the latter. Thus, in the 
different professions and occupations of life, we find 
that men reason easily and justly from mere habit, and 
without any assistance of an artificial logic ; because, 
from their daily pursuits, they have formed distinct 
notions relative to the several objects about which their 
reason is employed. 

" But though, by this natural logic, as it may be 
called, the understanding may be so improved as to 
answer all the practical purposes of life, it frequently 
happens, in certain cases where a man is called upon 
to exercise his reason, that the assistance of art may be 
extremely useful. When the objects presented to the 
mind are of an abstract, general, or complicated nature, 
the logical instruments of definition, division, and 

2 E 



434 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

classification, may be applied with great advantage ; 
and when, in the comparison of different objects, of 
which the relations are so remote or obscure that 
they cannot be discovered but by means of intermediate 
ideas connected with both extremes, the faculty of 
reason finds again resources in art, which, by suggesting 
certain positions and arrangements of thought, lead the 
mind by safe and easy steps to the perception of truth. 
We have accordingly received from the philosophers 
of Greece an art for improving and directing the power 
of reason — a system of rules according to which, in 
particular cases at least, comparison may be fairly 
made, and conclusions justly deduced."* 

We have thus been induced to dwell upon the system 
which Dr Jardin introduced into the university of Glas- 
gow at some length, — partly from the extended period 
he occupied the logic chair, full fifty years, and partly 
from the widely spread and distinguished reputation he 
has left behind him as a teacher and logician. 

We shall now merely add a few remarks from the 
Commissioners' Eeport of 1830 relative to this univer- 
sity : — " Logic is here taught with rhetoric. The first 
division of the logical course contains an analysis of the 
powers of the understanding, with the means of im- 
proving, assisting, and directing them in the acquisition 
of knowledge, and in the investigation of truth. Dr 
Buchanan continues the system of Dr Jardin, with 
such alterations as his own experience has suggested 
to him. He thinks logic could not be taught to 
young persons without examination ; and he conceives 
the examinations and the hearing of essays to be more 

* Essay, 126. 



TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 435 

useful than delivering lectures. Average number of 
students (1828), 150." 

Marischal College, Aberdeen. — This college was 
founded in 1593. Logic was here originally taught in 
the first course as a necessary study to every other. 
This has been reversed for many years, and it now 
takes the last place. Logical tuition is given here in 
conjunction with moral philosophy. 

The Commissioners' Eeport of 1830 states, that " the 
system followed here as to logical studies is, that the 
lecturer must shew that the foundation of a proper 
system of logic must be laid in an analysis of the mental 
faculties ; the distinction of the various kinds of terms 
and the right use of them are explained ; the nature 
and varieties of propositions are pointed out ; there is 
given an analysis of arguments, shewing how then- truth 
may be discovered, or their fallacy detected ; and there 
is subjoined a description of the methods of classifica- 
tion and arrangement, which best enables us to retain 
and to apply the knowledge we have acquired. Ave- 
rage number of students in logic class, 34." 

King's College, Aberdeen. — This college was found- 
ed in 1506. Logic is taught in this establishment in 
conjunction with rhetoric. The scholastic system was 
the established one here till about the middle of the 
last century. 

In the new regulations of King's College in 1753, it 
was, among other things, recommended that the study 
of logic should be shortened, to give more time for the 
acquisition of historical knowledge. 



436 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

Till about 1760, logic, with the abstract sciences, 
took precedence over mathematics and natural philo- 
sophy ; because it was alleged that these sciences could 
not be successfully taught while men were ignorant of 
the art of reasoning and the rules of judging. But 
this rule was altered upon the ground, " that mankind 
are now fully convinced of the inefficiency of the syllo- 
gistic art to guide the understanding in the discovery 
of truth. The logic which can answer this end must 
have for its groundwork all arts and sciences, and be 
founded on an analysis and natural history of the in- 
tellectual faculties. Every illustration and maxim 
must be derived from these sources ; and its rules can 
be understood no further than the several sciences 
which it reviews and criticizes are understood. Nor is 
the previous knowledge of logical rules necessary to- 
wards acquiring the elements of science. Man exercises 
his understanding before he is formally instructed in 
the rules of reasoning. Upon these grounds, logic 
was considered to belong more naturally to the last 
than the first part of a philosophical course of educa- 
tion." 

St Andrew's University. — Up to the period of the 
appointment of Mr Henry Bymer to the logic chair of 
St Andrews in 1747, the logical system of Peter Ramus 
had been generally taught in the university. Rymer, 
however, was a zealous disciple of Locke's, and a great 
admirer, too, of Bacon's Novum Organum ; and he 
made the first regular departure from the old formal 
system. He introduced, as a course of preliminary 
lectures, the leading logical views of both Bacon and 



TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 437 

Locke. Still, however, the formal or syllogistic rules 
were retained, but made to follow as a sort of secondary 
course of logical study. Mr Kobert Watson succeeded 
Professor Rymer in 1756, and followed the same gene- 
ral plan of tuition as his predecessor. 

Mr William Barron succeeded Mr Watson in 1778. 
The logical system which Mr Barron taught is founded 
on the doctrines of the common sense school of thinking. 
The cultivation of the understanding or reason, he 
says, ought to be the great object of all mental im- 
provements. " It is the faculty by which we are most 
distinguished above the creatures of this world, and by 
which, perhaps, we partake most of the constitution of 

superior natures." " Of all arts, then, that 

surely is entitled to attention which pretends to tell us 
how we may improve and properly employ this most 
useful faculty ; and logic is that art. The professed 
purpose of it is to teach the right use of reason, both 
in the investigation and in the communication of truth ; 
to inform us how to introduce clearness and good order 
among our ideas ; to explain the operations of the 
mind which are conversant about them ; and by the 
proper exercise of which operations we shall be least in 
danger of deviating into error."* 

According to this view of the object of logic, he 
treats it under two leading divisions : — the nature of 
ideas, which are the materials on which the reason or 
understanding acts ; and the nature of the faculties or 
powers of the mind which are immediately engaged 
in the act of reasoning. The explanations under 

* Barron's Lectures, vol. ii. p. 362. 



438 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

these two heads, embrace the whole science or art of 
logic which can be of any utility whatever. 

On the nature of the syllogistic logic, Mr Barron 
makes the following remarks : — " The principal opera- 
tions of any investigation are the invention of inter- 
mediate ideas, and the comparison of them with one 
another, and with the extremes. The invention of 
middle terms is the chief operation, and excellence in 
it is the most important qualification any inquirer can 
possess. It seems to depend on natural sagacity and 
acuteness, fortified and improved by exercise. ~No art 
can be of any use. From syllogism, in particular, no 
aid can be derived. It does not even pretend to give 
any aid. Its only object is to assist in the second 
operation, the comparison of ideas ; and we have seen 
that the syllogistic exhibition is not more perspicuous 
than the natural one." . . . " What is the mystery of 
this mighty syllogistic art, which has so long engaged 
the attention of learned men, and is still accounted 
by many of that description to contain something 
mysterious, or to be an analysis of the art of reason- 
ing ? It is no more than this : whatever agrees with 
any genus, will agree with ever species of that genus ; 
or whatever disagrees with any genus, will disagree 
with every species of that genus. If this be the prin- 
ciple of the art, can we wonder at the self-evidence of 
all the conclusions of all its syllogisms, or that it never 
gratified science or business with the discovery of any 
useful truth?"* 

Mr Joseph Hunter succeeded Mr Barron as profes- 

* Lect., vol, ii. p. 540. 



TAUGHT IK THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 439 

sor of logic in 1806. He followed his immediate pre- 
decessor in the mode of treating the science, making 
it dependent upon a knowledge of the faculties of the 
understanding. 

The Eeport of the Parliamentary Commission of 
1830, makes the following statements on the logical 
tuition of St Andrews : — " The professor of logic 
teaches one class on five days of the week one hour, 
from eleven to twelve each day. He commences his 
prelections with an investigation of the powers of ex- 
ternal perception, as exercised through the medium of 
the five senses; passing thence to an analysis of the 
intellectual operations of attention, conception, ab- 
straction, association of ideas, memory, imagination, 
judgment, and reasoning, he next considers the various 
sources of our prejudices and errors, and the means 
which have been devised to guard against them ; tak- 
ing here a hasty survey of the syllogistic logic of 
Aristotle, and pointing out the advantages which in- 
duction, or the study of facts, must ever possess over 
the multiplication of verbal distinctions. He then 
concludes his logic course with some lectures on 
method, explaining its nature, and shewing its import- 
ance as an indispensable preparation for profitable 
study, and for perspicuous and persuasive writing." 

Among the general suggestions of the Commissioners 
in treating of the university of St Andrews, is one point- 
ing out the advantages which would follow from a system 
of examination on the logical lectures delivered. The 
report states : " Eow, mere lecturing is a very imperfect 
mode of teaching. Addressing itself in the same way 
to minds of the greatest variety as to acumen, it must 



440 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

necessarily leave a multiplicity of matters obscure to 
some that may be perfectly clear and comprehensible 
to others, and may thus be available in many cases to 
communicate only the most superficial information. It 
does not, moreover, supply necessarily any stimulus 
whatever to mental exertion — any excitement to culti- 
vate habits of reflection, of judging, of reasoning, of 
arrangement, of statement and communication, the 
great object of all academical tuition. Very advanced 
students may perhaps find no other aid necessary for 
forwarding them in their course. But the great mass 
of students are not singularly gifted persons, and must 
be catechised — must be dealt with in easy colloquy- — 
must be indulged with explanations — must frequently 
perform exercises, in order to insure to them the most 
ordinary portion of learned attainment."* 

Mr William Spalding was successor to Mr Hunter, 
and entered on his duties in 1845. Professor Spalding 
enters more fully into the syllogistic logic in his lec- 
tures than any of his predecessors for the last century. 
The number of logical students average about forty 
annually. 

Thus we see that, till within these few years, the 
mere formal logic was almost entirely banished from 
the Scottish colleges, and a system adopted in its stead 
which had for its direct object the improvement of the 
entire mental faculties, with a view of conducting the 
mind to the highest logical manifestations. This mode 
of teaching logic had a powerful and direct tendency 
to uphold the speculative views of the common sense 
philosophy. Indeed, the mode of teaching this science 

* Report, p. 51. 



TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 441 

was a pure exponent of the mental principles of this 
school relative to reasoning generally. 

Edinburgh University. — The foundation of this seat 
of learning is intimately associated with the science of 
logic. It may be said to have been founded by the 
labours and munificence of a Mr James Lawson, a 
minister of Edinburgh, who was a passionate admirer 
of logical studies, and whose aim was to introduce them 
to public notice and favour through the medium of a 
school on an extended scale. General philosophy was 
to be taught in it ; but the scholars were to be instructed, 
in an effective and careful manner, in every thing that 
appertained to dialectical knowledge and skill. 

The logical system of Peter Ramus was countenanced 
at an early period in the history of this seat of learning. 
In 1604, we find the students were interrogated on his 
Dialectics and the Ars Syllogistica. Porphyry and the 
categories were also used — together with Aristotle's 
Topics and book of Sophisms. In 1615, we find a Mr 
Young professor of logic in this university — a gentle- 
man who enjoyed an unrivalled reputation as an able 
and subtile expounder of Aristotle's system. 

The formal appointment of the logic chair in Edin- 
burgh, bears date from the year 1708. Up to a certain 
period this chair was held in conjunction with that of 
rhetoric. 

Mr John Stevenson was appointed logical professor 
in 1730. The science of metaphysics was likewise 
joined to his chair. The logic class was the second in 
the course, and the lectures were given in the Latin 
language. Mr Stevenson, it appears, did not admire 



442 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

the scholastic logic ; but he, at the same time, thought 
it his duty to give a distinct sketch of its history and 
nature, and to render that art which had been the 
admiration of ages in some measure understood by his 
students. His conviction was, that the Aristotelian 
logic presented a formidable barrier to the free and 
expansive movements of the human mind, and to the 
extension of useful and popular information; and he 
was, consequently, particularly anxious to impress upon 
the minds of his young auditory, that truth was not to 
be discovered by the employment of such an instru- 
ment. The work he used as a text-book was the logical 
treatise of Heineccius. He did not, however, follow it 
slavishly, as may readily be surmised — inasmuch as this 
work is strongly tinged with Aristotelian principles and 
forms. At the time Mr Stevenson was appointed to the 
logic chair, the philosophy of Locke had just reached 
the university. Mr Stevenson entered warmly into its 
spirit, and was, in fact, the first person of any note who 
introduced to academical students the Essay on the 
Human Understanding. He also introduced to his 
class Dr Wynne's abridgement of the Essay, which he 
considered a highly useful publication. A short time 
after, Professor Stevenson adopted this abridgement of 
Locke's work as a text-book, and was thus instrumental 
in laying the foundation of the English philosophical 
system in the university. He died in 1775, having 
held the logic chair £ov forty -four years. 

Mr John Bruce was appointed Mr Stevenson's suc- 
cessor. His system of logical tuition was founded on 
Locke and Bacon's philosophy. According to Bruce, 
scientific evidence rested on three general principles, — 



TAUGHT IN, THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 443 

the evidence of consciousness or attention, the evidence 
of sensation, and the evidence of cause and effect. Mr 
Bruce resigned his chair in 1792. 

Dr James Finlayson succeeded Mr Bruce, and held 
the logic chair till 1808. His general logical instruc- 
tions were grounded on the principles of the common 
sense philosophy, then all prevalent in Scotland. Dr 
Finlayson was an ardent admirer of the opinions of the 
late Dugald Stewart, on the practicability and useful- 
ness of a philosophical logic. 

Dr David Ritchie was Dr Finlayson's successor, and 
filled the chair till the appointment of Sir William 
Hamilton in 1836. 

The Commissioners appointed to examine into the 
Scotch colleges in 1830, make the following observa- 
tions, in their Report, on the subject of logical studies 
in the university of Edinburgh : — " The logic class 
meets one hour each day, for five days of the week, 
during the session of five months and a half. Some 
students so young as thirteen have entered this class ; 
but in general they are about fifteen years of age, and 
many of them older. The average number who attend 
is from 170 to 175, or 180. The lectures are divided 
into four parts, — the first consists of a view of intellec- 
tual philosophy, or a description of the faculties by 
which we acquire the elements of our knowledge, the 
laws which regulate their operation, and the imperfec- 
tions to which they are liable, with hints for their 
improvement. The second part comprehends the 
theory of evidence, and includes a view of demonstra- 
tive evidence, of the evidence of sense, consciousness, 
memory, testimony, experience, analogy, mixed mathe- 



444 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

matics, and the calculation of chances. The third 
includes reasoning, and explaining syllogistic reason- 
ing, with the various abridged modes of it in common 
use, and the sophisms or fallacious reasonings connected 
with it ; and, secondly, inductive reasoning, and a view 
of the prejudices which are apt to mislead the mind. 
The fourth part explains the analytical and synthetic 
method of conducting our reasonings, as well as the 
Socratic and controversial method, and the principles 
of interpreting written documents. The course con- 
cludes with a view of the theory of language, or prin- 
ciples of universal grammar."* 

About three years after the Report of the Govern- 
ment Commissioners on the state of the Scotch univer- 
sities, from which we have taken some passages, there 
appeared in the Edinburgh Review some pungent 
remarks on the state of logical knowledge and tuition 
in Scotland generally. The writer, Sir William Hamil- 
ton, observes, that in the colleges " of Scotland the 
chairs of logic have for generations taught any thing 
rather than the science which they nominally profess — 
a science, by the way, in which the Scots have not 
latterly maintained the reputation once established by 
them in all, and still retained in other departments of 
philosophy. To the philosophers of our country we 
must confess, that in part at least is to be attributed 
the prevalence of the erroneous notions on this subject 
promulgated by Locke. ~No system of logic deserving 
of notice ever appeared in Scotland ; and for Scottish 
writers of any merit we must travel back for more 
than two centuries, to three contemporary authors. 

' Report, 1830. 



TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GREAT BRITAIN. 445 

whose abilities, like those indeed of almost all the 
more illustrious scholars of their nation, were developed 
under foreign influence — to Robert Balfour, Mark 
Duncan, and William Chalmers, professors in the 
universities of Bordeaux, Samur, and Angers." 

Sir William Hamilton succeeded Dr Ritchie in 1836 
in the Edinburgh University. About fours years after 
this, it is said that the professor introduced what is 
termed his new analytic method of teaching formal logic. 
This method proceeds on a thoroughgoing quantification 
of the predicate. By the adoption of this principle we are 
told that " past evils are corrected, past omissions sup- 
plied, and logic receives its highest development in the 
perfection and simplicity of its form." 

The entire doctrine of the conversion of svlloo-isms 
is, on the principle of this new analytic method of Sir 
William's, pronounced to be useless and false. " This 
inconsistent and cumbrous doctrine resulted, as we 
have said, from a false analvsis bv logicians of the ele- 
ments with which they had to deal. The whole doc- 
trine is founded upon the relation of quantity between 
the subject and predicate in a proposition ; but if a 
principal element of that relation be left out, the doc- 
trine will of course be defective. Logicians stand 
chargeable with this neglect. They commenced to 
recompose their system before, by thorough decompo- 
sition, they had obtained all the elements requisite for 
that purpose."* 

In Ireland there are three collegiate institutions where 

* New Analytic of Logical Forms, p. 30, Edinburgh, 1850, to which the reader 
is referred for a full account of the system . 



446 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEMS OF LOGIC 

logic forms an essential part of academical learning : 
Trinity College, Dublin, the Eoman Catholic College 
of Maynooth, and the three Queen's Colleges of Cork, 
Galway, and Belfast, now embodied into one university. 

In Trinity College, Dublin, logic has been taught 
from the system of Archbishop Murray, enlarged and 
commented on by Mr Walker and other writers. In 
the preface to the edition of his book of 1847, it is 
stated that " many writers consider the study of logic 
as the proper introduction to a metaphysic, others as 
intended as a prelude to mathematical pursuits, and 
accordingly works on logic have been composed with 
reference to either of these views ; but until some sys- 
tem of logic is produced in our language, which is 
founded upon, and grows out of some philosophical 
system, it is surely better for the student to study a 
purely formal logic, independent of any philosophical 
system, and yet applicable to all. Such are the senti- 
ments of a celebrated writer, and such have been the 
views of the University of Dublin in their adoption of 
the present treatise." 

In the introduction to the archbishop's work, now 
used as a text-book, it is stated, that after the student 
goes through the syllogistic logic, he is introduced to 
the new or modern logic of Mr Locke's Essay on the 
Human Understanding. 

In the Catholic College of Maynooth, in Ireland, 
logic is taught with great care and erudition. All 
students are examined on the science when they enter 
the college. The system taught is of a comprehensive 
character, although the text-books in common use pre- 
sent but a meagre outline of the study. But the 



TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF GEE AT BRITAIN. 447 

professor of logic invariably examines the students in 
reference to their knowledge of the most elaborate 
and systematic works. The logical philosophy coun- 
tenanced, however, has a decided leaning to theological 
science, as well as to those particular views of scientific 
truth which the Catholic clergy generally entertain 
and promulgate in their ordinary channels of philo- 
sophical literature. The number of logical students 
amounts to about sixty annually. 

In the Queen's Colleges, the logic class is only now 
about to open. There is no prescribed mode of teach- 
ing the science ; and it is quite open to the several 
logical professors to adopt any system of tuition, in 
accordance with their own individual judgment. 



448 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 



CHAPTEE XXII. 

THE LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OF A PHILOSOPHIC AND 
SYSTEMATIC CAST, FROM THE YEAR 1800 TILL THE PRESENT 
DAY. 

The logical works of Great Britain during the last half 
century have been both numerous and important. The 
first twenty years of this period were comparatively 
unfruitful ; but since then both logical studies and 
literature have received fresh impulses and a somewhat 
new direction. 

At the commencement of this century we have Mr 
Belsham's Logic (1801). He defines his subject thus : 
" The use of logic is to guide and assist the intellectual 
powers in the investigation of truth, and the commu- 
nication of it to others." . . . " Logic is not, as some 
have supposed, a mere explanation of scholastic phrases, 
nor, as others have imagined, the art of disputing by 
mechanical forms ; but it is one branch of the theory 
of the human mind applied to a valuable practical 
purpose." 

Mr Belsham keeps to the old division of his subject 
into four parts — Perception, Judgment. Reasoning, and 



AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 449 

Disposition ; the four operations of the mind employed 
in the acquisition and communication of knowledge. 

Dr Richard Kirwan's Logic (1807) is a highly re- 
spectable and useful treatise. He defines logic thus : — 
(; Logic is both a science and an art ; it is a science 
inasmuch as, by analysing the elements, principles, and 
structure of arguments, it teaches us how to discover 
their truth, or detect their fallacies, and point out the 
sources of such errors. It is an art, inasmuch as it 
teaches how to arrange arguments in such a manner 
that their truth may be most readily perceived, or their 
falsehood detected.'' * 

Up to the year 1820, the writings of Dngald Stewart 
on mental philosophy occupied the chief place in public 
estimation, relative to the abstract nature and application 
of the principles of logical science. Some of his principal 
works made their appearance during the early part of the 
present century. They abound with many most ingeni- 
ous speculations on logical studies generally, and on the 
varied character of the evidence which belongs to many 
individual departments of scientific investigation. Much, 
valuable instruction is to be derived from the volumes he 
published within the period now mentioned. We shall 
not, however, refer to them again, as we have already 
made a formal allusion to them in a previous chapter. 
We have classed their highly-gifted author with the 
philosophical school to which he belonged, and to which 
lie was so great an ornament. 

When Dr Thomas Brown's Lectures on the Philo- 
sophy of the Human Mind (1822) made their appear- 
ance, a new direction was given to mental science ; and 

* Vol. i. p. 1. 
2 F 



450 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

the subject of reasoning, and logical deduction and 
inference, were handled after a new fashion. Brown's 
theory of the argumentative process was altogether 
different from that of his predecessor's, Professor 
Stewart : in fact, they had nothing in common, save 
perhaps the unity of sentiment which both philosophers 
expressed on the inutility of the syllogism, or all mere 
formal looic. 

The science of looic or of reasoning forms one of the 
divisions in Brown's system of the philosophy of mind. 
His general position is, that there are no independent 
or distinct faculties of the intellect, but simply different 
states of it. Every thing is merged into one universal 
law, which he calls the Jaiv of suggestion. This sugges- 
tion is either simple or relative. All reasoning belongs 
to the latter. Propositions of every kind are but the 
verbal enunciation of the relation of two terms. Every 
proposition implies an analysis ; and there may be 
propositions expressive of position, of resemblance, of 
order, of proportion, of degree, and of comprehension. 

Brown makes no distinction between reason and 
judgment — a distinction which is found in almost every 
other work on logic. Eeasoning with him is nothing 
more than a series of relative suggestions, or feelings 
of relation, which, in being expressed in formal lan- 
guage, constitute a series of propositions. The terms 
reason and judgment, may be indifferently applied to 
the susceptibility of feeling these relations. He says, 
" The natural progress of reasoning I have already 
explained to you, and illustrated by examples, both of 
the analytic and proportional kind. One conception 
follows another conception, according to certain laws 



AXD THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 451 

of suggestion, to which our Divine Author lias adapted 
our mental constitution ; and, by another set of laws 
which the same Divine Author has established, certain 
feelings of relation arise from the consideration of the 
suggesting and suggested object. This is all in which 
reasoning, as felt by us, truly consists. We have the 
conception of A ; it suggests B ; and these two con- 
ceptions coexisting, we feel some relation which they 
bear to each other, B, thus suggested, suggests C ; 
and the relation of these is felt in like manner; and 
thus, through the longest ratiocination, analytical or 
proportional, each subject of our thought suggests 
something which forms a part of it, and is involved in 
it, or something which has to it a certain relation of 
proportion ; and the relation of comprehension in the 
one case, or of proportion in the other case, is felt 
accordingly at every step. Nothing, surely, can be 
simpler than a process of this kind ; and it is not easy 
to conceive how the process could be made shorter 
than nature herself has rendered it, unless every 
truth were known to us by intuition. Objects, and 
the relation of objects — these are all which reasoning 
involves ; and these must always be involved in every 
reasoning, While reasoning, then, or a series of pro- 
positions, is necessary for the development of truth, 
the intervening conceptions which form the subjects 
of those propositions that connect one remote concep- 
tion with another, must arise successively in the mind, 
and their relations be felt, in like manner, successively. 
What is it which the syllogistic art would confer on us 
in addition ? To shorten the process of arriving at 
truth, it forces us to use in every case three proposi- 



452 LOGICAL LITERATIM OF GREAT BRITAIN 

tions, instead of the two which nature directs us to 
use. Instead of allowing us to say, i Man is fallible; be 
may therefore err even when be thinks himself most 
secure from error' — which is the spontaneous order of 
analysis in reasoning — -the syllogistic art compels us to 
take a longer journey to the same conclusion by the 
use of what it calls a major proposition — a proposition 
which never rises spontaneously, for the best of all 
reasons, that it cannot rise without our knowledge 
of the very truth which is by supposition unknown. 
To proceed in the regular form of a syllogism, we 
must say, 'All beings that are fallible may err even 
when they think themselves most secure from error. 
But man is a fallible being ; he may therefore err even 
when he thinks himself most secure from error.' In 
our spontaneous reasonings, in which we arrive at 
precisely the same conclusions, and with a feeling of 
evidence precisely the same, there are, as I have said, 
no major propositions, but simply what, in this futile 
art, are termed technically the minor and the conclu- 
sion. The invention and formal statement of a major 
proposition, then, in every case, serve only to retard 
the progress of discovery, not to quicken it, or render 
it in the slightest degree more sure." Again, he 
observes, " The syllogism, therefore, which proceeds 
from the axiom to the demonstration of particulars, 
reverses completely the order of reasoning, and begins 
with the conclusion in order to teach us how we may 
arrive at it. It is in the great journey of truth, as if, in 
any of our common journeyings from place to place — 
from Edinburgh to London, for example — we were to 
be directed first to go to London, and then to find out 



AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 453 

York, or some other intermediate town, when we 
might be quite sure of knowing the way from York to 
London, because we must already have travelled it. 
Is this the sort of direction which we could venture to 
give to any traveller ? or would not every traveller, if 
we were to venture to give them such a direction, 
smile at our folly ?"* 

On the nature of logical science generally, Dr 
Brown makes the following remarks : — " That there 
may be, or rather that there is, a rational logic, I 
am far from denying ; and many useful directions, in 
conformity with a certain system of rules, may be 
given to the inexperienced student, that may facilitate 
to him acquisition of knowledge, which, but for such 
directions, he would have made only more slowly, or 
perhaps not made at all. The art of reasoning, how- 
ever, which a judicious logic affords, is not so much 
the art of acquiring knowledge as the art of commu- 
nicating it to others, or recording it in a manner that 
may be most profitable for our own future advance- 
ment in the track which we have been pursuing." . . . 
•'• If an art of reasoning is to be given to us, it is surely 
to be an art which is to render the acquisition of 
knowledge more easy, not more difficult — an art which 
is to avail itself of the natural tendency of the mind to 
the discovery of truth, not to counteract this tendency, 
and to force the mind, if it be possible, to suspend the 
very progress which was leading it to truth." 

Thus we see, that it is the distinctive characteristic 
of Dr Brown's theory of reasoning, that all the logical 
powers of the understanding are absorbed in conscious^ 

* Lecture 49 > 



454 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

ness, and tills consciousness is again resolved into 
simple feeling. There is but one principle or law of 
the mind — that of suggestion — which regulates the 
several combinations and successions of feelings, and 
which imparts that unity of operation and design 
which enters into every conception we can form of 
mind or intellect as a whole. In reference to cause 
and effect/ which enter into the logical systems of 
many authors, Dr Brown identifies causation with 
succession. The principle he holds is simply this — 
Every cause is an invariable antecedent ; therefore 
every invariable antecedent is a cause. 

Archbishop Whately's Elements of Logic (1825), 
is one of the most important and influential logical 
publications of modern times. It is an able and 
popular exposition of the scholastic logic ; and has, 
in fact, been the main instrument in producing the 
revival of the syllogistic system in Great Britain. The 
work has gone through many editions, and is used 
more or less, in several seats of learning, as an ordinary 
text-book for logical students. 

The archbishop informs us, that f( logic, in the 
most extensive sense which the name can with pro- 
priety be made to bear, may be considered as the 
science, and also as the art of reasoning. It investi- 
gates the principles on which argumentation is con- 
ducted, and furnishes rules to secure the mind from 
error in its deductions. Its most appropriate office, 
however, is that of instituting an analysis of the pro- 
cess of the mind in reasoning, and in this point of 
view it is, as has been stated, strictly a science ; while, 
considered in reference to the practical rules above 



AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 455 

mentioned, it may be called the art of reasoning. This 
distinction, as will hereafter appear, has been over- 
looked, or not clearly pointed out, by most writers on 
the subject ; logic having been in general regarded as 
merely an art, and its claim to hold a place among the 
sciences having been expressly denied." 

This definition of the nature and offices of logic lias 
been the subject of numerous criticisms, embracing 
very opposite opinions and statements. We cannot 
enter into these, except by merely stating that this 
account of logic is very incorrect, and in some points 
contradictory. It is abundantly proved by the most 
cursory glance at the history of logic, that, in opposi- 
tion to the statements of the archbishop, the opinion of 
its ranking as a science is almost the uniform one in 
all ages. This error of the definition is simply an error 
of a matter of fact. The contradiction involved in it 
is apparent. The author says, " The most appropriate 
office of looic is that of instituting an analysis of the 
process of the mind in reasoning ;" and then again, "that 
the process of reasoning is alone the appropriate pro- 
vince of logic." If the object of logic is to analyse the 
process of reasoning, then logic must be identified with 
the science of mind ; for this science does, among 
other things, profess to make such an analysis. But 
when the archbishop's definition is contrasted with 
other portions of his work, the contradiction is still 
more marked and irrreconcilable. He says, " In 
introducing the mention of language previously to the 
definitions of logic, I have departed from established 
practice, in order that it may be clearly understood 
that logic is entirely conversant about language — a 



456 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

truth which most writers on the subject, if indeed they 
were fully aware of it themselves, have certainly not 
taken due care to impress on their readers."* . . . 
" Logic is wholly concerned in the use of lan- 
guage." f 

" All reasoning," says the author again, " rests on 
the one simple principle, that what is predicated, either 
affirmatively or negatively, of a term distributed, may 
be predicated in like manner of any thing contained 
under that term." . . . " Whatever the subject matter 
of an argument may be, the reasoning itself, con- 
sidered by itself, is in every case the same process ; and 
if the writers against logic had kept this in mind, they 
would have been cautious of expressing their contempt 
of what they call ' syllogistic reasoning,' which is in 
truth all reasoning ; and, instead of ridiculing Aristotle's 
principle for its obviousness and simplicity, would have 
perceived that these are in fact its highest praise — the 
easiest, shortest, and most evident theory, provided it 
answer the purpose of explanation, being ever the 
best," 

The archbishop, however, nearly makes a complete 
shipwreck of this doctrine, so decidedly laid down. 
On the nature of sophisms, he says, " It is to be 
observed, however, that in all correct reasoning the 
premises virtually imply the conclusion ; so that it is 
not possible to make precisely the distinction between 
the fallacy in question (the petitio prindpii) and fair 
argument," 

Archbishop A\ nately's account of induction is as 
follows : — " Logic takes no cognisance of induction for 

* Elem., p. 5G.- f Ibid., p. 74. 



AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 457 

instance, or of a priori reasoning; &c, as distinct forms 
of argument ; for when thrown into the syllogistic 
form, and when letters of the alphabet are substituted 
for the terms (and it is thus that an argument is pro- 
perly to be brought under the cognisance of logic), 
there is no distinction between them ; e. cj. y c a property 
whicl i belongs to all horned animals; rumination be- 
longs to these ; therefore to all.' This, which is an 
inductive argument, is evidently a syllogism in Bar- 
bara. The essence of an inductive argument (and so 
of the other kinds which are distinguished from it) 
consists, not in the form of the argument, but in the 
relation which the subject matter of the premises bears 
to the conclusion.'' — (P. 110.) And again: — "In 
the process of reasoning by which we deduce, from our 
observation of certain known cases, an inference with 
respect to unknown ones, we are employing a syllogism 
in Barbara with the major premiss suppressed; that 
being always substantially the same, as it asserts that 
4 what belongs to the individual or individuals we have 
examined, belongs to the whole class under which they 
come.' "—(P. 216.) 

By the advocates for strictly formal logic, the arch- 
bishop has been charged with deviating from their, 
and even his own principles, by assigning certain 
offices to the syllogism which are entirely foreign to 
its nature. He observes, " It belongs exclusively to a 
syllogism, properly so called (i. e., a valid argument so 
stated that its conclusiveness is evident from the mere 
form of the expression), that if letters, or any other 
unmeaning symbols, be substituted for the several 
terms, the validity of the argument shall still be evi- 



458 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

dent." The following statements are, however, in 
direct opposition to this doctrine : — " Should there be 
no sign at all to the common term, the quantity of the 
proposition (which is called an indefinite proposition) 
is ascertained by the matter ; that is, the nature of the 
connexion between the extremes, which is either neces- 
sary, impossible, or contingent" It is contended, that 
by here admitting the matter of a syllogism as an 
element of its argumentative conclusiveness, the entire 
principle of formal logic is surrendered. A, B, and C, 
it is said, know nothing whatever of what is necessary, 
impossible, or contingent. 

We regret we cannot enter more fully into the 
merits of the Elements of Logic, Particular views of 
the author's system, as a whole, will fall in our way as 
we proceed to notice other recent logical publications. 
We cannot, however, refrain from giving a sentence or 
two from the pen of Sir "William Hamilton, published 
a few years after the appearance of the archbishop's 
treatise : — " The work, indeed, never transcends, and 
generally does not rise to the actual level of the 
science ; nor, with all its ability, can it justly pretend 
to more than a relative and local importance. Its 
most original and valuable portion is but the insuffi- 
cient correction of mistakes touching the nature of 
logic, long exploded, if ever harboured, among the 
countrymen of Leibnitz, and only lingering among the 
disciples of Locke." * 

There were several writers on logic immediately fol- 
lowed Dr Whately, whose treatises may be consulted 
with advantage. Among the number, we may mention 

* Edin, Rev., 1833. 



ASD THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 459 

Introduction to Logic (1827), by the Eev. Samuel 
Hinds ; Questions on Aldriclrs Logic (1829) ; An 
Examination of some Passages in Dr Whatehfs ' Ele- 
ments,'' by G. C. Lewis, Esq. ; and Outline of a New 
System of Logic (1827), by G. Bentham, Esq. 

Though not assuming the shape of a regular treatise, 
we feel bound to give a formal notice of Sir William 
Hamilton's article on several logical publications, in 
the Edinburgh Review for April 183-3. This paper 
has had no small degree of influence over logical specu- 
lations in this country since its appearance : and on 
this account, as well as for its intrinsic merits, we feel 
justified in giving a brief and passing summary of the 
chief points discussed in the article in question, for the 
especial use and guidance of those who feel an interest 
in the subject. This periodical communication forms, 
in fact, a distinct landmark in the modern history of 
logic. 

The learned author gives a brief sketch of the state 
of logical science in Scotland, Cambridge, Oxford, and 
Dublin. He then commences to notice Dr Wnately'a 
Logic, and the treatises of several other logicians, 
pointing out, as he proceeds, some of the chief errors 
into which they have respectively fallen. Sir "William's 
remarks on the question, whether logic be a science or 
an art, or both, are entitled to especial notice. He 
lavs down the position, that the laws of thought, and 
not the laws of reasoning, constitute the proper objects 
of logical science. On the real nature and intrinsic 
value of Aristotle's purely iogical works, there are 
many important statements given by the able critic. 



460 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

Sir William denies that the schoolmen were ever guilty 
of attempting to employ logic for the purpose of physi- 
cal discoveries — an accusation often made against them, 
but without any solid foundation whatever. " Logic is 
a formal science ; it takes no consideration of real 
existence, or of its relations, but is occupied solely 
about that existence and those relations which arise 
through, and are regulated by, the conditions of 
thought itself. Of the truth or falsehood of proposi- 
tions in themselves, it knows nothing, and takes no 
account ; all in logic may be held true that is not con- 
ceived as contradictory. In reasoning, logic guarantees 
neither the premises nor the conclusions, but merely 
the consequence of the latter from the former ; for a 
syllogism is nothing more than the explicit assertion of 
the truth of one proposition, on the hypothesis of other 
propositions being true in which that one is implicitly 
contained. A conclusion may thus be true in reality 
(as an assertion), and yet logically false (as an infer- 
ence)." The truth or falsehood being extra-logical, 
so likewise is the modality of the syllogism. The 
syllogistic inference is always necessary ; it comes 
under no extra-formal condition, but is equally apo- 
dictic in contingent as in necessary matter." 

Our critic, after having disposed of some minor 
matters, proceeds to examine some positions relative to 
categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms, 
and the enthymeme, and lays down several important 
rules relative to their nature and application. On the 
use of the terms induction and deduction, and of their 
correct philosophical meaning, we have many excellent 



A XI) THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 461 

and profound critical remarks. This part of Sir 
William's critique is by far the most acute and most 
ably argued. 

If any proof were wanting of the opposite and irre- 
concilable opinions men entertain at the present day 
of logical science, it would be furnished by a reference 
to the New System of Logic (1839) of Mr Bosanquet. 
Here we have the scholastic dogmatists of all shades 
set at nought, and their entire system considered little 
better than a piece of gross and mischievous delusion. 

The author tells us that the Aristotelian logic, taken 
as a whole, is manifestly inconsistent with a Divine 
revelation, because it adopts a style of reasoning alto- 
gether opposed to its special character and offices. 
For this chief reason, the existing svstems of logic, 
which are founded upon it, ought to be set aside, and 
a more rational and perfect one substituted in its 
stead. The Grecian dialectics being of heathen origin, 
they weaken the proper tone of the mind, run counter 
to Christian principle, and give a wrong direction to 
those processes of analysis and reasoning, called into 
requisition in all theological investigations and re- 
searches. " The mind which lias been trained and 
formed in the schools of Grecian wisdom, cannot see 
the truths of Christianity. To the Greeks they must 
still be foolishness."*" 

As Aristotle's logic is one of the main supports of 
this heathen system, the author's object is to refute its 
chief principle, the syllogism, and display its utter 
incompetency to accomplish what it professes to per- 
form. This logic, the author maintains, is founded on 

* Logic, p, 10. 



4G2 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

a false principle ; inasmuch as it commences with a 
division of the operations of the mind, the proper sub- 
jects of which are thoughts and ideas ; and then it 
abruptly passes on to language, which is a very imper- 
fect means of representing them. The consequence of 
this is, that the logic does not treat of thoughts and 
ideas, but only gives us rules for the use of language — 
an imperfect substitute for an instrument which is itself 
imperfect. Besides, the division of the intellectual 
operations is absurdly imperfect. The distinction made 
between judgment and reasoning is without any foun- 
dation. Judging and reasoning, for logical purposes, 
are one and the same thing. In order to support the 
Aristotelian division, a the whole province of judg- 
ment is made to consist in the mechanical use and 
estimate of such forms of words as convey a simple 
affirmation or negation ; being, it is true, by a fortui- 
tous and figurative coincidence of language, an expres- 
sion of the 'judgment/ or 'sentence' of the reason- 
ing faculty; not at all, however, the operation of judg- 
ment and reasoning itself."* The Aristotelian logic, 
therefore, " leaves the whole faculty of judgment with- 
out use or office, except in so far as it is employed in 
drawing the conclusion from the syllogism — an opera- 
tion which it performs professedly by virtue of tlie 
mere form of words, and not by the full exercise of 
that discretion to which the term is properly applied, 
and which is chiefly requisite, in the use of this system, 
to form and arrange the premises. This division, 
therefore, is wholly specious, and falls to the ground." 
Mr Bosanquet affirms, that the syllogism is to the 



AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 463 

processes of reasoning what language is to ideas. It 
is an imperfect instrument, and used for the purpose 
of representing these processes rapidly and compen- 
diously. 

Mathematical reasoning is like every other kind of 
reasoning, with the exception of its subject-matter. 
This distinguishes a mathematical argument from every 
other. The author likewise maintains, that propositions 
in this science cannot be reduced to the syllogistic 
form, " except only by distant and figurative approxi- 
mation. For every mathematical syllogism would have 
four terms in it, instead of three ; namely, the two 
terms which are compared, the term of comparison, and 
the term of equality or proportion ; for the substitution 
of the term ' greater,'' or ' equal to,' for the only legiti- 
mate logical link or copula ' is,' at once removes it 
beyond the application and principles of logic."* 

Mr Bosanquet differs from Mr Locke as to the ab- 
stract character of knowledge in general. He considers 
that Locke's notion, that the perception of the agree- 
ment of ideas constitutes knowledge, is entirely erro- 
neous. Neither does truth consist in the joining of 
signs, according to their actual agreement. These are 
pronounced as pure chimeras, Ideas themselves are 
knowledge, whether of a simple or compound charac- 
ter. Opinion is the attaching these ideas to real 
things ; and truth is the actual agreement of these 
ideas and opinions with realities. " The idea of colour 
is knowledge. The idea of pleasure and of pain is 
knowledge. The idea of heat is knowledge. The idea 
of pain following or accompanying heat also is know- 

* P. 45. 



4G4 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

ledge. The agreement of this idea with reality and 
experience is truth. In like manner, the ideas of 
virtue and of duty are knowledge. The idea of God 
is knowledge. The idea of God rewarding ns for the 
performance of our duty in a future life is know- 
ledge."* 

The Lectures on Logic (1838) by Francis W. New- 
man, display an intimate and correct knowledge of 
logical subjects, and contain many acute and valuable 
remarks on the science of reasoning generally. He 
tells us, that " the object-matter of logic is no parti- 
cular set of phenomena parallel in character to that 
which other sciences contemplate, but is proof or 
evidence, as such. And in discussing evidence, the end 
in view is to investigate the laws of evidence — to lay 
down when and why it is that we say a thing has been 
proved ; its evidence is good ; it is therefore to be 
believed." " I conceive it is a part of logic to inquire, 
both why we believe our senses, and why we believe 
human testimony." 

Mr Newman -throws an air of originality over every 
thing he discusses. The reader will find this observa- 
tion borne out by a reference to his remarks on defini- 
tion, analogy, cause and effect, and induction. 

We shall now make a few remarks illustrative of 
Mr Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Matioci native and 
Inductive (1843). From the voluminous and varied 
character of the work, we can do little more than 
merely advert, and that very briefly indeed, to a few of 
the leading principles on which the author's peculiar 
theory of reasoning is founded. 

* r. 112. 



AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 4G5 

Mr Mill says, that " Logic comprises the science of 
reasoning, as well as an art founded on that science;" 
and he then goes on to shew the various meanings, 
hoth scientific and popular, which are attached to the 
word reasoning. He comes, however, to the conclu- 
sion, " that the province of logic will include several 
operations of the intellect not usually considered to 
fall within the meaning of the terms — reasoning and 
argumentation." He says again, " The sole object of 
logic is the guidance of one's own thoughts." " Logic 
takes cognisance of all intellectual operations only as 
they conduce to our own knowledge, and to the com- 
mand of that knowledge for our own uses." The art 
of communicating knowledge to others. Mr Mill refers 
to rhetoric, to which, he conceives, it rightly belongs. 

It will tend greatly to give an insight into the entire 
scope and drift of Mr Mill's system of logic, to pre- 
mise, at the outset, that there are two important 
doctrines which lie, as it were, in the background of 
all his reasonings and discussions on the principles of 
logical science, and to which he seems indissolubly 
wedded ; — namely, the theory of causation, developed 
by Hume, and illustrated by Dr Brown ; and the doc- 
trine of the association of ideas, maintained by Hartley, 
Priestly, and others. Upon those two principles or 
theories, or whatever they may be called, Mr Mill 
takes his stand, under a firm persuasion that no one 
has the power to dislodge him frorn his fancied 
security. 

In accordance with the general philosophy embodied 
in these two theories of our mental nature, Mr Mill 
speaks of truth in these words : — " Truths are known 

2g 



466 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

to us in two ways ; some are known directly, and of 
themselves ; some through the medium of other truths. 
The former are the subject of intuition or conscious- 
ness; the latter of inference. The truths known by 
intuition are the original premises from which all 
others are inferred." This brings us by a short route 
to the source of all truth, consciousness or feeling — 
the same conclusion on which Dr Brown's logical 
theory rests. 

The first chapter of Mr Mill's first volume is chiefly 
occupied with discussions on the nature of language, 
and its connexion with various kinds of propositions. 
Mr Mill is a nominalist, and views the offices which 
words perform in our reasoning, in strict conformity 
with the canons laid down in the verbal school of 
thinking. There are, however, in this division of the 
work, many excellent and profound observations, not 
to be met with in other treatises on logical science. 

In the second chapter we come to ratiocination, or 
the syllogism, with the formal rules of which the 
author enters to" some limited extent. He tells us in 
his preface, in reference to the syllogistic logic gene- 
rally, that " the scientific theory on which its defence 
is usually rested, appears to him erroneous." He 
gives his reasons for this in the part of his work now 
under consideration. The reader will find some excel- 
lent .matter here ; and we regret exceedingly that 
want of space forbids our giving even an outline of all 
the arguments adduced against the scientific validity 
and value of the syllogism. All we can do is to cull 
out a passage or two at random* " It must be 
granted," lays Mr Mill, '"' that in every syllogism, con- 



AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 46? 

sidered as an argument to prove the conclusion, there 
is a petiiio principu. "When we say, ' All men are 
mortal ; Socrates is a man ; therefore Socrates is 
mortal' — it is unanswerably urged by the adversaries 
of the syllogistic theory, that the proposition. Socrates 
is mortal ; is presupposed in the more general assump- 
tion, All men are mortal ; that we cannot be assured 
of the mortality of all men, unless we were previously 
certain of the mortality of every individual man ; that 
if it be still doubtful whether Socrates, or any other 
individual you chose to name, be mortal or not, i^ie 
same degree of uncertainty must hang over the asser- 
tion, All men are mortal : that the general principle, 
instead of being given as evidence of the particular 
case, cannot itself be taken for true without exception, 
until every shadow of doubt which could effect any 
case comprised with it, is dispelled by evidence aliunde ; 
and then what remains for the syllogism to prove ? 
That, in short, no reasoning from generals to particu- 
lars can, as such, prove any thing ; since from a gene- 
ral principle you cannot infer any particulars, but 
those which the principle itself assumes as foreknown." 
. . . " This doctrine is irrefragable." * 

" Archbishop Whately has contended, that syllogis- 
ing, or reasoning from generals to particulars, is not, 
agreeably to the vulgar idea, a peculiar mode of reason- 
ing, but the philosophical analysis of the mode in which 
all men reason who reason at all. With the deference 
due to so high an authority, I cannot help thinking 
that the vulgar notion is, in this case, the more correct. 
If from our experience of John, Thomas, &c, who 

* Vol. i. p. 216. 



468 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

once were living, but are now dead, we are entitled to 
conclude that all human beings are mortal, we might 
surely, without any logical inconsequence, have con- 
cluded at once from these instances that the Duke of 
Wellington is mortal. The mortality of John, Thomas, 
and Company, is, after all, the whole evidence we have 
for the mortality of the Duke of Wellington. £Tot one 
iota is added to the proof by interpolating a general 
proposition." . . . " ~Not only may we reason from 
particulars to particulars, without passing throng] i 
generals; but we perpetually do so. All our earliest 
inferences are of this nature. From the first dawn of 
intelligence we draw inferences ; but years elapse be- 
fore we learn the use of general language." 

Leaving the doctrine of the syllogism, and passing 
over much excellent discussion on Trains of Keason- 
ings and the Deductive Sciences, we come to another 
leading branch of Mr Mill's logic, that of Induction; 
the theory of which is as follows : — All inference is 
of a decidedly inductive character, and rests upon the 
great principle of the association of ideas. One event 
A, is a mark or sign of another event B ; for this sole 
and simple reason, that A and B have been conjoined 
in our experience : we have seen the one follow the 
other. Reasoning by induction is, therefore, just the 
recording of the connexion (of whatever nature that 
may be) subsisting among particular objects or events ; 
the mind goes from one particular thing to another 
particular thing, without the intervention of any gene- 
ral or formal proposition whatever. When we refer an 
individual thing or object to a collection, a class, or 
assortment of other objects or events, either from a 



AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 4G9 

principle of resemblance, or from a frequency of con- 
junction, tins collection, class, or assortment, is consi- 
dered bv tlie mind as a single or individual thing ; 
whether it be. in fact, composed of only two units, or 
two millions of units. The totality of its character is 
never broken or impaired ; it is still, in the mind's eye, 
one particular and individual object or event. Mr Mill 
says, " If reasoning be from particulars to particulars, 
and if it consists in recognising one fact as a mark of 
another, or a mark of a mark of another, nothing is 
required to render reasoning possible except senses and 
association — senses to perceive that two facts are con- 
joined ; association, as the Law by which one of these 
two facts raises up the idea of the other. For these 
mental phenomena, as well as for the belief or expec- 
tation which follows, and by which we recognise as 
having taken place, or about to take place, that of 
which we have perceived a mark, there is evidently no 
need of language. And this inference of one particu- 
lar tact from another, is a case of induction. It is of 
this sort of induction that brutes are capable ; it is in 
this shape that uncultivated minds make almost all 
their inductions, and that we all do so in the cases in 
which familiar experience forces our conclusions upon 
us, without any active process of inquiry on our part, 
and in which the belief or expectation follows the 
suggestion of the evidence, with the promptitude and 
certainty of an instinct."* 

This, in few words, is the sum total of the author's 
theory of inductive logic, It is simply the observing 
of one event following another ; which act of observing 

* Vol. ii. p. 233. 



470 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

resolves itself into pure consciousness or feeling; or, 
to speak more strictly, it is nothing but this conscious- 
ness or feeling itself. This law of antecedent and con- 
sequent gives rise (query, how?) to a certain rule of 
judging, or of calculating probable events or circum- 
stances ; but the law can never give any thing ap- 
proaching to infallible certainty that any event, or 
series of events, will actually take place. It is only 
probable evidence which we have to deal with in induc- 
tive philosophy; which, says Mr Mills, is founded on 
this rule : " Certain individuals have a given attribute ; 
an individual or individuals resemble the former in 
certain other attributes ; therefore they resemble them 
also in the given attribute." 

We shall now make a remark or two on this theory 
of reasoning. 

Mr Mill has a deep and singular abhorrence of any 
thing being considered binding on the minds of men 
to believe. His scheme will admit of no mental com- 
pulsion or dictation. He cannot tolerate any who 
" adduce as evidence of the truth of fact in external 
nature, any necessity that the human mind may be 
conceived to be under of believing it." His whole 
inward man rises up in open rebellion against an act 
of such licentious and unbridled authority. But let us 
see, by his own system, how he stands in reference to 
this necessity of believing. The law of association, 
that is, the law by which A suggests B, is the only law 
of an intellectual cast which enters into his inductive 
theory. It is the only law which he thinks necessary 
or adequate to produce the effects he describes. Is 
this law compulsory ? Does it imply a necessity of be- 



AXD THE I/XITED STATES OF AMERICA. 471 

lieving any tiling? Is it quite optional with us whether 
we attend either to antecedents or consequents, or pin 
the slightest degree of faith upon either or both? 
Surely there is something very like an internal necessity 
to helieye what this associating law of antecedent and 
consequent is said to teach us. It must be borne in 
mind, that Mr Mill has here left us no choice in the 
matter ; for he points out no other law but this law of 
association, by which the reality of that which he 
himself calls knowledge can be substantiated. If we 
are under no necessity whatever of believing any thing 
upon the power or authority of this law, it must be a 
law without authority, and by whose yoice his own 
system cannot be sustained, as one having the smallest 
particle of evidence or certainty attached to it. With 
all due deference, we conceive Mr Mill is bound, for 
the credit of his own theory, to place this matter upon 
a more satisfactory basis. 

With respect to the nature of mathematic evidence, 
a subject which forms a conspicuous element of discus- 
sion in several sections of his work, Mr Mill main- 
tains the position, that it is decidedly of an experi- 
mental character, and by no means what is termed 
necessary or intuitive. "'What is the ground," he asks, 
" of our belief in axioms ? What is the evidence on which 
they rest ? I answer, they are experimental truths J 
generalizations from observation. The proposition, 
6 Two straight lines cannot inclose a space ; or, in other 
words, Two straight lines which have once met, do not 
meet again, but continue to diverge,' is an induction 
from the evidence of our senses." The author also 
affirms, that arithmetical science is a science of expe- 



472 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

rience and observation. " The fundamental truths of 
that science all rest upon the evidence of sense ; they 
are proved by shewing to our eyes and our fingers, that 
any given number of objects, — ten balls for example 
may, — by separation and re-arrangement, exhibit to 
our senses all the different sets of numbers, the sum of 
which is equal to ten." 

On the categories of Aristotle Mr Mill remarks : 
" The imperfections of this classification are too obvious 
to require, and its merits are not sufficient to reward, a 
minute examination. It is a mere catalogue of the 
distinctions rudely marked out by the language of 
familiar life, with little or no attempt to penetrate, by 
philosophic analysis, to the rationale even of these 
common distinctions." He gives us four categories of 
his own, which he conceives embrace all nameable 
things. 1st, Feelings, or states of consciousness. 2d, 
The minds which experience those feelings. 3d, The 
bodies or external objects which excite certain of those 
feelings, together with the powers or properties whereby 
they excite them; And 4th, The successions and co- 
existences, the likenesses and unlikenesses, between 
states of consciousness. 

We should have liked to have examined Mr Mill's 
theory of causation ; but we are compelled to cut short 
our observations on his work. We venture to affirm, 
however, that in our humble opinion this is a very 
unsound part of his system. It is ill reasoned, and 
presents flagrant inconsistencies and contradictions at 
every turn. We are fully aware that he was under the 
necessity of adopting and carrying out these views on 
cause and effect, in order to impart a semblance of 



AKB THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ' 473 

unity to liis entire theory ; which, being of an entirely 
material character, could admit no spiritual or purely 
mental element to come in contact with it. But we 
feel confident that when the question as to causation 
is dispassionately examined, and upon strictly philo- 
sophical grounds, it will be found that there is a prin- 
ciple implanted in human nature, of steady and un- 
erring operation, that refers every true cause to some 
power, faculty, or mental influence. This position, we 
conceive, is as susceptible of complete demonstration 
as any thing in the whole circle of human knowledge 
can manifest. 

Among the number of English writers on the philo- 
sophical principles of logical science, we must include 
Mr Hallam, who, in his Introduction to the Literature 
of Europe, has entered into the subject, not only as a 
commentator on writers on logic generally but as an 
original thinker on some of the main points connected 
with modern controversies on the nature of the reason- 
ing process. Mr Hallanvs opinions are of very recent 
date (1847), and are entitled to attentive considera- 
tion, both from his unquestionable learning and dis- 
passionate judgment. The passage we are about to 
quote, though somewhat long, is valuable ; because it 
contains his matured and settled opinions on the 
nature and utility of the syllogistic theory, now a gene- 
ral topic of interest and discussion. 

Mr Hallam observes, " It by no means is to be 
inferred, that because the actual text of Bacon is not 
always such as can be well understood by very young 
men, I object to their being led to the real principles 
of inductive philosophy, which alone will teach them to 



474 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN" 

think, firmly but not presumptuously, for themselves, 
Few defects, on the contrary, in our system of educa- 
tion, are more visible than the want of an adequate 
course of logic ; and this is not likely to be rectified, 
so long as the Aristotelian methods challenge that 
denomination, exclusively of all other aids to the rea- 
soning faculties. The position, that nothing else is to 
be called logic, were it even agreeable to the derivation 
of the word, which it is not, or to the usage of the 
ancients, which is by no means uniformly the case, or 
to that of modern philosophy and correct language, 
which is certainly not at all the case, is no answer to 
the question, Whether what ice call logic does not 
deserve to be taught at all ? 

" A living writer of high reputation, who has at least 
fully understood his own subject, and illustrated it 
better than his predecessors, from a more enlarged 
reading and thinking, wherein his own acuteness has 
been improved by the writers of the Baconian school, 
has been unfortunately instrumental, by the very 
merits of his treatise on logic, in keeping up the pre- 
judices on this subject, which have generally been 
deemed characteristic of the university to which he 
belonged. All the reflection I have been able to give 
to the subject, has convinced me of the inefficacy of 
the syllogistic art in enabling us to think rightly for 
ourselves, or, which is part of thinking rightly, to 
detect those fallacies of others which might impose on 
our understanding before we have acquired that art. 
It has been often alleged, and, as far as I can judge, 
with perfect truth, that no man who can be worth 
answering ever commits, except through mere mad- 



AXD THE UNITED STATES OE AMERICA. 475 

vertence, any paralogisms which the common logic 
serves to point out. It is easy enough to construct 
syllogisms which sin against its rules ; but the question 
is, By whom were they employed ? For though it is 
not uncommon, as I am aware, to represent an adver- 
sary as reasoning illogically, this is generally effected 
by putting his argument into our own words. The 
great fault of all, over-induction, or the assertion of a 
general premiss upon an insufficient examination of 
particulars, cannot be discovered or cured by any 
logical skill ; and this is the error into which men 
really fall, not that of omitting to distribute the middle 
term, though it comes in effect, and often in appear- 
ance, to the same thing. I do not contend that the 
rules of syllogism, which are very short and simple, 
ought not be learned ; or that there may not be some 
advantage in occasionally stating our own argument, 
or calling on another to state his in a regular form 
(an advantage, however, rather dialectical, which is, 
in other words, rhetorical, than one which affects the 
reasoning faculties themselves) ; nor do I deny that it 
is philosophically worth while to know, that all general 
reasoning by words may be reduced into syllogism, as 
it is to know that most of plane geometry may be 
resolved into the superposition of equal triangles ; but 
to represent this portion of logical science as the whole, 
appears to me almost like teaching the scholar Euclid's 
axioms and the axiomatic theorem to which I have 
alluded, and calling this the science of geometry. The 
following passage from the Port-Royal logic is very 
judicious and candid, giving as much to the Aristo- 
telian system as it deserves :— ' That part of which we 



476 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

now have to treat, and which comprehends the rules 
of reasoning, is regarded as the most important in 
logic, and is almost the only one which has been 
treated of with any care. But it may be doubted 
whether it is really as useful as it has been supposed 
to be. The greater part of the errors of men, as we 
have already said elsewhere, arises much more from 
their reasoning on false principles, than from their 
reasoning wrongly on their principles. It rarely hap- 
pens that men allow themselves to be deceived by 
reasonings which are false, only because the conse- 
quences are ill deduced ; and those who are not 
capable of discovering such errors by the light of 
reason alone, would not commonly understand the 
rules which are given for this purpose, much less the 
application of them. Nevertheless, considering these 
rules simply as speculative truths, they may always be 
useful as mental discipline ; and, further than this, it 
cannot be denied that they are of service on some 
occasions, and in relation to those persons who, being 
of a lively and inquiring turn of mind, allow themselves 
at times, for want of attention, to be deceived by false 
consequences, which attention to these rules would 
probably rectify.' How different is this sensible pas- 
sage from one quoted from some anonymous writer in 
AVhately's Logic, p. 34 : — ' A fallacy consists of an 
ingenious mixture of truth and falsehood, so entangled, 
so intimately blended, that the fallacy is, in the che- 
mical phrase, held in solution ; one drop of sound logic 
is tliat test which immediately disunites them, makes 
the foreign substance visible, and precipitates it to the 
bottom.' One fallacy, it alight be answered, as com- 



AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 477 

mon as any, is the false analogy, the misleading the 
mind by comparison, where there is no real proportion 
or resemblance. The chemist's test is the necessary 
means of detecting the foreign substance. If the 6 drop 
of sound logic' be such, it is strange that lawyers, 
mathematicians, and mankind in general, should so 
sparingly employ it — the fact being notorious, that 
those most eminent for strong reasoning powers are 
rarely conversant with the syllogistic method. It is 
also well known, that these i intimately blended mix- 
tures of truth and falsehood,' perplex no man of plain 
sense, except when they are what is called extra- 
logical — cases wherein the art of syllogism is of no 
use." 

Oxford, for the last fifteen years, has taken a lead- 
ing part in the cultivation and extension of logical 
science. Mr Huyshe's work on the subject (183-3) 
contains many valuable and acute observations on the 
principles of reasoning generally. But, in our humble 
opinion, Mr Chretien's Essay on Logical Method 
(1848) is by far the most philosophical treatise which 
lias hitherto appeared from this venerable seminary of 
learning. The grand aim of the work is to shew the 
connexion of logical methods with science in general. 
In the preliminary parts of the treatise, the author 
gives us the view which the ancient logicians took of 
the connexion of method with scientific knowledge : 
the opinions which the scholastic reasoners entertained 
on the matter ; and then, lastly, the discussions of 
modern philosophers on the subject. In every part of 
this extended inquiry, we see displayed a perfect know- 
ledge of logical history, and a philosophical spirit of 



w 



478 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

the highest and most genial kind — genial in all that is 
elevating, noble, and improving. 

In reference to logical method generally, Mr Chre- 
tien observes : " Logic is no part of philosophy ; or, 
in other words, it is not a science. The student of 
pure logic has, as such, no more speculative know- 
ledge on any particular subject of investigation, when 
he concludes his course, than when he began it. 
The basis of logic may shew through, indeed, and so 
some insight into metaphysics be gained ; or its appli- 
cation, by way of example, may inform him of physical 
truths, before unknown, as the case may be, in art, or 
morals, or theology. But this does not really effect its 
proper nature as a system of rules, implying previous 
knowledge, and ministering to its further attainment, 
but of little value in themselves as theoretic truths, 
and even assuming an imperative form more naturally 
than that of a proposition."" 

The author divides logical method into three distinct 
branches ; the method of science, art, and of practical 
evidence. All science is made up of general concep- 
tions of the mind ; and the grouping of several of 
these conceptions together under one idea, constitutes 
a science. And the same thing may be applied to 
method, when considered in reference to the fine arts, 
and to the nature and application of practical evidence 
of every kind and degree. For the full illustration of 
this subject, we must refer to the author's work itself. 

The following general observations on the nature of 
the verbal school of logic, must conclude our notice of 
this able treatise : — " It is much to be regretted, that 

* P, 128. 



AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 479 

so many symptoms of an adhesion to the opinions of 
this moderate section of the verbal school, are to he 
found in the able treatise of Archbishop Whately. 
His definition of logic, as the " art of employing lan- 
guage properly for the purpose of reasoning/ is con- 
ceived quite in this spirit. To trace this evil tendency 
in detail through his work, would be quite foreign to 
our present purpose. Two of the more general features 
may, however, be mentioned here, as illustrative of the 
turn of mind with which this logical theory is asso- 
ciated. In the first place, he is led to attach far too 
much importance to the mere arrangements of words, 
and to measure the elasticity and pliability of thought 
by that of the raw material out of which its finished 
representations are fabricated. The most striking in- 
stance of this defect is found in his way of treating; 
hypothetical and inductive arguments. He compels 
methods of reasoning, which, when viewed in the 
thinking mind, are clearly distinct from the deductive 
process and from each other, to bow to an artifice of 
language, and submit to the one unvarying formula of 
syllogism. And, secondly, he shews a continual dis- 
position to underrate the number of real questions at 
issue among mankind, and to increase in proportion 
the number of merely verbal differences. His com- 
mon way of dealing with contending disputants, is to 
accuse them of an equivocation, to assure them that' 
they either mean the same thing by different words, 
or use the same words to signify distinct things. Or, 
if this plan will not succeed, he looks for some formal 
error in the argument of one of the parties, and is 
ready to assign the discrepancy to any cause except 



480 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

that which is really probably the real one — some broad 
difference of principle underlying the whole discussion, 
and forcing, as it were, the superficial strata of thought 
from what would be else their level and unbroken 
direction. This is in fact to assume, that men can 
with equal ease be made to be of one mind and of one 
vocabulary. 

" The truth is, that the minds of men differ in actual 
constitution as widely as their bodies. As we do not 
all spontaneously move our limbs in the same manner, 
so neither do we think alike. When discipline makes 
men uniform and simultaneous in their motions, it 
only suspends their natural peculiarities, and does not 
destroy them. Though the effect of the drill-ser- 
geant's labours may be observable when the soldier is 
off parade, they no longer produce an exact uniformity. 
Those differences of gait and bearing then display them- 
selves once more, which at the time seemed oblite- 
rated." 

Mr Moberly's Lectures on Logic (1848) is a work 
of considerable merit. He divides the science of logic 
into two branches ; the first considers the forms of 
reasoning ; and the second makes clear the method of 
their application. The author expresses a hope, that 
the Latin manual of Aldrich " may still be retained 
in our (Oxford) university, without much actual alter- 
ation of the text, but vivified and made practical by 
continual increase of knowledge, as to botli the forms 
of reasoning and their matter/' 

Mr Mansel's work on logic (1840), is another 
Oxford publication of fair reputation and importance. 
He is inclined to think, that the benefits derivable 



AND THE UNITED STATES OP AMEEICA. 48 1 

from logic are of a secondary, and not of a primary 
character. He says, " It is not intended to deny the 
usefulness of logic ; but it may safely be asserted, that 
its more valuable fruits are to be found in the training 
which the mind unconsciously receives, rather than in 
the conscious employment of knowledge in the forma- 
tion and examination of reasonings, and that both, 
in respect of the true character of the science, are 
secondary and accidental results, not primary and 
essential features."* 

Mr Thomson's Outline of the Necessary Laws of 
Thought (1849), is another Oxford publication, of a 
profound and scientific character. His categories of 
the rational understanding are quantity, quality, rela- 
tion ; and relation he resolves again into time, space, 
causation, composition, agreement and repugnance, 
polar opposition of finite to infinite. The author con- 
siders logic as a science rather than an art, that it is the 
science of the necessary laws or forms of thought, and 
has thought rather than language for its object-matter. 

While Oxford has been displaying of late so much 
zeal and well-directed labour in the field of logical 
science, Cambridge has not been altogether idle. Mr 
Soly's work is highly spoken of ; and Mr De Morgan's 
Formal Logic (1847), is a treatise of acknowledged 
ability. The chapter on Probabilities, and that on 
Fallacies, are the two most interesting in his book. 
Mr Boole's Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1848), is 
an attempt to resolve the ordinary proposition and 
syllogism to such a form as will admit of the applica- 
tion of symbolical notation. We regret that his system 

* Artis Log. Rud. . Oxford, 1849, 

2h 



482 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN 

requires more attention to matters of detail than we 
can now devote to it. 

In Scotland we have recently had Mr Leechman's 
Logic (1847), and Mr Munro's Manual of Logic 
(1850), both good works of their kind, and embodying 
many acute and valuable observations on logic, viewed 
as a philosophical instrument. 

Mr Bayne's Essay (1850) we have already alluded 
to in connexion with Sir William Hamilton's system of 
logic. We subjoin the following letter which appeared 
in the Athenceum of 21st December last, on the sub- 
ject to which the work especially refers: — 

"Quantification of the Predicate. — I trust you will 
oblige me by giving insertion to the following remarks 
on the discovery of the doctrine of a thorough-going 
quantification of the predicate by Sir W. Hamilton : — 
Having lately perused Mr Bayne's Essay on the new 
analytic of logical forms, it occurred to me that I had long 
since seen the same doctrine advanced and carried quite 
as far in a work" on logic which I rather think fell still- 
born from the press. The work in question was pub- 
lished in the year 1827, under the title of An Outline 
of a New System of Logic, with a critical examination 
of Dr Whately's Elements of Logic, by George Ben- 
tham, Esq. It is strange that the title of this book 
never attracted the attention of the Edinburgh pro- 
fessor of logic, and is not mentioned in the Historical 
Notice touching the Quantification of the Predicate, 
appended to Mr Bayne's Essay. I invite logicians 
carefully to examine chapters eight and nine of Mr 
Bentham's Outline, and to compare the views therein 



AXD THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 483 

contained with the pages of the above-named Essay, 
and then to state in what respect they fall short of Sir 
W. Hamilton's doctrine. The Outline was evidently 
written in haste and for a temporary purpose. More- 
over, it contains many errors ; but in it the principle 
'of a thorough-going quantification' is as clearly laid 
down and carried into practice as it is in the essay 
which so ably expounds the doctrine of Sir W. Ha- 
milton. Unfortunately, the author has never since 
furnished us $ with a summary of his more matured 
views.' I should not have spoken of the quantifica- 
tion of the predicate as a discovery, but for the follow- 
ing passage in Mr Bayne's Essaij : — ' We cannot, how- 
ever, close, without expressing the true joy we feel, 
that in our country, and in our time, this discovery 
has been made.' — I am, &c. W. Warlow." 

" Haverfordwest." 

The logical literature of the United States is not of 
any great or original value. It has, however, been 
cultivated with some zeal within the last half-century. 
Levi Hedge, of Harvard College, published his Ele- 
ments of Logic (1816), a work founded on the common 
sense views of Eeid and Stewart. The subject is divided 
into three branches. In the first the author gives an 
account of the various powers or faculties of the mind ; 
in the second, he discusses the nature of general terms 
and propositions ; and in the third, he points out those 
intellectual instruments more immediately engaged in 
the operation of reasoning or argumentation, " Inductive 
reasoning," says the author, " is founded on the belief 
that the course of nature is based on uniform laws, 



484 LOGICAL LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN, ETC. 

and that things will happen in future as we have 
observed them to happen in times past. We can give 
no proof of a permanent connexion between any events, 
or between any two qualities either of body or of mind. 
The only reason for supposing such a connexion in any 
instance is, that we have invariably found certain things 
to have been conjoined in fact ; and this experience, in 
many cases, produces a conviction equal to that of 
demonstration." (P. 61.) 

The Elements of Logic (1840) of Charles K. True, 
of Boston, is a treatise of considerable talent. His 
definition of logic is, that it is the science of enabling 
us to discover truth, and communicate it to others. 
That part of the work devoted to the consideration of 
general propositions, general terms, and the principles 
of induction, are the most interesting and useful. 

Henry P. Tappan's Elements of Logic (1844) con- 
tain, independent of logical matters, an introductory 
view of the philosophy of mind generally. Logic is 
treated of in the eleventh section of the first part, and 
is founded on the German transcendental philosophy. 



THE ESD. 



INDEX OF NAMES. 



Abelard, 139, 140. 

Abicht, 306. 

jEnesidemus, 103. 

Agricola, Rudolphus, 168, 420. 

Agrippa, 103. 

Aitzema, M., 405. 

Alcinous, 65. 

Alcuinus, Alblnus Flaccus, 110. 

Aldeburgus, J., 185. 

Aldrich, 263, 426. 

Alembert, D', 317. 

Alexander, 65. 

Alfarabi, 113. 

Algazeli, 115. 

Alkendi, 113. 

Almeida, De T., 414. 

Almquist, 416. 

Alphonso X., 141. 

Alphoxsus de Cepeda, 155. 

Amaury de Chartres, 147. 

Ammonius, 103. 

Ancillon, 307. 

Andreas, A. John, 184. 

Anselm, St, 135. 

Antiphon, 9. 

Antisthenes, 16. 

Apelion, 49. 

Aquinas, St Thomas, 125, 149. 

Arcesilaus, 62. 

Arcisius, G. V., 184. 

Ariston, 53. 

Aristotle, 19, 26, 34, 49, 79. 

Aristoxenus. 52. 

Arnauld, 253. 

Arnobius, 101. 



Athenagoras (St), 96, 99, 
Atterborn, 416. 
Atticus, 49. 
Augustine, St, 102. 
auriytllius, p., 270. 

AVENTINUS, 134. 

Ayenpace, 116. 
Ayeroes, 117. 
Ayicenna, 114. 

Axelson, A., 375. 

Baader, 391. 
Bacon, Lord, 200. 
Baconthorpe, 422. 
Bake, Alex., 406. 
Baldlnotti, 337. 
Balfour, E., 445. 
Ballanche, 401. 
Balmes, Don. J., 414. 
Bardili, 389. 
Barrol, M. F., 337. 
Barron, TF., 437. 
Battam, 401. 
Bayle, Peter, 266. 
Beattie, Dr, 351, 357. 
Beausobre, 307. 
Becart, M., 408. 
Beck, Sigis., 306. 
Begnelin, 307. 
Belsham, 449. 
Bentham, G., 459. 
Bertius, Joh., 185. 
Bessarion, 164. 
Bilberg, John, 374. 
Bini, Vin., 409. 



486 



INDEX OF NAMES. 



Biran, Maine de, 400. 
Biyar, Fran, de, 184. 
Blamede, 109. 
Block, M. G., 373. 
BOETHIU3, J., 270. 
Boilme, Jacob, 198. 
Bonald, 401. 

BONAVENTURE, St, 152. 

Boxxoxia, John, 185. 
Boole, Mr, 481. 
Boot, G. de, 270. 
Bosanquet, 459. 
Bossuet, 266. 
Bostos, F., 413. 
Bottura, P., 412. 
Bouterweck, Fred., 388. 
Boter, 307. 
Bradwardln, 426. 
Brederod, R. C., 270. 
Brerewood, 423. 
Brissot, J. P., 401. 
Beown, Dr Thos., 449. 
Bruce, John, 442. 
Brunnmark, 289. 
Bruxella, Peterus de, 185. 
Bijdeus, 290. 
Buffler, Father, 313. 
Bltleus, John, 199. 
Burger sdicius, Fran., 263. 
Buridanus, Th., 185. 
Burley, 422. 
Butler, Sam., 205." 
Byrs^us, F., 185. 

Calker, F. V., 389. 
Campanella, Thomas, 181. 
Campbell, Dr, 348. 
Carlowszky, S., 417. 
Carneades, 62, 63. 
Caeonelli, Antonius, 184. 

CarPEXTARIUS, P., 185. 
CiESARIUS, J., 185. 
Cassiodorus, 107. 
Crakanthorpe, 423. 
Chalmers, W., 445. 
Charma, 405. 



Chesneiophorus, John, 270. 
Chretien, 126, 477. 
Christernlx, 375. 
Cicero, 24, 64. 
Clement, St, 100. 
Clemextis, Johx, 194. 
Clerc, J. Le, 323. 
Clitomachus, 63. 
Coxcio, James, 178. 
coxdlllac, 318. 
Coxrlxg, Her., 193. 
Cousin, Y. 243, 402. 
Critolaus, 53. 
Crousaz, M., 258, 311. 
Crusius, 291. 
Cuoco, 411. 
Cusa, Nicolas de, 197. 
Cyprius, George, 108. 

Damascenus, 108. 
Damlron, 404. 
Damon, 10. 
Daube, 399. 
David of Leon, 109. 
Dated de Dlnaut, 147. 
Daytes, 291. 
Deiariyieee, M., 402. 
Democrttus, 54. 
Dexixa, 339. 
Derodon, Dayid, 265. 
Descartes, Rexe, 231. 
Desciiamps, 288. 
Destutt-Tracy, 321. 
Deuslxghius, A., 270. 
Deuzixger, M. J., 407. 
Dic^archus, 52. 
Diderot, 316. 
Digby, Edward, 261. 
Digby, Sir Kenelm, 262. 
Diogexes Laertius, 35, 64. 
Dioxysodorus, 9. 
Dioxysius, Father, 184. 
Dorpius, M. 185. 
Doytcam, 421. 
Dreyer, Ch., 193. 
Dufour, 405. 



INDEX OF NAMES. 



487 



DuHAMEL, 265. 

Dumarsais, 312. 
Dukcak, De, 346, 421. 
Duxcax, Mark, 445. 

Eberhard, 307. 
Eisenach, J. J., 189. 
Elxala, D. R., 414. 
Empiricus, Sextus, 104. 
Exaxder, 270. 
Erasmus, 166. 
Erigexa, John Scotus, 130. 
eskharshausex, 392. 
eskstelx, d 
Euclid, 16. 
Eudemus, 51. 
euthydemus, 9. 

Faber, James, 168. 
Fabriano, Sig., 413. 
Facciolati, 338. 
Faclnus, Marcelius, 164. 
Fayorin, 104. 
Fexelox, 268. 
Fickte, 389. 

Fichte, J. Hermann, 393. 
Fixlaysox, Dr, 443. 
Flotte, J. L., 400. 
Foxtexelle, 269. 
Forge, Louis de la, 263. 
Foucher, Abbe, 264. 
Fraxkoxius, F. A., 199. 
Frederic II., 141. 
Fries, J. F., 389. 
Fromoxd, Claude, 337. 
Fughs, J. S., 417. 

Galex, 65, 104. 
Gallardius, P., 185. 
Gallupi, B. P., 413. 
Gassexdi, 229. 
Gaza, Theodore, 165, 167. 
Gexoyesi, 334. 
Gextz, M., 402. 
Geraxdo, 397. 
Gerdel, Cardlnal, 409. 



Gerson, 147, 157. 
Geyer, 416. 
Gezelius, 270. 
Gilbert de la Poree, 145. 
Gioberti, 413. 
Gibox, M., 408. 
Glaxytl, Joseph, 261. 
Goxzalez, Fraxcis, 184. 
Gorgias, 9, 10. 
Gotama, 380. 
Gothus, Bishop, 185. 
Gottsched, 291. 
Gravesaxde, 324. 
Groxes, G., 409. 
Grostete, R., 422. 
Grote, Mr, 6, 9, 23. 
Grubbe, S., 415. 
Gulxalox, 138. 
Gyorgyi, E., 417. 

Hales, 422. 

Hallam,Mr, 118, 173, 181, 183, 

217, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 

258, 281, 473. 
Hamiltox, SmW., 423, 443, 459, 

482. 
Hauchecorxe, M., 402. 
Hedge, Levi, 483. 
Hegel, 391. 
Heiberg, 417. 
Helmoxt, Tax, 198. 
Herbert, Lord, 250. 
Herbert, J. F., 392. 
Hermas, 101. 
Hermext, Yax, 326, 405. 
Heerera, J. A. de, 155. 
Heusde, Yax, 406. 
Hlxds, Key. S., 459. 
Hlppias, 9. 

Hlrxham, Jero:»ie, 265. 
Hobbes, Til, 224. 
Holier, B. H., 415. 
Hollmaxn, 293. 
Holstroux, P., 375. 
Hooghelaxde, Cor. Ab., 270. 
Horxessis, C, 193. 



488 



INDEX OF NAMES. 



Huet, Bishop, 264. 
Huexs, Aug., 185. 
Hugo, St Victor, 143. 
Hulschoff, A., 325. 
Hume, David, 214, 355. 
Hunter, J., 438. 
IIuygexs, 2G8. 
Huysche, 477. 
Hyphoff, E., 375. 

Irenjeus, 101. 

Isaac, Abraham Ben, 120. 

Isidore of Seville, 108. 

Janssexs, J. H., 407. 

Jardin, 212. 

Jardin, Dr, 430. 

Javari, 405. 

Javelin, 270. 

Jina, 385. 

Joffred, Abbot, 420. 

John the Grammarian, 108. 

John of Salisbury, 141, 145. 

Junius, B., 270. 

Kames, Lord, 350. 
Kant, 295. 

Katzchexofskj, M., 378. 
Keckerman, 184. 
Kempe, Alex., 270. 
Keratry, 400. 
Klxker, 327. 

Kirwan, Dr Richard, 449. 
Klein, 390. 
Kolmack, P., 375. 
Krause, 392. 
Krug, 388. 
Kyrger, 289. 

Lactantius, 101. 
Lallebasque, 409. 
Lallersted, 374. 
Lamexais, Abbe, 401. 
Lampredi, 337. 
Lancelot, 253. 
Lancelot, 400. 



Lanfranc, 131. 

Larguet, M., 405. 

Laromiguiere, 400. 

Latonius, Bart., 185. 

Lawrens, 270. 

Lawson, J., 441. 

Lee, Dr, 343. 

Leechman, Mr, 482. 

Leibnitz, G. W., 247. 

Leopold, G. P., 375. 

Lesbos, 51. 

Lewis, G. C., 459. 

Lidbeck, A., 415. 

Liebaert, M., 407. 

Listrius, G., 185. 

Llaxa, Fran. Murcta de la, 184. 

Locke, John, 271. 

Lully, Raymond, 153. 

Luther, 186. 

Luzac, E., 326. 

Lycon, 53. 

Maas, 307. 
Macaulay, 216. 
Magentixus, 109. 
Maimonides, Moses, 120. 
Maimon, S., 306. 
Maistre, Le, 401. 
Malebranche, Father, 259. 
Mamertus, Claudianus, 103. 
Mamiani, Count T., 413. 
Mancio, S., 413. 
Manio, Sig., 413. 
Manettus, 166. 
Mansel, 480. 
Mariotte, Abbe, 269. 
Marsenxe, P., 265. 
Martin Capella, 107. 
Martini, C, 193. 
Martyr, Justin, 95, 97. 
Maupertuis, 307. 
Maxim us, 65. 
Mazzarelli, 339. 
M'Cree, 177, 195, 197. 
Medici, Cosmo di, 164. 
Meexex, M. Van, 407. 



INDEX OF NAMES. 



489 



Melancthon, 173, 191. 
Melville, Andrew, 173, 194. 
Melville, James, 19-4. 
Mendorius, Joh. B., 184. 
Mendoza, P. H. de, 184. 
Merian, 307. 
Mesne, John, 113. 
Mesterton, C, 375. 
Metachita, Theodorus, 109. 
Mill, Mr Stuart, 464. 
Moberly, 480. 
Molander, A. J., 375. 
Moller, H., 375. 
Monboddo, Lord, 352. 
Mongin, M., 399. 
Morgan, A. de, 481. 
Muller, Aug. P., 293. 
Munro, Mr, 482. 
Murmellius, J., 185. 
Murray, Arch., 44 G. 

Nannius, P., 270. 
Napier, Prof., 213. 
Naricius, Ol. N., 185. 
Newman, Francis W., 4G4. 
Nicole, M., 253. 
Nieuport, De, 406. 
Nieuwenhuis, M., 406. 
Nizolini, M., 184. 
Noel, M., 399.. 
Norms, John, 262-344. 
Nuesslein, F. A., 391. 

Occam, William, 155. 
Oldfield, 262. .■ 
Oswald, 357. 

paladanus, m.,.270.. 
Paracelsus, 198. 
Parmenides , 5 , . 1 7 . 
Pascal, Blaise, 251. 
Paschius, Barth. J., 184. 
Pelagius, 109. 
Perrard, M., 405. 
Perron, 401. 
Peter Lombard, 145, 



Petrus Cirnelo, 155. 
Picart, M., 193. 
Philo, 63. 
Philippi, G., 270. 
Plato, 26, 45, 95. 
Plattner, 307. 
Playfair, Prof., 214. 
Plenning, J., 374. 
Pletho, George G., 163. 
Plotinus, 100. 
Ploucquet, 293. 
PODSCHrWALOFF, W. S., 379. 
Poli, B., 410. 
Polus, 9. 

polyander, j., 185. 
Popofskj, N., 378. 

POKPHYRY, 101. 
POTAMON, 64. ' 

Pkoclus, 102. 

Prodicus, 9. 

Protagoras (of Abdera), 9, 10. 

Psellxts, 109. 

Pyrrho, 54, 103, 104. 

Ramus, Peter, 169. 
Read, Sir R., 421 
Rebus, Tho., 185. 
Regis, Pierre . Sylvain, 263. 
Regnault, Father, 316. 
Reid, Dr, 357. 
Retffexbeeg, Baron, 408. 
Reimarius, .293. 
Relxhold, 306. 
Reuchlin, John, 190. 
Reusch, 293. 
Richai{d, St Victor, 143. 
Ritchie, Dr, 443. 
Rixxer, 393.. 
Romagnosi, G. D., 411. 
Ronigk, O., 375. 
Roscellinus, 134. 
Roscoe, 164. 
Rosmlni, Ant., 411. 

R.OYER COLLARD, 400. 

Rubeo, Antonius, 184. 
Rudbeckius, J., 185. 



490 



INDEX OP NAMES. 



Rudigee, And., 289. 

RUTHEEFOED, JOHN, 194. 

Rydelius, Andbew, 373. 
Rymee, H., 436. 

Sacy, 253. 
Saint-Raphael, 339. 
Sanchez, 182. 
Sandeeson, 425. 
Sandys, C, 422. 
Saeia, G. de, 337. 

SCAEELLA, J. B., 337. 
SCHALEEUS, JOH., 270, 
SCHAUMANN, 307. 
SCHEGK, J., 193. 
SCHEIBLE, CH., 193. 
SCHELLLNG, 389. 
SCHEEBIUS, P., 193. 
SCHLETEWEIN, 293. 
SCHOEEBLNG, C. M., 416. 
Scholaeius, GEOEGroSjl65, 167. 
Schookius, M., 270. 
Scotus, Duns, 153. 
Sell j, N., 378. 
Sengueedius, Anth., 270. 

SlBBEEN, F. C, 417. 

Sigwabt, 393. 

Slmonius, S., 193. 

Sinus, S., 375. 

Skitte, J., 185. 

Smiglecius, 263. 

Smith, Adam, 212, 450. 

Snellius, R., 185. 

Socbates, 17. 

Sodensten, 416. 

Soly, Me, 481. 

Somnee, Eenest, 193. 

Soto, Domlnic, 184. 

Spalding, W., 440. 

Speecq, G., 270. 

Stahl, D., 193. 

Steffexs, Henry, 391, 417. 

Stevenson, Me, 441. 

Stewaet, Dug., 177, 218, 357. 

Stilpo, 54. 

Stjebahjelm, G., 199. 



Steato, 53. 

Steokwich, M. Van, 375. 
Stuemius, J., 185. 
Sylla, 49. 
Synesius, 103. 
Syebius, 290. 

Tappan, H. P., 484. 

Tamasia, 409. 

Tandel, E., 408. 

Tatian, 98. 

Teissieb, 170. 

Teebason, Abbe, 313. 

Teetullian, 95, 101. 

Tetens, 307. 

Theophbastus, 51. 

Thibon Maebion, Jehudah Ben, 

128. 
Thomasius, 286. 
Thomson, Me, 481. 
Theasymachus, 9. 
Tibon, Moses Eben., 120. 
Tlmon, 54. 
Tibabochi, 339. 
Titelmannus, F., 185. 
Toledo, Feancis, 184. 
Tommasio, 413. 

TOPHAIL, 116. 

Teebizond, Geoege of, 165, 167. 
Teue, C. K., 484. 
tschienhausen, 286. 
Tyeannion, 49. 
Tybwitt, T., 343. 

Ubaghs, M., 408. 

Valla, Laueentius, 166. 

Velsius, J., 185. 

Ventuea, G., 410. 

Veebel, A., 270. 

Vico, 331. 

Vincent de Beauvais, 148. 

Viyes, Ludoyicus, 167. 

TVagneb, 391. 
Wahlsteom, A., 375. 



INDEX OF NAMES. 



491 



Walch, 293. 
"Walker, 446. 
Wallachius, 289. 
Wallarius, 374. 
Wallis, 262, 426. 
Warlow, W., 483. 
Watson, Robert, 437. 
Watts, Isaac, 344. 
Westtersten, B., 375. 
Whately, Archbishop, 426, 454. 
White, Thomas, 261. 
William of Champ aux, 138. 
William of Paris, 149. 
Winperse, D. Van, 326. 



Wolff, 287. 

Wood, Anthony, 421. 

Wyttenbach, Dan., 326, 405, 

Xenophon, 19. 

Yocng, 441. 



Zabarella, James, 181, 
Zeno of Elea, 5, 17. 
Ziedler, Mel., 193. 
Zuxica, Father, 184. 



A LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC, 

ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED. 



Abicht (Joh. Tieinr.), Philosophic cler Erkenntnisse. Bayr., 1791. 
Idem, Von dem Nutzen und der Einrichtung eines zu Logischen Uebun- 

gen bestimmten Collegium. Leipsic. 1790. 
Idem, Yerbcsserte Logik oder Wahrheits, &c. Fuerth., 1802. 
Idem, Anleitung und materialien zu einem Logisch-practischen Insti- 
tute. Erlangen, 1796. 
Academle Lovaxiexsis Comment aria in Isagogen Porphyrii, et in omnes 

libros Aristotelis de dialectica. Loi\, 1568. Fol. 
Acevedo, Dialectica et Logica. Madrid, 1563. 
Ackeksdyck (Corn, ab), Logica. Traj. ad R. 1666. 
Acoxtius (Jac.), De methodo, sive de recta investigaudarum traden- 

darumque artium ac scientiarnm ratione. Basil, 1558. 
Agraxa (Nicol.), Disquisitiones in V. Porphyrii univcrsalia. Franc, 

1601. 
Ageicola (Rudolphus), De dialectica inventione, libri III. Colon., 1527 ; 

Paris, 1554. 
Alcuixts sive Albixus Flaccus, Dialectica et grammatica. Ingolst., 

1604. 
Albeetes Magnus, Opera ad logicam pertinentia. Venet, 1494. 
Idem, Coinmentaria in IV. libros logicaj Aristot. Colon., 1490. Fol. 
Idem, Epitornata sive reparationes logics veteris et novse Aristot. 

Cot., 1496. 4to. 
Idem, Commentaria in Isagogen Porphyrii, et in omnes libros Aristot, 
de vetere logica. Col. Agr., 1494. Fol. 
Aldrich, Artis Logicaj Comp* Oxford, 1846* 



494 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 

Alemanus (Ad.), De optimo genere disputandi, libri III. Paris, 1546. 
Aler (P. Paul.), Dialectica nova. Trev. 

Idem, Logica. Colog., 1710. 
Alexander, Aplirod. in pr. anal. Aristot. comment. Venet., 1520. 
Algazeli (Abou Ham Mohammed), Pliilos. et Logica. Colog., 1506. 
Almeida (D. Teodoro de), Elementos de Logica. Madrid, 1847. 
Alphonsus de Corduba, Principia Dialectices. 
Alphoxsus de Prado, Qua?st. Dialec. 
Alphoxsus de Veracruz, De Topicis Dialec. 

Alstedius (Jo. Henr.), Logica? systema harmonicum. Herborn, Nassov. 
1614-1623. 

Idem, Nucleus logics. Herb. 1628. 

Idem, Theatrum scholasticum. Ed. alt. Herb. 1620. 

Idem, Compendium lexici pliilosopliici. Herbornoe, 1626. 
Alvaradus (Alp.), Ars disserendi ac dicendi, lib ii. Basil, 1600. 
Ammoxius Hermeas, Comment, in Aristotelis, &c. Gr. Tenet., 1545. 

Idem, Comment, in Aristotelis librum de interpretatione. Gr. Venet., 
1545. 
Ancillox, Memoire sur la certitude, et en particulier sur la nature de 
la certitude liumaine. Mum. de l'Acad. de Berlin. 1792, 1793. 

Idem, Doute sur les bases du calcul des probabilites. lb., 1794- 
1795. 
Andrea (Antoninus), Questiones in Aristotelis Logicam. 1489. 
Anepoxymus (Georg.), Compendium philosophic sive organi Aristotelis. 

Gr. et Lat. Aug. Vind., 1600. 
Axgest (PL), Problemata logicalia. Par., 1507 et 1511. 
Axtoxius (Coronel), Quest. Logica3. 
Axtonius de Espixosa, In Summulas. 
Axtoxius (Ramirez de V.), Abbre. Parv. Logicaiium. 
Antoxius Gexuexsis, Ars logico-critica. Neapoli, 1758. 
Arboreus, Scholia ad Predicamenta Aristotelis. Paris, 1582. 

Idem, Dialectica. Paris, 1530 et 1536. 
Argall (John), Introd. ad Artem Dialecticann London, 1605. 
Amesius (William), Dcmonst. Logica? vera?. Lugd., 1632. 
Aristoteles, Organon. Franc, 1592. 

Arxauld (Ant.), Des vraies et des fausses idees, contre ce qu'enseigne 
rauteur dela recherche de la verite. Cologne, 1683. 

Idem, L'art de penser. Paris, 1664. 
Arxdt (Chris.), De vero usu Logices in theoiogia. Rostock, 1650. 
Arxoult (Gatien), Programme d'un cours complct de philosophic. 

Paris, 1831. 
Apaczai (A. J.), A System of Logic. Weissenburg, 1636. 
Augustixus, Tractatus de dialectica. Antv., 1700. 
Augustixus (Perez de Olivan), In poster! Arist. 
Augustixus (de Sbarroia), Dialectica?. 
Aurivillius (Pctr.), Principii Logicorum. 1630. 
Averroes, Uni. res logica. Venice, 1560. 



LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 493 



B 

Baader (F.), Ferraenta cognitionis. Berl, 1822. 

Bacon (Franc), Op. omnia. Amstel, 1730.; fol. 1823. Wurtz* 

bourg, 1770-1789. 3 vols. 8vo. 
Bake (Alex.), Lessen over de Redekunde, ten dienste van jonge lieden, 

die de scbolen liebben verlaten. Ley den, 1828. 
Baldixotti, De Recta Mentis Institutione. 1787. 
Balduixus (Junius), De tota Aristotelis Logica. 1634. 
Balmes (Don. J.), Logica. Barcelona, 1850. 
Balfour (Robert), Logiertia et Ethica. Burd., 1616. 
Barbat (Petr.), Comm. in Arist. Logicam. Paris, 1680. 
Barby (Petr.), Com aientarius in Aristotelis logicam. Lugd., 1692. 
Bardilus (C. G.), Grundriss der ersten Logik gereinigt von den Irr- 
thuemern bisheriger Logiken ueberhaupt, der Kantischen insbe- 
sondre. Stuttgart, 1 800. 
Idem, Beytrag zur Beurtheikmg des gegenwaertigen Zustandes der 
Vernunftlehre in einigen Bemerkungen ueber die Tieftrunk'sche 
und Schulze'sche Logik. Landshut, 1803. 
Barlaam, Logistica. Paris, 1594. 

Barron (Profess.), Lee. on the Belles Lettres and Logic, 1806. 
■ Barthollxe (Caspar), Natura Logical, 1624. 
Barxabas (Gallego de Vera), Controv. Logicales. 
Bastos (Father), Logica. Salamanca, 1815. 
Batesox (George), Plain Logick for Plain Men. London, 1702. 
Baumeister (Fr. Chr.), Institutiones philos. rationalis methodo Wolfii 
conscripta3. Wittenb. 1735, ed. decima 1769, item 1798. 
Idem, Philosophia definitiva ex syst. "Wolfii. Wittenb., 1758 et 

1789. 
Idem, Philosophia rccens controversa. Lips, et Gorlicii, 1749 et 

1766. 
Idem, Logica. Wittenb., 1780. 

Idem, De fallaci expectatione casuum similium. Lips, et Gorl, 1741. 
4to. 
Baidigaeten (Alex. Gottl.), Acroasis logica, in Christ, L. B. De Wolf. 
Halce, 1761. 
Idem, Logica. Halle, 1773. 

Idem, Acroasis logica aucta et in systema redacta a J. Gott. T^ll- 
nero. Ed. ii. Halce, 1773. 
Bayle (P.), Systeme de philosophic, contenant la loqique et la meta- 

physique. Imprime par ordre du roi. Berlin, 1785. 
Bayxes (T. S.), An Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms. 

Edinburgh, 1850. 
Beattie (James), Logic, &c. 1804. 

Beausobee, Reflexions philos. sur la certitude. Mem. de 1'Acad. de 
Berlin, 1776. Pp. 306-370. 



496 LIST OF WORKS ON" LOGIC. 

Becart, Expose des Facultes, des Lois, et des Operations de l'Ame. 

Bruxelles, 1838. 
Beck (J. S.), Lelirbuch der Logik. Rostock und Schwerin, 1820. 
Beck (D.), Institutiones logicae. Salzb., 1784. 

Idem, Philosophia rationalis. 1764. 4to. 
Beck, Psychologie und Logik. Stuttgard, 1846. 
Becmannus (C. B.), Usu Logices. Han., 1619. 
Bems (Venerabilis), Opera Omnia. Col., 1688. 
Bejer (0. F. A.), De formis cogitandi disjunctivis. Lips., 1813. 
Belloyisius (Amandus), Logica. Venice, 1535. 
Belsham (Dr Thomas), Compend. Logic. 1801. 
Bendavid (Laz.), Versuch einer logischen Auseinandersetzung der 

Mathem. Unendlichen. Berlin, 1796. 
Benedictus (Majoricensis), In Logicam. 
Beneke (Fr. Ed.), Erkenntnisslehre nacli dem Bewusstseyn der reinen 

Vernunft. Jena, 1820. 
Bentham (Dr Edward), An Introduction to Logic, Scholastic and 

Rational. Oxford, 1773. Reflexions on Logic. Oxon, 1770. 
Bentham (George), Outlines of a System of Logic. London, 1827. 
Berard (Fred.), Doctrine des rapports du physique et du moral de 

rhomme. Paris, 1823. 
Berg (Franz.), Epikritik der philosophic. Auerstadt und Rudolstadt, 

1805. 
Bergk (J. A.), Die Kunst zu Denken. Leipz., 1802. 
Bertius (P.), Logical peripatetics lib. VI. Lugd. Bat., 1604. 
Beurhusius (Krid.), Dialectical Rami. 
Idem, Paedagogia logica. Colon., 1583. 
Idem, Defensio P. Rami dialectics. Franco/., 1589. 
Idem, Ad P. Rami dialectic* praxin introductio. Franco/., 1598. 
Idem, Disputatio pro Ramea hoc est Socratica et Aristotelica philoso- 
phia. Col, 1610. 
Bm (Vincenzo), Corso Elementario di Lezioni Logico-Metafisico- 

Morali. Perugia, 1818. 
Bilstenius (Joach.), -Dialectica. Hanov., 1592. 
Blakey (Robert), Essay on Logic. Second Edition. London, 1848. 
Blanchet (Jean), Logique de l'espv et du cceur. La Haye et Paris, 

1760. 
Blemmid^e (Nicephori), Epitome logica. Opera Wegelini. Aug. Vind. 

1605. 
Blundeyille (Thomas), Arte of Logicke. 1599. 
Boeiime (C. F.), Beantwortung der Frage : Was ist Wahrheit ? Altenb., 

1803. 
Boehme (And.), Logica. Franc, 1749. 
Boethius, Opera cum notis varior. Basil, 1546. 
Boisgelin (le Cardinal de), L'art de juger par l'analyse des ide'ce, 

Paris, 1789. 
Bononia (John), Compendium Dialectices. 1550. 



LIST OF WORKS OX LOGIC. 497 

Boxstettex (Cli. Victor de), Etudes cle l'homme, Geneve et Fan's, 

1821. 
Boole (George), The Mathematical Analysis of Logic. Cambridge, 

1847. 
Boot (Gerardns cle), Philosophic Aristotiliea? accurata Examinatio ac 

Bolida Confusio. 1640. 
Borelly, Elemcns de l'art cle penser, on la logique reduite a cc qu'elle 

a cle plus utile. Noiiv. edit. Liege, 1821. 
Borx (F. G.), De scientia et conjectura. Leipz., 1805. 
Boscherus (Hiezo), Harmonia Logica. 1595. 
Bottuka (Pietro), Logica. 1833. 

Bosaxquet (S. R.), New System of Logic. London, 1839. 
Bouteeweck (Fred.), Lehrb. cler philos. Vorkenntnisse. Goett., 1810 

et 1820. 
Idem, Lehrbuch cler pliilos. Wissenschaften. Goett., 1820. 
Braxiss (Jul.), Die Logik. Berl, 1823. 
Beederodius (Petrus Cornelius), Analysis, sou Resolutiones Dialect. 

1634. 
Bkerewood (Edw.), Elementa Logica?. Oxon., 1614. 
Bricot, Textus logices. 

Bricotds (Thomas), Abbre. Textus totius Logices. Paris, 1494. 
Brightlaxd (John), Art of Rhetoric and Logic. Lond., 1712. 
Brissot (J. P.), De la Verite, &c. 1825. 
Brooke (Sir Robert), The Nature of Truth. London, 1640. 
Bruce (John), Syllabus of Logic. Edinburgh. 
Bruckerus (Jac), Observatio cle Pyrrhone. 
Bruxo (Jord.), De compendiosa architectura et complemento artis 

Lullii. Parisiis, 1580. 
Ldem, Ars memoria?, sivc de umbris idearum. Parisiis, 1582. 
Ldem, De lampade coinbinatoria Lulliana. Yitemb., 1587. 
Ldem, De progressu et lampade venatoria logicorum. Yitemb., 15S7. 
Ldem, De imaginum, signoruin, et idearum compositione ad omnia 

inventionum, dispositionum, et memoria? genera, lib. iii. Franco/., 

1591. 
Bri'xellexsis (Georgius), ou Vax Breussel, Facillima in Aristotclis 

logica interpretatio. Parisiis, 1496. 4to. 
Buchker (A.), Erkenntniss und Philosophic. Landsli., 1806. 
Buddeus (Jo. Fr.), Elementa pliilos. Hala>, 1703. 
Buffier (Claude), Traite des premieres verites. Avignon, 1822. 
Ldem, Logiques Nouvelles. Paris, 1714. 
Ldem, Les principcs du raisonnement exposes en deux logiques. Paris, 

1714. 
Bchle (Jo. Theoph.), Aristotclis. op., vol. i.-iv. Bipont., 1761- 

1793. 
Ldem, Antiquorum Gra?corum, &c. 
Ldem, Einleitung in die alls'. Losfik und die Kritik der reinen Yer- 



nunft. Goett., 1795. 



498 LIST OP WORKS ON LOGIC. 

Bullfinger (G. B.), Prsscepta logica. Jena, 1720. 
Buefoed (John), Insti. logicae. Camb., 1680. 

Buegeesdicifs (Franc), institt. logicae ad Aristotclis. &c. Cantabr. 
1647. 

Idem, Logic. 1685. 
Bueeoaxus (J.), Summula in logicam. S. L. 1487. 4to. 

Idem, Compendium logics. Venet., 1499. 
Buekhaeusee (Nic), Institt. logica?. Wirceb., 1772. 
Bueleius (Walterus, Anglicus), Scripta in Isagogen Forphyrii et artem 

veterem Aristotelis. Venet., 1509. 
Buesius (Adamus), Dialectica Ciceronis. Samosci, 1604. 
Buschehus (Heiz.), Do ratione solvendi sophismata ex Rami logica 
deducta, lib. ii. Hamb., 1597. 

Idem, Hahnoniaj logics Philippo-Rameae, lib. ii. lemgov., 1597. 
Bf/tner (M. Guolf.), Dialectica Germanica. Lips., 1576. 
Buzenkay (Mich.), Compendii logici. 1696. 



c 

C-esaetus (J.), Dialectica. Paris, 1541. 

Idem, Dialectica, acccd. Jo. Murmellii Isagogen in decern Aristotelis 
praedicamenta. Moguntice, 1550. 

Calkee (Fr. Yon), Dcnklehre, oder Logik und Dialektik, &c. Bonn, 
1822. 

Callisen (Ch. Fried.), Kurzer Abriss der Logik und Metaphysik. 
Nureb. und Sidzbach, 1805. 

Camerarius (Guli.), Selectaj disputationes philos. Paris, 1630. 

Cameaxella (Th.), Pliilosophia rationalis. Paris, 1638. 

Caxtifxcfla (Claudius), Topica. Basil, 1520. Fol. 

Capea (Balth.), Disp, Logica. Patav., 1606. 

Caramfel (J.), Herculis labores logici. Franco/., 1655. 
Idem, Philosophia rationalis et realis. Lovanii, 1642. 

Caramuel (de Lob.), Precursor Logicus. Franc., 1654. 

Caebonel (Hug.), Ars Lulliana seu memoria artificialis. Paris, 1621 . 

Cardaillac (De), Cours elcmentaire de philosophic. Paris, 1881. 2 vols. 

Caedaxus (Hier.), Dialectica. Basil, 1566. 

Carlo wszky (Sigism.) Logica. Cassovics, 1820. 

Caeo (J.), Cours elcmentaire de philosophic. Paris, 1831. 

Carpentaria (Jac), Dcscriptio universal artis disserendi ex Aristo- 
telis organo logico. Parisiis, 1552. 

Cartesius (Renatus), Op, omnia. Amst., 1692. 

Gaetiee (P. G.), Logica. Wirceb., 1756. 

Caevill, Manual of Logic. 1821. 

Care (John), In Aristotelis Dialccticam. London, 1584. 

Cas.uaxxus (Oth.), P. Rami dialectica! et Mclancthonis collata?. Ilanov., 
159-1. 



LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 499 

Cassaxder (G.), Tabula? pra?ceptionum dialecticarum. Paris, 1548. 
Cassiodorus Opp. ed. Joh. Garatius. Rotomagi, 1679. 
Castillox (De), Sur la maniere d'enseigner de Socrate. Mem. de 
l'Acad. de Berlin. 1779. 
Idem, Reflexions sur la logique. Mem. de l'Acad. de Berlin. 1802. 
Idem, Menioire sur un nouvel algorithme logique. 1803. 
Chambers (R. and W.), Logic for the People. Edinburgh, 1849. 
Chambre (F. I.), La Logique. Paris, 1754. 
Champaigxac (Jean de), Logique. Paris, 1606. 
Chaxgeux, Traite des extremes ou des elemens de la science de la 

realite. Amst., 1767. 
Charma, Lemons de Logique. Paris, 1842. 
Chaestadius (Val.), Syn. Logica. Norib., 1622. 
Chauvix (Steph.), Lexicon philos. Rotterod., 1692. 
Chesxeiophorus (Joh.), Logica. Stockholm, 1629. 
Chladexius (Job. Nart.), Dissert, de vita et ha?resi Roscellini. Etlang., 

1756. 
Chxichtov-eus (Jud.), Fundamentum logica?. Paris, 1534. 

Idem, Iutroductio in terminorum cognitionem, in libros logicorum. 
Paris, 1520. 
Choul (John Rob.), Introd. to Logic. 1672. 

Chretiex (Charl. F.), An Essay on Logical Method. Oxford, 1848. 
Christierx (P. N.), Diss, de usu logica? in ideis acquirendis. UpsaL, 

1788. 
Chrysoveloxe, Traite de Logique et de morale. Vienne, 1800. 
Claubergius (Joh.), Logica. Amst., 1658. 

Idem, Ontosophia nova et accedit logica contracta. Duisburgi ad 

Rh., 1660. 
Idem, Onderscheijt tusschen de Cartesiaensche ende de anders in de 

schoolen gebruijckelijkc philosophic Nijmegen, 1661. 
Idem, Initiatio philosophi, sive dubitatio Cartesiana. Dirisb., 1655. 
Idem, Differentia inter Cartesianam et alias in scholis usitatas phi- 

losophias. 1680. 
Idem, Defensio Cartesiana adversus Revium. Amst., 1652. 
Idem, Specimen logica? Cartesians. 
Clericus (Joan.), Opp. philos. Lips., 1710. — Sebast. Edzard a pub- 
lie : Examen logica? Joannis Clerici. Hamb., 1699. 
Idem, Logica. Amst., 1693. 
Clerc (John le), Logica. Lond., 1692. — Logica. Amst., 1692. 
Clightoveus (J. N.), Logica? Introd. 1520. — Fundamentum Logica?. 

Paris, 1554. 
Cceuret de St Georges, Prmcipes de logique. Paris, 1822. 
Coke (Zac), Art of Logic. 1687. 
Collar© (John), Logic. 1796. 

Idem, A praxis of Logic. 1799. 
Complutexsis Collegii FF. discalceati in Aristotelis, &c, Lugd., 1668. 
2 vols. 



500 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 

Condillac, CEuvres completes. Paris, 1822. 16 vols. 
Contmbricensis collegii Comment, in Isagogen Porphyrii et omnes 

libros Aristotelis de dialectica. Lovan., 1569. 
Contzen (Adam), Prrelectiones logics. Mechlinice, 1822. 
Coronel (Vincentius), Quaest. Logicales. Paris, 1520. 
Coronel (Ant.), Logica. Paris, 1530. 
Corvinus (Chr. Ant. Jo.). Institutiones philos. Jence, 1739. 
Cosmus Alem. (Algazelis Arabis), Logica et philos. Colon., 1501. 
Costacciaro, Introd. in Logicam. 1597. 
Crakanthorp (Richard), Logica. London, 1622. 
Crassotius (Jo.), Logica. Paris, 1617. 
Crellius (Fort.), Isagoge logica. Neustad., 1592. 

Idem, Isagoge logica. Stett., 1621. 
Crousaz (J. P. de), Systeme des reflexions, ou nouvel essai de logique. 
Amst, 1725. 
Idem, Logicas compendium. Groningce, 1725. 
Idem, Logicas sy sterna. Genevce, 1724. 
Idem, Examen du Pyrhonisme ancien et moderne. La Haije, 1733. 

Fol. 
Idem, Observations critiques sur Tabrege de la logique de M. Wolf. 
Geneve, 1744. 
Crucii (Jacobi), Medulla Logics. Lugd. 1640. 
Crusius (Chr. A.), Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlaessigkeit der men- 
schlichen Erkenntnisse. Leipz., 1747. 

jen Yernunffcwahrheiten. Leipz., 1745. 
de usu et lhnitibiis rationis sufficients. Lips., 1752. 
Idem, De summis rationis principiis. Lips., 1775. 
Cuoco, Esercizio Logico. 1824. 
Cyprianus (Benedictus), Clavis Logica?. 



D 

Dagoumer (Guill.), Philosophia ad usum scholar adornata. Vind. Lugd., 

1746. 
D'Alembert, Histoire de Philosophic Paris, 1760. 
Dalham (FL), De ratione recte cogitandi. Aug. Vind., 1762. 
Damascenus (Joh.), Capita philos. sive dialectica. Paris, 1712. Vol. I. 
Damiron (Ph.), Cours de philosophic Paris, 1831. 
Danhauerus (Jo. Conr.), De syllogismo infmito. Argent., 1631. 
Daniel (Gabriel), Voyage du monde de Descartes. Paris, 1691. 
Daniel (G.), Some Words on the Logick of my Lord Bacon. London, 

1645. 
Daube (L. J. J.), Essai d'ideologie, ou introduction a la grammaire 

generalc Paris, 1805. 
Davies (Charles), The Logic and Utility of Mathematics. New York, 

1850. 



LIST OF WORKS OX LOGIC. 501 

Date (Ant.), Dialectica peripatetiea. Lov., 1652. 
Deddeley (P. Jac), Sum inula? logica?. Ingolstd. etAug. Vind., 1751. 
Degeraxdo, Des signcs et de Fart de penscr, considered dans leurs rap- 
ports mutuels. Paris, 1800. -1 vols. 
Delariyiere, Logique classique. Clermont, 1829. 
De Morgan, on the Structure of the Syllogism. 1817. 
Dexzixger (Ign.), Prima lineamenta logices. Leod., 1818. 

Idem, Institutiones logiere. Leod., 1821. 2 vols. 8vo. 

Idem, Prima elementa logices, secundum institutiones logicas ex- 
posita. Leod., 182G. 
Derodox (David), Logica. Geneva, 1659. 

Idem, Compend. logicse. 1663. 

Idem, Phil. Cent. Logica. Geneva, 1661. 

Idem, Logica Metaphysica. Geneva, 1669. 
Deschamps, Logique. Berlin, 1736. 
Destutt (Comte de Tracy), Elemens d'ideologie, logique. Paris, 1818. 

Idem, Principes logiques. Parts, 1817. 
Dexippus, Qiupstionum in Aristotelis categorias. Paris, 1519. 
Dicker (Conrad), Logica. Oppcn., 1620. 
DroAcus (a Jesu), In Logicam. 
Didacus de Ledesma, Dialectica. 
Dbdacus de Zuxiga, Dialectica. 
Didacts Masius, Dialectica. 
Didacus Naverus, Dialectica. 
Di daces Ortiz, Dialectica. 

Deoerot (Den.), CEuvrcs philos. Paris, 1819. 7 \o\<. 
Digby (Edward), De Duplici methodo libri duo, unicam P. Kami Metbo* 

dum Refutantes. 1589. 
Diekserx (E. H.), Organon des gesammten transcendenten Analysis. 

Berlin, 1845. 
Dolz (Joh. A.), Opus Syll. sive Logices. Paris, 1512. 
Dolz (J. Chr.), Kleinc Denkk 
Domtnicus Baxez, Dialectica. 
Dominicus Soto, Dialectica. 

Dorpius (Martinus), Orationes de Laudibus xVristotelis. 151-1. 
Drallac, Epitome of Logic. 1795. 

Drew (James), Logick. London, 1702. v/ 

Drobitsch (W.), Kcue Darstcllung der Logik. Leipsic, 1836. 
Dullardus (J.), Quai'Stiones in Aristotelis. Paris, 1509. Fol. 

Idem, Qnajstiones in librum prsedicabilium Porphyrii, cura Joannis 
Drabbii Bonicollii. Paris, 1520. 

Idem, Prsefatio ad Logicam Joaunis Buridani. 
Du Marsais, Logique. 1769. 

Duncan (Mark), A Latin System of Logic. Salmur., 1612. 
Duncan (Dr William), Logic. London, 1759. 
Dutexs, Logique. Paris, 1773. 
Du Trieu (Phil.), Manductio ad Logicam. Oxon., 1826; 



502 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 



E 

Ebeldtg (H. M. F.), Yersucli einer Logik fur dcu gemeinen Yerstand. 

Berlin, 1797. 
Ebelius (J. P.), Hermes logicus. 1620. 
Ebeehaed (J. A.), Allgemeine Theorie cler Denkens imd Empfindeus. 

Berlin, 1786; Leipz., 1786. 
Ebeet (P. C), Elementa logica? cclectica.\ Franco/., 1763. 4to. 
Eisenach (J. J.), Summa totius Logics. Erfurt, 1501. 

Idem, Epitome seu Breviarinm Dialectics. 
Eixala (D. Eamon Marti de), Corso di Filosofia de las Ideas, la Gra- 

matica general, y la Logica. Benel., 1847. 
Eliot (John), The Logick Primer, for the use of the Indians. 1672. 
Enandeb (S. N.), Logica. 1641. 
Endfield (William), Elements of Logic. Lond., 1810. 
Exgel (J. J.), Yersucli einer Methode die Yernunftlehre aus den Pla- 

tonischen Dialogen zu cntwickeln. Berlin, 1780. 
Excel, Sur la realite dcs idees generates on abstraitcs. Memoirs do 

l'Acad. de Berlin. 1801. 
Exgelhaed (Nicol.), Institutionum philosophise theoretics, complectans 

logicam. Groningce, 1748. 
Ernestus (Jo. Aug.), Initia doctrinae solidioris. Lips. 1796, 
Eexsthaesen (Y. T. E. von), Inhalt der logischen Wahrheit, Berlu, 

1804. 
Eschenbach (J. C), Logik, oder Denkungswissensehaft. Bostock, 1756. 
Essee (Willi.), System der Logik. Eberfeld, 1823. 
Eufaeler, Specimen artis ratiocinandi naturalis et artificialis. Harnb. 

1684. 
Eulee, Lettres a une princesse d'Allemagne. Nouv. ed. Paris, 1812. 

— Logique, t. i. 
Eustachius (Fran.), De Rebus Diaiecticis. Cant., 1648. 
Eveeaedus (Nicolaus-), Topica de Locis Logicalibus. Malines, 1493. 
Ewtck (J. van), Dissertatio inaug. de cognitionis in mathesi ct in 

philosophia indole. Traj. ad Rh ., 1810. 

F 

Fabeb (John R.), Totius Logics, &c. AureL, 1623. 

Fabeiaxo, Prospetto degli Studj Filosofici. 1833. 

Fabricius (Joh. Alb.), Diss, de cavillationibus Stoicorum. Lips,, 1692, 

Facciolati (Jac), Logical discipline?, &c. Venet., 1728. 

Idem, Institutiones schola? peripateticae. Tenet., 1729. 
Faedella (Michel Aug.), Logica. Venet., 1696. 
Feciixee (G. Th.), Katcchismus der Logik oder Denklehre. Lips., 1823; 
Fedee (J. G. II.), Logik und Metaph. Goett., 1790. 

Idem, Grundsaetzc der Logik und Mciaphysik. Goett., 1794. 



LIST OF VfOEKS ON LOGIC. OOd 

Fedku (J. G. H.), Yorlesimgen ueber die Federschc Logik mid Metaph. 

Lemgo, 1793-1794. 
Idem, Erklaerung der Logik, Metaph. imdpract.Philosopli. naeli Feder. 

Wien, 1793-1794. 
Idem, Institutiones logica} ct metaph. Goeit., 1797. 
Fellx, Lecons de logique. Yverdon, 1770. 
Fell (Dr John), Artis Logica?, &c. 
Felwinger (Jo. Paul.), Philosophia Altdorfiana, hoc est disputationcs 

collectse Scherbi, Soneri, Piccarti. Xorimb., 1644. 
Ferdixaxdus Encias, Princip. Dialectica?. 
Ferrer (J. C. F.), Vernimftlehrc. 1770. 

Idem, Grundriss der Vemunftlehre. Ilelmst., 1774. 
Feuerldjus (J. G.), Diss, do variis modi's logicam tradendi. Jena;, 

1712. 
Idem, De logic* Meroglypliiea. Lips., 1712. 
Idem, Orat. inaug. de prudent ia logica ex vitis cruditorum addis- 

ccnda. Alt., 1715. 
Fichte (J. G.), Leber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre oder soge- 

nannten Philosophic. Weimar, 1794-1798. 
Idem, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslelire. Lips., 1794- 

1802. 
Fillasier, Eraste, on l'amidela jcunesse. Cinquieme ed. Paris, 1803. 

— Les entretiens 2 et 3 contiennent des elemens de logique. 
Fischhaber (G. E. F.), Lt'lirbuch der Logik. Stuttg., 1818. 
Flatt (K. Ch.), Bemerkungen gegen den Kantischen mid Kiesewetter- 

ischen Grundriss der reinen allgemeinen Logik. Tuebingen, 

1802. 
Flotte (J. S.), Lecons elementaires de philos., t. ler, Logique. 2me 

ed. Paris, 1805. 
Fonseca (Petr.), Institutt. dialectics, lib. viii. Basil, 1590; Colon., 

1591 ; Leod., 1608. 
Formey, Examen de la question: Si toutes les verifces sout bonnes a 

dire. Mem. de l'Acad. de Berlin, 1777, pp. 333-354. 
Foestee (Chr.), A. G. Baumgarten philos. gen. cum dissert, prcemiali 

de dubitatione et certitudine. Halco, 1770. 
Foucher, Philosophia academica. Paris, 1692. 
Feaxcke (G. S.), Institutiones psychologiaj empiriere et logica?. Kilice, 

1814. 
Fraxcke (F. J. C), De sensu proprio quo Aristotelis usus est in argu- 

mentandi modis. Diss. acad. Rostochii, 1824. 4to. 
Franctscus Alphonsus, Disputa in Logicam. 
Fraxciscus Bivaries, Dialectica, 
Franctscus del Fresno, In Univcrs. et Prredieamenta, 
Fraxciscus Fuetado, Dialectica. 
Franciscus Loscos, De Logica Arte. 
Fraxciscus Mubgia, Selecta ad Dialect.- 
Fraxciscus Nunez, Dialectics. 



504 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 

Franciscus de Oyiedo (Maclritanus), Soc. Jcsn, cursus pliilos. ad unum 
corpus redactus, t. I., complectcns summulas, logicam, physicam, 
&c. Lugd., 1651. 

Franciscus Sanchez, Organum Dialec. 

Franciscus Satjrez, Iii Logicam. 

Franciscus Satjrez de Yillegas, Dialcctica. 

Franciscus de Toledo, Logica. 

Fraunce (Abraham), Lawier's Logike. London, 1588. 

Freights (Jo. Th.), Artium logicarum schematism! logici. Bas., 1560. 

Fries (Jac. Fred.), Grundriss der Logik. Heidelb., 1811-1819. 

Frischlinus (Nic), Dialogus contra P. Rami sophisticam pro Aristotclc. 
Franco/., 1590. 

Frfsius (Paulus), Comparationum logicarum lib. III. Franco/, 1596. 

Frommenius (Andrew), Synopsis Metaphysica. Oxford, 1649. 

Fromond (Claude), Delia Logica. 1762. 

Fuller, Art of Thinking. London, 1731. 

Foiana (Adam), System of Logic. Padua, 1739. 



G 

Gallandius (Petrus), Oration, desert, pro Aristotele et Parisiensi 

Scliola, contra novam Petri Eami Academiam. 1551. 
Gallupi (Baron Pasquale), Lczioni di Logica, c di Metafisica. Firenze, 

1841. 
Gammarus (P. A.), Ehetorica ac dialcctica lcgalis. 
Garniee (Adr.), Precis d'nn cours de psychologic. Paris, 1831. 8vo. 
Garrigues, Cours de philosophic Paris, 1821. 
Garve, De nonnullis qua? pertinent ad logicam probabilium. 1766. 
Gascon (Johannes), In Logicam. 
Gaspar Cardillo, Intro, in Dialecticam. Smnma Summularum. In 

Univ. Praedi. et alia Dialectica. 
Gaspar de la Fuexte, Dialectica. 
Caspar Lax, Dialectica. 
Gaspar Vaz, Dialectica. 
Gassendi (P.), Opera omnia. Lugd., 1658. 

Idem, Syntagma philosophic Epicuri. Hayoz Comit., 1659. 
Idem, Exercitationes paradoxical adversus Aristotelem. Amstet.^ 
Flzcv., 1649. 
Gaultier (I'Abbt'), Methode pour analyser la peusec et pour fairs des 

abreges. Paris. ISmo* 
Gebwiller (Jo.), Par. Artis Logices Compil. Basil, 1511. 
Genovesi (Antony), Artis Logicse. Naples, 1744. 
Idem, Elementa Artis Logic. -Critic. 1767. 
Idem, Delia Logica. 1799. 
Georghjs Axeporymus, Compendium pliilos, sire organi Aristotelis; 
Groccc et Latin. Aug. Yindel., 1600/ 



LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 505 

Georgius (Brnxellensis), Logica secundum, &c. 1512. 

Georgius Dla.contjs, Epitome logics Aristotelis. Par., 1548. 

Gexty (F. J. H.), Siemens de philosophic, livre premier, Logique. 

Paris. 1819. 
Gerhard (Ephr.), Delineatio philos. rationalis eclectica?. Jena, 1703 

et 1716. 
Gerlach (Glo. Willi.), Grundriss der Logik. Halle, 1817, 1822. 

Idem, Grundriss der Fundamental-Philosophic. Halle, 1816. 
Georgius, Expositiones logicales. S. L., 1504. 4to. 
Gesneb (J. M.), Primae Linea; Isagoges in eruditionem univcrsalem. 

Lips., 1785. 
Geulixgius ou Geulixcx (Arnold), Logica fundamentis, &c. Lugd. 

Bat, 1662. 
Idem, Annotata majora in principia philosophic R. Descartes. Dor- 

draci, 1691. 
Idem, De Geest-knnde. Dordr., 1696. 
Gezelius (B.), Artis Logica? Compil. 1661. 

Giiiffexe (Laurent.), Prodidagmata sive logica?, &c. Ioi\, 1627. 4to. 
Gillet (R.), Logic. Lond., 1796. 
Gibox, Cours de Philosophic. 1842. 
Goclexius (Rud.), P. Rami dialectica collecta a M. Chst. Cramero. 

Ursell, 1600. 
Idem, Isagogc in organon Aristotelis. Franco/., 1598. 
Idem, Problemata logica et philosophica. Marb., 1614. 
Goess (G. F. D. von), Grundriss der Logik. Amst., 1795. 
Goxzalez (Fr.), Logica Tripartita. Romce, 1639. 4to. 
Goel.eus (David), Exereitationcs philosophical. 1620. Foppens, 

Bibl. Belg. 
Goescius (J.), Commentariorum artis dialectica 1 . Lips. 
Gothus (L. P.), Institut. Logica?. 1578. 
Gottigxies (Mg. F.), Logistica Univer. Neap., 1687. 
Gottsched (J. Chr.), Erstc griinde der gesammten Wcltweishcit. Leipz., 

1734. 
Goyeaxus (Ant.), Responsio ad Rami calumnias pro Aristotele. Paris, 

1543. 
Goyeaxus (Th.), Logica elenchtica. Dublini, 1683. 
Gray (G. T.), Lessons on Logic. London, 1850. 
Granger (Thomas). Diviue logic. London, 1620* 
Gravesaxde (W. J.), Logic. 

Greexe (Robert), The Principles of Philosophy. Cambridge, 1717. 
Gregorius de Arcis, Dialectica. 
Groeffe (Joh. Fr. Chr.), Die Socratik nach ihrer urspruenglichen Bes- 

chanenhcit. Goettingen, 1794. 
Gileter (F. D.), Ausfuehrliche Logik. Esslingen, 1815. 
Grosserus (Sam.), Pharus intellcctus sive logica electiva". Lipsice, 

1697. 
Gruithuisex (F. P.), Grundriss der reinen Logik, Glogau, 1808. 



506 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 

Gkuyee (L. A.), Systemc des facultes dc Lame, par Laromiguierc. 

Bruxelles, 1823. 
Gemellus (Petr.), Commentarius de doctrina ct arte deinonstrandi. 

1554. Bibl. Belg. II. 
Guischet (P.), Artis Rationandi. Sahnur., 1650. 
Guxdlixg (N. H.), Via ad veritatem moralem. Bailee, 1713 et 1726. 
Guxtherus (J. Casp.), Dissertatio dc metliodo disputandi Megarica. 

Jence, 1707. 
Gutkius (Gcorg.), Logica divina sivc peripatetica. Colon., 1631. 



H 

Hagek (Joli. Geor.), Dissertatio dc metliodo dispntandi Euclidis. Lips.. 

1736. 
Hallier (Francis), Analysis Logica?. Paris, 1630. 
Haxgestus (Hier.), Problemata Logicalia, Paris, 1516. 
Haxschius (Mich. Gottl.), Principia philosophic. Franco/, et Lips., 

1728. 
Idem, Ars inveniendi, sive synopsis regularum prsecipuarnra artis in— 

veniendi. Franc, et L/ps., 1728. 
Haxslik (J.), Uebersicht der logischen Formen, 3 Tabell. gr. fol. Prag.. 

1823. 
HARDEnyriCExsis (Gerardus), Commentaria in Logicani Aristotelis. 

1494. 
Harlay (Fr. de), Artificii logici descriptio. Paris, 1605. 
Hateaxus (Stcph.), Introductio ad principia philosophies solidioris. 

Debriezini, 1757. 
Hauchecorxe, Abrege latin de philosophic, avec nnc introd. et des 

notes francaises. Paris, 1784. 2 vols., 12mo. 
Idem, Logique francaise, pour preparer les jeuncs gens a la rhctorique, 

Paris, 1810. 
Haumoht, Discours sur les arts et les sciences en general, et sur leur 

laugue en particulier. Brux,, 1818. 
Haughtox (Sir Graves Chammig), Prodromus, or an Inquiry into the 

First Principles of Reasoning, including an Analysis of the Human 

Mind. London, 1859. 
Hauxoldus (C), Logica practica in rcgulas digesta. Ingotst., 1646. 
Hedge (Levi), Elements of Logic. New York, 1816. 
Heeeeboobd (Adr.), Ermenia logica. Lugd.Bat., 1654 et 1656. 

Idem, Philosophia naturalis, moralis, rationalis. Lugd. Bat., 1654. 
Heeueboord (And.), Synop. Logica 1 . Lond., 1658. 
Hegel (G. W. F.), Wissenschaft der Logik. Nurenberg, 1816. 

Idem, Encyclopaedic der philos. Wissenschaften im Grimdriss. Heidelb. , 

1817. 
Hegendorphtnus (C), Dialectica legalis cum scholiis. Paris, 1547. 
Heiberg, Einleit'T.'len Yorirag zran Logischen Csrsus. 1840. 



LIST OF WORKS OX LOGIC. 507 

Heigl (G. A.), Die platonisclie Dialektik. Landsh., 1812. 

Heeseccius (J. G.), Elemeuta pfailos. Amst., 1730. 

Hemert (P. van), Beginzels der Kantiaeusclie wysgeerte, naar liet hoog 

duitsch vreylyk gevolgd, &c. Amst,, 1796. 
Hbmstekhuys, Aristee, ou de la verite. Paris, 1779. 
Hex'xert (Job. Fred.), Aphorismi philosophici. Traj. ad II., 1718. 
Herbart (J. F.), Lehrbuch zurEinleitimgin die Philosophic Kcenigsb., 

1813-1821. 
Herbert (B.), Elementa logica?. 'Wurizb., 1773. 
Hexser (E. J.), Logics pra?lectionibus accommodata. Colon., 1815. 
Hesselbeinius (Job.), Theoria Logica. Franc, 1606. 
Hierius (Joau.), Precepta Doctrina? Logica?. Cant., 1617. 
HiERoxv:\irs Moxtee, Dialectica. 
HiERcomirs Pardo, Dialectica. 
HlE»03?T8fus Pla. Dialectica. 
HiEROXvurs de Valera, Dialectica. 
Hilaire, St (J. B.), Logique d'Aristote. Paris, 1844. 
Hillebraxd (Jos.), Gi'iindriss der Logik. Heidclb., 1820. 
Hiller, (J. F.), Curriculum philosophise, logicam compl. Wittenb. 
Hills (T. S.), System of Logic. 1846. 
Hixd (Samuel), Introduction to Logic. Oxford, 1827. 
Hrppius (Fabianus), Prob. Physica et Logica. Franc, 1603. 
Hutius (M. Fabianus), Problemata pliysica et logica peripatetica. 

Witteb., 1698. 
Hispanus (P.), Sum inula? logic ales. Colon. Ayr., 1622. 4to. 
Hobbes (Th.), Opera omnia. Amst., 1668. 2 vols., 4to. 
Hoeckelsiioyex (Jo.), Systema logicum in versibus. Franco/., 1611. 
Hoex (Math.), Comp. Logices. Cologne, 1619. 
Hoffbaueb (J. C), Anfangsgrueiiclc der Logik. Halle, 1794-1810. 

Idem, Analytik der Urtheile und Schluesse. Halle, 1792. 
HonoLVx (Don.), De usu et appli. noti. Logicarum. Frankfort, 1596. 
Hogel (Cli.), Empirische Psychologic und Logik. Gera., 1810. 
Hoijer (B. H.), Aphorismi Logic. Transcendent. Upsala, 1812. 
Hollmax^x (S. C), Institutiones philos. Vitemb., 1729. 
LIolyoake (G. L.), The Logic of Facts. London, 1848. 
LTooke (Dr), The True Method of Building a Solid Philosophy ; or, A 

Philosophical Algebra. London, 1645. 
Korxeius (Con.), Logicte. Ilelmt., 1621. 
IIortius (Gregory), Instit. Logicarum. 1618. 
Horvatt (J. B.), Institutiones logics. Aug. Vind., 1772 et 1781. 
Hotomaxxt:s (F.), Dialectica? institutiones. Hcerii, 1573. 
Huexs, (Augustus, a native of Mechlin, and born 1521), Dialectica. 

Idem, Prodidagmata Logices. 1578. 
Huetivs (P. D.), Censura philosophia? Cartesian*. Paris, 1689. 

Idem, De imbecilitate mentis humanse, lib. III. Amst., 1738. 
HrLscnorr (Allard.), Logica. 1772. 
Huxgar (C. F.), Ueber die Natar der Wahrlieit Dresden, 1786. 



508 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 

Hunnveus (Aug.), Dialectica. Antverpice, 1566. 
Idem, Prodidagmata logics. Antverp., 1566. 
Hutcheson (Fr.), Compendium logics et metaph. Argent., 1771. 
Huyche (John), A Treatise on Logic. Oxford, 1833. 
Hyacintiius le Sarasa, In Logicam. 

I 

Ignatius Franciscus, In Arist. Logicam. 

Isendooen (Gisbertus), Cursus Logicus. Oxford, 1658. 

J 

Jacob (L. H.), Grundriss tier allgemeinen Logik. Halle, 1789. 
jAccHiBUs (Gilb.), Primae Philosophise Institutiones. Lugd. Bat., 

1616. 
Jacquier, Elemens de Psychologic, d'ideologie, et de logiquc. 
Jameson, Grammar of Logic. 1821:. 

Jankowsky (J. E.), Logique en Polonaise. Cracovie, 1822. 
Jani i>i Soeia, Philosophia3 Kationalis Institutiones. 1741. 
Janssens (J. H.), Logique. Louvain, 1825. 
Jardine, Synopsis of Logic. 1820. 
Javelin (H. L.), In Arist. Logicam. 1663. 
Joachimus Climenti, Disputa Dialectics. 
Joannes Bx\.ptista Moullok, Priorum Analyticorum. De Nomine En- 

telech. 
Joannes Cantero, In Porph. Isagogen. 
Joannes Caramuel, Pra3cnrsor Logicus. 
Joannes Clemens, In Prsdicamenta. 
Joannes (Constan.), Artis Logicse. Massil, 1671. 
Joannes Dalz, Syllogismi. 
Joannes (Grammaticus), Comment, in prior, analyt. Aristotelis. Vend., 

1536. 
Josef-hus Ferrer, Logica. 
Julius Pacius, Commentarius Analyticus in Porphyrii Isagogen et 

Aristotelis Organon. Francof, 1592. 
Jungius (Joach.), Logica Hamburgensis. Hamburg, 1638. 



Kalkreutii (H. W. A. von), Was ist Wahrheit? Leipz., 1821. 
Kames (Lord), Sketches of the History of Man. 1770. 
Kant (Emm.), Kritik dcr reinen Vernunft. Leipz., 1781. 

Idem, Die falsche Spizfindigkeit der vicr syllogistichen FigureiL 
Kccnigsb., 1763. 

Idem, Vermischte Schriftcn. Halle, 1799. 

Idem, Logik, herausg. Kamigrb., 1800. 



LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 509 

Keckerman (Barth.), Systema Logica. Han., 1600. 
Idem, Prsecog. Logica. Han., 1604. 
Idem, Gymnasium Logicum. Han., 1605. 
Idem, Systema Logicum. Han., 1613. 
Kempe (Alex.), Systema Logica. 1623. 
Keslerus (Andreas), Tract. Logicus. Wittenb., 1623. 

Idem, Priucip. Logicorum. Wittenb., 1642. 
Kept (Henry), Logic. Lond., 1809. 

Kiesewetter (J. G. C), Gruiidriss einer allgemeinen Logik. Berlin, 
1795. 
Idem, Logik zum Gebrauch fuer Schulen. Berlin, 1797. 
Idem, Compendium einer allg. Logik nacli Kant'schen Grundsaetzen. 
Berlin, 1796. 
Kinker (J.), Essai d'une exposition succincte de la critique de la raison 

pure. Amst., 1801. 
Kirby (John), Logic. Lond., 1752. 
Kirchman (John), Eudim. Logics. Lub., 1669. 
Kirwant (Rich.), Logic. Lond., 1807. 
Klein (G. M.), Verstandeslehre. Bamb., 1817. 

Idem, Anschanungs und Denklehre, ein Handbuch zu Vorlesuugen. 
Bamb. und Wiirzb., 1818. 
Knigge (Phil. Freih. von), Versuch einer Logik. Hanov., 1789. 
Knutzen (Mart.), Elementa Philos. Rationalis sive Logica. Regio- 

monti, 1771. 
Koch (C. D.), Specimen Polyhistoris Logici. Jence, 1728. 

Idem, Programma de Logices Abusu. lb. 
Koeppen (Fred.), Leitfaden fuer Logik und Metaphysic. Landshut., 

1809. 
Kohler (Lud. Mar.), Elementa Logica?. Gotting., 1740. 
Kragius (Andr.), Schola Ramea, vel defensio P. Rami adversus G. 

Leibleri calumnias. Basil, 1582. 
Krentz (Albert), Instit. Logica?. Leipsic, 1517. 
Krause (C. Christi Fred.), Grundriss der Historischen Logik. Jena, 1803. 
Krug (Willi. Traug.), Denklehre oder Logik. Kamigsb., 1806. 

Idem, Handbuch der Philos. und der Philosophischen Litteratur. 

Leipz., 1820. 
Idem, Fundamental Philosophic Zullichau und Freystadt, 1803. 
Idem, Von der Ueberzengung nach ihren verschiedenen Graden. Jena, 

1797. 
Idem, System der theoret. Philos: — Logik. Kamigsb., 1819. 



Lambert (Joh. Heinr.), Neues Organon. Leipz., 1764. 2 vols. 
Idem, Neues Organon. 1844. 

Idem, Logische und Philosophische Abhandlungen. Dessau, 1786, 
1787. 2 vols. 



510 LIST OP WOEKS ON LOGIC. 

Lambert (Joh. Heinr.), Anlage zur Architektonik, oder Theorie des 

Erstern und Einfachen in der Philos. und Mathemat. Riga, 1771. 

2 vols. 
Idem, Examen d'une espece de superstition ramenee au calcul des 

probability. Mem. de l'Acad. de Berlin. 1771. 
Laxceux, Introduction a l'analyse des systemes. 
Laxge (Joh. Joach.), Medicina mentis. Halo?, 1703. 
Laxiolle (De), La Logique sans epines, et ses matieres rendues les plus 

claires du monde, par des exemples sensibles. 2me edit. Paris, 

1670. 
Lapidaxtts (Guill.), Methodus dialectics Aristotelicas. Lud., 1542. 
Laromeguiere (P.), Lecons de Philosophie. Paris, 1815. 
Larroque (P.), Elemens de Philosophic Paris, 1831. 
Latham, First Lines of Logic. 
Latjr^us (01.), Elementa Logical. 1655. 
Layritz (P.), Elementa Logical. Stuttg., 1765. 
Lax (Gasp.), In Logicam Tractatus varii. Paris, 1511. Fol. 
Le Bretox (le P.), La Logique adaptee a la Rhetoriqtie. Paris, 1788. 
Ledexo (Joannes Sanchez), Logica. 
Leechmax (John), Logic. Glasgow, 1847. 
Leewis (Dion, a), De Scientia Universalium. 
Le Graxd (Ant,), Philosophia veterum e mente Renati Descartes. 

Lond., 1671. 
Idem, Institutio Philosophica. Lond., 1672; Norimb., 1679. 
Lehmaxx (J. Jac), Neue und Nuetzlichste Art der Yernunftlehre, 

1723. 
Lehmtjs (C. D.), Grundriss des gesunden Menschenverstandes. Heilbr., 

1785. 4 vols. 
Le Moixe (P. J.), Comment, acad. de diversi adsensus formis qua3 

dicuntur scientia, fides, opinio, nee non de fiducia in rationis hu- 

rnanas auctoritate collocanda. Lugd. Bat., 1829. 
Leibxitius (God. Guil.), Opp. omnia. 1768. 
Lemoxier (P.), Cursus Philosophicus, ad scholarum usum accommo- 

datus. Paris, 1*750. 
Leo (Ambrosius), Ambrosii Nolani Castigationes, adversus Averroes. 

Ven., 1517. 
Letomus (Barth.), Summa totius ratiouis Disserendi. Colon., 1527. 
Idem, Scholia in dialecticam Georgii Trapezuntii. Lugd., 1545. 
Idem, Epitome Commentar. Agricolae. Colon., 1533. 
Lever (Richard), the Art of Reason, rightly termed Witcraft, teaching 

a perfect way to argue and dispute. London, 1573. 
Lewes (G. C), An Examination of some passages in Dr "Whately's 

Elements of Logic. Oxford, 1829. 
LiBAvirs (Andr.), Collatio dialectices Melancthonis et Rami. Norimb., 

1593. 
Liebaert (M»), Tractatus de Logica. 1818. 
Likawetz (J. C), Elementa Philos. Grcecii, 1820. 



LIST OF WOKKS ON LOGIC, 511 

Lipsius (J.), Manndnctio ad Stoic. Pliilos. Paris, 1604. 

Listrius (Gerd.), Coinmontarium in Dialecticam Petri Hispani. 1520. 

Loewe (J. H.), Ucber den Begriff der Logik. YYien, 1848. 

Lorrrs (Dudley), Logica Armeniaca. Dublin, 1657. 

Lossius (Joh. Chr.), Unterricht der Gesimden Vemunft. Gotha, 1777. 

Idem, De arte obstetrica Socratis. Erfurt., 1785. 
Lott. Zur Logik. 184G. 

Lublam (Rev. Will.), Essays Logical. Loud., 1809. 
Ludoyices (de Lernos), Paradox. Dialectorum. 
Leshixgtox (Thomas), Logica Analytica. Land.. 1650. 

M 

Maass (J. G.). Grnndriss der Logik. Halle, 1793. 

Mackexsex (Vr.), Grundriss zu einer Theorie des Abstractions vermoe- 

geus. Halle, 1799. 
Mackestseus (Geo.), De humanse rationis imbecilitate. Ultraj., 1690. 
Mackexzie (Sir James), Reason, an Essay. London, 1675. 
Madeitaxes (P.), Dialectica sen Logica Minor. Romce, 1711. 
Mailhat (Raymond) Sinnma Philosophic. Colon., 1660. 
Madiox (Salom.), Vcrsneh einer neuen Logik oder Theorie des Denkens. 
Berlin, 1792. 

Idem, Die Kategorien des Aristotelis. Berl., 1798. 

Idem, Kritische Untersuchungen ueber den menschlichen Geist. Leipz., 
1787. 
Majeb (G. F.), Vernunfthlehre. Halle, 1752. 
Major (John), Logicos et Magistrum. Lyons, 1514. 
Majoeagiis, Reprcheusiones contra Xizolium. 1570. 

Idem, Explanationes in Aristotelis Rhetoricam. 1572. 
Makes (P.), Compend. Logics Institutio. Yindobona?, 1760. 
MaJxBBRAJSiCHE (Xic), De la Recherche de la Verite. Ed. Paris, 1712. 
Mamiani (Terenzio), Dell' Ontologia del Metodo. Parif/i, 1841. 
Manderston (Gail.), Tripartitam epitoma in totius dialectics artis 

principia. Paris, 1517. 
Mangold (J. M.), Philosophia rationalis. Ingolst., 1755. 
Maxsel (H. L.), Artis Logicee Rndimenta, from the text of Aldrich. 

Oxford, 1849. 
Maxsfelt (Reg.), Elementa recta? ratiociuationis. Ultraj., 1668. 
Marcus (de los Hnertos), Quaest. Dialecticam. 
Mariotte, Essai de Logiqne. Paris, 1678. 
Maries (Xizolius), Antibarbarns. Pawnee, 1553. 
Mabsais (C. C), Logic. Paris, 1762. 
Mars.vis (Dn), Logiqne et principes de grammaire. Paris, 1769. 

Idem, Essais snr les prejages, on de l'iaflaence de l'opinion snr le 
bonheur des hommes. Paris, 1822. 
Marsh (Narciss.), Manductio ad Logicam. Oxon.. 1678. 

Idem, Instit. Logieae. Dublin, 1681. 



512 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 

Martiaxus (Capelle), Probate et sincere latinitatis auctoris Dialectica, 

perutilis acjucunda omnibus Ms qui, spretis barbaricis deviis, rectum 

dialectices querunt iter. M. Tullii Ciceronis Topica. Lyptzk. ,1510. 
Martinet (Carol.), Logica sen ars cogitancli ad publicum scliolarum 

nsum. Paris, 1771. 
Martinez (Joannes), In Aristo. 
Martinez (Joannes Gonzalez), In Aristo. 

Martixus (Corn.), Disputatio contra Ramistas de subjecto et fine logi- 
cs. Lemgov., 1597. 
Idem, Commentarii logici adv. Ramistas. Helmst., 1623. 
Martixus (Perez), In Univer. Porpliy. 
Mabtdjus (de Santolaria), Dialectica. 
Massa (N.), Logica. Venet., 1559. 
Massias (le Baron), Rapport de la nature a 1'homme. Paris, 1821. 

Idem, Probleme de Tesprit humain. Paris, 1825. 
Matthle (Aug.), Lehrbuch fiir der ersten Unterricht in der pliilosopliie. 

Leipz., 1823. 
Matthisius (Ger.), Scholia in organon Aristotelis. Colon., 1565. 

Idem, Epitome logics Aristotelica^, gr.-lat. Colon., 1569. 
Math;eus (Doniensis Ormazius), Instru. Instrumentorum. 
Maugras, Cours de pliilosopliie. Paris, 1822. 
Mauterxus (Jo.), Pannonius, rect. scliol. Cassov., tabella? logica?. Leuts- 

chovice, 1640. 
Mazeas (J. M.), Institutiones philosophica? sen elemcnta logica? et meta- 

physica?. Paris, 1777. 
Mazzarelli, II buon uso della logica in materia di religione. Foligno, 

1787. 
Mehmel (G. C. A.), Versucli einer volstaendigen analytischen Denk- 

lehre. Erlangen, 1803. 
Meilixger (Fl.), Grundriss der Logik und Metaphysik. Muenchen, 1826. 
Meixees (Christ.), De nominalium ac realium initiis. Goetting. T. xi. 
Idem, Untersuchungen ucber die Denk-und-^Yillens-kraefte. Goett., 

1806. 
Meisler (W.), Logica, Vindob., 1781. 
Meister, Logique a mon usage. Amst., 1772. 
Melaxcthox (Phil.), Compend. dialectices ratio. Wittenb., 1520. 
Idem, Dialectica?. Paris, 1522. 
Idem, Erotematum dialectica?. Wittenb., 1547. 
Melciiior (de Beleago), Logicam. 
Melciiior (de Castro), Logica, 
Mellix (G. S. A.), Encyclopaedische Woerterbuch der kritischen Philos. 

Zullichau und Leipz., 1797. 
Mexdosa (P. H. de), Disputationes logica? ac metaphysics. Toloso?, 

1617. 
Mexzifs (Fr.), Diss, de Socratis methodo docendi non omnino preescri- 

benda. Lips., 1740. 
Mercier, Logique, ou l'art de penscr. Geneve, 1766. 



LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 513 

Merinero (Joannes), Logica. 

Metobius (Burchardus), Metaphysica et Logica. 1565. 
Metz (Andr.), Institutiones logica?. Bamb. et Wirceb., 1796. 
Idem, Handbuch der Logik. Bamb. et Wirceb., 1802. 
Idem, Ueber den Werth der Logik ein Yerhaeltnisse zur Metapli3 r sik 

und Mathematik. Wurzb., 1813. 
Idem, De philos. criticorum de logica. Wirceb., 1799. 
Meurisse (Tr. M.), Systeina logicum figuris emblematicis representatum. 

J. H. Acker. Struvii. 
Michael (de Trinitate), Logica. 
Michael (de Villaverde), Logica. 
Mells, Logic. 1846. 

Milton (Joh.), Artis logica?, &c. London, 1672. 
Molln^eus (P.), Elementa logica. Paris, 1609. 
Moberly (0. E.), Lectures on Logic. Oxford, 1848. 
Monboddo (Lord), Ancient Metaphysics. 1779. 
Mongin, Philosophic elementaire ou methode analytique. Nancy, 1803. 
Monro, Logic. Glasgow, 1850. 

Monsnerius (P.), De Methodo Scientiarum. Lugd., 1626. 
Mooxey (Daniel), Veram Logicam, &c. 1812. 
Mueller (J. F.), Zweifel gegen Hen-n Christ. "Wolfs vernuenftige Ge- 

denken. Giesen., 1731. 
Muench (Jo. Gottl.), Diss, de notione ac indole scepticismi, nominatim 

Pyrrhonismi. Altd., 1797. 
Murmellius (Joh.), Isagoge in pra?dicamenta seu categorias Aristotelis. 

Paris, 1535. 
Murker (R. P. Th.), Chartiludium logicum. 
Murray, Logic. Dublin, 1812. 
Musschenbroek (P. van), Institutiones logica?. Ludg. 



N 

Napalton, Logic. 1793. 

Nason (George), Phil, of Logic. Lond., 1809. 

Nast (J. Jac), Prog, de methodo Platonis philos. Stuttg., 1787. 

Naston (John), Introduction to the Art of Logic. London, 1671. 

Naverus (Jacobus), In Arist. 

Naverus (Joannes,) Logica. 

Neander (C), Tabula? in dialecticam Petri Rami. Franco/., 1591. 

Neeb (Joh.), System der kritischen Philos. Bonn und Franco/., 1795. 

Nehr (Joh. Geor.), Logik. Nuernberg, 1797. 

Neldelius (Joh.), Institutio de usu organi Aristotelici in disciplinis 

omnibus. Helmst., 1666. 
Nericius (Olaus Nicolai), Logica. 1570. 
Newton (John), Introduction to the Art of Logic. London, 1671. 



514 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 

Nicephorus Blemmydas, Epitome logics doctrine Aristotelis, Gr. et Lat. 

1605. 
Nicolai Cusanus, Opp. Basil, 1565. 
Nicolai, Sur les abstractions, les imperfections qui en sont inseparables, 

et leur frequent abus. Mem. de l'Acad. de Berlin, 1803. 
Idem, Sur le regressus logique et sur l'idee qu'attachaient a ce mot 

les anciens commentateurs d'Aristote. lb., 1803. 
Nieuport (C. F. de), Essai sur la tkeorie du raisonnement. Bruxelles, 

1805. 
Nizolius, De Veris Principiis et Yera Ratione Philosophandi. Parma, 

1553. 
Nobilius (Fl.), Qurestiones logic* varise. Amber g, 1611. 4to. 
Noel, Logique de Condillac. Paris, 1202. 
Noldius (Christ.), Logica. 

Nolentus (Petr.), Elementa logica. Amst, 1638. 
Nordin (P.), Theses methodum philosophandi corrigentes. Christianst., 

1820. 
Novaeia (Thomas de), Scientiam Logice, &c. Rome, 1626. 
Nuesslein (Georg.), Kritik der falschen Ansichten der Logik. Bamb., 

1803. 
Nuesslein (Fr. Ant.), Begriff und Eintzeilung der Philosophic, als Ein- 

leitung in das Stadium derselben. Bamb., 1824. 
Idem, Grundlinien der Logik. Bamb., 1824. 
Nunez (Ludovicus), De Formatione Syllogis. 





Occam (Guil.), Doctoris invincibilis et nominalium parentis, summa 

totius logic*. Venet., 1532-1598. 
Oldfield, Essay towards the Improvement of Reason. 1707. 
Oosterga (Cyp. Reg. _ab.), Logica juridica. Ultraj., 1638. 
Osterrieder (H.), Logica critica. Aug. Vind., 1760. 
Ozell, Logic, or the Art of Thinking. 1716. 



P 



Paciijs, Comni. in Analy. Pr. Franco/., 1564. 
Paiva (Hiei\ de), Comp. Logices. Lond., 1627. 
Paludanus (M.), Dialectica. Antverpice, 1628 et 1636. 
Pardus (Hier.), Medulla dialectices. Paris, 1505. Fol. 
Perionius (J.), Dialectic*. Basil, 1549. 
Idem, Epitome dialectic*. Basil, 1551. 
Pedrolo (Joannes), Lectur* Logicales. 



LIST OF WORKS ON -LOGIC. 515 

Perrard (J. F.), Introduction a la Philosophie, ou Nouvelle Logique 

Francaise. Paris, 1844. 
Perron (F.), Essai d'une Nouvelle Theorie sur les Idees Fondamen- 

tales. Paris, 1830. 
Petrus (Barth.), Prseceptiones logica?. Duaci, 1625. 
Petrus JEgedius, Insti. Dialectica3. 
Petrus Ciruelo, Logica. 
Petrus de Espinosa, In Summulas. 
Petrus Fermosellus, In Logicam. 
Petrus Fernandez Torrenjon, In Arist. Dialecticam. 
Petrus de Fonseca, Dialectica. 
Petrus (Hispanus), Logica. Hisp., 1571. 
Petrus a Jesu Maria, In Logicam. 
Petrus Joannes Monzon, Logica. 
Petrus de Mercado, In Logicam. 
Petrus Nunez Vela, Dialectica. 
Petrus de Ona, Logica. 
Petrus de Oviedo, Logica. 
Petrus Simon Abril, Introd. ad Logicam. 

Petterman (Aug.), Philos. Cartesians adversus, &c. Lips., 1690. 
Pfaffradius (Casp.), Commentatio de studiis Rameis. Franco/. 
Phild?pus (Guil.), Medulla logicaj. Lov., 1661. 3 vols., 4to. 

Idem. Logica. Lov., 1658. 
Philoponus (Job.), Comment, in analyt. prima. Grrece. Venet., 1536. 

Idem, Comment, in analytica posteriori. Gr. Venet, 1534. 
Phoclylldes (John H.), Logica. Franc., 1643. 
Plnk (Rob.), Qiues. Selec. in Logicam. Oxon, 1680. 
PrNNOCK, Logic. London, 1840. 
Platner (Ern.), Philosophische Apliorismen. Leipz., 1776. 2 vols. 

Idem, Lehrbuch der Logik und Metaphysik. Leipz., 1795. 
Ploucquet (Gottf.), Methodus demonstrandi directe omnes syllogisino- 

rum species. Tuebing., 1763. 
Idem, Principia de substantiis et phenomenis. Accedit methodus 

calculandi in logicis. Tuebing., 1773. 
Poelitz (K. H. L.), Elementar-Logik. Dresden und Leipz., 1802. 
Poggi (T. F.), Lezioni d'Ideologia, di Grammatica, di Logica, Firenze, 

1842. 
Polanus (A.), Syntagma Logicum. Basle, 1605. 
Poli (B.), Corso de Filosofia. Milano, 1828. 
Pomellus (Alex.), Methodus syllogistica. Venet., 1572. 4to. 
Porphyrius, In categorias Aristotelis expositio ; Greece. Paris, 1543. 
Priscianus (Theod.), Logicus. Basle, 1532. 

Pselli (Mich.), Introductio in sex philos. modos ; GraBce. Venet., 1532. 
Idem, Compendium in quinque voces Porphyrii et Aristotelis praa- 

dicamenta. Grsce. Paris, 1541. 
Idem, Paraphrasis libri Aristotelis de interprete ; Gr. cum Ammonii 

et Magentini comment. Venet.. 1503. 



516 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 

Pselli (Mich.), Synopsis logics Aristotelis ; Gr. et Lat. Aug. Vind., 1600. 
Polyander (Johan.), Theses Logicae. 1602. 

R 

Radacus (Phil.), Disputatio pneumatica de errore. Traj. ad R., 1720. 
Rambach (J. T. F.), Pract. Yeraunftlehre. Marb., 1795. 
Ramus (Petr.), Institutiones dialectics. Paris, 1543. 
Idem, Dialectica. Colon., 1572. 

Idem, Animadversiones in dialecticam Aristotelis. Paris, 1543. 
Idem, Schohe in artes liberales. Basil, 1569. 
Idem, Opp. elegantioris methodi philosophise, studiosis pernecessaria3. 
Basil, 1584. 
Rathe (P.), Instit. Logica?. 1721. 
Rattiee, Logique. Paris, 1840. 
Raymundus Lullius, Opera t. X. Moguntice, 1721 et 1742. 

Idem, Opera ea quae ad inventam ab ipso artem universalem, &c. 
Argentor., 1609. 
Recemstius (John P.), Parva Logica. 1605. 
Regis (P. Sylvain), Systeme de la philosophic, contenant la logique, 

&c. Paris, 1690. 3 vols. 4to. 
Regius (Job. D.), Comm. Logici. 1603. 
Regnault (le P.), Logique en forme d'entretiens, ou Tart de trouver la 

verite. Paris, 1746. 
Reed (Dr), Works. 1780. 

Reiffenberg (Baron), Logique. Bruxelles, 1839. 
Reemarus (Herm. Sam.), Vernunftlehre als eine Anweisung zum rich- 

tigen Gebrauch, &c. Hamb. und Kiel, 1756. 
Reimmanus (Jac. Frid.), Critiserender Geschichts-Calender von der 

Logica. Franco/., 1698. 
Reinhold (K. L.), Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vor- 
stellungsvermoegens. Prag und Jena, 1789. 
Idem, Ueber das Fundamente der philos. Wissensch. Jena, 1791. 
Idem, Versuch einer kritik der Logik. 1806. 
Idem, Die alte Frage, Was ist die Wahrheit? Altona, 1820. 
Reuntiold (Ernst), Begruendung und neue Darstellung der logischcn 

Formen. Leipz., 1819. 
Reisch (Geor.), Rhetorica et Logica. Basil, 1508. 
Rennemaknus (Herm.), Enodatio totius philosophic Ramea?. Franco/., 

1599. 
Reusch (J. P.), Via ad perfectionem intellectus compcndiaria. Isenaci, 
1728. 
Idem, Systema logicum. Jena, 1734. 
Reuss (Matern.), Logica universalis. Wirceb., 1789. 

Idem, Vorlesungen ueber die theoretische und practische Philosophic. 

1797. 
Idem, Initia philosophise solidioris, initia Logicie. Salzburgi, 1798. 



I 



LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 517 

Reyxeau (Charles R.), Logic. 

Richter (K. A.), Logik. Wien, 1800. 

Rixgelbergius (Jo.), Dialectica et Rhetorica. Antv., 1529. 

Idem, De disputatione inter disputautes dialectice instituenda libellus. 

Lov., 1551. 
Rnrus (J. A.), Object, et Anno, super Logicam Pauli Yeneti. Bonn, 

1517. 
Ritter (Hein.), Yorlesnngen zur Einleitung in die Logik. Berl., 1823. 

Idem, Abriss der philosophischen Logik. Berl., 1824. 
Rrvrus (Jo.), Dialectic*. Lov., 1546. 
Rixxer (Thad. Ans.), Aphorismen der gesammten Philos. Sulzbach, 

1818. 
Rochow (F. Ebh. V.), Kleine Logik fuer Frauenzininier. Braunschweig, 

1789. 
Rodericus Sixetus, Dialectica. 
Rodolphus (C), Dialectica. Moguntice, 1548. 
Rodriguez (Ludovicus), Dialectica. 

Roeser (Coliunb.), Institutiones Logic*. Wirceb., 1775. 
Romagxosus (J. D.), Che cosa e la mente saua? Indovinello massinio 

che potrebbe valere poco o niente. Milano, 1827. 
Rosexerextz, Modifications de Logique. 1846. 

Rothius (E. R.), Logica practica adjecta Logic* Paulina3. TJlmce, 1172. 
Rubus (Joah.), Logices Aristotelic*. 1572. 
Rudbeckius (J.), Elemen. Logic*. 1580. 
Ruediger (J. A.), Disp. de eo quod omnes ide* oriantur a sensione. 

Lips., 1704. 
Idem, De sensu veri et falsi, lib. IV. Hales, 1709. 
Idem, De usu et abusu terminorm, de novis ratiocinandi adminiculis. 
Rutherford (John), Commentarium de Arte Disserendi. Edinburgh, 

1577. 
Rydelius (And.), Compendium Logices. 1690. 



Saccherus (P.), Logica demonstrativa. Aug. Ubior., 1735. 
Salat (J.), Grundzuege der allg. Philos. Muench., 1820. 

Idem, Vernunft und Verstand. Tuebing., 1808. 2 vols. 
Saxcius Carraxza, Logicolia. 
Saxdersox (Bishop), Logic*. Oxon, 1841. 
Saria (J. G.), De Rationali Philosophia Institutiones. 1780. 
Saure, Elemens de Logique, a l'usage des gens du monde. Paris, 1794. 
Saxoxia (Alb. de), Sophismata. 4to. 
Scarella (J. B.), Elementa Logica. 1762. 
Scayxus, Paraphrasis in Organum. 1569. 
Schad (J. B.), Neuer Grundriss der Logik. Coburg, 1801. 

Idem, Institut. philos. univers*, t. L, Logicam compl. Charkow, 1815. 



518 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 

Scharfhjs (J.), Manuale Logicum. Wittenb., 1635. 

Schaumanx (J. Ch. GL), Elemente der allg. Logik. Marb., 1795. 

Schegkius (Jac), Responsio ad quatuor epistolas P. Rami contra se 

editas. Tuebing., 1570. — Rami defensio adv. Schegkium. Lau- 

san, 1517. 
Scheibler (Chris.), Logica, Metaphysica, &c. Oxon, 1657. 
Scherbius (Phil.), Dissertatio pro philos. peripat. adversus Raniistas. 

Giessen, 1610. 
Scherfer (Car.), Institutiones Logics. Vienna, 1753. 
Schiekhardus (M.), Logica juridica. Herb. Nass., 1615. 
Schmtdt-Phiseldek (C. F. de), Philosophise criticae. Alton., 1796. 

2 vols. 
Schmidt (K. Chr.), Grundriss der Logik. Jena, 1797. 
Schookius (Martinus), Philosophia Carthesiana, sive adrniranda metho- 

dus novae philosophiae Renati Descartes. 1643. Collegium Lo- 
gicum. 1658. 
Schopenhauer (Arthur), Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vier 

Buecher nebst einem Anhange, der die Kritik der Kant'sche Philos. 

enthaelt. Leipz., 1819. 
Schotaxus (Jo.), Discussio censurae Huetianae, cum praefatione Jacobi 

Romani. Amstel., 1702. 
Schulze (G. E.), Grundsaetze der allg. Logik. Helmst., 1802. 
Idem, Kritik der theoretischen Philosophic Hamb., 1802. 
Idem, iEnesidenius, oder ueber die Fundamente, der von Reinhold 

gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie. Helmst., 1792. 
Idem, Encyclopaedic der Philos. Wissenschaften. Goett., 1818. 
Schutz (C. G.), Grundsaetze der Kunst zu Denken. 1773. 
Scott (R. E.), Principles of a Rational Logic. Lond., 1806. 
Scott (Sir Michael), Commentarius in Aristot. Venice, 1496. 
Scribonius (G. A.), Triumphus Logicae Rameae. Basil, 1583. 
Sebastiaxus Couto, Logica. 
Sebastiaxus Foxius Marzillo, Dialectica. 
Sebastiaxus Izquierdo., Dialectica. 
Sebastiaxus de Soto, Summula. 

Seguy (Ant.), Philos. ad usum schol. accommod. Logica. Paris, 1762. 
Sels (H.), Initia Logicae. Confluent. 1778. 
Semler (C. A.), Versuch iiber die combinatorische Methode, ein Bei- 

trag zur angewandten Logik und Allgem. Methodik. Dresden, 

1811. 
Serraxo (Johannes), Dialectica. 

Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae hypoth. ed Fabricio. Lips., 1718. 
Sibberx (Fred. C), Logik als Denklehre. Copenhagen, 1835. 
Sievers (G. J.), De methodo Socratica. Slesv., 1810. 
Sigwart (H. C. W.), Handbuch zu V r orlesungen ueber die Logik. Tuc- 

bing., 1818. 
Simeox (Rabbi), Logica. Basil, 1527. 
Simonius, Varia in Aristotelcm scripta. Genev., 1567. 



( 



LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 519 

Simplicius, Comment, in Aristotelis categorias, Gr. Venet., 1499. 

Smiglecius (M. Soc), Logica. Oxon, 1638. 

Smith (P.), Grammar, Criticism, and Logic. 

Smith (Samuel), Aditus ad Logicam. Oxon, 1658. 

Sxell (F. W. D.), Erste Gruncllinein der Logik. Giesen, 180-1. 

Sxell (Ch. W. und F. W.), Logik nnd Metaphysik. Giesen, 1804. 

Sxell (F. W. D.), Leerboek voor het eerste onderwijs in de wysbe- 

geerte, nit het hoogduitsch vertaald door A. J. Aitzema. Win- 

scJwten, 1821. 
Sxell (Eodolph), De Praxi Logica. 1595. 

Idem, Comment, in dialecticam Rami. Herborn, 1597. 
Idem, Pra?lectiones in Rami dialecticam. Franco/., 1596. 
Soaye (F.), Instituzioni di Logica, Metafisica, ed Ethica. Milan, 1831 . 
Soly, Logic. Cambridge, 1844. 

Soto (Dom.), Suinmula? logica? et physical. Salmanticce, 1547. 
Spaldlxg (J. L.), Vindicia? philosophorum Megaricorum. BeroL, 1795. 
Spexcer (Thomas), Arte of Logic. Lond., 1628. 
Spieghel, Ruygh bewerp van de redenkaYeliug ofte nederduytsche dia- 

lectike. Amst., 1585. 
Spixoza (Bened. de), Opp. qua? supersunt, edE. H. E. G. Paulus. Jence, 

1802. 
Spruyt (M. H.), Introduction a la dialectique legale. Bruxelles, 1814. 
Spoibeeger (J. C), Oratio de pra?stantia et utilitate artis dialectica\ 

Wittemb., 1598. 
Stahlius (Dan.), Institutiones Logics. Jence, 1662. 
Stattler (Bened. J. S.), Philosophia methodo scientiis propria expla- 

nata, t. I. Logica. Aug. Vind., 1769-1772. 
Steele (Sir R.), Grammar, Logic, &c. London, 1728. 
Stelxbart (G. S.), Gememnuetzige Anleitung des Verstandes zum regel- 

rna?ssigen Selbstdenken. Dritten Aufl. Zullichau, 1793. 
Stexgelius (G.), Libellus de bono etmalo syllogismo. 1623. 
Sterxe (Richard), Summa Logica?. Lond., 1685. 
Stierius (J.), Pra?cepta logica? peripatetica?. S. L., 1632. 4to. 
Stierius, Pra?cepta Doc. Logica?. 1689. 

Stoeger (B.), Introd. in studium philos. theor. P. 1, Logica. S. a. 
Stoechexau (S. Yon.), Institut. Logica?. Ofenb., 1795. 
Strauss (K. G.), Lehrbuch einer system. Logik. Berlin, 1783. 
Strokirch (M. Van), Logica, eller Stutkonsten, &c. Stockholm, 1721. 
Sturmius (J.), Disputationes logica? pro veritate et Aristotele concepta?. 

Gryphisw., 1643. 
Idem, Partitionem dialecticarum, lib. IV. Argent., 1560. 
Syrbhts (Jo. Jac), Institutiones philos. rationalis eclectica* una cum 

historia logices. Jence, nil. 



520 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 



Tal^us, P. Rami dialectica Audoni. Colon., 1578. 
Tandel (E.), Cours de Logique. Louvain, 1841. 
Tappan (Henry P.), Elements of Logic. New York, 1844, 
Tartakettus (Petr.), In summulas Patri Hispani, in Isagogen Porphyrii 

et Aristotelis logicam. Venet., 1592. 
Tatham, Chart and Scale of Truth. 

Teeeason (Abbe), La Philosophic de l'esprit. Paris, 1770. 
Teeey (John), Theological Logic. Oxon, 1600. 
Teteks (J. M.), Philosophische Versuch ueber die meuschliche Natur, 

ihre Entwickelung. Leipz., 1777. 
Thankee (Ignat.), Handbuch der Yorbereitung und Einleitung zum 

selbstaendigen wissenschaftlichen Studium, besonders der Philos. 

I Th., die Denklehre. Mnenchen, 1807. 
Themistius, Paraphrases in Arist. analyt. post., physica de anima, de 

memoria et reminiscentia, Gr. ed. Trincavelus. Venet., 1534. 
Thiebault (Dieudonne), Grammaire philosophique, ou la metaphysique, 

la logique en un seul corps de doctrine. Paris, 1802. 2 vols. 
Thomas Coreea, Logica. 
Thomas de Meecado, Dialectica. 
Thomasius (Chr.), Introductio in philosophiam aulicam. Lips., 1688; 

Halce, 1702. 
Idem, Introd. in philos. rationalem, &c. Lips., 1601. 
Idem, Einleitung zu der Vernunftlehre. Hal., 1691. 
Idem, Ausuebung der Vernunftlehre. Hal., 1710. 
Thomasius (Jac), Logica. Lips., 1692. 
Thomasius (Joh.), De secta nominalium orat. Lips., 1683. 
Thompson (Rev. William), Outlines on the Laws of Thought. London, 

1842. 
Theummig (Lud. Ph.), Institutiones philos. Franco/., 1725. 
Thynne, Logic. 
Tiara (Petreius), Sophisten Platonis, sive, de eo quod vere esse dicitur. 

Lovaini, 1552. 
Tiefteunk (J. H.), Grundriss der Logik. Halle, 1801. 
Titelmannus (Fr.), Summa Aristotelici organi cum scholasticis collati. 

Paris, 1545. 
Trrius (J. G.), Ars cogitandi. Lips., 1702. 
Tittel (G. A.), Erlauterungen der theoretischen und pract. Philos. 

nach Feders ordnung. — Logik. Franco/., 1783. 
Idem, Kantsche Denkformen oder Kategorien. Franco/, 1786. 
Tittmann (J. A. H.), Grundriss eines Elementarlogik, &c. Leipsic, 

1785. 
Toellner (A. G., Baumgarten's acroasis logica aucta. 1765. 
Trendelenberg (F. A.), Elcmenta Logices Aristot. Berol., 1845. 
TrtESCiiow (Niels), Logik. Copenhagen, 1813. 



LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 521 

Trieu (Ph. du), Manuductio ad logicam. Luxemburg, 1690. 
Treutler (Hier.), Rudimenta dialectica? P. Rami. Herbom, 1589. 
True (Charles K.), Elements of Logic. Boston, U. S., 1840. 
Tschirnhausen, Medicina mentis sive artis inveniendi prascepta gene- 

ralia. Amst., 1687. 
Tullt (Thomas), Logica. Oxon, 1662. 
Twesten (A. D. Ch.), Die Logik, insbesondere die Analytik. Schiesicig, 

1825. 
Tyrwitt (Thomas), Solid Reasons for Philosophizing. Winchester, 

1652. 



u 

Ubaghs (G. C), Precis de Logique Elementaire. Louvain, 1838. 
Ulrich (J. A. H.), Institutiones logics et metaphysical. Jence, 1785. 



Valerius (C), Dialectica. Antv., 1575. 

Valla (Lanr.), De dialectica, lib. III. Venet., 1499. 

Idem, Nicephori compendiaria de arte disserendi ratio. Basil, 1542. 
Valltus (Paulus), Logica. Lugd., 1622. Fol. 
Velsius (Justus), ou Welsens, Disputatio de universalibus. 

Idem, Tabulae in Aristotelis topica. 
Ventura (G.), De Methodo Philosophandi. 1828. 
Veromanduus, Institutionum dialecticarum lib. III. Paris, 1554. 4to. 
Verri (Pietro), Di Logica. Bolog., 1760. 
Verney (L. Ant.), Logica. 1750. 
Vico, Scienza Nuova. 1720. 
Villaume (P.), Practische Logik. Berlin und Libau, 1787. 

Idem, Populaere Logik znr Einleitung in die Schuhvissenschaft, 
Hamb. und Mainz, 1805. 
Vincentius Justinianus, In Logicam. 
Vincentius Montanus, In Logicam. 

Viottus (Barthol.), De demonstratione, lib. V. Paris, 1560. 
Viyes (Joannes Ludovicus), In Dialecticos. 
Vives (Lud.), Opp. Basil, 1555. 

Idem, De disputatione. 

Idem, Anfuhrung zu der Weisheit. (trad.) Wolffenb., 1656. 
Vladeraccus (Christ.), Epitome dialectices Hunnaei. Sylvce Ducis, 1590. 
Vossrus (J. G.), De logices et rhetoricae natura et constitutione, lib. II. 
Hagce, 1658. 4to. 



2l 



522 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 

w 

Wagnek (L. H.), Grundriss der reinen und allg. Logik. Ho/., 1806. 
Walch (J. G.), Einleitung in die Philos. Leipz., 1727. 

Idem, Philos. Lexikon. Leipz., 1726 and 1775. 
Walch (J. J.), Commentatio de philosophiis veterum criticis. 
Walchius (J. GottL), Novum logica? systema. Jence, 1766. 
Walker (J.), Familiar Commentary on Logic. London. 
Wall, Practical Logic. 1838. 
Wallarkts (N.), Compen. Logica? Instit. 1706. 
Waxdelincourt (Hubert), Cours d'education pour les ecoles du second 

age, t. I., la Logique du second age, ou l'art de bien diriger les 

idees. Paris, 1801. 
Watts (Isaac), Logic. Lond., 1736. 

Idem, Supplement to his treatise of Logic, &c. 1741. 
Weber (Jos.), Logica in usum eorum qui eidem student edita. Land- 

shuti, 1799. 
Weise (F. C), Architectonik aller menschlichen Erkenntnisse. Heidelb., 

1820. Fol. 
Weisens (Christ.), Curieuse Fragen ueber die Logica. Leipz., 1676. 
Weishaupt (A.), Ueber die Gruende und die Gewiszheit der menschl. 

Erkenntniss, zur pruefung von Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 

Nurenb., 1788. 
Weiss (Chr.), Lehrbuch der Logik. Leipz., 1801. 
Wekdel (J. A.), Skeptische Logik. Coburg und Leipz., 1819. 
Wendelentus (M. F.), Logics institutiones. Amst., 1640. 

Idem, Insti. Logica?. Amst., 1654. 
Wenzel (G. J.), Canonik der Verstandes und der Yernunft. ein Com- 

mentar ueber Kant's Logik. 1810. 
Werenfels (S.), De logomachiis eruditorum. Amst., 1716. 
Whately, Logic. 1842. 

Wiedeburg (Fr. Aug.), Ueber die practische Logik. Helmst., 1789. 
Wild (J. C. D.), Logik und allg. Encyclop. Goett., 1802. 
Willis (Profess.), Institutio Logica?. Oxon, 1715. 
Wilson (Sir Thomas), Art of Logic. London, 1580. 
Wittenbachitts, Praecepta Philos. Logica?. 1823. 
Wittichius (Chr.), Anti-Spinozo. Amst., 1690. 
Wolf (Chr.), Vernuenftige Gedenken von den Kraeften des mensch- 
lichen Verstandes. Halle, 1710. 
Idem, Philosophia rationalis sive logica methodo scientifica pertrac- 

tata. Franco/, et Lips., 1728. 4to. 
Idem, Philosophia Wolfiani contracta logicam, &c. Halce, 1744, 

1745. 2 vols. 4to. 
Idem, Logique, ou reflexions sur les forces de l'entendement humain. 
Woetzel (J. K.), Versuch der einzig zweckmaessigen Prapaedeutik der 

Vernunftlehre oder Logik, &c. Leipz., 1802. 
Wotton (Samuel), The Art of Logik. Lond., 1626. 



LIST OF WORKS OX LOGIC. 523 

Wottox (Antony), Logic of Peter Ramus. London, 1626. 
Wyxpersse (Dion, van de), Institutiones logicae. Groninga, 1767; 

Lugd. Bat, 1779. 
Wrssrus (Casp.), Logica. Geneva, 1609. 
Wyttenbach (Dan.), Prascepta philosophise logicae. Amst., 1781. 



X 

Xylander (Will.), Instit. Aph. Logicae. Heidelb., 1577. 



Yzexdoorx (Gisb. ab), Compendium logicae peripateticae. 1640. 
Idem, Logica peripatetica. 1645. 4to. 



Zabauella (Jacob), Opera logica. Basil, 1594 ; Colon., 1597. 4to. 

Idem, Tabulae logical. Patavii, 1580. Fol. 
Zeidlerus, Introductio in Aristot. Gothce, 1684. 

Idem, De modo solvendi sophismata. Rudolst., 1679. 
Zeisoldus (J.), Collegium logicum. Jence, 1660. 



ANONYMOUS. 

A Familiar Commentary on Logic. Oxford, 1793. 

A Key to Questions on Aldrich's Logic. Oxford, 1829. 

A Philosophical Discourse of Speech, conformable to the Cartesian 

Principles. London, 1668. 
A Rational Introduction to Bentham's Logic. Oxford, 1773. 
Ars Rationis, videlicet Logica, ad mentem nominalium. Oxon, 1673. 
Ars Sciendi sive Logica. By T. G. London, 1681. 
Artis argumentandi principia, in usum stud, juvent. concinnata. Lugd. 

Batav., 1741. 
Artis Logics Rudimenta. Oxon, 1837. 
Commentaria in quatuor libros novae logicae secimdum processus bursas 

Laurentianae Coloniensis ubi doctrina Alberti magni, &c. Colon., 

1494. Fol. 
De Logica. Madrid, 1563. 



524 LIST OF WORKS ON LOGIC. 

Dialogus de dialectica Aristotelis a Melancthone et Ramo exposita. 

Franco/., 1600. 
Easy Lessons on Reasoning. London, 1847. 
Elementa Logics. 1795. 
Elements de Logique. Bruxelles, 1817. 
Essai sur les prejuges, ou Ton traite principal ement de la nature et de 

l'influence des prejuges philos. Neuchdtel, 1796. (Attrib. to J. 

Tremble y, Genevese.) 
Essai sur la psychologie, comprenant la theorie du raissonnement et du 

langage, l'ontologie, l'esthetique, et la diceosyne. Paris, 1826. 
Excerpta ex Aristotelis Organon. Oxford, 1802. 
Gramniatica rationis, sive institutiones logics. Oxonis, 1685. 
Institutio logics ad communes usus accommodata. 1687. Fol. 
Institutiones philosophies in novam methodum digests. Antissiodori. 

1761. 3 vols. 12mo. 
Institutionum philos. cursus, ad usum stud. juv. prssertimque semina- 

riorum accommodatus. Paris, 1818. 
Introduction to Logic. Oxford, 1830. 

Lectures on Locke; or, The Principles of Logic. London, 1840. 
Logic by Question and Answer. London, 1790. 
Logic, or the Key of Sciences. 1692. 
Logica, sive ars Cogitandi. Adjects sunt adnotationes logics. Ultruj.. 

1707. 
Logica, pars prima Philos. ad usum seminarii Leodiensis. Leod., 1816. 

et 1817. 
Logica, sive ars Cogitand. Lug. Bat., 1682, 1694, et 1702. Arnst., 

1736. 
Logica, sive ars Cogitandi ; adj. sunt adnot. logics. Traj. ad R., 17 '07. 
Logics ; sive ars Cogitandi, e Gallica in Latinum sermonem versa. 1674. 
Political Logic. Lond., 1773. 

Prolegomena zur Analysis in der Philos. Gotha, 1804. 
Questions on Aldrich's Logic. Oxford, 1829. 
Specimen artis ratiocinandi naturalis et artificialis ad Pantosophis 

principia manuducons. Hamb., 1684. 
Systema logicee Dantiscanse. Hanov., 1618. 
Systeme de Logique. Lausanne, 1735. 

Tractatus de logica in schol. philos. Lovanii dictata. Lovanii, 1817. 
Wit, Interpreter, or New Logic. 1655. 



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